Fernandez v. California

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Fernandez v. California
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 13, 2013
Decided February 25, 2014
Full case nameWalter Fernandez, Petitioner v. California
Docket no. 12-7822
Citations571 U.S. 292 ( more )
134 S. Ct. 1126, 188 L. Ed. 2d 25, 82 U.S.L.W. 4102
Holding
When a resident who objects to the search of his dwelling is removed for objectively reasonable purposes (such as lawful arrest), the remaining resident may validly consent to search.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer  · Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor  · Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityAlito, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer
ConcurrenceScalia
ConcurrenceThomas
DissentGinsburg, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that explored the limits of Georgia v. Randolph , a 2006 case that held that consent to search a dwelling is invalid in the presence of an objecting co-resident. [1] Fernandez, however, held that when the objecting co-resident is removed for objectively reasonable purposes (such as lawful arrest), the remaining resident may validly consent to search. [2]

Contents

Case aspects

Supreme Court Case law precedent

Fernandez v. California is governed by two cases: The 1974 case United States v. Matlock and the 2005 case Georgia v. Randolph(GA v. Randolph). In Matlock the U.S. Supreme Court laid out the so-called "co-occupant consent rule". This rule means that anyone who has "common authority" over the home can consent to a search of the home. [1] The Supreme Court defined "common authority" as “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Then they arrested him.” [1] In essence the court decided that any one person who is a “joint occupant” can consent to a police search of the shared residence, without a search warrant. [3] In Georgia v. Randolph the Court limited the holding of Matlock. In Randolph the court decided that when co-occupants who are disagreeing whether to let the police search their dwelling the police can't conduct a search, if a "physically present" co-occupant objects that search. [3]

Case background

When police arrived at Fernandez's apartment, they believed a suspect in a gang-related assault had just entered. While approaching the apartment they heard screaming and fighting occurring inside. Police knocked on the apartment's door, which was answered by Fernandez's bloodied girlfriend. Believing that Fernandez may have assaulted his girlfriend, police attempted to separate the two. Fernandez refused to follow the police's directive to step away from his girlfriend and yelled "You don't have a right to come in here. I know my rights." The officers soon realized that Fernandez was the suspect in the gang-related assault and arrested him for that crime. About an hour later the police came back to ask Fernandez's girlfriend for consent to search the apartment, which she gave. Fernandez later challenged the lawfulness of this third-party consent. Counsel to Fernandez were attorneys Jeff Fisher and Gerald Peters. [1] [3]

Supreme Court decision

By a vote of six to three, the Court ruled that the search which followed the arrest of defendant Fernandez did not violate the Constitution, because Fernandez was no longer physically there and had been removed for fair reasons. Respect for the girlfriend's independent voluntary consent requires that it be honored. The three dissenting judges argued that the girlfriend had been pressured into consenting, and that police should have gotten a search warrant once they knew Fernandez objected to the search. [3]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

In the United States, the plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement that allows an officer to seize evidence and contraband that are found in plain view during a lawful observation. The doctrine is also regularly used by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers while screening persons and property at U.S. airports.

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that without a search warrant, police had no constitutional right to search a house where one resident consents to the search while another resident objects. The Court distinguished this case from the "co-occupant consent rule" established in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), which permitted one resident to consent in absence of the co-occupant.

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when the police obtained voluntary consent from a third party who possessed common authority over the premises sought to be searched. The ruling of the court established the "co-occupant consent rule," which was later explained by Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) and distinguished later by Georgia v. Randolph (2006), in which the court held that a third party could not consent over the objections of a present co-occupant, and Fernandez v. California (2014), where the court held when the objecting co-resident is removed for objectively reasonable purposes, the remaining resident may validly consent to search.

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), is a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with the issue of whether a warrantless search conducted pursuant to third party consent violates the Fourth Amendment when the third party does not actually possess common authority over the premises.

Consent searches are searches conducted by United States law enforcement after obtaining the voluntary consent of the person being investigated. In some cases, consent may also be obtained from certain third-parties. Searches that are the product of consent are one of several recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was freely and voluntarily given.

Search incident to a lawful arrest, commonly known as search incident to arrest (SITA) or the Chimel rule, is a U.S. legal principle that allows police to perform a warrantless search of an arrested person, and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, in the interest of officer safety, the prevention of escape, and the preservation of evidence.

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), held that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have probable cause to seize items in plain view.

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), was a case before the United States Supreme Court, which incorporated the Fourth Amendment's protections against illegal search and seizure. The case was decided on June 10, 1963, by a vote of 5–4.

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 14, 2009. The court decided that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when a police officer makes an arrest based on an outstanding warrant in another jurisdiction, but the information regarding that warrant is later found to be incorrect because of a negligent error by that agency.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law-enforcement officers to demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent occupants have been arrested and secured.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Therefore, Belton extended the so-called "Chimel rule" of searches incident to a lawful arrest, established in Chimel v. California (1969), to vehicles. The Supreme Court sought to establish bright line rules to govern vehicle search incident to eliminate some confusion in the cases.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment."

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 244 P.3d 501, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105 was a Supreme Court of California case, which held that police are not required to obtain a warrant to search information contained within a cell phone in a lawful arrest. In a sting operation conducted by local police, the defendant, Gregory Diaz, was arrested for the sale of the illicit drug ecstasy and his cellphone, containing incriminating evidence, was seized and searched without a warrant. In trial court proceedings, Diaz motioned to suppress the information obtained from his cellphone, which was denied on the grounds that the search of his cellphone was incident to a lawful arrest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the court's decision and was later upheld by the California Supreme Court. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court overruled that position in Riley v. California and held that without a warrant, police may not search the digital information on a cellphone that has been seized incident to arrest.

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of the digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that drivers of rental cars have rights protecting them from unconstitutional searches by police, even if the drivers are not listed on the rental agreement.

This article is a chronological list of United States criminal case law articles on Wikipedia that discuss the Fourth Amendment constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure in its relation to consent to search.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Kerr, Orin (November 6, 2013). "Fernandez v. California and the problem of third-party consent". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved June 23, 2014.
  2. Kerr, Orin (February 26, 2014). "Five thoughts on Fernandez v. California". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved June 23, 2014.
  3. 1 2 3 4 Little, Rory (February 25, 2014). "Opinion analysis: The Court narrowly limits a precedent allowing co-occupant objections to warrantless consent searches". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved June 23, 2014.