Adams v. Burke

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Adams v. Burke
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Decided December 8, 1873
Full case nameAdams v. Burke
Citations84 U.S. 453 ( more )
17 Wall. 453; 21 L. Ed. 700; 1873 U.S. LEXIS 1384
Court membership
Chief Justice
vacant
Associate Justices
Nathan Clifford  · Noah H. Swayne
Samuel F. Miller  · David Davis
Stephen J. Field  · William Strong
Joseph P. Bradley  · Ward Hunt
Case opinions
MajorityMiller, joined by Chase, Clifford, Davis, Field, Hunt
DissentBradley, joined by Swayne, Strong

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court first elaborated on the exhaustion doctrine. According to that doctrine, a so-called authorized sale of a patented product (one made by the patentee or a person authorized by it to sell the product) liberates the product from the patent monopoly. The product becomes the complete property of the purchaser and "passes without the monopoly." The property owner is then free to use or dispose of it as it may choose, free of any control by the patentee. Adams is a widely cited, leading case. A substantially identical doctrine applies in copyright law and is known as the "first sale doctrine".

Contents

As the Supreme Court recently explained, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013), the principle comes from early English common law of property, explained in Coke on Littleton early in the 17th century. Under the common law, if a man is possessed of a chattel (item of personal property) and he transfers his property in it to another, no restriction against the use or disposition of the chattel will be effective, for that would hinder trade and commerce – it would interfere with bargaining among men. If once a patented product was sold and allowed to enter the stream of commerce, if it could be subject to restrictions (perhaps secret) on its use or further disposition, businessmen would not be able to know whether transactions in the product were effective and business certainty would be greatly impaired.

Factual background

In 1863, U.S. Patent No. 38,713 issued to the inventors Merrill and Horner for a coffin lid that permitted interested persons to view the name-plate and inscription of the decedent in the coffin, irrespective of whether the coffin cover is open or closed. In 1865 they assigned to Lockhart & Seelye of Cambridge. Massachusetts, the ownership of the patent in a circular area around Boston having a ten-mile radius. Adams, the plaintiff in this case, was the assignee of the patent in an area outside this circle which included the town of Natick, Massachusetts. [1]

Burke, the defendant, was an undertaker doing business in Natick, Massachusetts, seventeen miles from Boston. Burke purchased some patented coffin lids from Lockhart & Seelye, who had manufactured them. Burke then took them to Natick (more than ten miles from Boston), and used them in his business. Adams then sued him. [2]

Trial court opinion

The circuit court for the district of Massachusetts dismissed the case. It said:

When a patented product passes lawfully into the hands of a purchaser without condition or restriction, it is no longer within the monopoly or under the protection of the patent act, but outside of it. ...It is clear that by such a sale the purchaser acquires an absolute title to the manufactured product which is the subject of a patent, and may deal with It in the same manner as if dealing with any other kind of property. He may use it, repair it, Improve upon it, or sell it. Subsequent purchasers acquire the same rights as the seller had, and may do with the article, or its materials, whatever the first purchaser could have lawfully done if he had not parted with the title. [3]

Supreme Court opinion

Adams appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed. The Court began by observing that this was a case of first impression in the Supreme Court although the governing principle had been involved in other patent cases. [4] That principle was this:

[T]he sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use . . . a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time.  . . . [I]n the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the Court, passes without the limit of the monopoly. [citation omitted] That is to say the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees. [5]

Accordingly, the Court ruled that "we hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described, when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees." [6]

Subsequent Supreme Court cases following the doctrine of the Adams case include:

But see:

Related Research Articles

Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913), was a 1913 United States Supreme Court decision involving whether a purchaser of a patented product bearing a price-fixing notice incurs guilt of patent infringement by reselling the product at a price lower than that which the notice commands. A divided Court (5–4) held that it was not.

In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

The exhaustion doctrine, also referred to as the first sale doctrine, is a U.S. common law patent doctrine that limits the extent to which patent holders can control an individual article of a patented product after a so-called authorized sale. Under the doctrine, once an authorized sale of a patented article occurs, the patent holder's exclusive rights to control the use and sale of that article are said to be "exhausted," and the purchaser is free to use or resell that article without further restraint from patent law. However, under the repair and reconstruction doctrine, the patent owner retains the right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making the patented invention anew, unless it is specifically authorized by the patentee to do so.

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), was a case that the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 1938. The decision upheld so-called field-of-use limitations in patent licenses: it held that the limitations were enforceable in a patent infringement suit in federal court against the licensee and those acting in concert with it—for example, a customer that knowingly buys a patented product from the licensee that is outside the scope of the license.

An implied license is an unwritten license which permits a party to do something that would normally require the express permission of another party. Implied licenses may arise by operation of law from actions by the licensor which lead the licensee to believe that it has the necessary permission.

<i>Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.</i>

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in which the court appeared to overrule or drastically limit many years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine, for example in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine. The decision made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that it is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to engage the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), is a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court overturning the doctrine of licensee estoppel and holding that public interest considerations require that licensees be free to challenge the validity of possibly spurious patents under which they are licensed. This entailed the overruling of Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. and prior cases that it had reaffirmed.

