Theological determinism

Last updated

Theological determinism is a form of predeterminism which states that all events that happen are pre-ordained, and/or predestined to happen, by one or more divine beings, or that they are destined to occur given the divine beings' omniscience. Theological determinism exists in a number of religions, including Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is also supported by proponents of Classical pantheism such as the Stoics and by philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza.

Contents

Categorization of theological determinism

Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism. [1]

There exist slight variations on the above categorization. Some claim that theological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity (i.e. they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all. [5] Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God. [6] With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions", more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism. [7]

Free will and theological determinism

A simplified taxonomy of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism TheologicalDeterminismXFreeWill.svg
A simplified taxonomy of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism

There are various implications for metaphysical libertarian free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.

A rejection of theological determinism (or divine foreknowledge) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will. [8]

The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows;

  1. Assume divine foreknowledge or omniscience
  2. Infallible foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)
  3. Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise)
  4. Assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will

This argument is often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included;

History

Many Christians have opposed the view that humans do not have free will. Saint Thomas Aquinas, the medieval Roman Catholic theologian, believed strongly that humanity had free will. (However, though he desired to defend a doctrine of free will, he ultimately ended up espousing what today would be known as compatibilism, or "soft determinism.") [13] The Jesuits were among the leading opponents of this view, because they held that divine grace was actual, in the sense that grace is among other things participative, and that humans could freely benefit from grace by a mediation between their own imperfect wills and the infinite mercy of God.

Martin Luther and Desiderius Erasmus

The concept of theological determinism has its origins within the Bible as well as within Christianity. A major theological dispute at the time of the sixteenth century would help to force a distinct division in ideas – with an argument between two eminent thinkers of the time, Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther, a leading Protestant Reformer. Erasmus in Discourses On the Freedom of the Will believed that God created human beings with free will. He maintained that despite the fall of Adam and Eve freedom still existed. As a result of this humans had the ability to do good or evil. Luther, conversely, attacked this idea in On the Bondage of the Will . He recognised that the issue of autonomy lay at the heart of religious dissension. He depicted an image of humanity manipulated through sin. Humans, for Luther, know what is morally right but are unable to attain it. He claimed that humans thus must give up aspiring to do good in their fallen state and by their own power, as only by this could salvation be formed. This is reflected in the reformation doctrine of Sola Fide, that asserts that salvation is by faith alone and not achieved by meritorious good works. Luther also believed that the fall of Adam and Eve as written in the Bible supported this notion.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Omniscience</span> Capacity to know everything

Omniscience is the capacity to know everything. In Hinduism, Sikhism and the Abrahamic religions, this is an attribute of God. In Jainism, omniscience is an attribute that any individual can eventually attain. In Buddhism, there are differing beliefs about omniscience among different schools.

Philosophy of religion is "the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions". Philosophical discussions on such topics date from ancient times, and appear in the earliest known texts concerning philosophy. The field is related to many other branches of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Predestination</span> Doctrine in Christian theology

Predestination, in theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God, usually with reference to the eventual fate of the individual soul. Explanations of predestination often seek to address the paradox of free will, whereby God's omniscience seems incompatible with human free will. In this usage, predestination can be regarded as a form of religious determinism; and usually predeterminism, also known as theological determinism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Free will</span> Ability to make choices without constraints

Free will is the capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Determinism</span> Philosophical view that events are determined by prior events

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like eternalism, determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. The opposite of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to chance. Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Divine simplicity</span> View of God without parts or features

In classical theistic and monotheistic theology, the doctrine of Divine Simplicity says that God is simple.

Open theism, also known as openness theology, is a theological movement that has developed within Christianity as a rejection of the synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christian theology. It is a version of free will theism and arises out of the free will theistic tradition of the church, which goes back to the early church fathers. Open theism is typically advanced as a biblically motivated and logically consistent theology of human and divine freedom, with an emphasis on what this means for the content of God's foreknowledge and exercise of God's power.

The argument from free will, also called the paradox of free will or theological fatalism, contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible and that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is therefore inconceivable. See the various controversies over claims of God's omniscience, in particular the critical notion of foreknowledge. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Incompatibilism</span> Contradiction of free will and determinism

The philosophical term incompatibilism was coined in the 1960s, most likely by philosopher Keith Lehrer, to name the view that the thesis of determinism is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will. The term compatibilism was coined to name the view that the classical free will thesis is logically compatible with determinism, i.e. it is possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will even in a universe at which determinism is true. These terms were originally coined for use within a research paradigm that was dominant among academics during the so-called "classical period" from the 1960s to 1980s, or what has been called the "classical analytic paradigm". Within the classical analytic paradigm, the problem of free will and determinism was understood as a Compatibility Question: "Is it possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will when determinism is true?" Those working in the classical analytic paradigm who answered "no" were incompatibilists in the original, classical-analytic sense of the term, now commonly called classical incompatibilists; they proposed that determinism precludes free will because it precludes our ability to do otherwise. Those who answered "yes" were compatibilists in the original sense of the term, now commonly called classical compatibilists. Given that classical free will theorists agreed that it is at least metaphysically possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will, all classical compatibilists accepted a compossibilist account of free will and all classical incompatibilists accepted a libertarian account of free will.

Fatalism is a family of related philosophical doctrines that stress the subjugation of all events or actions to fate or destiny, and is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable; with an individual believing they cannot control what happens to them.

