Copperweld v. Independence Tube | |
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Argued December 5, 1983 Decided June 19, 1984 | |
Full case name | Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. |
Citations | 467 U.S. 752 ( more ) 104 S. Ct. 2731; 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 |
Case history | |
Prior | Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982); cert. granted, 462 U.S. 1131(1983). |
Subsequent | Remanded, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984). |
Holding | |
A parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiracy as defined by the Sherman Act. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Burger, joined by Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall |
White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Antitrust Act | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc. , 340 U.S. 211 (1951) |
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), is a major US antitrust law case decided by the Supreme Court concerning the Pittsburgh firm Copperweld Corporation and the Chicago firm Independence Tube. [1] It held that a parent company is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they cannot be considered separate economic entities.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." However, for a condition of conspiracy to exist, there must be at least two parties involved. Copperweld held that separate incorporation was not enough to render a parent and its subsidiary capable of conspiring, since forcibly the economic interests of a wholly owned subsidiary must be those of its parent. It does not apply to partially owned subsidiaries. [2]
Independence Tube commenced a civil action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act against Copperweld Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary (" Regal Tube Corporation"), and a third-party company that supplied mill ("Yoder Company"). Amongst others, Independence Tube claimed that Copperweld Corporation and Regal Tube Corporation had induced Yoder Company to breach a supply contract with Independence Tube to provide a tubing mill. This led to a nine months delay in Independence Tube's entry into the steel tubing business. The Supreme Court considered whether Independence Tube's claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act could succeed in relation to coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. [3]
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The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, held that an agreement between a wholly owned subsidiary and a parent did not fall under the definition of an "agreement" in Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the two companies, while legally separate, constituted a single economic entity.
The majority also observed that Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applied to concerted action between two (or more) independent firms:
"It cannot be denied that § 1's focus on concerted behavior leaves a "gap" in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such - but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy - it leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability." [4]
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, is a part of United States antitrust law with the goal of adding further substance to the U.S. antitrust law regime; the Clayton Act seeks to prevent anticompetitive practices in their incipiency. That regime started with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the first Federal law outlawing practices that were harmful to consumers. The Clayton Act specified particular prohibited conduct, the three-level enforcement scheme, the exemptions, and the remedial measures.
In the United States, antitrust law is a collection of mostly federal laws that regulate the conduct and organization of businesses to promote competition and prevent unjustified monopolies. The three main U.S. antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These acts serve three major functions. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing and the operation of cartels, and prohibits other collusive practices that unreasonably restrain trade. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Third, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.
Price fixing is an anticompetitive agreement between participants on the same side in a market to buy or sell a product, service, or commodity only at a fixed price, or maintain the market conditions such that the price is maintained at a given level by controlling supply and demand.
The rule of reason is a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the cornerstones of United States antitrust law. While some actions like price-fixing are considered illegal per se, other actions, such as possession of a monopoly, must be analyzed under the rule of reason and are only considered illegal when their effect is to unreasonablyrestrain trade. William Howard Taft, then Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, first developed the doctrine in a ruling on Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, which was affirmed in 1899 by the Supreme Court. The doctrine also played a major role in the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.
Competition law is the field of law that promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies. Competition law is implemented through public and private enforcement. It is also known as antitrust law, anti-monopoly law, and trade practices law; the act of pushing for antitrust measures or attacking monopolistic companies is commonly known as trust busting.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States found Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey guilty of monopolizing the petroleum industry through a series of abusive and anticompetitive actions. The Court's remedy was to divide Standard Oil into several geographically separate and eventually competing firms.
A civil conspiracy is a form of conspiracy involving an agreement between two or more parties to deprive a third party of legal rights or deceive a third party to obtain an illegal objective. A form of collusion, a conspiracy may also refer to a group of people who make an agreement to form a partnership in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member and engage in planning or agreeing to commit some act. It is not necessary that the conspirators be involved in all stages of planning or be aware of all details. Any voluntary agreement and some overt act by one conspirator in furtherance of the plan are the main elements necessary to prove a conspiracy.
Restraints of trade is a common law doctrine relating to the enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom to conduct business. It is a precursor of modern competition law. In an old leading case of Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) Lord Smith LC said,
it is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in all matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according to his own discretion and choice. If the law has regulated or restrained his mode of doing this, the law must be obeyed. But no power short of the general law ought to restrain his free discretion.
The history of competition law refers to attempts by governments to regulate competitive markets for goods and services, leading up to the modern competition or antitrust laws around the world today. The earliest records traces back to the efforts of Roman legislators to control price fluctuations and unfair trade practices. Throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, kings and queens repeatedly cracked down on monopolies, including those created through state legislation. The English common law doctrine of restraint of trade became the precursor to modern competition law. This grew out of the codifications of United States antitrust statutes, which in turn had considerable influence on the development of European Community competition laws after the Second World War. Increasingly, the focus has moved to international competition enforcement in a globalised economy.
Under a unilateral policy a manufacturer, without any agreement with the reseller, announces a minimum resale price and refuses to make further sales to any reseller that sells below the announced price. Unilateral policy is a form of resale price maintenance that enables a manufacturer to influence the price at which its distributors and dealers resell its products without a formal contract regarding the resale price. The policy was first identified in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
United Kingdom competition law is affected by both British and European elements. The Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002 are the most important statutes for cases with a purely national dimension. However, if the effect of a business' conduct would reach across borders, the European Commission has competence to deal with the problems, and exclusively EU law would apply. Even so, the section 60 of the Competition Act 1998 provides that UK rules are to be applied in line with European jurisprudence. Like all competition law, that in the UK has three main tasks.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), also referred to as the Danbury Hatters' Case, is a United States Supreme Court case in United States labor law concerning the application of antitrust laws to labor unions. The Court's decision effectively outlawed the secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, despite union arguments that their actions affected only intrastate commerce. It was also decided that individual unionists could be held personally liable for damages incurred by the activities of their union.
Copperweld is an American company based in Fayetteville, Tennessee, and maintaining a management office in Brentwood, Tennessee. Its main products are wire and stranded electrical cable made from its Copperweld brand copper-clad steel ("CCS") or copper-clad aluminum ("CCA"). In addition to its American operations, Copperweld maintains a production facility in Telford, England, and a distribution hub in Liège, Belgium.
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), is a 1941 decision of the United States Supreme Court sustaining an order of the Federal Trade Commission against a boycott agreement among manufacturers of "high-fashion" dresses. The purpose of the boycott was to suppress "style piracy". The FTC found the Fashion Guild in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, because the challenged conduct was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision. It stated that lawyers engage in "trade or commerce" and hence ended the legal profession's exemption from antitrust laws.
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that foreign states are entitled to sue for treble damages in U.S. courts, and should be recognized as "persons" under the Clayton Act.
United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, was a US antitrust case in which the Court held that Apple Inc. conspired to raise the price of e-books in violation of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court held it a violation of the antitrust laws to refuse to a competitor access to a facility necessary for entering or remaining in the market. In this case a combination of firms was carrying out the restrictive practice, rather than a single firm, which made the conduct susceptible to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than under the heightened standard of section 2 of that act. Even so, the case was brought under both sections.
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), is a United States Supreme Court decision that limited the scope of the 1926 Supreme Court decision in the General Electric case that had exempted patent licensing agreements from antitrust law's prohibition of price fixing. The Court did so by applying the doctrine of the Court's recent Interstate Circuit hub-and-spoke conspiracy decision.