Copperweld v. Independence Tube | |
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Argued December 5, 1983 Decided June 19, 1984 | |
Full case name | Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. |
Citations | 467 U.S. 752 ( more ) 104 S. Ct. 2731; 81 L. Ed. 2d 628 |
Case history | |
Prior | Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982); cert. granted, 462 U.S. 1131(1983). |
Subsequent | Remanded, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984). |
Holding | |
A parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiracy as defined by the Sherman Act. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Burger, joined by Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall |
White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Antitrust Act | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc. , 340 U.S. 211 (1951) |
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), is a major US antitrust law case decided by the Supreme Court concerning the Pittsburgh firm Copperweld Corporation and the Chicago firm Independence Tube. [1] It held that a parent company is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they cannot be considered separate economic entities.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." However, for a condition of conspiracy to exist, there must be at least two parties involved. Copperweld held that separate incorporation was not enough to render a parent and its subsidiary capable of conspiring, since forcibly the economic interests of a wholly owned subsidiary must be those of its parent. It does not apply to partially owned subsidiaries. [2]
Independence Tube commenced a civil action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act against Copperweld Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary (" Regal Tube Corporation"), and a third-party company that supplied mill ("Yoder Company"). Amongst others, Independence Tube claimed that Copperweld Corporation and Regal Tube Corporation had induced Yoder Company to breach a supply contract with Independence Tube to provide a tubing mill. This led to a nine months delay in Independence Tube's entry into the steel tubing business. The Supreme Court considered whether Independence Tube's claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act could succeed in relation to coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. [3]
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The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, held that an agreement between a wholly owned subsidiary and a parent did not fall under the definition of an "agreement" in Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the two companies, while legally separate, constituted a single economic entity.
The majority also observed that Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applied to concerted action between two (or more) independent firms:
"It cannot be denied that § 1's focus on concerted behavior leaves a "gap" in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. An unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms. Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as such - but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy - it leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability." [4]
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
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In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010), the Court refined the rule in Copperweld, holding that intra-enterprise agreements may be reviewed under §1 of the Sherman Act where they deprive the marketplace of independent centers of decision making, thus harming actual or potential competition. [5]
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair monopolies. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
In the United States, antitrust law is a collection of mostly federal laws that govern the conduct and organization of businesses in order to promote economic competition and prevent unjustified monopolies. The three main U.S. antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These acts serve three major functions. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing and the operation of cartels, and prohibits other collusive practices that unreasonably restrain trade. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Third, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.
Price fixing is an anticompetitive agreement between participants on the same side in a market to buy or sell a product, service, or commodity only at a fixed price, or maintain the market conditions such that the price is maintained at a given level by controlling supply and demand.
The rule of reason is a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the cornerstones of United States antitrust law. While some actions like price-fixing are considered illegal per se, other actions, such as possession of a monopoly, must be analyzed under the rule of reason and are only considered illegal when their effect is to unreasonablyrestrain trade. William Howard Taft, then Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, first developed the doctrine in a ruling on Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, which was affirmed in 1899 by the Supreme Court. The doctrine also played a major role in the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.
Competition law is the field of law that promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies. Competition law is implemented through public and private enforcement. It is also known as antitrust law, anti-monopoly law, and trade practices law; the act of pushing for antitrust measures or attacking monopolistic companies is commonly known as trust busting.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that ruled that John D. Rockefeller's petroleum conglomerate Standard Oil had illegally monopolized the American petroleum industry and ordered the company to break itself up. The decision also held, however, that U.S. antitrust law bans only "unreasonable" restraints on trade, an interpretation that came to be known as the "rule of reason".
A civil conspiracy is a form of conspiracy involving an agreement between two or more parties to deprive a third party of legal rights or deceive a third party to obtain an illegal objective. A form of collusion, a conspiracy may also refer to a group of people who make an agreement to form a partnership in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member and engage in planning or agreeing to commit some act. It is not necessary that the conspirators be involved in all stages of planning or be aware of all details. Any voluntary agreement and some overt act by one conspirator in furtherance of the plan are the main elements necessary to prove a conspiracy.
