Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado

Last updated

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 11, 1984
Decided April 17, 1984
Full case name Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al. v. Delgado
Citations466 U.S. 210 ( more )
104 S. Ct. 1758; 80 L. Ed. 2d 247
Holding
Unless the circumstances of an encounter between law enforcement and citizens are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the encounter qualifies as detention under the Fourth Amendment.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Burger, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor
ConcurrenceStevens
ConcurrencePowell (in judgment only)
Concur/dissentBrennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Amend. IV

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court decision on the limits of worksite enforcement by immigration agents. Specifically, the Court ruled that factory raids by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were not illegal seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Contents

Summary

INS v. Delgado concerned whether the restrictions placed on government officials by the Fourth Amendment applied to worksite enforcement operations by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The case was originally filed by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) in 1978 on behalf of members of the union who worked at two Los Angeles garment factories (Southern California Davis Pleating Co. and Mr. Pleat) raided by the INS in January and September 1977. [1] The raids were based on search warrants that claimed probable cause to believe undocumented workers were employed in the factories, but did not name specific workers to be questioned or detained. During the operation, some INS agents guarded the exits while others moved through the factory questioning workers about their to citizenship status. Agents arrested workers they believed to be undocumented immigrants. Four of the employees questioned filed actions against the INS in 1978, arguing that the sweeps violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.[ citation needed ] The U.S. district court rejected the plaintiff's claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling in 1982, finding that the faculty raids were unlawful violations of the Fourth Amendment. [2] The INS appealed that ruling to the Supreme Court.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." [3] The case hinged narrowly on whether a seizure took place at all, and therefore whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment applied. The Court had previously ruled that non-citizen immigrants are protected by the Fourth Amendment. Also, the Court had ruled that not every interaction between police or government officials and a suspect qualifies as a search or seizure, and that officials can approach and speak with people so long as the interaction is brief. In the Delgado case, the Court held that the factory survey was not a seizure of the workforce, but instead an instance of “mere questing.” The presence of INS agents at the doors of the factory and the manner with which the workers were approached and questioned, the Court ruled, did not constitute a formal detention. Therefore the Fourth Amendment did not apply.

Background

Factory Sweeps

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has a history of conducting "factory sweeps" across the country in order to locate undocumented immigrant workers. While critics have claimed that these sweeps are largely ineffective and serve most often as media events, the INS maintains that they are an important tool for protecting U.S. jobs. [4] These sweeps occur when the INS receives information that a certain business may be employing undocumented immigrants and the workers at the business are determined to fit such a profile, though, as in the case of INS v. Delgado, no specific individuals need be identified. Typically, 15 or 25 INS agents enter a place of business, surrounding workers and guarding exits, and proceed to question workers with regards to their citizenship status, often carrying those suspected of being undocumented away in handcuffs. As can be expected, these raids can cause considerable stress for the workers; one woman subjected to this procedure is even quoted as saying she was afraid "because if I leave and they think I don't have no papers and they shoot me or something." [5] Despite the fear-inducing nature of the sweeps, the Supreme Court maintained that those subjected to them have in no way been detained or seized, as they are technically free to go at any time and any "reasonable person" would realize this freedom.

Terry v. Ohio

In the case of Terry v. Ohio , the Supreme Court established a practical standpoint on “mere questioning”, effectively giving law enforcement officials the ability to speak with citizens, and even search them, in certain situations without necessarily being held accountable to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. [6] In this case, an officer approached three men he suspected of casing a building for a robbery or stick up. He confronted them, questioned them, and for the purposes of his own safety, patted them down. The officer found that they were carrying concealed weapons, which were later used as evidence that they were about to attempt a robbery. The case hinged on whether the weapons were admissible as evidence under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable and warrantless searches and seizures, and prevents evidence collected in such a manner from being used in court. The opinion of the Court was that in lieu of the circumstances, in which the officer had reason to fear for his own safety, the pat-down was reasonable and did not constitute a search to which the Fourth Amendment is applicable. Specifically, the Court held that “Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required” and “The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate.” While these particular circumstances warranted a search based on the safety of the officer, the decision of the Court allowed for a greater freedom of officers to confront and question individuals in other situations. The Supreme Court has frequently referenced Terry v. Ohio and the principle of “mere questioning” in later cases, including INS v. Delgado. The most important formulation of the principle as it relates to Delgado is that “law enforcement officials can approach and speak to individuals without the constraints of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, so long as the encounter is consensual.”

United States v. Mendenhall

Terry v. Ohio, and the ensuing principle of mere questioning, left open the important question of where the line is drawn between a consensual encounter and a temporary detention. In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court outlined a number of variables which may indicate a temporary detention or seizure, and a number of variables which may indicate a mere consensual stop. Those indicative of a seizure are “(1) threatening presence of several officers; (2) display of weapons by officer; (3) some physical touching of the individual; and (4) use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the request might be compelled.” Those factors indicative of a consensual stop are “(1) questioning in public; (2) officers not wearing uniforms; (3) displaying no weapons; (4) approaching, not summoning, an individual and identifying oneself as a law enforcement official; and (5) requesting, not demanding, to ask questions or see identification.” INS v. Delgado demonstrates a complex mixture of these factors, making the determination difficult. For example, while the workers were free to move about the factory, INS agents were stationed at all exits, possibly indicating a level of detention.

