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China's dark fleet, also known by the terms shadow fleet or ghost fleet, describes a clandestine network of Chinese tankers and fishing vessels operating under concealed identities by disabling transponders, or using deceptive practices to evade international monitoring systems and sanctions. This network's main objective is to smuggle oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia into China.
The term dark fleet is known to be commonly used by analysts, maritime experts, and policymakers, when describing vessels that avoid detection on purpose by disabling automatic identification system (AIS) transponders, using flag-of-convenience registries, engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in international waters, and manipulating geolocation data. [1] [2] [3] China's dark fleet was expanded during the 2000s, first to increase amounts of seafood fishing and later for illegal cargo transfer from sanctioned countries like Iran and Venezuela. [4] [5] Its global operations from the Pacific Ocean to West Africa brought it worldwide attention. [6] [7]
China's dark fleet, uses similar tactics like other dark fleets and disable their AIS transponders or spoof geolocation data to operate undetected and avoid enforcement. [8] [9]
China's dark fleet registers its vessels under various flags like Panama, Liberia, or even smaller nations like Gambia, in order to obscure ownership, skirt regulations, and avoid accountability. [10] [11]
Tankers of China's dark fleet take part in ship to ship transfer of oil from foreign sources who are under sanctions. This takes place in several hot spots like the waters off Malaysia, the Gulf of Guinea (West Africa), and the South China Sea. [4] [12]
GPS spoofing also known as software defined geofencing is used to send a fake signal locating the ship at one location while it is actually in an other location. [13] [14] [15]
China's dark fleet operates mainly in several hot spots around the world:
China's dark fleet, consisting of hundreds of ships, often locates itself on the edge of fishing areas of South American countries like Ecuador (near the Galápagos Islands) and Peru. While in the area they shut down their tracking systems to fish undetected and in an unregulated manor. [8] [9]
China's dark fleet including trawlers and tankers, has increased its presence along the shores of West Africa, where it engages in illegal fishing damaging local fish stock and oil trades. During these activities it often uses local flags for cover. [6]
China's dark fleet is known to use the same modus operandi in international waters near Malaysia (for Iran-China oil), the Mediterranean Sea, and regions near Russia. [4] [11] [16]
China's dark fleet is used by Beijing in order to maintain independence in areas like energy and food supply. Experts claim that the fleet often uses illegal methods so it can avoid international rules and global sanctions while carrying out illegal fishing and transfer of energy sources without getting detected by international authorities. [16] [17] [18]
China's dark fleet plays a role also in sensitive areas like the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea. In these areas the ships have a double role, on one hand they are used to collect intelligence and monitor foreign activity. On the other hand, they are used to strengthen China's territorial claims in disputed water. This makes the fleet a powerful tool for China's regional strategy. [16] [19] [20]
In recent years the United States has issues new sanctions targeting more than 50 individuals, entities, and over 50 vessels linked to China's dark fleet and its clandestine oil transport networks, supporting Iran. The United States regards these actions as the most extensive since the 2018 "maximum pressure" campaign. Investigations that were conducted have monitored an rise in ship-to-ship oil transfers in international waters near Malaysia. In addition, the United States and other international officials documented unprecedented activity and revenue flows of up to $70 billion, enabling Iran to sustain its regime and nuclear ambitions despite sanctions. [21] [22] [23] [24]
The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have tried to ban certain ships and limit the insurance and shipping services that support China's dark fleet. But as different countries have different standards, these efforts have encountered problems. Trying to target companies and insurers involved in these illegal actions has made it harder for global businesses to handle risks and follow maritime trade rules. [18] [25]
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