Background
Thomas Barefoot (February 23, 1945 – October 30, 1984) was convicted of the murder of a police officer. The same Texas jury determined, in the sentencing phase of the trial, whether Barefoot should receive the death penalty.
The Texas death-penalty statute required that the jury consider whether Barefoot would pose "future dangerousness". [4] Along with other evidence, the prosecution called two psychiatrists who, answering hypothetical questions, testified that Barefoot was likely to remain a danger to society. Neither psychiatrist had examined Barefoot nor asked to do so, but each summarized their professional experience as equipping them to answer the questions accurately. One psychiatrist called Barefoot a "criminal sociopath" and said there was no treatment for this condition and that Barefoot was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. The other psychiatrist testified that Barefoot had "a fairly classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder." He placed Barefoot in the "most severe category" of sociopaths, and on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was "above ten". [5] The jury considered this as well as other evidence and imposed the death penalty. [1]
The Court ignored amicus briefs arguing that psychiatric evidence cannot be offered on such issues with any reasonable degree of certainty. [2]
Appeals
Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which rejected his argument that this use of psychiatric testimony during the sentencing phase of his trial was unconstitutional and upheld the conviction and sentence. After denials of a writ of certiorari and of habeas corpus, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court raising the same objections to the use of psychiatric testimony. Although the District Court rejected his claims and denied the writ, it did issue a certificate of probable cause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied a second writ of habeas corpus and denied a stay of execution. The Court of Appeals also denied a stay of execution. [1]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Subsequent developments
The Court's decision in this death penalty case was very important in influencing the legal opinion regarding psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, a position with which the American Psychiatric Association and other medical ethicists disagree, leading some experts to conclude that a psychiatrist making such statements verges on the brink of being a quack. Nevertheless, courts have been willing to accept such testimony despite the lack of empirical evidence that these predictions of future dangerousness are accurate. [6]
However, forensic experts state that psychiatric testimony on ultimate questions at law is unreliable due to the inherent limitations of current psychiatric clinical and experimental knowledge and practice. [3] Dr. James P. Grigson, one of the psychiatrists that testified in this case, was expelled from the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Association of Psychiatric Physicians (TAPP) for making statements in testimony on defendants he had not examined. The TAPP said his expulsion was due not only to his replies to hypothetical questions but also for predicting dangerousness with 100% certainty. [7]
Barefoot was executed on October 30, 1984, at the age of 39.
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