Opinion of the Court

Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, which Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Sandra Day O’Connor, and John P. Stevens joined. John P. Stevens filed a concurring opinion in the result. William J. Brennan filed and Thurgood Marshall joined an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Concurring Opinion

The Court held that “The factory surveys did not result in the seizure of the entire workforces, and the individual questioning of the respondent employees by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” The decision is broken down into a few key components. For one, interrogation by members of law enforcement for one’s identity or identification does not in itself constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. Also, so long as a “reasonable person” would not have reason to believe that he could not leave the questioning, it does not constitute a detention under the Fourth Amendment. While the Court accepted that the ability of the workers to leave the questioning was “meaningfully restricted”, it was restricted by their obligations to their employer and not by the INS. Further, the entire workforce of the factory was not seized during the sweeps, though agents were placed by the doors. The agents’ presence at the exits was held to be nothing more than a measure to make sure that all workers were questioned, and “If mere questioning did not constitute a seizure when it occurred inside the factory, it was no more a seizure when it occurred at the exits.” Lastly, as there was no seizure of the workforce in its entirety, the respondents may only litigate what happened to them individually and, based on their testimonies, all of their interactions with agents were nothing more than “classic consensual encounters.”

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, calls the decision of the Court a “sleight of hand.” Brennan cited a number of preceding cases, including Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Mendenhall, drawing up a general rule from Mendenhall as follows; that "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled” is a threshold indication of a seizure taking place. Brennan concluded that the factory sweep was very much a seizure. While there was no restraint of the individuals physically, the sudden and systematic intrusion of 15 to 25 agents upon the factory and the manner in which they dealt with the workers demonstrated a “show of force” and created an “intimidating atmosphere” with “widespread disturbance among workers”, fit to indicate that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and that a seizure was in fact taking place.

Notes

  1. Marsh, Cheryl (1984). "Brief Encounters of the 'Alien' Kind: Challenges to Factory Sweeps and Detentive Questioning in INS v. Delgado". HeinOnline. Retrieved November 5, 2021.
  2. Appeals, United States Court of; Circuit, Ninth (December 9, 1981). "681 F2d 624 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union". F2d (681): 624.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. "The Fourth Amendment" . Retrieved November 3, 2011.
  4. "L.A. Times on Factory Sweeps". Los Angeles Times . September 12, 1986. Retrieved November 3, 2011.
  5. "The Yale Law Journal on Factory Sweeps". 362: 559–571. JSTOR   79645.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  6. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A search warrant is a court order that a magistrate or judge issues to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct a search of a person, location, or vehicle for evidence of a crime and to confiscate any evidence they find. In most countries, a search warrant cannot be issued in aid of civil process.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Search and seizure</span> Police power to confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to a crime

Search and seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a trained police dog to sniff of a person's luggage or property in a public place.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal's ruling that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under California law and that the search in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case that overturned a per se rule imposed by the Florida Supreme Court that held consensual searches of passengers on buses were always unreasonable. The Court ruled that the fact that the search takes place on a bus is one factor in determining whether a suspect feels free to decline the search and walk away from the officers.

In United States criminal law, the border search exception is a doctrine that allows searches and seizures at international borders and their functional equivalent without a warrant or probable cause. Generally speaking, searches within 100 miles of the border are more permissible without a warrant than those conducted elsewhere in the U.S. The doctrine also allows federal agents to search people at border crossings without a warrant or probable cause. The government is allowed to use scanning devices and to search personal electronics. Invasive bodily searches, however, require reasonable suspicion.

<i>United States v. Brignoni-Ponce</i> 1975 United States Supreme Court case

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), was the case in which the Supreme Court determined it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. A roving patrol car must have articulable facts that allow for an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying illegal aliens beyond their ethnicity. The Court handed down a 9–0 decision that affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in the case.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that allowed the United States Border Patrol to set up permanent or fixed checkpoints on public highways leading to or away from the Mexican border and that the checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that recording conversations using concealed radio transmitters worn by informants does not violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus does not require a warrant.

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), was a unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution allows detention of an occupant in handcuffs while a search is being conducted, and that it does not require officers to have an independent reasonable suspicion before questioning a subject about their immigration status.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined "seizure" occurs when an officer uses displays of authority to detain a person.

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning search and seizure. A 6–3 decision reversed the weapons conviction of a Long Island man who had been detained when police followed his vehicle after he left his apartment just before it was to be searched. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and Antonin Scalia filed a concurrence. Stephen Breyer dissented.

<i>House v. Napolitano</i>

House v. Napolitano is a United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts case involving David House, a known supporter of Chelsea Manning and co-founder of the Manning Support Network, who brought action against Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security(DHS), Alan Bersin, Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection(CBP), and John T. Morton, Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE) for the search and seizure of his electronic devices by federal agents at the border. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the court denied the motion on First Amendment and Fourth Amendment grounds. House subsequently reached a settlement with the government in May 2013, to return or destroy all information obtained from the investigation.

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections to searches and seizures that occur on buses, as well as the function of consent during searches by law enforcement. During a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort and interviewed passengers. After talking to two of the passengers and asking if they could "check [their] person", officers discovered the two passengers had taped several packages of cocaine to their legs. At trial, the passengers argued that officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because the police engaged in coercive behavior and never informed them that their participation in the drug interdiction efforts was voluntary.

Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), was a United States Supreme Court case.