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court explaining the exhaustion doctrine and applying it to find an antitrust violation because Univis's ownership of patents did not exclude its restrictive practices from the antitrust laws. The Univis case stands for the proposition that when an article sold by a patent holder or one whom it has authorized to sell it embodies the essential features of a patented invention, the effect of the sale is to terminate any right of the patent holder under patent law to control the purchaser's further disposition or use of the article itself and of articles into which it is incorporated as a component or precursor.

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Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), is a patent misuse decision of the United States Supreme Court. It was the first case in which the Court expressly labeled as "misuse" the Motion Picture Patent/Carbice tie-in defense to a charge of patent infringement and created the present blanket remedy in infringement cases of unenforceability of the misused patent. The decision re-emphasized that misuse can be found without finding an antitrust violation.

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), is United States Supreme Court decision that is notable as an early example of the patent misuse doctrine. It held that, because a patent grant is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, the patent law does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to the patented article, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting the use of the patented article to materials necessary for their operation but forming no part of the patented invention, or to place downstream restrictions on the articles making them subject to conditions as to use. The decision overruled The Button-Fastener Case, and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., which had held such restrictive notices effective and enforceable.

Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that limited the doctrine of the Court's 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. Beginning with the 1926 decision in United States v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court made a sharp distinction between (i) post-sale restraints that a patentee imposed on purchasers of a patented product and (ii) restrictions (limitations) that a patentee imposed on a licensee to manufacture a patented product: the former being illegal and unenforceable under the exhaustion doctrine while the latter were generally permissible under a lenient "rule of reason." Thus, under the General Talking Pictures doctrine, a patent holder may permissibly license others to manufacture and then sell patented products in only a specified field (market), such as only a particular type of product made under the patent or only a particular category of customer for the patented product. The Ethyl decision held, however, that a patent licensing and distribution program based on both the sale of a patented product and licenses to manufacture a related product was subject to ordinary testing under the antitrust laws, and accordingly was illegal when its effect was to "regiment" an entire industry.

Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), was a 1912 decision of the United States Supreme Court that upheld patent licensing restrictions such as tie-ins on the basis of the so-called inherency doctrine—the theory that it was the inherent right of a patent owner, because he could lawfully refuse to license his patent at all, to exercise the "lesser" right to license it on any terms and conditions he chose. In 1917, the Supreme Court overruled the A.B. Dick case in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,

<i>Button-Fastener case</i>

The Button-Fastener Case, Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., also known as the Peninsular Button-Fastener Case, was for a time a highly influential decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Many courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court in the A.B. Dick case adopted its "inherency doctrine"—"the argument that, since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether from public use, he must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any conditions which he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it." In 1917, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Button-Fastener Case and the A.B. Dick case, in the Motion Picture Patents case.

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the exhaustion doctrine in patent law in which the Court held that after the sale of a patented item, the patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement relating to further use of that item, even when in violation of a contract with a customer or imported from outside the United States. The case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Lexmark against Impression Products, Inc., which bought used ink cartridges, refilled them, replaced a microchip on the cartridge to circumvent a digital rights management scheme, and then resold them. Lexmark argued that as they own several patents related to the ink cartridges, Impression Products was violating their patent rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a 2016 decision of the Federal Circuit, held that the exhaustion doctrine prevented Lexmark's patent infringement lawsuit, although Lexmark could enforce restrictions on use or resale of its contracts with direct purchasers under regular contract law. Besides printer and ink manufacturers, the decision of the case could affect the markets of high tech consumer goods and prescription drugs.

Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), is a 1938 decision of the United States Supreme Court extending the tie-in patent misuse doctrine to cases in which the patentee does not use an explicit tie-in license but instead relies on grants of implied licenses to only those who buy a necessary supply from it.

Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), is a 1980 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the patent misuse doctrine and explaining the scope of the 1952 amendment of the patent laws that resurrected the contributory infringement doctrine in the wake of the Mercoid cases. The Mercoid cases and a few predecessor cases had denied relief against patent infringement to patentees who were deriving revenue from the sale of unpatented products used as supplies for patented combinations or as components of patented combinations, even when the unpatented products were specially adapted for use with the patented combinations and even when they lacked any utility other than that use. The patentees used contributory infringement suits or threats of such suits to enforce their business model, which the Mercoid cases outlawed.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. Adams v. Burks, 1 Fed. Cas. 100 (Case No. 50) (C.C.D. Mass. 1871).
  2. 1 Fed. Cas. at 100.
  3. Adams v. Burks, 1 Fed. Cas. 100 (Case No. 50) (C.C.D. Mass. 1871).
  4. "The question presented by the plea in this case is a very interesting one in patent law, and the precise point in it has never been decided by this Court, though cases involving some of the considerations which apply to it have been decided and others of analogous character are frequently recurring." Adams, 84 U.S. at 455.
  5. Adams, 84 U.S. at 455-56.
  6. Adams, 84 U.S. at 457.
  7. In this case, the Court ruled that the Adams patent exhaustion doctrine applied to sales, but not to agency agreements or licenses to manufacture.
  8. In this case, the Court ruled that the Adams patent exhaustion doctrine did not apply to a sale made by a licensee to manufacture a patented product only for use or sale in a defined field, where the licensee's customer had notice of the license limitation or restriction.