Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. | |
---|---|
Argued February 7, 1946 Decided February 25, 1946 | |
Full case name | Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. |
Citations | 327 U.S. 251 ( more ) 66 S. Ct. 574; 90 L. Ed. 652 |
Case history | |
Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 327 U.S. 817(1946). |
Holding | |
A damage award does not need to be mathematically precise, but it must be a just and reasonable estimate based on the evidence presented, and not based on speculation. Can use yardstick or before & after, but must be careful to use comparable data. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Stone |
Dissent | Frankfurter |
Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and 7; Clayton Act, §§ 4 and 16 |
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court allowing an action to recover compensatory damages under the antitrust statutes. The jury had returned a verdict for $120,000 in petitioner's favor, covering a five-year period where plaintiff suffered due to respondents' antitrust conspiracy. The trial court, sitting in the Northern District of Illinois, gave judgment for treble damages, as prescribed by § 4 of the Clayton Act. The 7th Circuit reversed on the sole ground that the evidence of damage was not sufficient for submission to the jury, and directed the entry of judgment for respondents non obstante veredicto (notwithstanding the verdict). [1] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the evidence of damage was sufficient to support the verdict. Respondents argued that any measure of damages would be too speculative and uncertain to afford an accurate measure of the amount of the damage. [2] The Supreme Court disagreed, not wanting to let the respondent defeat a remedy because its antitrust violation was so effective and complete. The Court held that the jury could return a verdict for the plaintiffs, even though damages could not be measured with the exactness which would otherwise have been possible, so long as the jury made a "just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data". [3] The judgment of the district court was affirmed and the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.
Petitioners, owners of the Jackson Park motion picture theatre in Chicago, alleged that respondents, some of whom, like RKO Pictures, were distributors of films, and some of whom owned or controlled theatres in Chicago, entered into a conspiracy which continued from some time before November 1936 to the date the suit was brought, July 28, 1942. During the conspiracy, films were distributed among cinemas in Chicago in such a manner that theatres owned by some of the conspirators were able to show movies before independent theater operators. Independent exhibitors were not able to show new movies until the conspirators had finished with a "first run".
The first question was whether there was an unlawful conspiracy, and the second question was how to measure the damages for any loss, given the difficulty of knowing how many people might have attended different films.
The Supreme Court found that it was "indisputable that the jury could have found that ... a first run theater possessed competitive advantages over later run theaters" and that this discriminatory release was "damaging to petitioners". [4] The problem, however, was the uncertainty in determining to what amount those damages should total. The petitioners submitted two methodologies for calculating damages. The first was the yardstick method, which compared the earnings from petitioner's theater, Jackson Park, during the conspiracy to the earnings of its competitor, the Maryland Theater. The two theaters were comparable in size, although the Jackson Park theater was "superior in location, equipment, and attractiveness to patrons." [5] The Maryland Theater, however, was owned by Paramount Pictures, and benefited from the conspiracy. The evidence showed that during the five-year period, Maryland's profit exceeded petitioner's like profit by $115,982.34.
The second measure was the before & after method. Here, the Court looked to the years 1933–1937, where the petitioner had successfully showed at least some first run movies, to the five-year period where the conspiracy was established to have happened, and petitioner was completely shut out of first run movies despite its best efforts. This comparison showed a falling off of petitioners' profits during the five-year period aggregating $125,659.00.
The 7th Circuit concluded that the jury had adopted the before & after method, but that this proof did not furnish a proper measure of damage for the reason that it could not be proved what petitioner's earnings would have been in the absence of the illegal distribution of films. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a damage award does not need to be mathematically precise, but it must be a just and reasonable estimate based on the evidence presented, and not based on speculation. Petitioners are able to submit yardstick or before & after estimates, but they must be careful to use comparable data.
At common law, damages are a remedy in the form of a monetary award to be paid to a claimant as compensation for loss or injury. To warrant the award, the claimant must show that a breach of duty has caused foreseeable loss. To be recognised at law, the loss must involve damage to property, or mental or physical injury; pure economic loss is rarely recognised for the award of damages.
In common law, a petit jury hears the evidence in a trial as presented by both the plaintiff (petitioner) and the defendant (respondent). After hearing the evidence and often jury instructions from the judge, the group retires for deliberation, to consider a verdict. The majority required for a verdict varies. In some cases it must be unanimous, while in other jurisdictions it may be a majority or supermajority. A jury that is unable to come to a verdict is referred to as a hung jury. The size of the jury varies; in criminal cases involving serious felonies there are usually 12 jurors, although Scotland uses 15. A number of countries that are not in the English common law tradition have quasi-juries on which lay judges or jurors and professional judges deliberate together regarding criminal cases. However, the common law trial jury is the most common type of jury system.
