Empty Fort Strategy | |||||||
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Traditional Chinese | 空城計 | ||||||
Simplified Chinese | 空城计 | ||||||
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The Empty Fort Strategy involves using reverse psychology to deceive the enemy into thinking that an empty location is full of traps and ambushes, and therefore induce the enemy to retreat. It is listed as the 32nd of the Thirty-Six Stratagems . Some examples are listed in the following sections.
According to the Sanguozhi , in 195, the Empty Fort Strategy was used by the warlord Cao Cao against his rival Lü Bu in one incident at Chengshi County (乘氏縣; southwest of present-day Juye County, Shandong). In the summer of that year, Lü Bu went to Dongmin County (東緡縣; northeast of present-day Jinxiang County, Shandong) and gathered about 10,000 troops to attack Cao Cao. At the time, Cao Cao had very few soldiers with him, but he set up an ambush and managed to defeat Lü Bu. [1]
The Wei Shu (魏書) gave a more detailed account of the ambush. Cao Cao had sent most of his troops out to collect grain so he had less than 1,000 men available in his base, which could not be well defended with so few men. When Lü Bu showed up, Cao Cao ordered all his available soldiers to defend the base and even ordered women to stand guard on the walls. To the west of Cao Cao's base was a dyke, and to its south was a deep forest. Lü Bu suspected that there was an ambush, so he told his men, "Cao Cao is very cunning. We must not fall into his ambush." He then led his troops to 10 li (Chinese miles) south of Cao Cao's base and set up his camp there. The next day, Lü Bu came to attack Cao Cao, and by then, Cao Cao had really set up an ambush near the dyke with the soldiers that had returned from gathering the grain. Lü Bu's forces fell into the ambush and were defeated. [2]
The "ambush" mentioned in the Sanguozhi refers to the ambush that Lü Bu's forces fell into a trap on the second day, as described in the Wei Shu. The incident is also mentioned in Sima Guang's Zizhi Tongjian . However, the Zizhi Tongjian account, which combined the Sanguozhi and Wei Shu accounts, did not mention the events on the first day – which were about Cao Cao sending all his available soldiers to defend the base and ordering women to stand guard on the walls. [3]
Yi Zhongtian, a history professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国) in response to criticism from Fudan University historian Zhou Zhenhe and an online commentator known as "Hongchayangweili" (红茶杨威利). Earlier on, Yi referred to this incident when he said in a lecture on the television programme Lecture Room that "Cao Cao's rights to the invention of the Empty Fort Strategy had been stolen from him". Zhou claimed that the Empty Fort Strategy had never been used in history before so there were no "rights" to its invention; the online commentator argued that the incident does not count as a use of the Empty Fort Strategy.
Yi defended his claim and said that the incident in 195 is valid because of the circumstances under which it was used, which were very similar to the incidents involving Zhao Yun and Wen Ping (see the sections below). Cao Cao was trying to confuse Lü Bu by making use of the geographical features (the "deep forest") and by ordering women to stand guard on the walls, so as to make Lü Bu suspect that he had set up an ambush in the "deep forest" and lure Lü Bu to attack his "weakly defended" base by deploying women as soldiers to show how "desperate" he was to set up a defence. The ploy worked because it made Lü Bu hesitate when he wanted to attack. Cao Cao had bought sufficient time to set up a real ambush, and he defeated Lü Bu when he came to attack again on the following day. [4]
The Zhao Yun Biezhuan (趙雲別傳; Unofficial Biography of Zhao Yun) mentioned an incident about Zhao Yun, a general under the warlord Liu Bei, using the Empty Fort Strategy during the Battle of Han River in 219, fought between Liu Bei and his rival Cao Cao as part of the Hanzhong Campaign.
This incident took place after Cao Cao's general Xiahou Yuan was defeated and killed in action at the earlier Battle of Mount Dingjun. Cao Cao's forces were transporting food supplies to the north hill when Liu Bei's general Huang Zhong, heard about it and led a group of soldiers, including some of Zhao Yun's men, to seize the supplies. When Huang Zhong did not return after a long time, Zhao Yun led tens of horsemen in search of Huang. Zhao Yun's search party encountered Cao Cao's forces and engaged them in battle but were outnumbered and was forced to retreat back to camp with Cao Cao's men in pursuit. Zhao Yun's subordinate Zhang Yi wanted to close the gates of the camp to prevent the enemy from entering. However, Zhao Yun gave orders for the gates to be opened, all flags and banners to be hidden, and the war drums silenced. Cao Cao's forces thought that there was an ambush inside Zhao Yun's camp so they withdrew. Just then, Zhao Yun launched a counterattack and his men beat the war drums loudly and fired arrows at the enemy. Cao Cao's soldiers were shocked and thrown into disarray. Some of them trampled on each other while fleeing in panic, and many of them fell into the Han River in their haste to get away and drowned. When Liu Bei came to inspect the camp later, he praised Zhao Yun and held a banquet to celebrate his victory. [5]
The Weilüe mentioned an incident about the Empty Fort Strategy being used by a general Wen Ping during a battle between the forces of the states of Cao Wei and Eastern Wu in the Three Kingdoms period. It is not clear which battle this was, but it could have been the Battle of Jiangling of 223.
The Wu leader Sun Quan led thousands of troops to attack a fortress defended by the Wei general Wen Ping. At the time, there were heavy rains and many fortifications were damaged. The civilians in the fortress had retreated to the fields further back so they could not help with repairs to the fortifications, and some repairs were still uncompleted when Sun Quan arrived with his men. When Wen Ping heard that Sun Quan had arrived, he was unsure of what to do, but eventually formulated a plan to deceive him. He ordered everyone in the fortress to stay under cover while he hid behind the walls, creating an illusion of an empty fortress. As Wen Ping expected, Sun Quan became suspicious and he said to his subordinates, "The northerners regard this man (Wen Ping) as a loyal subject, which is why they entrusted him with defending this commandery. Now, as I approach, he does not make any move. It must be either that he has something up his sleeve or that his reinforcements have arrived." Sun Quan then withdrew his forces. [6]
The historian Pei Songzhi commented that the Weilüe account did not match the original account in the Sanguozhi . The Sanguozhi mentioned: "Sun Quan led 50,000 troops to besiege Wen Ping at Shiyang (石陽). The situation was very critical but Wen Ping put up a firm defence. Sun Quan withdrew his forces after more than 20 days, and Wen Ping led his men to attack them as they were retreating and defeated them." [7]
One of the best known examples of the use of the Empty Fort Strategy is a fictional incident in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms , which romanticises historical events in the late Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period. This event took place during the first of a series of campaigns – known as Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions – led by Shu Han's chancellor Zhuge Liang to attack Shu's rival state, Cao Wei.
In the first Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang's efforts to conquer the Wei city Chang'an were undermined by the Shu defeat at the Battle of Jieting. With the loss of Jieting (present-day Qin'an County, Gansu), Zhuge Liang's current location, Xicheng (西城; believed to be located 120 li southwest of present-day Tianshui, Gansu), became exposed and was in danger of being attacked by the Wei army. In the face of imminent danger, with the main Shu army deployed elsewhere and only a small group of soldiers in Xicheng with him, Zhuge Liang came up with a ploy to hold off the approaching enemy.
Zhuge Liang ordered all the gates to be opened and instructed soldiers disguised as civilians to sweep the roads while he sat on the viewing platform above the gates with two page boys by his side. He put on a calm and composed image by playing his guqin. When the Wei army led by Sima Yi arrived, Sima was surprised by the sight before him and he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was an ambush inside the city. Zhuge Liang later explained that his strategy was a risky one. It worked because Zhuge Liang had a reputation for being a careful military tactician who hardly took risks, so Sima Yi came to the conclusion that there was certainly an ambush upon seeing Zhuge's relaxed composure. [8]
Christopher Cotton, an economist from the Queen's University, and Chang Liu, a graduate student, used game theory to model the bluffing strategies used in the Chinese military legends of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 AD). In the case of these military legends, the researchers found that bluffing arose naturally as the optimal strategy in each situation. The findings were published under the title 100 Horsemen and the empty city: A game theoretic examination of deception in Chinese military legend in the Journal of Peace Research in 2011. [9] [10]
The basis for this story in Romance of the Three Kingdoms is an anecdote shared by one Guo Chong (郭沖) in the early Jin dynasty (266–420). [11] In the fifth century, Pei Songzhi added the anecdote as an annotation to Zhuge Liang's biography in the third-century historical text Sanguozhi . The anecdote is as follows:
Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping (陽平; around present-day Hanzhong, Shaanxi) and ordered Wei Yan to lead the troops east. He left behind only 10,000 men to defend Yangping. Sima Yi led 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang and he took a shortcut, bypassing Wei Yan's army and arriving at a place 60 li away from Zhuge Liang's location. Upon inspection, Sima Yi realised that Zhuge Liang's city was weakly defended. Zhuge Liang knew that Sima Yi was near, so he thought of recalling Wei Yan's army back to counter Sima Yi, but it was too late already and his men were worried and terrified. Zhuge Liang remained calm and instructed his men to hide all flags and banners and silence the war drums. He then ordered all the gates to be opened and told his men to sweep and dust the ground. Sima Yi knew that impression that Zhuge Liang was a cautious and prudent man, and he was baffled by the sight before him and suspected that there was an ambush. He then withdrew his troops. The following day, Zhuge Liang clapped his hands, laughed, and told an aide that Sima Yi thought that there was an ambush and had withdrawn. Later, his scouts returned and reported that Sima Yi had indeed retreated. Sima Yi was very upset when he later found out about the ruse. [12]
After adding the anecdote to Zhuge Liang's biography, Pei Songzhi wrote a short commentary as follows:
When Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping, Sima Yi was serving as the Area Commander of Jing Province and he was stationed at Wancheng (宛城; present-day Wancheng District, Nanyang, Henan). He only came into confrontation with Zhuge Liang in Guanzhong after Cao Zhen's death (in 231). It was unlikely that the Wei government ordered Sima Yi to lead an army from Wancheng to attack Shu via Xicheng (西城; present-day Ankang, Shaanxi) because there were heavy rains at the time (which obstructed passage). There were no battles fought at Yangping before and after that period of time. Going by Guo Chong's anecdote, if Sima Yi did lead 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang, knew that Zhuge Liang's position was weakly defended, and suspected that there was an ambush, he could have ordered his troops to surround Zhuge Liang's position instead of retreating. Wei Yan's biography mentioned: "Each time Wei Yan followed Zhuge Liang to battle, he would request to command a separate detachment of about 10,000 men and take a different route and rendezvous with Zhuge Liang's main force at Tong Pass. Zhuge Liang rejected the plan, and Wei Yan felt that Zhuge Liang was a coward and complained that his talent was not put to good use." As mentioned in Wei Yan's biography, Zhuge Liang never agreed to allow Wei Yan to command a separate detachment of thousands of troops. If Guo Chong's anecdote was true, how was it possible that Zhuge Liang would allow Wei Yan to lead a larger army ahead while he followed behind with a smaller army? Guo Chong's anecdote was endorsed by the Prince of Fufeng (Sima Jun, a son of Sima Yi). However, the story puts Sima Yi in a negative light, and it does not make sense for a son to approve a story which demeans his father. We can tell that this anecdote is fake after reading the sentence "the Prince of Fufeng endorsed Guo Chong's anecdote". [13]
Evidence from historical sources indicate that Sima Yi was indeed not in Jieting at the time. The Battle of Jieting took place in 228 but Sima Yi's biography in the Book of Jin claimed that in 227, Sima Yi was stationed at Wancheng in the north of Jing Province. He led an army to suppress a rebellion by Meng Da at Xincheng (新城; in present-day northwestern Hubei), and returned to Wancheng after his victory. Later, he went to the imperial capital Luoyang to meet the Wei emperor Cao Rui, who consulted him on some affairs before ordering him to return to Wancheng. [14] Sima Yi only engaged Zhuge Liang in battle after 230. [15]
Yi Zhongtian, a professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国). He pointed out three problems in the story: [4]
According to historical sources such as the Old Book of Tang , New Book of Tang and Zizhi Tongjian , Li Yuan, the founding emperor of the Tang dynasty, used a similar strategy in 618 CE in a battle against the Turks before he started his rebellion against the Sui dynasty. In early 618, Li Yuan was still a Sui general and his base was Jinyang (晉陽; present-day Taiyuan, Shanxi). When he heard rumours that Emperor Yang wanted to execute him, he started making preparations for a rebellion against the Sui dynasty to save himself. In May 618, the Turks allied with the warlord Liu Wuzhuo to attack the Sui dynasty in order to gain territory. Jinyang became one of their targets.
Around the time, Li Yuan had just arrested Wang Wei (王威) and Gao Junya (高君雅), two officials sent by Emperor Yang to spy on him. He was also still busy plotting his rebellion. [18] Moreover, he was also not prepared for a battle against the Turks because of two reasons. Firstly, the Turk cavalry was so powerful that Li Yuan was not confident that his troops could defeat the enemy. Secondly, even if Li Yuan won the battle, he would nonetheless suffer significant losses that would undermine his rebellion against the Sui dynasty.
Li Yuan thus ordered his soldiers to hide in Jinyang and leave the city gates wide open. Shibi Khan, who led the Turk cavalry, saw that the city appeared to be deserted and feared that there might be an ambush, so he did not enter. Li Yuan then ordered his son Li Shimin and subordinate Pei Ji to make their troops beat war drums loudly in the empty camps they had set up earlier, so as to create an illusion that reinforcements had arrived in Jinyang. Shibi Khan was so frightened that he retreated after two days. [19]
Many traditions say that in 1572, during the Sengoku Period in Japan, Tokugawa Ieyasu used the tactic during his retreat in the Battle of Mikatagahara. He commanded that the fortress gates remain open, and that braziers be lit to guide his retreating army back to safety. One officer beat a large war drum, seeking to add encouragement to the returning men of a noble, courageous retreat. When the enemy forces, led by Baba Nobuharu and Yamagata Masakage heard the drums, and saw the braziers and open gates, they assumed that Tokugawa was planning a trap, and so they stopped and made camp for the night. The authenticity of this story has been disputed by some, however, as it appears to be copied straight from Zhuge Liang's story, perhaps in an attempt to embellish Tokugawa's career. [20]
The Battle of Xiaoting (猇亭之戰), also known as the Battle of Yiling and the Battle of Yiling and Xiaoting, was fought between the state of Shu and the state of Wu, between the years 221 and 222 in the early Three Kingdoms period of China. The battle is significant because Wu was able to turn the situation from a series of initial losses into a defensive stalemate, before proceeding to win a decisive victory over Shu. The Wu victory halted the Shu invasion and preceded the death of Liu Bei, Shu's founding emperor.
Zhao Yun, courtesy name Zilong (子龍), was a military general who lived during the late Eastern Han dynasty and early Three Kingdoms period of China. Originally a subordinate of the northern warlord Gongsun Zan, Zhao Yun later came to serve another warlord, Liu Bei, and had since accompanied him on most of his military exploits, from the Battle of Changban (208) to the Hanzhong Campaign (217–219). He continued serving in the state of Shu Han – founded by Liu Bei in 221 – in the Three Kingdoms period and participated in the first of the Northern Expeditions until his death in 229. While many facts about Zhao Yun's life remain unclear due to limited information in historical sources, some aspects and activities in his life have been dramatised or exaggerated in folklore and fiction. In the 14th-century historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, he was lauded as a member of the Five Tiger Generals under Liu Bei.
Zhuge Liang, also commonly known by his courtesy name Kong Ming or Kongming, was a Chinese statesman, strategist, and inventor who lived through the end of the Eastern Han dynasty and the early Three Kingdoms period (220–280) of China. During the Three Kingdoms period, he served as the Imperial Chancellor of the state of Shu Han (221–263) from its founding in 221 and later as regent from 223 until his death in September or October 235.
Zhang He, courtesy name Junyi, was a military general serving under the warlord Cao Cao in the late Eastern Han dynasty of China. He continued serving in the state of Cao Wei under its first two rulers, Cao Pi and Cao Rui, during the Three Kingdoms period until his death.
Sima Yi, courtesy name Zhongda, was a Chinese military general, politician, and regent of the state of Cao Wei during the Three Kingdoms period of China.
The Battle of Jieting was fought between the states of Cao Wei and Shu Han in 228 during the Three Kingdoms period in China. The battle was part of the first Northern Expedition led by Shu's chancellor-regent, Zhuge Liang, to attack Wei. The battle concluded with a decisive victory for Wei.
Liu Shan, courtesy name Gongsi, was the second and last emperor of the state of Shu Han during the Three Kingdoms period. As he ascended the throne at the age of 16, Liu Shan was entrusted to the care of the Chancellor Zhuge Liang and Imperial Secretariat Li Yan. His reign of 40 years was the longest of all emperors in the Three Kingdoms era. During Liu Shan's reign, many campaigns were led against the rival state of Cao Wei, primarily by Zhuge Liang and his successor Jiang Wei, but to little avail, due to their drastic mismatch in terms of population and geographic extent. Liu Shan eventually surrendered to Wei in 263 after Deng Ai led a surprise attack on the Shu capital Chengdu. He was quickly relocated to the Wei capital at Luoyang, and enfeoffed as "Duke Anle". There he enjoyed his last years peacefully before dying in 271, most probably of natural causes.
Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions were a series of five military campaigns launched by the state of Shu Han against the rival state of Cao Wei from 228 to 234 during the Three Kingdoms period in China. All five expeditions were led by Zhuge Liang, the Imperial Chancellor and regent of Shu. Although they proved unsuccessful and ended up as a stalemate, the expeditions have become some of the best known conflicts of the Three Kingdoms period and one of the few battles during it where each side fought against each other with hundreds of thousands of troops, as opposed to other battles where one side had a huge numerical advantage.
Cao Zhen, courtesy name Zidan, was a military general of the state of Cao Wei during the Three Kingdoms period of China. He was an adopted son of Cao Cao, a warlord who rose to power in the late Eastern Han dynasty and laid the foundation for Wei. After Cao Cao's death and the end of the Eastern Han dynasty, Cao Zhen served under Cao Pi and Cao Rui, the first two emperors of Wei. He is best known for leading a successful defence of Wei from the first two of a series of invasions by Wei's rival state, Shu Han, between 228 and 229.
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Guo Huai, courtesy name Boji, was a Chinese military general of the state of Cao Wei during the Three Kingdoms period of China. He started his career towards the end of the Eastern Han dynasty under the warlord Cao Cao as a subordinate of Cao Cao's generals Xiahou Yuan and Zhang He. During the Three Kingdoms period, he served in Wei, the state established by Cao Cao's son Cao Pi, and lived through the reigns of four Wei emperors. From the 220s until his death in 255, he governed and defended Wei's western borders in Yong and Liang provinces. During this time, he resisted multiple invasions by Wei's rival state, Shu Han, and quelled some rebellions by local Qiang, Di and other non-Han Chinese tribes.
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reprinted from materials provided by University of Miami