Ariovistus

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Ariovistus
Caesar and Ariovistus (meeting before the battle) by Johann Nepomuk Geiger (cropped).jpg
Anachronistic 1873 depiction of Ariovistus
Born1st century BC
DiedUnknown
NationalityGermanic
Known forLeader of the Suebi during the 1st century BC
Military career
Commands Suebi
Battles / wars

Ariovistus was a leader of the Suebi and other allied Germanic peoples in the second quarter of the 1st century BC, whose name appears prominently in Julius Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico . Before their conflict with the Romans, Ariovistus and his followers took part in a war in Gaul, assisting the Arverni and Sequani in defeating their rivals, the Aedui. They then settled in large numbers into conquered Gallic territory in the Alsace region. They were defeated however, in the Battle of Vosges and driven back over the Rhine in 58 BC by Julius Caesar. [1]

Contents

While known primarily for his conflict with Caesar, Ariovistus is one of the earliest named figures associated with the peoples the Romans later categorized as Germani . Caesar portrays Ariovistus as a violent and threatening invader in Gaul; however, modern scholars recognize that this depiction reflects Roman political motives in as much as it does historical fact. [2] Like other major ancient Germanic figures, Ariovistus remains a pivotal figure for understanding early Greco-Roman conceptions of "barbarian" identity, frontier politics, and the complex dynamics of early Germanic ethnography. [3]

Primary sources

Ariovistus is known exclusively through Roman sources, chiefly Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico in books 1.31–1.54. [4] Not a single non-Roman account survives to provide an independent perspective about Ariovistus. As such, modern historians approach his portrayal with caution. [a] Modern scholarship has emphasized Caesar’s rhetorical techniques in constructing Ariovistus as a threatening "barbarian" figure. Emma Allen-Hornblower argues that Caesar employs language of animality and savagery, presenting leaders like Ariovistus as prone to anger (iracundus), rash (temerarius), and violent, in deliberate contrast with the disciplined self-image of Rome. [6] This rhetorical stylization underscores the propagandistic dimension of Caesar’s narrative, in which Ariovistus's defeat affirms Roman order against barbarian chaos. [7]

Caesar presents Ariovistus less as an autonomous leader than as a rhetorical construct—a dangerous barbarian whose defeat showcased Caesar's valor and Roman superiority. [b] Historian Adrian Goldsworthy observes that Caesar's commentaries functioned both as military reports and as political propaganda for the Senate and Roman public. [10] Modern historiography stresses reading them within Roman ideological frameworks, especially in depictions of the so-called barbarian. [11] [12] Caesar's portrayal of Germanic peoples as restless, semi-nomadic aggressors obscures more complex realities: some groups were settled, and Caesar himself employed Germanic mercenaries. [13]

Role and status

According to Caesar, Ariovistus spoke Gaulish fluently [14] and had two wives: one Suebian, brought from "home", and another, the sister of King Voccio of Noricum, acquired through a political marriage. Both later died attempting to escape from Caesar's forces. [15] His possible Suebian origin rests mainly on the mention of the Suebian wife, [15] though this remains debated. [c]

Caesar styled him rex Germanorum ('king of the Germani'). [17] In reality, Germania was politically fragmented, with many tribal kings. [18] Ariovistus's authority likely extended only over those Germanic groups who had crossed into Gaul, since individual tribes had their own leaders. [19]

In 59 BC, during Caesar's consulship, the Senate recognized Ariovistus as "king and friend of the Roman people" (rex et amicus populi Romani). [20] At the very least, this title indicated that Ariovistus was already a significant power in central Gaul before Caesar’s campaigns. [21] Yet how this Roman title corresponded to his actual Germanic status remains unclear. [22] Scholars warn that rex in Roman terminology cannot be equated uncritically with Germanic leadership traditions. [23] [24] Tacitus later wrote that kings were chosen by birth, military leaders by merit, and neither held absolute power. [18]

Intervention in Gaul

Before Caesar's arrival in Gaul (58 BC), the Arverni and Sequani enlisted Ariovistus in their struggle against the Aedui, Rome's allies. [17] Perhaps Ariovistus seemed like a natural ally from whom to solicit assistance, since a few years prior (61 BC), he had defeated the Aedui handily. [25] The Aedui occupied territory along the upper Loire between the Sequani of the Doubs valley and the Arverni of the Massif Central. [26] The Sequani controlled access to the Rhine via the Doubs valley and had fortified Vesontio to dominate trade between the Rhine and Rhone. Strabo, writing later, identified commercial rivalry over tolls along the Arar (Saône) as a cause of conflict. [27]

At the Battle of Magetobriga, Ariovistus's 15,000 men defeated the Aedui, enslaved hostages, and seized a third of their territory, settling 120,000 Germanic peoples there. [28] [d] He later demanded more land for his allies the Harudes—some 24,000 of them [5] —and began devastating Sequani lands, effectively turning on his former patrons. [20]

