Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States

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Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 1,4, 1940
Decided March 25, 1940
Full case nameEthyl Gasoline Corporation, et al. v. United States
Citations309 U.S. 436 ( more )
60 S. Ct. 618; 84 L. Ed. 852; 1940 U.S. LEXIS 1265; 44 U.S.P.Q. 614
Case history
PriorUnited States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); probable jurisdiction noted, 60 S. Ct. 296 (1939).
Court membership
Chief Justice
Charles E. Hughes
Associate Justices
James C. McReynolds  · Harlan F. Stone
Owen Roberts  · Hugo Black
Stanley F. Reed  · Felix Frankfurter
William O. Douglas  · Frank Murphy
Case opinion
MajorityStone, joined by Hughes, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy
McReynolds and Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), [1] was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that limited the doctrine of the Court's 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. [2] Beginning with the 1926 decision in United States v. General Electric Co. , [3] the Supreme Court made a sharp distinction between (i) post-sale restraints that a patentee imposed on purchasers of a patented product and (ii) restrictions (limitations) that a patentee imposed on a licensee to manufacture a patented product: the former being illegal and unenforceable under the exhaustion doctrine while the latter were generally permissible under a lenient "rule of reason." Thus, under the General Talking Pictures doctrine, a patent holder may permissibly license others to manufacture and then sell patented products in only a specified field (market), such as only a particular type of product made under the patent or only a particular category of customer for the patented product. The Ethyl decision held, however, that a patent licensing and distribution program based on both the sale of a patented product and licenses to manufacture a related product was subject to ordinary testing under the antitrust laws, and accordingly was illegal when its effect was to "regiment" an entire industry.

Contents

Background

Sign on an antique gasoline pump advertising tetra-ethyl lead EthylCorporationSign.jpg
Sign on an antique gasoline pump advertising tetra-ethyl lead

Ethyl owned several patents on tetra-ethyl lead, an anti-knock fuel additive, and on its utilization: two patents on the chemical itself, a patent on a motor fuel—gasoline containing tetra-ethyl lead, and a patent on a method of using the fuel in an automobile engine. [4]

Ethyl established an elaborate licensing program under its several patents: Ethyl sold the fuel additive, and licensed purchasers to use it to practice the other patents. The licensing program fixed prices for the motor fuel and strictly limited the types of customer (i.e., no price-cutters) to which given licensees could sell the motor fuel. Ethyl's program "controls the business of the major part of those engaged in manufacturing and distributing [gasoline] in the United States." Ethyl licensed almost every US refiner and its licensees refined 88% of the gasoline in the US. [5] It was Ethyl's "long established practice . . . to refuse to grant licenses to jobbers who cut prices or refuse to conform to the marketing policies and posted prices of the major refineries or the market leaders among them." [6]

The United States sued Ethyl for violating the antitrust laws, and Ethyl claimed that its patents exempted its conduct.

Ruling of Supreme Court

Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone photograph circa 1927-1932.jpg
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone

Ethyl emphasized to the Supreme Court the fact that, while it sold the fuel to refiners subject to a post-sale restraint, it licensed the other patents, which covered the manufacture of the fuel (by adding tetra-ethyl lead to ordinary gasoline) and the method of using the fuel in automobile engines. Ethyl argued that the licensed patents and the manufacturing brought the case within the shelter of the General Talking Pictures doctrine. Ethyl urged that the various restrictions were "all reasonably necessary for the commercial development of [its] patents and for insuring a financial return from them, and are therefore within its patent monopoly." Further, they "are appropriate and reasonably adapted to the maintenance of the quality of the product and for the protection of the public in its use of a product containing a dangerous poison." [7]

The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, refused without dissent to make any distinctions among the different patents and struck the whole program down for improperly “regimenting” the industry in violation of the antitrust laws.

The Court said that Ethyl used its patents and licensing program to obtain

the power to exclude at will from participation in the nationwide market for lead-treated motor fuel all of the 12,000 motor fuel jobbers of the country, by refusing to license any of the 1,000 unlicensed jobbers, or by cancelling, as it may at will, the licenses of any of the 11,000 licensed jobbers. [8]

It then unlawfully

exercise[d] that power in such manner as to control the patented commodity in the hands of the licensed jobbers who had purchased it, [and] their actions with respect to it in ways not within the limits of the patent monopoly, and conspicuously among such controls which the Sherman law prohibits and the patent law does not sanction is the regulation of prices and the suppression of competition among the purchasers of the patented articles. [9]

Relying on the exhaustion doctrine and citing Adams v. Burke , [10] the Court stated:

By its sales to refiners, it relinquishes its exclusive right to use the patented fluid and it relinquishes to the licensed jobbers its exclusive rights to sell the lead-treated fuel by permitting the licensed refiners to manufacture and sell the fuel to them. And, by the authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers, the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and, after the sale, neither [Ethyl] nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents to exercise any control over the price at which the fuel may be resold. [11]

The Court found this violative of the antitrust laws:

[Ethyl] has established the marketing of the patented fuel in vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the 11,000 jobbers and, at the same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents, it has built up a combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers' prices and suppressing competition among them. It seems plain that this attempted regulation of prices and market practices of the jobbers with respect to the fuel purchased, for which [Ethyl] could not lawfully contract, cannot be lawfully achieved by entering into contracts or combinations through the manipulation of which the same results are reached by the exercise of the power which they give to control the action of the purchasers. Such contracts or combinations, which are used to obstruct the free and natural flow in the channels of interstate commerce of trade even in a patented article, after it is sold by the patentee or his licensee, are a violation of the Sherman Act. [12]

The Court found it particularly objectionable that Ethyl exploited its patents by fixing the prices on which gasoline was sold, which was not the product that Ethyl manufactured and sold. "The licensing conditions are thus not used as a means of stimulating the commercial development and financial returns of the patented invention which is licensed, but for the commercial development of the business of the refiners and the exploitation of a second patent monopoly not embraced in the first." [13]

Related Research Articles

Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913), was a 1913 United States Supreme Court decision involving whether a purchaser of a patented product bearing a price-fixing notice incurs guilt of patent infringement by reselling the product at a price lower than that which the notice commands. A divided Court (5–4) held that it was not.

In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

The exhaustion doctrine, also referred to as the first sale doctrine, is a U.S. common law patent doctrine that limits the extent to which patent holders can control an individual article of a patented product after a so-called authorized sale. Under the doctrine, once an authorized sale of a patented article occurs, the patent holder's exclusive rights to control the use and sale of that article are said to be "exhausted," and the purchaser is free to use or resell that article without further restraint from patent law. However, under the repair and reconstruction doctrine, the patent owner retains the right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making the patented invention anew, unless it is specifically authorized by the patentee to do so.

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), was a case that the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 1938. The decision upheld so-called field-of-use limitations in patent licenses: it held that the limitations were enforceable in a patent infringement suit in federal court against the licensee and those acting in concert with it—for example, a customer that knowingly buys a patented product from the licensee that is outside the scope of the license.

<i>Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.</i>

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in which the court appeared to overrule or drastically limit many years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine, for example in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine. The decision made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that it is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to engage the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court explaining the exhaustion doctrine and applying it to find an antitrust violation because Univis's ownership of patents did not exclude its restrictive practices from the antitrust laws. The Univis case stands for the proposition that when an article sold by a patent holder or one whom it has authorized to sell it embodies the essential features of a patented invention, the effect of the sale is to terminate any right of the patent holder under patent law to control the purchaser's further disposition or use of the article itself and of articles into which it is incorporated as a component or precursor.

United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a patentee who has granted a single license to a competitor to manufacture the patented product may lawfully fix the price at which the licensee may sell the product.

A post-sale restraint, also termed a post-sale restriction, as those terms are used in United States patent law and antitrust law, is a limitation that operates after a sale of goods to a purchaser has occurred and purports to restrain, restrict, or limit the scope of the buyer's freedom to utilize, resell, or otherwise dispose of or take action regarding the sold goods. Such restraints have also been termed "equitable servitudes on chattels".

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court first elaborated on the exhaustion doctrine. According to that doctrine, a so-called authorized sale of a patented product liberates the product from the patent monopoly. The product becomes the complete property of the purchaser and "passes without the monopoly." The property owner is then free to use or dispose of it as it may choose, free of any control by the patentee. Adams is a widely cited, leading case. A substantially identical doctrine applies in copyright law and is known as the "first sale doctrine".

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), is United States Supreme Court decision that is notable as an early example of the patent misuse doctrine. It held that, because a patent grant is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, the patent law does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to the patented article, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting the use of the patented article to materials necessary for their operation but forming no part of the patented invention, or to place downstream restrictions on the articles making them subject to conditions as to use. The decision overruled The Button-Fastener Case, and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., which had held such restrictive notices effective and enforceable.

Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 was a 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that sought to narrow the defense of patent misuse to claims for patent infringement. Princo held that a party asserting the defense of patent misuse, absent a case of so-called per se misuse, must prove both "leveraging" of the patent being enforced against it and a substantial anticompetitive effect outside the legitimate scope of that patent right. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the misuse alleged must involve the patent in suit, not another patent.

<i>Button-Fastener case</i>

The Button-Fastener Case, Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., also known as the Peninsular Button-Fastener Case, was for a time a highly influential decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Many courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court in the A.B. Dick case adopted its "inherency doctrine"—"the argument that, since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether from public use, he must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any conditions which he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it." In 1917, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Button-Fastener Case and the A.B. Dick case, in the Motion Picture Patents case.

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the exhaustion doctrine in patent law in which the Court held that after the sale of a patented item, the patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement relating to further use of that item, even when in violation of a contract with a customer or imported from outside the United States. The case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Lexmark against Impression Products, Inc., which bought used ink cartridges, refilled them, replaced a microchip on the cartridge to circumvent a digital rights management scheme, and then resold them. Lexmark argued that as they own several patents related to the ink cartridges, Impression Products was violating their patent rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a 2016 decision of the Federal Circuit, held that the exhaustion doctrine prevented Lexmark's patent infringement lawsuit, although Lexmark could enforce restrictions on use or resale of its contracts with direct purchasers under regular contract law. Besides printer and ink manufacturers, the decision of the case could affect the markets of high tech consumer goods and prescription drugs.

Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), is a 1938 decision of the United States Supreme Court extending the tie-in patent misuse doctrine to cases in which the patentee does not use an explicit tie-in license but instead relies on grants of implied licenses to only those who buy a necessary supply from it.

The Mercoid casesMercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)—are 1944 patent tie-in misuse and antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court. These companion cases are said to have reached the "high-water mark of the patent misuse doctrine." The Court substantially limited the contributory infringement doctrine by holding unlawful tie-ins of "non-staple" unpatented articles that were specially adapted only for use in practicing a patent, and the Court observed: "The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." The Court also suggested that an attempt to extend the reach of a patent beyond its claims could or would violate the antitrust laws: "The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the antitrust laws, not by the patent law."

<i>National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.</i>

National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, is one of the earliest or the earliest federal court decision to hold that it is patent misuse for a patentee to require licensees not to use a competitive technology. Such provisions are known as "tie-outs."

United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), is a 1952 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that a claim of conspiracy to fix uniform minimum prices and to eliminate competition throughout substantially all of the wrinkle finish industry of the United States by means of patent license agreements was, if proved, a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. That one of the defendants, a patent-holding company, abstained from manufacturing activities, did not ship goods in commerce, and engaged solely in patent licensing did not insulate its activity from § 1. Making these license contracts for the purpose of regulating distribution and fixing prices of commodities in interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act, even though the isolated act of contracting for the licenses occurs within a single state. Patents give no protection from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act when the patent licensing agreements are used to restrain interstate commerce and fix prices of goods shipped in commerce.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co. was a patent–antitrust case in which the United States Supreme Court decided, first, in 1948, that a patent licensing program that fixed prices of many licensees and regimented an entire industry violated the antitrust laws, and then, decided in 1950, after a remand, that appropriate relief in such cases did not extend so far as to permit licensees enjoying a compulsory, reasonable–royalty license to challenge the validity of the licensed patents. The Court also ruled, in obiter dicta, that the United States had standing to challenge the validity of patents when a patentee relied on the patents to justify its fixing prices. It held in this case, however, that the defendants violated the antitrust laws irrespective of whether the patents were valid, which made the validity issue irrelevant.

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the doctrine of the 1926 General Electric decision, excusing price fixing in patent license agreements. The Line Material Court held that cross-licenses between two manufacturer competitors, providing for fixing the prices of the licensed products and providing that one of the manufacturers would license other manufacturers under the patents of each manufacturer, subject to similar price fixing, violated Sherman Act § 1. The Court further held that the licensees who, with knowledge of such arrangements, entered into the price-fixing licenses thereby became party to a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act § 1.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co, 304 U.S. 175 (1938), affirmed on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
  3. United States v. General Electric Co. , 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
  4. 309 U.S. at 446.
  5. 309 U.S. at 449.
  6. 309 U.S. at 450.
  7. 309 U.S. at 451.
  8. 309 U.S. at 452.
  9. 309 U.S. at 452.
  10. Adams v. Burke , 84 U.S. (17 Wall. ) 453 (1873).
  11. 309 U.S. at 457.
  12. 309 U.S. at 457-58.
  13. 309 U.S. at 459.