Bell Atlantic v. Twombly | |
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Argued November 27, 2006 Decided May 21, 2007 | |
Full case name | Bell Atlantic Corporation, BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. (successor-in-interest to Bell Atlantic Corporation) v. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus, both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated |
Docket no. | 05-1126 |
Citations | 550 U.S. 544 ( more ) 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 75 U.S.L.W. 4337, 2007-1 Trade Cases ¶ 75,709, 68 Fed.R.Serv.3d 661, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5550, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7097, 41 Communications Reg. (P&F) 567, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 267 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Case history | |
Prior | Complaint dismissed, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated and remanded, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 548 U.S. 903(2006). |
Holding | |
Parallel conduct alone, absent some evidence of agreement to engage in anti-competitive behavior, is not sufficient to prove a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. A complaint must allege facts with sufficient specificity to state a claim for relief that is plausible, not merely conceivable, on its face. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Souter, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Ginsburg (except Part IV) |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6) | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
Conley v. Gibson (1957) |
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States involving antitrust law and civil procedure. Authored by Justice David Souter, it established that parallel conduct, absent evidence of agreement, is insufficient to sustain an antitrust action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It also heightened the pleading requirement for federal civil cases by requiring for plaintiffs to include enough facts in their complaint to make it plausible, not merely possible or conceivable, that they will be able to prove facts to support their claims. The latter change in the law has been met with a great deal of controversy in legal circles, as evidenced by the dissenting opinion from Justice John Paul Stevens. [1]
William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus brought a class-action lawsuit alleging that Bell Atlantic and the Baby Bells (successor companies to the trust-busted AT&T) had engaged in anti-competitive behavior in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the companies had acted to disadvantage smaller telephone companies and charge consumers more by, for example, refraining from entering markets where another large company was dominant (thereby preventing a price war), even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had made it relatively inexpensive to do so. [2] The lawsuit alleged a conspiracy between the Baby Bells to not compete. As examples, the lawsuit noted that Qwest did not compete in California despite having business in all the surrounding states, and that Verizon did no business in Connecticut despite having a monopoly in all the surrounding states. [3]
Their complaint was dismissed by Judge Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, as failing to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for a violation of the Sherman Act. [4] The decision was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, [5] and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in 2006.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit, which had reversed the decision of the district court (Lynch D.J.) dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court clarified the requirements of proving a claim of anti-competitive behavior under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act prohibits entering into a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" to restrain trade. The court held that while parallel conduct (actions by competing companies that might be seen as implying some agreement to work together) is "admissible circumstantial evidence" from which an agreement to engage in anti-competitive behavior may be inferred, parallel conduct alone is insufficient to prove a Sherman Act claim.
The court then upheld the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the mere allegations contained in the complaint that the competitors had agreed not to compete were insufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under the Sherman Act. The court found that Twombly's complaint had not provided enough facts for the court to find it plausible that the companies had engaged in a conspiracy; instead, the complaint provided factual bases for parallel conduct, not enough under the court's new interpretation of the Sherman Act, and stated only that an agreement had taken place, with no details to support that allegation. The court held that the dismissal of the complaint was therefore proper.
The decision changed the existing interpretation of the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and the standards for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by creating a new, stricter standard of a pleading's required specificity.
Previously, under the standard the court set forth in Conley v. Gibson , a complaint needed to state only a "conceivable" set of facts to support its legal claims. In other words, a court could not dismiss claims unless it appeared, beyond a reasonable doubt, that plaintiffs would be able to prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. In Twombly, the court adopted a stricter "plausibility" standard that required "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."
The Twombly test however remained vague, and the legal establishment was stumped as how to interpret the "plausibility" standard, even though it was not supposed to be a heightened pleading standard, as the Court said in footnote 14. [3] The general applicability of this heightened standard of pleading outside of antitrust cases was established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , when the court also provided guidance as to how lower courts should apply the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly test:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions... Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged approach.
The two cases are often jointly referred to as Twiqbal .
The case was argued successfully by Michael K. Kellogg of law firm Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel and Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae for the petitioners. [6]
Twombly remains controversial as of 2020. Not only did it overturn Conley v. Gibson, but it also overturned Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163 (1992). Leatherman had unanimously established that the heightened pleading standard was fundamentally at odds with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court opined that the only way to change the standard would be to amend the Rules. The Court had further cemented this idea with another unanimous ruling in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002), making Twombly all the more surprising. [3]
On July 22, 2009, after the Supreme Court broadened Twombly with its decision in Iqbal, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, which provided: [7]
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41 (1957).4
Shortly thereafter, a similar bill was introduced in the US House of Representatives. It was called the "Open Access to Courts Act of 2009:"
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Neither bill ever made it to the floor for a vote.
In legal terminology, a complaint is any formal legal document that sets out the facts and legal reasons that the filing party or parties believes are sufficient to support a claim against the party or parties against whom the claim is brought that entitles the plaintiff(s) to a remedy. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) that govern civil litigation in United States courts provide that a civil action is commenced with the filing or service of a pleading called a complaint. Civil court rules in states that have incorporated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure use the same term for the same pleading.