Restraints of trade is a common law doctrine relating to the enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom to conduct business. It is a precursor of modern competition law. In an old leading case of Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) Lord Smith LC said,
it is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in all matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according to his own discretion and choice. If the law has regulated or restrained his mode of doing this, the law must be obeyed. But no power short of the general law ought to restrain his free discretion.
In United States antitrust law, monopolization is illegal monopoly behavior. The main categories of prohibited behavior include exclusive dealing, price discrimination, refusing to supply an essential facility, product tying and predatory pricing. Monopolization is a federal crime under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. It has a specific legal meaning, which is parallel to the "abuse" of a dominant position in EU competition law, under TFEU article 102. It is also illegal in Australia under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that any person "who shall monopolize. .. any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Section 2 also forbids "attempts to monopolize" and "conspiracies to monopolize". Generally this means that corporations may not act in ways that have been identified as contrary to precedent cases.
The history of competition law refers to attempts by governments to regulate competitive markets for goods and services, leading up to the modern competition or antitrust laws around the world today. The earliest records traces back to the efforts of Roman legislators to control price fluctuations and unfair trade practices. Throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, kings and queens repeatedly cracked down on monopolies, including those created through state legislation. The English common law doctrine of restraint of trade became the precursor to modern competition law. This grew out of the codifications of United States antitrust statutes, which in turn had considerable influence on the development of European Community competition laws after the Second World War. Increasingly, the focus has moved to international competition enforcement in a globalised economy.
United Kingdom competition law is affected by both British and European elements. The Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002 are the most important statutes for cases with a purely national dimension. However, prior to Brexit, if the effect of a business' conduct would reach across borders, the European Commission has competence to deal with the problems, and exclusively EU law would apply. Even so, the pre-Brexit section 60 of the Competition Act 1998 provides that UK rules are to be applied in line with European jurisprudence. Like all competition law, that in the UK has three main tasks.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), also referred to as the Danbury Hatters' Case, is a United States Supreme Court case in United States labor law concerning the application of antitrust laws to labor unions. The Court's decision effectively outlawed the secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, despite union arguments that their actions affected only intrastate commerce. It was also decided that individual unionists could be held personally liable for damages incurred by the activities of their union.
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), is a 1941 decision of the United States Supreme Court sustaining an order of the Federal Trade Commission against a boycott agreement among manufacturers of "high-fashion" dresses. The purpose of the boycott was to suppress "style piracy". The FTC found the Fashion Guild in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act, because the challenged conduct was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the assertion that attempted monopolization may be proven merely by demonstration of unfair or predatory conduct. Instead, conduct of a single firm could be held to be unlawful attempted monopolization only when it actually monopolized or dangerously threatened to do so. Thus, the Court rejected the conclusion that injury to competition could be presumed to follow from certain conduct. The causal link must be demonstrated.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision. It stated that lawyers engage in "trade or commerce" and hence ended the legal profession's exemption from antitrust laws.
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that foreign states are entitled to sue for treble damages in U.S. courts, and should be recognized as "persons" under the Clayton Act.
United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. was a criminal case filed on October 15, 1996 in which the United States alleged that Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) and other corporations and individuals engaged in a conspiracy to fix and maintain prices of lysine and citric acid and to restrain or eliminate competing suppliers of these additives in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. ADM entered into a plea agreement in which ADM pleaded guilty to both antitrust counts and agreed to pay a combined fine of $100 million. This is equivalent to $237.10 million in present-day terms and was at the time the largest antitrust fine ever imposed.
United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, was a US antitrust case in which the Court held that Apple Inc. conspired to raise the price of e-books in violation of the Sherman Act.
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), was a 1953 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, where exclusive output contracts used by one company "and the three other major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available outlets for this business throughout the United States" the practice is "a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few [that it] falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' " under § 5 of the FTC Act. In so ruling, the Court extended the analysis under § 3 of the Clayton Act of requirements contracts that it made in the Standard Stations case to output contracts brought under the Sherman or FTC Acts.
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court held it a violation of the antitrust laws to refuse to a competitor access to a facility necessary for entering or remaining in the market. In this case a combination of firms was carrying out the restrictive practice, rather than a single firm, which made the conduct susceptible to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than under the heightened standard of section 2 of that act. Even so, the case was brought under both sections.