United States v. American Tobacco Co. | |
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Argued January 3–6, 1910 Reargued January 9–12, 1911 Decided May 29, 1911 | |
Full case name | United States v. American Tobacco Company |
Citations | 221 U.S. 106 ( more ) 31 S. Ct. 632; 55 L. Ed. 663 |
Case history | |
Prior | Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York |
Holding | |
The combination in this case is one in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize the business of tobacco in interstate commerce within the prohibitions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | White, joined by McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar |
Concur/dissent | Harlan |
Laws applied | |
Sherman Antitrust Act |
United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106(1911), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the combination in this case is one in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize the business of tobacco in interstate commerce within the prohibitions of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. As a result, the American Tobacco Company was split into four competitors.
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The Sherman Antitrust Act was created in 1890, and in 1907 the American Tobacco Company was indicted in violation of it. [1] In 1908 when the Department of Justice filed suit against the company, sixty-five companies and twenty-nine individuals were named in the suit. The Supreme Court ordered the company to dissolve in 1911 on the same day that it ordered the Standard Oil Trust to dissolve. [1] The ruling in United States v. American Tobacco Co. stated that the combination of the tobacco companies “in and of itself, as well as each and all of the elements composing it whether corporate or individual, whether considered collectively or separately [was] in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize, and a monopolization within the first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act.” [2]
In order to promote market competition, four firms were created from the American Tobacco Company's assets: American Tobacco Company, R. J. Reynolds, Liggett & Myers, and Lorillard. The monopoly became an oligopoly. [3]
In 1938 Thurman Arnold in the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division began hosting hearings in the Temporary National Economic Committee to determine whether the four companies were further engaged together in monopolistic practices. [4] That committee found that 3 of the 4 companies were guilty of the charges presented to the court. [4]
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
In the United States, antitrust law is a collection of mostly federal laws that regulate the conduct and organization of businesses to promote competition and prevent unjustified monopolies. The main statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These acts serve three major functions. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing and the operation of cartels, and prohibits other collusive practices that unreasonably restrain trade. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Third, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.
The American Tobacco Company was a tobacco company founded in 1890 by J. B. Duke through a merger between a number of U.S. tobacco manufacturers including Allen and Ginter and Goodwin & Company. The company was one of the original 12 members of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1896. The American Tobacco Company dominated the industry by acquiring the Lucky Strike Company and over 200 other rival firms. Antitrust action begun in 1907 broke the company into several major companies in 1911.
The rule of reason is a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the cornerstones of United States antitrust law. While some actions like price-fixing are considered illegal per se, other actions, such as possession of a monopoly, must be analyzed under the rule of reason and are only considered illegal when their effect is to unreasonablyrestrain trade. William Howard Taft, then Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, first developed the doctrine in a ruling on Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, which was affirmed in 1899 by the Supreme Court. The doctrine also played a major role in the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States found Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey guilty of monopolizing the petroleum industry through a series of abusive and anticompetitive actions. The Court's remedy was to divide Standard Oil into several geographically separate and eventually competing firms.
The McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, is a United States federal law that exempts the business of insurance from most federal regulation, including federal antitrust laws to a limited extent. The McCarran–Ferguson Act was passed by the 79th Congress in 1945 after the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association that the federal government could regulate insurance companies under the authority of the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution and that the federal antitrust laws applied to the insurance industry.
Restraints of trade is a common law doctrine relating to the enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom to conduct business. It is a precursor of modern competition law. In an old leading case of Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) Lord Smith LC said,
it is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in all matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according to his own discretion and choice. If the law has regulated or restrained his mode of doing this, the law must be obeyed. But no power short of the general law ought to restrain his free discretion.
The history of competition law refers to attempts by governments to regulate competitive markets for goods and services, leading up to the modern competition or antitrust laws around the world today. The earliest records traces back to the efforts of Roman legislators to control price fluctuations and unfair trade practices. Throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, kings and queens repeatedly cracked down on monopolies, including those created through state legislation. The English common law doctrine of restraint of trade became the precursor to modern competition law. This grew out of the codifications of United States antitrust statutes, which in turn had considerable influence on the development of European Community competition laws after the Second World War. Increasingly, the focus has moved to international competition enforcement in a globalised economy.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), also referred to as the Danbury Hatters' Case, is a United States Supreme Court case in United States labor law concerning the application of antitrust laws to labor unions. The Court's decision effectively outlawed the secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, despite union arguments that their actions affected only intrastate commerce. It was also decided that individual unionists could be held personally liable for damages incurred by the activities of their union.
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), often referred to as International Boxing Club or just International Boxing, was an antitrust decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. By a 7–2 margin, the justices ruled that the exemption it had previously upheld for Major League Baseball was peculiar and unique to that sport and that it did not apply to boxing. Since it met the definition of interstate commerce, the government could therefore proceed with a trial to prove IBCNY and the other defendants had conspired to monopolize the market for championship boxing in the United States.
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the assertion that attempted monopolization may be proven merely by demonstration of unfair or predatory conduct. Instead, conduct of a single firm could be held to be unlawful attempted monopolization only when it actually monopolized or dangerously threatened to do so. Thus, the Court rejected the conclusion that injury to competition could be presumed to follow from certain conduct. The causal link must be demonstrated.
A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, was an early appellate case testing the legality of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), in this instance whether it could properly be alleged to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Cigarette smoking for weight loss is a weight control method whereby one consumes tobacco, often in the form of cigarettes, to decrease one's appetite. The practice dates to early knowledge of nicotine as an appetite suppressant.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), is a major US antitrust law case decided by the Supreme Court concerning the Pittsburgh firm Copperweld Corporation and the Chicago firm Independence Tube. It held that a parent company is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they cannot be considered separate economic entities. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." However, for a condition of conspiracy to exist, there must be at least two parties involved. Copperweld held that separate incorporation was not enough to render a parent and its subsidiary capable of conspiring, since forcibly the economic interests of a wholly owned subsidiary must be those of its parent. It does not apply to partially owned subsidiaries.
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that foreign states are entitled to sue for treble damages in U.S. courts, and should be recognized as "persons" under the Clayton Act.
The history of United States antitrust law is generally taken to begin with the Sherman Antitrust Act 1890, although some form of policy to regulate competition in the market economy has existed throughout the common law's history. Although "trust" had a technical legal meaning, the word was commonly used to denote big business, especially a large, growing manufacturing conglomerate of the sort that suddenly emerged in great numbers in the 1880s and 1890s. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 began a shift towards federal rather than state regulation of big business. It was followed by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, and the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court held it a violation of the antitrust laws to refuse to a competitor access to a facility necessary for entering or remaining in the market. In this case a combination of firms carried out the restrictive practice, rather than a single firm. That made the conduct susceptible to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than under the heightened standard of section 2 of that act, but the case was brought under both sections.
United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. , 225 F. 800, was a civil antitrust prosecution overlapping to some extent with the issues in the decision in the Supreme Court's Motion Picture Patents case. After the trial court found that the defendants violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by establishing control over "trade in films, cameras, projecting machines, and other accessories of the motion picture business," by their patent licensing practices and other conduct, they appealed to the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., however, the parties dismissed the appeal by stipulation in 1918 that the decision had made the defendants' appeal futile.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court involving the right to make petitions to the government. The right to petition is enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as: "Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This case involved an accusation that one group of companies was using state and federal regulatory actions to eliminate competitors. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to petition is integral to the legal system but using lawful means to achieve unlawful restraint of trade is not protected.
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