The False Claims Act of 1863 (FCA) is an American federal law that imposes liability on persons and companies who defraud governmental programs. It is the federal government's primary litigation tool in combating fraud against the government. The law includes a qui tam provision that allows people who are not affiliated with the government, called "relators" under the law, to file actions on behalf of the government. This is informally called "whistleblowing", especially when the relator is employed by the organization accused in the suit. Persons filing actions under the Act stand to receive a portion of any recovered damages.
In law as practiced in countries that follow the English models, a pleading is a formal written statement of one party's claims or defenses in response to another party's complaint(s) in a civil action. The parties' pleadings in a case define the issues to be adjudicated in the action.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair monopolies. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
In the United States, antitrust law is a collection of mostly federal laws that regulate the conduct and organization of businesses in order to promote competition and prevent unjustified monopolies. The three main U.S. antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These acts serve three major functions. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing and the operation of cartels, and prohibits other collusive practices that unreasonably restrain trade. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Third, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.
A lawsuit is a proceeding by one or more parties against one or more parties in a civil court of law. The archaic term "suit in law" is found in only a small number of laws still in effect today. The term "lawsuit" is used with respect to a civil action brought by a plaintiff who requests a legal remedy or equitable remedy from a court. The defendant is required to respond to the plaintiff's complaint or else risk default judgment. If the plaintiff is successful, judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the Court may impose the legal and/or equitable remedies available against the defendant (respondent). A variety of court orders may be issued in connection with or as part of the judgment to enforce a right, award damages or restitution, or impose a temporary or permanent injunction to prevent an act or compel an act. A declaratory judgment may be issued to prevent future legal disputes.
In law, a summary judgment, also referred to as judgment as a matter of law or summary disposition, is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another party summarily, i.e., without a full trial. Summary judgments may be issued on the merits of an entire case, or on discrete issues in that case. The formulation of the summary judgment standard is stated in somewhat different ways by courts in different jurisdictions. In the United States, the presiding judge generally must find there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In England and Wales, the court rules for a party without a full trial when "the claim, defence or issue has no real prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial."
A demurrer is a pleading in a lawsuit that objects to or challenges a pleading filed by an opposing party. The word demur means "to object"; a demurrer is the document that makes the objection. Lawyers informally define a demurrer as a defendant saying "So what?" to the pleading.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern civil procedure in United States district courts. They are the companion to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rules promulgated by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act become part of the FRCP unless, within seven months, the United States Congress acts to veto them. The Court's modifications to the rules are usually based upon recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal judiciary's internal policy-making body.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law 104–67 (text)(PDF), 109 Stat. 737 ("PSLRA") implemented several substantive changes in the United States that have affected certain cases brought under the federal securities laws, including changes related to pleading, discovery, liability, class representation, and awards fees and expenses.
In terrorem, Latin for "into/about fear", is a legal threat, usually one given in hope of compelling someone to act without resorting to a lawsuit or criminal prosecution.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that plaintiffs must present a "plausible" cause of action. Alongside Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Iqbal raised the threshold which plaintiffs needed to meet. Further, the Court held that government officials are not liable for the actions of their subordinates without evidence that they ordered the allegedly discriminatory activity. At issue was whether current and former federal officials, including FBI Director Robert Mueller and former United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, were entitled to qualified immunity against an allegation that they knew of or condoned racial and religious discrimination against Muslim men detained after the September 11 attacks. The decision also "transformed civil litigation in the federal courts" by making it much easier for courts to dismiss individuals' suits.
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court further refined the test for determining whether federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law as opposed to federal law. The question in Walker is whether in a diversity action the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations (SOL). The Court found no such conflict because a court’s refusal to apply the federal rule at issue would not in fact thwart some purpose the federal rule was intended to achieve. Favored treatment for federal procedural rules under the Rules Enabling Act is only appropriate when a rule is in fact applicable.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that provided a basis for a broad reading of the "short plain statement" requirement for pleading under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pleading in United States Federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Twiqbal is a colloquial term in American law, referring to two separate US Supreme Court cases that heightened the pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Together, these cases made it more difficult to sue in federal court by requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims are "plausible", rather than simply describing the case in sufficient detail to put the defendant on notice.
O'Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc.,, aff'd, No. 15-6336, is a U.S. court case concerning defamation in online search results. The plaintiff, Colin O'Kroley, alleged that Google's automated snippet algorithm created a defamatory search result by falsely implying that the plaintiff had been accused of indecency with a child. The District Court granted Google's motion to dismiss the case, and found that Google had immunity from the defamation charges under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects interactive computer services from being held liable as a speaker or publisher for information provided by a third-party information content provider. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.
Swanson v. Citibank N.A. 614 F 3d 400 (2010) is a discrimination law and US civil procedure case, concerning the scope of federal preemption against state law for labor rights.
Fant v. The City of Ferguson is a putative class action claim was filed on May 26, 2015, against the City of Ferguson, Missouri. The claims were pursuant of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the code lays out the applicability, or lack thereof, for the legal deprivation of rights. The multiple plaintiffs claimed that the City of Ferguson had violated their constitutional rights, namely the 4th, 6th, and 14th amendments.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on February 26, 2002. The Court held that for complaints in employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not required to allege specific facts that establish a prima facie case as required by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
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