In law, a verdict is the formal finding of fact made by a jury on matters or questions submitted to the jury by a judge. In a bench trial, the judge's decision near the end of the trial is simply referred to as a finding. In England and Wales, a coroner's findings used to be called verdicts but are, since 2009, called conclusions.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), was a landmark United States Supreme Court antitrust case that decided the fate of film studios owning their own theatres and holding exclusivity rights on which theatres would show their movies. It would also change the way Hollywood movies were produced, distributed, and exhibited. It also opened the door for more foreign and independent films to be shown in U.S. theaters. The Supreme Court affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's ruling that the existing distribution scheme was in violation of United States antitrust law, which prohibits certain exclusive dealing arrangements. The decision created the Paramount Decree, a standard held by the United States Department of Justice that prevented film production companies from owning exhibition companies. The case is important both in American antitrust law and film history. In the former, it remains a landmark decision in vertical integration cases; in the latter, it is responsible for putting an end to the old Hollywood studio system.
In cinematic parlance, a film in its first run has been recently released. In North America, new films attract the majority of their theatrical viewers in the first few weeks after their release. In North America, different movie theatres pay different rates to show films depending on how recently they have been released. In 1946, the Supreme Court of the United States found major film distributors in violation of antitrust laws when they precluded independent theaters from screening first-run films.
Under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, private entities are immune from liability under the antitrust laws for attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, even if the laws they advocate for would have anticompetitive effects. The doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment protection of political speech, and "upon a recognition that the antitrust laws, 'tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.'"
In United States law, treble damages is a term that indicates that a statute permits a court to triple the amount of the actual/compensatory damages to be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. Treble damages are a multiple of, and not an addition to, actual damages in some instances. On occasion, however, as in California Civil Code § 1719, they are additive. When such damages are multiplicative and a person received an award of $100 for an injury, a court applying treble damages would raise the award to $300. Some statutes mandate awards of treble damages for all violations. Examples of statutes with mandatory treble damages provisions are the Clayton Antitrust Act and RICO. Some statutes allow for an award of treble damages only if there is a showing that the violation was willful. For example, "up to three times the amount found or assessed" may be awarded by a court in the United States for willful patent infringement. The idea behind the creation of such damages is that they will encourage citizens to sue for violations that are harmful to society in general, and deter the violator from committing future violations.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that if there is to be an award of statutory damages in a copyright infringement case, then the opposing party has the right to demand a jury trial.
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with jury trials in civil matters. The court held that where legal and equitable claims are joined in the same action, the legal claims must be tried by a jury before the equitable claims can be resolved.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. Written by Associate Justice William Rehnquist, the decision of the Court held that a party moving for summary judgment need show only that the opposing party lacks evidence sufficient to support its case. A broader version of that doctrine was later formally added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Alcatel-Lucent v. Microsoft Corp., also known as Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Gateway Inc., was a long-running patent infringement case between Alcatel-Lucent and Microsoft litigated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California and appealed multiple times to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alcatel-Lucent was awarded $1.53 billion in a final verdict in August 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in San Diego. The damages award was reversed on appeal in September 2009, and the case was returned for a separate trial on the amount of damages.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset was the first file-sharing copyright infringement lawsuit in the United States brought by major record labels to be tried before a jury. The defendant, Jammie Thomas-Rasset, was found liable to the plaintiff record company for making 24 songs available to the public for free on the Kazaa file sharing service and ordered to pay $220,000.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), also referred to as the Danbury Hatters' Case, is a United States Supreme Court case in United States labor law concerning the application of antitrust laws to labor unions. The Court's decision effectively outlawed the secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, despite union arguments that their actions affected only intrastate commerce. It was also decided that individual unionists could be held personally liable for damages incurred by the activities of their union.
Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885), was an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release the petitioner from imprisonment in the District of Columbia jail where he was held, as he alleges, unlawfully by John S. Crocker, the warden of the jail. He presents with the petition the record of his conviction and sentence in the Supreme Court of the District to imprisonment for five years under an indictment for embezzlement, and this record and the petition of the applicant present all that could be brought before the court on a return to the writ, if one were awarded.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the law that fixing a maximum price was illegal per se. This rule was reversed in 1997 by State Oil Co. v. Khan, which held that maximum price-setting was not inherently anti-competitive and not always a violation of antitrust law, and should therefore be evaluated for legality under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule.
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that an agreement among competitors in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices of their products violates the Sherman Antitrust Act.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause usually limits punitive damage awards to less than ten times the size of the compensatory damages awarded and that punitive damage awards of four times the compensatory damage award is "close to the line of constitutional impropriety".
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that speech made in a public place on a matter of public concern cannot be the basis of liability for a tort of emotional distress, even if the speech is viewed as offensive or outrageous.
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court case where the majority ruling, written by Justice Harlan, asserted that the burden of showing a lack of factual controversy rests upon the party asserting the summary judgment. It was later challenged by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), but the case was not officially overruled. While the issue before the Supreme Court was a fairly technical matter, the subject matter regarded the violation of white teacher Sandra Adickes' civil rights in the segregated South, after being refused service at a restaurant because she wished to eat with her black students.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), is a 1939 decision of the United States Supreme Court finding an antitrust price-fixing conspiracy based on what subsequently came to be known a hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory.
Text of Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251(1946) is available from: Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress