Cognitive imitation is a form of social learning, and a subtype of imitation. Cognitive imitation is contrasted with motor and vocal or oral imitation. As with all forms of imitation, cognitive imitation involves learning and copying specific rules or responses done by another. The principal difference between motor and cognitive imitation is the type of rule (and stimulus) that is learned and copied by the observer. So, whereas in the typical imitation learning experiment subjects must copy novel actions on objects or novel sequences of specific actions (novel motor imitation), in a novel cognitive imitation paradigm subjects have to copy novel rules, independently of specific actions or movement patterns.
The following example illustrates the difference between cognitive and motor-spatial imitation: Imagine someone overlooking someone's shoulder and stealing their automated teller machine (ATM) password. As with all forms of imitation, the individual learns and successfully reproduces the observed sequence. The observer in our example, like most of us, presumably knows how to operate an ATM (namely, that you have to push X number of buttons on the ATM screen in a specific sequence), so the specific motor responses of touching the screen isn't what the thief is learning. Instead, the thief could learn two types of abstract rules. On the one hand, the thief can learn a spatial rule: touch item in the top right, followed by item on the top left, then the item in the middle of the screen, and finally the one on lower right. This would be an example of motor-spatial imitation because the thief's response is guided by an abstract motor-spatial rule. On the other, the thief could ignore the spatial patterning of the observed responses and instead focus on the particular items that were touched, generating an abstract numerical rule, independently of where they are in space: 3-1-5-9. This would constitute an example of cognitive imitation because the individuals is copying an abstract serial rule without copying specific motor-responses. In this example, the thief's responses match those he observed only because the numbers are in the same location. If the numbers were in a different location—that is, if the numbers on the ATM's keypad were scrambled with every attempt to enter a password—the thief would, nonetheless, reproduce the target password because they learned a cognitive (i.e., an abstract, item-specific serial rule), rather than a spatial rule (i.e., an observable motor-spatial pattern).
The term "cognitive imitation" was first introduced by Subiaul and his colleagues (Subiaul, Cantlon, et al., 2004), defining it as "a type of observational learning in which a naïve student copies an expert's use of a rule". To isolate cognitive from motor imitation, Subiaul and colleagues trained two rhesus macaques to respond, in a prescribed order, to different sets of photographs that were displayed simultaneously on a touch-sensitive monitor. [1] Because the position of the photographs varied randomly from trial to trial, sequences could not be learned by motor imitation. Both monkeys learned new sequences more rapidly after observing an expert execute those sequences than when they had to learn new sequences entirely by trial and error. A mircro-analysis of each monkeys' performance showed that each monkey learned the order of two of the four photographs faster than baseline levels. A second experiment ruled out social facilitation as an explanation for this result. A third experiment, however, demonstrated that monkeys did not learn when the computer highlighted each picture in the correct sequence in the absence of a monkey ("ghost control").
Subiaul and colleagues, using two computerized tasks that measure the learning of two abstract rules: cognitive—item-based—rules (e.g., apple-boy-cat; [2] ) and motor-spatial-based rules (e.g., up-down-right [3] ) have shown that there are important dissociations between the imitation of these two types of rules. Specifically, results have shown that while 3-year-olds successfully imitate item-specific rules (i.e., cognitive imitation), these same 3-year-olds fail to imitate motor-spatial rules (i.e., motor-spatial imitation). [4] This dissociation isn't because there's something inherently harder about learning spatial versus cognitive rules. Follow-up studies have shown that 3-year-olds easily learn new spatial rules by trial and error, correctly recalling such rules after a 30s delay, [5] (Exp. 2). This result excludes the possibility that 3-year-olds' motor-spatial imitation problems are due to difficulty learning (i.e., encoding and recalling) novel spatial rules in general. In another study, 3-year-olds observed a model correctly touch the first item (e.g., Top Right) in the sequence, but then skip the middle item (e.g., Top Left picture) and, instead, touch the last item in the sequence (e.g., Bottom Left picture), resulting in an error, marked as unintentional by the model who said, "Whoops! That's not right!". This is a goal emulation learning condition, as the child had to copy the model's intended goal (Top-Right, Bottom-Left, Top-Left), rather than the observed (incorrect) response (Top-Right, Top-Left), similar to Meltzoff's "re-enactment" paradigm. [6] When given an opportunity to respond, 3-year-olds generated the intended (i.e., correct) sequence [5] (Exp. 3.) 3-year-old's success in the goal emulation condition excludes the possibility that 3-year-olds' motor-spatial imitation problem is due to difficulty vicariously learning (i.e., because of a lack of interest, failure to attend, problems inferring goals, etc.) a novel spatial rule from a model. Children's success in the goal emulation condition shows that social learning may be achieved by social reasoning (inferring goals) and causal inferences (error detection), independently of any domain-specific imitation learning mechanism. [7]
To further explore this dissociation between cognitive- and motor-spatial imitation Subiaul and colleagues [7] conducted a large-scale cross-sectional, within-subject study with preschoolers (2–6 years) using the same two tasks: cognitive (item-specific) and motor-spatial (spatial-specific). Results showed that children's cognitive imitation performance did not predict their motor-spatial imitation learning, and vice versa. Importantly, while age predicted improved cognitive and motor-spatial imitation performance, children's ability to individually learn each type of rule via trial and error did not predict their ability to imitate those same rules.
Subiaul and colleagues have argued that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that imitation learning is domain-specific, not domain-general. A critical caveat may be that the imitation of NOVEL rules and responses is domain-specific while the imitation of FAMILIAR responses is likely to be mediated by domain-general, non-specialized mechanisms, as Heyes and others have argued.
Observational learning is learning that occurs through observing the behavior of others. It is a form of social learning which takes various forms, based on various processes. In humans, this form of learning seems to not need reinforcement to occur, but instead, requires a social model such as a parent, sibling, friend, or teacher with surroundings. Particularly in childhood, a model is someone of authority or higher status in an environment. In animals, observational learning is often based on classical conditioning, in which an instinctive behavior is elicited by observing the behavior of another, but other processes may be involved as well.
Categorization is a type of cognition involving conceptual differentiation between characteristics of conscious experience, such as objects, events, or ideas. It involves the abstraction and differentiation of aspects of experience by sorting and distinguishing between groupings, through classification or typification on the basis of traits, features, similarities or other criteria that are universal to the group. Categorization is considered one of the most fundamental cognitive abilities, and it is studied particularly by psychology and cognitive linguistics.
Animal cognition encompasses the mental capacities of non-human animals including insect cognition. The study of animal conditioning and learning used in this field was developed from comparative psychology. It has also been strongly influenced by research in ethology, behavioral ecology, and evolutionary psychology; the alternative name cognitive ethology is sometimes used. Many behaviors associated with the term animal intelligence are also subsumed within animal cognition.
Object permanence is the understanding that whether an object can be sensed has no effect on whether it continues to exist. This is a fundamental concept studied in the field of developmental psychology, the subfield of psychology that addresses the development of young children's social and mental capacities. There is not yet scientific consensus on when the understanding of object permanence emerges in human development.
Imitation is a behavior whereby an individual observes and replicates another's behavior. Imitation is also a form of that leads to the "development of traditions, and ultimately our culture. It allows for the transfer of information between individuals and down generations without the need for genetic inheritance." The word imitation can be applied in many contexts, ranging from animal training to politics. The term generally refers to conscious behavior; subconscious imitation is termed mirroring.
In cognitive psychology, chunking is a process by which small individual pieces of a set of information are bound together to create a meaningful whole later on in memory. The chunks, by which the information is grouped, are meant to improve short-term retention of the material, thus bypassing the limited capacity of working memory and allowing the working memory to be more efficient. A chunk is a collection of basic units that are strongly associated with one another, and have been grouped together and stored in a person's memory. These chunks can be retrieved easily due to their coherent grouping. It is believed that individuals create higher-order cognitive representations of the items within the chunk. The items are more easily remembered as a group than as the individual items themselves. These chunks can be highly subjective because they rely on an individual's perceptions and past experiences, which are linked to the information set. The size of the chunks generally ranges from two to six items but often differs based on language and culture.
A mirror neuron is a neuron that fires both when an organism acts and when the organism observes the same action performed by another. Thus, the neuron "mirrors" the behavior of the other, as though the observer were itself acting. Mirror neurons are not always physiologically distinct from other types of neurons in the brain; their main differentiating factor is their response patterns. By this definition, such neurons have been directly observed in humans and primate species, and in birds.
Explicit memory is one of the two main types of long-term human memory, the other of which is implicit memory. Explicit memory is the conscious, intentional recollection of factual information, previous experiences, and concepts. This type of memory is dependent upon three processes: acquisition, consolidation, and retrieval.
In emulation learning, subjects learn about parts of their environment and use this to achieve their own goals and is an observational learning mechanism.
Primate cognition is the study of the intellectual and behavioral skills of non-human primates, particularly in the fields of psychology, behavioral biology, primatology, and anthropology.
Dr. Barbara Landau is the Dick and Lydia Todd Professor in the Department of Cognitive Science at Johns Hopkins University. Landau specializes in language learning, spatial representation and relationships between these foundational systems of human knowledge. She examines questions about how the two systems work together to enhance human cognition and whether one is actually foundational to the other. She is known for her research on unusual cases of development and is a leading authority on language and spatial information in people with Williams syndrome.
Associative sequence learning (ASL) is a neuroscientific theory that attempts to explain how mirror neurons are able to match observed and performed actions, and how individuals are able to imitate body movements. The theory was proposed by Cecilia Heyes in 2000.. A conceptually similar model proposed by Christian Keysers and David Perrett, based on what we know about the neural properties of mirror neurons and spike-timing-dependent plasticity is the Hebbian learning account of mirror neurons.
Perceptual learning is learning better perception skills such as differentiating two musical tones from one another or categorizations of spatial and temporal patterns relevant to real-world expertise. Examples of this may include reading, seeing relations among chess pieces, and knowing whether or not an X-ray image shows a tumor.
The study of memory incorporates research methodologies from neuropsychology, human development and animal testing using a wide range of species. The complex phenomenon of memory is explored by combining evidence from many areas of research. New technologies, experimental methods and animal experimentation have led to an increased understanding of the workings of memory.
A motor program is an abstract metaphor of the central organization of movement and control of the many degrees of freedom involved in performing an action.p. 182 Signals transmitted through efferent and afferent pathways allow the central nervous system to anticipate, plan or guide movement. Evidence for the concept of motor programs include the following:p. 182
Neurocomputational speech processing is computer-simulation of speech production and speech perception by referring to the natural neuronal processes of speech production and speech perception, as they occur in the human nervous system. This topic is based on neuroscience and computational neuroscience.
Catastrophic interference, also known as catastrophic forgetting, is the tendency of an artificial neural network to abruptly and drastically forget previously learned information upon learning new information. Neural networks are an important part of the network approach and connectionist approach to cognitive science. With these networks, human capabilities such as memory and learning can be modeled using computer simulations.
Imitative learning is a type of social learning whereby new behaviors are acquired via imitation. Imitation aids in communication, social interaction, and the ability to modulate one's emotions to account for the emotions of others, and is "essential for healthy sensorimotor development and social functioning". The ability to match one's actions to those observed in others occurs in humans and animals; imitative learning plays an important role in humans in cultural development. Imitative learning is different from observational learning in that it requires a duplication of the behaviour exhibited by the model, whereas observational learning can occur when the learner observes an unwanted behaviour and its subsequent consequences and as a result learns to avoid that behaviour.
Social learning refers to learning that is facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, another animal or its products. Social learning has been observed in a variety of animal taxa, such as insects, fish, birds, reptiles, amphibians and mammals.
Herbert S. Terrace is a professor of Psychology and Psychiatry at Columbia University. His work covers a broad set of research interests that include behaviorism, animal cognition, ape language and the evolution of language. He is the author of Nim: A Chimpanzee Who Learned Sign Language (1979) and Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Only Humans Can (2019). Terrace has made important contributions to comparative psychology, many of which have important implications for human psychology. These include discrimination learning, ape language, the evolution of language, and animal cognition.