Ariovistus's forces comprised a migratory conglomeration—Harudes, Eudusii, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Marcomanni, and Suebi—with uncertainty as to whether he possessed a distinct personal following beyond a probable mounted core. [21]

Roman politics and confrontation with Caesar

By Caesar's governorship in 58 BC, Ariovistus's Germanic people had been settled in Gaul for years. [17] Cicero attests to the Aedui's defeat by Ariovistus in 60 BC. [31] Pliny the Elder also records that Metellus Celer, proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, met a Suebian king in 62 BC. [32] When the Aedui appealed to Caesar through their magistrate Diviciacus, Caesar demanded that Ariovistus cease crossings, release hostages, and respect Rome's allies. [33] [34] It appears the territorial ambitions of Ariovistus alarmed the peoples of Gaul and Caesar saw another opportunity for a "dramatic military campaign" and declared that the Gallic appeal must be accepted. [25] [e] Ariovistus rejected these demands from Caesar, mocking Rome's ability to protect its friends. When Caesar and Ariovistus later met in person, accompanied only by cavalry, Caesar stressed Rome's duty to allies, while Ariovistus accused the Romans of hypocrisy and prophesied that Caesar could be killed for the benefit of Rome's elite. [36]

Battle

Ariovistus maneuvered around Vesontio to cut Caesar's supplies, but Caesar rallied his men, advancing in triplex acies . [37] According to Caesar, Germanic soothsayers delayed battle until the new moon, though Dio suggests Ariovistus intended to starve the Romans. [38] Whatever the cause, there was widespread panic for a short period among Caesar's military leaders and soldiers due to reports from traders and Gallic auxiliaries about the size and ferocity of the Germanic warriors prepared to face them. [39] However, Caesar was able to assuage their fears and rally his men. [40]

Eventually, the Germanic peoples arrayed by tribe—Harudes, Marcomanni, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi—faced six Roman legions. Caesar notes that his cavalry guard included soldiers from the 10th Legion, who joked they had been "promoted to knights," giving rise to the name Legio X Equestris. [41] In the ensuing battle, Germanic phalanx tactics briefly pushed back the Romans until Publius Licinius Crassus committed reserves at the critical moment, securing victory. Ariovistus's line of troops broke, fleeing toward the Rhine. Ariovistus escaped, but his wives were killed, one daughter slain, another captured. Caesar's envoys Gaius Valerius Procillus and Marcus Mettius were freed. [42]

Modern analysis

The battle between Caesar and Ariovistus has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. British classical scholar, Christopher Pelling, claimed that Caesar's descriptions of topography and troop movements are often simplified for his Roman audience, who otherwise lacked precise geographical knowledge. As a result, reconstructions based solely on Caesar's account are problematic and must be treated cautiously. [43]

Pelling highlights several key issues. First, Caesar states that after leaving Vesontio he marched for seven days, covering a distance of roughly 97 to 129 kilometres (60 to 80 mi), before learning of Ariovistus' position. [44] Ariovistus' manoeuvre to cut off Roman supplies also raises questions: Caesar may have omitted mention of unsuccessful cavalry engagements or simplified the geography to make the event more comprehensible. [45]

Ancient sources disagree on the distance of the Germanic retreat. Caesar records 8 kilometres (5 mi) to the Rhine, while Plutarch and Orosius give 80 kilometres (50 mi). [42] [46] [47] [48] Pelling argues that both readings may be possible: 8 kilometres (5 mi) seems too short to emphasize, while 80 kilometres (50 mi) may result from later textual corruption. He concludes that Caesar's figure is best regarded as an impressionistic estimate rather than precise measurement. [49]

The location of the battlefield also remains uncertain. Scholars have proposed sites at Ribeauvillé, Cernay, and the Mulhouse–Basel plain, but each presents difficulties of distance, terrain, or strategic plausibility. [50] Pelling finds the Belfort region most credible, as it lies naturally on the line of march between Vesontio and Upper Alsace, but even this reconstruction requires assumptions about distances and communications. [51] He concludes that Caesar's simplification of events makes any definitive identification of the battlefield unlikely. [52]

Aftermath

Caesar's victory shattered the Suebi's ability to cross the Rhine for years and his defeat of both the Helvetii and Ariovistus within a single year represented "massive achievements", according to Adrian Goldsworthy. [40] Ariovistus disappears from history soon after; by 54 BC, Caesar noted that the death of Ariovistus had provoked indignation among the Germanic warriors. [53]

