Washington v. Davis

Last updated

Washington v. Davis
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 1, 1976
Decided June 7, 1976
Full case nameWashington, Mayor of Washington, D.C., et al. v. Davis, et al.
Citations426 U.S. 229 ( more )
96 S. Ct. 2040; 48 L. Ed. 2d 597; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 154; 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1415; 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10,958
Case history
PriorCertiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Subsequent168 U.S. App. D.C. 42, 512 F.2d 956, reversed.
Holding
To be unconstitutional, racial discrimination by the government must contain two elements: a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory impact.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens; Stewart (Parts I and II)
ConcurrenceStevens
DissentBrennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. V
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), was a United States Supreme Court case that established that laws that have a racially discriminatory effect but were not adopted to advance a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the U.S. Constitution. [1]

Contents

Facts

Two black applicants for positions in the Washington, D.C. police department were turned down. Suing, they claimed that the department used racially discriminatory hiring procedures, including its use of a test of verbal skills (Test 21), which was failed disproportionately by African Americans. The plaintiffs sued the department, alleging that the test constituted impermissible employment discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the U.S. Constitution.

Since the respondents were filing the action in Washington, D.C., a federal territory, not a state, the constitutional provision the plaintiffs sued under was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment instead of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause directly applies only to the states, but the Supreme Court ruled in Bolling v. Sharpe that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, contains an equal protection component.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, "a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, [is not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." A plaintiff must prove discriminatory motive on the part of the state actor to receive redress under the Constitution, not just discriminatory impact. It held a "disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution."

The Court also examined whether Test 21 had a discriminatory effect. After applying the disparate impact analysis, it held that Test 21 did not have a discriminatory effect on blacks. The Court held that the Court of Appeals had erroneously assumed that the stricter, effects-based "disparate impact" test, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, existed under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause as well. The Court pointed out that the Washington, D.C., police department had gone to significant lengths to recruit black officers. In the years since the case was brought before the trial court, the ratio of blacks on the police force to blacks in the community had nearly evened out.

Justice White said the following: [2]

As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.

[...]

Nor on the facts of the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion that it is a purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional rights of respondents as well as other black applicants. As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that "a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.

Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. They would have held that the constitutional questions would not be reached and that the question should have first been decided on statutory grounds in the employees' favor.

Significance

The purpose-based standard made it much more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in discrimination suits arising under the Constitution. Unlike the Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was interpreted in Griggs v Duke Power Co. , 401 US 424 (1971) to prohibit employment practices that have a racially disparate impact irrespective of whether they were adopted with a discriminatory purpose.

In the years following Washington, the Court held that laws must be motivated by purposeful discrimination, not just have a discriminatory effect, to be unconstitutional. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney 442 US 256 (1979) held legislation obnoxious to the Equal Protection Clause is passed "because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."

In Mobile v. Bolden , the Court cited Washington in holding that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racially discriminatory voting laws only if they were adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose. That principle was affirmed again in McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which held that criminal statutes are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause only if they were adopted with a discriminatory purpose.

In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and codified the "disparate impact" test, established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and its progeny, which allows employees to sue their employers (including governmental entities) for racial discrimination irrespective of discriminatory purpose. Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII should be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Voting Rights Act of 1965</span> US federal legislation that prohibits racial discrimination in voting

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a landmark piece of federal legislation in the United States that prohibits racial discrimination in voting. It was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson during the height of the civil rights movement on August 6, 1965, and Congress later amended the Act five times to expand its protections. Designed to enforce the voting rights protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Act sought to secure the right to vote for racial minorities throughout the country, especially in the South. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the Act is considered to be the most effective piece of federal civil rights legislation ever enacted in the country. The National Archives and Records Administration stated: "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the most significant statutory change in the relationship between the federal and state governments in the area of voting since the Reconstruction period following the Civil War".

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case about Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court decided that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was unconstitutional, insofar as it allowed states to be sued by private citizens for money damages.

The Equal Protection Clause is part of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The clause, which took effect in 1868, provides "nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It mandates that individuals in similar situations be treated equally by the law.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), was a court case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on December 14, 1970. It concerned employment discrimination and the disparate impact theory, and was decided on March 8, 1971. It is generally considered the first case of its type.

Disparate impact in the law of the United States refers to practices in employment, housing, and other areas that adversely affect one group of people of a protected characteristic more than another, even though rules applied by employers or landlords are formally neutral. Although the protected classes vary by statute, most federal civil rights laws consider race, color, religion, national origin, and sex to be protected characteristics, and some laws include disability status and other traits as well.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), is a United States Supreme Court case, in which the death sentence of Warren McCleskey for armed robbery and murder was upheld. The Court said the "racially disproportionate impact" in the Georgia death penalty indicated by a comprehensive scientific study was not enough to mitigate a death penalty determination without showing a "racially discriminatory purpose." McCleskey has been described as the "most far-reaching post-Gregg challenge to capital sentencing."

Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), is a United States Supreme Court case that reviewed provisions of the 1890 Mississippi constitution and its statutes that set requirements for voter registration, including poll tax, literacy tests, the grandfather clause, and the requirement that only registered voters could serve on juries. The plaintiff, Henry Williams, claimed that Mississippi's voting laws were upheld with the intent to disenfranchise African Americans, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court did not find discrimination in the state's laws because, even though the laws made discrimination possible, the laws themselves did not discriminate against African Americans. The court found that any discrimination toward African Americans was performed by the administrative officers enforcing the law and that there was no judicial remedy for this kind of discrimination.

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), was a US Supreme Court case that determined that the US Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution did not extend to the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment over complaints of discrimination that is rationally based on age.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with a zoning ordinance that in a practical way barred families of various socio-economic, and ethno-racial backgrounds from residing in a neighborhood. The Court held that the ordinance was constitutional because there was no proof that "discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision."

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision upheld the constitutionality of a state law, giving hiring preference to veterans over nonveterans.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), is a United States labor law case of the United States Supreme Court on unlawful discrimination through disparate impact under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), is a United States Supreme Court case on United States labor law, concerning proof of disparate treatment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), was a case before the United States Supreme Court. It is the seminal case for the "strong-basis-in-evidence standard" for affirmative action programs.

<i>Hayden v. County of Nassau</i> American legal case

In Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a suit brought by White and Latino police officers alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an at-large election system for a large rural county with a large black population violated the Equal Protection Clause.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case that held that racially restrictive housing covenants cannot legally be enforced.

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously invalidated the criminal disenfranchisement provision of § 182 of the Alabama Constitution as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

<i>Brown v. City of Oneonta</i> American legal case

Brown v. City of Oneonta was a case brought to the U.S District Court for the Northern District of New York in 1993 and later appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1999 that concerned the use of race in law enforcement investigations.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case that re-examined the Batson Challenge. Established by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Batson Challenge prohibits jury selectors from using peremptory challenges on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and sex. Powers expanded the jurisdictions of this principle, allowing all parties within a case, defendants especially, to question preemptory challenges during a jury selection, regardless of race. This holding was protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

References

  1. ↑ Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
  2. ↑ 426 U.S. 229 at 238-246.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.