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. The opposing belief, that the thesis of determinism is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will, is known as "incompatibilism".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Molinism</span> Theological position on Gods knowledge

Molinism, named after 16th-century Spanish Jesuit priest and Roman Catholic theologian Luis de Molina, is the thesis that God has middle knowledge : the knowledge of counterfactuals, particularly counterfactuals regarding human action. It seeks to reconcile the apparent tension of divine providence and human free will. Prominent contemporary Molinists include William Lane Craig, Alfred Freddoso, Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, Kenneth Keathley, Dave Armstrong, John D. Laing, Kirk R. MacGregor, and J.P. Moreland.

Predeterminism is the philosophy that all events of history, past, present and future, have been already decided or are already known, including human actions.

Peter van Inwagen is an American analytic philosopher and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is also a research professor of philosophy at Duke University each spring. He previously taught at Syracuse University, earning his PhD from the University of Rochester in 1969 under the direction of Richard Taylor. Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of action. He was the president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013.

Free will in theology is an important part of the debate on free will in general. Religions vary greatly in their response to the standard argument against free will and thus might appeal to any number of responses to the paradox of free will, the claim that omniscience and free will are incompatible.

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science. Cosmology and ontology are traditional branches of metaphysics. It is concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world. Someone who studies metaphysics can be called either a "metaphysician" or a "metaphysicist".

The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to atheism:

The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to metaphysics:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense</span> Logical argument against the problem of evil

Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense is a logical argument developed by the American analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga and published in its final version in his 1977 book God, Freedom, and Evil. Plantinga's argument is a defense against the logical problem of evil as formulated by the philosopher J. L. Mackie beginning in 1955. Mackie's formulation of the logical problem of evil argued that three attributes of God, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, in orthodox Christian theism are logically incompatible with the existence of evil.

Free will in antiquity is a philosophical and theological concept. Free will in antiquity was not discussed in the same terms as used in the modern free will debates, but historians of the problem have speculated who exactly was first to take positions as determinist, libertarian, and compatibilist in antiquity. There is wide agreement that these views were essentially fully formed over 2000 years ago. Candidates for the first thinkers to form these views, as well as the idea of a non-physical "agent-causal" libertarianism, include Democritus, Aristotle, Epicurus, Chrysippus, and Carneades.

References

  1. Anne Lockyer Jordan; Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate; Neil Lockyer; Edwin Tate (25 June 2004). Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition. Nelson Thornes. p. 211. ISBN   978-0-7487-8078-5 . Retrieved 22 December 2012.
  2. A. Pabl Iannone (2001). "determinism". Dictionary of World Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. p. 194. ISBN   978-0-415-17995-9 . Retrieved 22 December 2012. theological determinism, or the doctrine of predestination: the view that everything which happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity. A weaker version holds that, though not predestined to happen, everything that happens has been eternally known by virtue of the divine foreknowledge of an omniscient divinity. If this divinity is also omnipotent, as in the case of the Judeo-Christian religions, this weaker version is hard to distinguish from the previous one because, though able to prevent what happens and knowing that it is going to happen, God lets it happen. To this, advocates of free will reply that God permits it to happen in order to make room for the free will of humans.
  3. Wentzel Van Huyssteen (2003). "theological determinism". Encyclopedia of science and religion. Vol. 1. Macmillan Reference. p. 217. ISBN   978-0-02-865705-9 . Retrieved 22 December 2012. Theological determinism constitutes a fifth kind of determinism. There are two types of theological determinism, both compatible with scientific and metaphysical determinism. In the first, God determines everything that happens, either in one all-determining single act at the initial creation of the universe or through continuous divine interactions with the world. Either way, the consequence is that everything that happens becomes God's action, and determinism is closely linked to divine action and God's omnipotence. According to the second type of theological determinism, God has perfect knowledge of everything in the universe because God is omniscient. And, as some say, because God is outside of time, God has the capacity of knowing past, present, and future in one instance. This means that God knows what will happen in the future. And because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed.
  4. "Reference to Predetermination" (PDF). p. 27.
  5. Raymond J. VanArragon (21 October 2010). Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 21. ISBN   978-1-4411-3867-5 . Retrieved 22 December 2012. Theological determinism, on the other hand, claims that all events are determined by God. On this view, God decrees that everything will go thus-and-so and ensures that everything goes that way, so that ultimately God is the cause of everything that happens and everything that happens is part of God's plan. We might think of God here as the all-powerful movie director who writes the script and causes everything to go in accord with it. We should note, as an aside, that there is some debate over what would be sufficient for theological determinism to be true. Some people claim that God's merely knowing what will happen determines that it will, while others believe that God must not only know but must also cause those events to occur in order for their occurrence to be determined.
  6. Eshleman, Andrew (2009). "Moral Responsibility". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 ed.).
  7. Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). "Arguments for Incompatibilism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 ed.).
  8. 1 2 3 Zagzebski, Linda (2011). "Foreknowledge and Free Will". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 ed.). See also McKenna, Michael (2009). "Compatibilism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 ed.).
  9. Boethius. "Book V, Prose vi". The Consolation of Philosophy.
  10. Aquinas, St. Thomas (1923). "Ia, q. 14, art 13.". Summa Theologica. See Summa Theologica
  11. C. S. Lewis (1980). Mere Christianity. Touchstone:New York. p. 149.
  12. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (25 April 1996). "chapter 6, section 2.1". The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-510763-0 . Retrieved 22 December 2012.
  13. Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 77.