The disposition of Alsace after Ariovistus is unclear. Pliny records that some Celtic tribes allowed Germanic settlement, [54] while Strabo places the Sequani on the Rhine. [55] The Boii, formerly strong on the Danube and Rhine, may have been displaced by the Marcomanni and Quadi. Caesar resettled surviving Boii among the Aedui just before his campaign against Ariovistus. In the early Empire, the same Germanic groups that had fought for Ariovistus appear on both sides of the Rhine in Alsace, forming the basis for Germania Superior. Over time, they seem to have integrated into Romano-Celtic society. After their settlement on the left bank of the Rhine, tribes such as the Vangiones, Nemetes, and Triboci became incorporated into the Roman province of Germania Superior, gradually adopting Roman civic life and integrating into Romano-Celtic society. [56] [57] [58]

Etymology

Most scholars derive Ariovistus from Gaulish ario ('noble', 'free') and uid-/uissu- ('knowledge', 'perception'), yielding 'noble sage' or 'he who knows in advance'. [59] There is also a corresponding translation that gets rendered 'high-born wise one'. [60]

References

Notes

  1. To this end, historian Dieter Timpe argues that Caesar's framing of Ariovistus as a barbarian aggressor and Rome's intervention as a defense of allies represent a propagandistic stylization that should not be taken at face value. [5]
  2. Later historians, notably Cassius Dio, are rightfully suspicious of Caesar's motives. [8] [9]
  3. Historian Helmut Castritius, points out that having a Suebian wife in tow proved nothing about Ariovistus' own origin. [16]
  4. Caesar reports that the Suebi maintained a citizen army of 100,000 men annually, [29] while Tacitus notes that they were not one tribe but a confederation. [30]
  5. As such, Caesar politically instrumentalized Ariovistus as a renewed "Cimbrian danger" yet the invasion itself shows the typical features of a Germanic migration aimed at symbiotic participation in the Celtic world rather than sheer predation against the Romans and their allies. [35]

Citations

  1. Caesar 2019, pp. 38–39, book 1.53–1.54.
  2. Krebs 2012, pp. 43–44.
  3. Wolfram 1997, pp. 5–7, 17.
  4. Caesar 2019, pp. 24–39, book 1.31–1.54.
  5. 1 2 Timpe 1998, p. 29.
  6. Allen-Hornblower 2014, pp. 682–685.
  7. Allen-Hornblower 2014, pp. 690–693.
  8. Dio 1914, book 38, paragraphs 34–50.
  9. Plutarch 1919, paragraph 19.
  10. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 186–190.
  11. Goffart 2006, pp. 26, 43, 50–52.
  12. Kulikowski 2008, pp. 56–60.
  13. Goldsworthy 2009, p. 104.
  14. Caesar 2019, p. 36, book 1.47.
  15. 1 2 Caesar 2019, p. 38, book 1.53.
  16. Castritius 2005, p. 188.
  17. 1 2 3 Caesar 2019, p. 25, book 1.31.
  18. 1 2 Tacitus 2009, p. 41, book 7.
  19. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 211.
  20. 1 2 Caesar 2019, p. 27, book 1.35.
  21. 1 2 Timpe 1998, p. 30.
  22. Todd 2004, pp. 56–60.
  23. Wolfram 1997, p. 36.
  24. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 33.
  25. 1 2 Grant 1978, p. 217.
  26. Barral, Guillaumet & Nouvel 2002, pp. 271–276.
  27. Strabo 1923, section 4.3.2.
  28. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 204, 207.
  29. Caesar 2019, p. 86, book 4.1.
  30. Tacitus 2009, p. 57, book 38.
  31. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 207.
  32. Pliny the Elder 1938, 2.170.
  33. Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 203–204.
  34. Caesar 2019, p. 27, book 1.34–35.
  35. Timpe 1998, pp. 30–31.
  36. Caesar 2019, p. 34, book 1.44.
  37. Caesar 2019, pp. 37–38, book 1.50–1.52.
  38. Dio 1914, book 38.48–50.
  39. Goldsworthy 2016, pp. 216–217.
  40. 1 2 Goldsworthy 2016, p. 217.
  41. Keppie 1984, p. 84.
  42. 1 2 Caesar 2019, pp. 38–39, book 1.53.
  43. Pelling 1981, pp. 741–752.
  44. Pelling 1981, pp. 752–754.
  45. Pelling 1981, pp. 756–757.
  46. Plutarch 1919, pp. 112–113.
  47. Orosius 1889, section 6.7.
  48. Pelling 1981, pp. 753–754.
  49. Pelling 1981, pp. 757–758.
  50. Pelling 1981, pp. 758–761.
  51. Pelling 1981, pp. 761–764.
  52. Pelling 1981, pp. 762–764.
  53. Caesar 2019, pp. 124–125, book 5.29.
  54. Pliny the Elder 1938, 4.106.
  55. Strabo 1923, section 4.3.4.
  56. Freyssinet 2007, pp. 51–52.
  57. Haeussler 1994, pp. 46, 50–51, 73.
  58. Oldenstein 1983, pp. 201–232.
  59. Johnston, Mengden & Thim 2006, p. 115.
  60. Delamarre 2003, p. 55.

Bibliography

Further reading