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The constitutional basis of taxation in Australia is predominantly found in sections 51(ii), [1] 90, [2] 53, [3] 55, [4] and 96, [5] of the Constitution of Australia. Their interpretation by the High Court of Australia has been integral to the functioning and evolution of federalism in Australia.
The constitutional scheme as well as judicial interpretations have created a vertical fiscal imbalance, whereby the Commonwealth has the revenue-raising abilities while the States have major spending responsibilities. For example, primarily, Australian states fund schools and hospitals. The result of the limitations on state taxing power is that the Commonwealth collects the money through taxes, and distributes that money to states. The power to distribute funds to states, on conditions, is contained in section 96. [5] As a result, the sphere of Commonwealth power has expanded through dictating policy through conditional grants. This limits the autonomy and power of the states in controlling policy.
Australia is a federation and legislative power is distributed between the Commonwealth and the States. Section 51 enumerates areas of Commonwealth power. [6]
Section 51(ii) allows the Commonwealth to enact laws in respect of taxation, but so not as to discriminate between States or parts of states. [1]
The non-discrimination limitation repeats the more general prohibition found in section 99 that the Commonwealth cannot discriminate between states in laws on trade, commerce, or revenue.
The broad Commonwealth power to impose "taxation" must be read subject to the start of section 51 which grants the enumerated powers "subject to this constitution". Section 51(ii) must also be considered in combination with section 90. [2]
Before 1942, consistent with the concurrent power in section 51(ii), both the states and the Commonwealth levied income taxes. However, in 1942 the Commonwealth attempted to gain a monopoly on income taxes by passing the Income Tax Act 1942 and the States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942. The first act purported to impose Commonwealth income tax. The latter act said Commonwealth funding would be provided to the States only if they imposed no income tax. This latter act was premised on section 96. [5]
Since 1942 no state has imposed income taxes; instead the states have largely relied on section 96 grants.
Section 90 gives the Commonwealth the exclusive, as opposed to concurrent with the States, power to impose "duties of customs and of excise". [2] Any state taxing law which can be characterized as a duty of customs or excise is unconstitutional.
The major purpose of section 90 was to achieve objectives of federation, including uniform trade relations with other countries and free trade between the states. However, As a result of the loss of income taxing powers in 1942, the states turned to other forms of taxation, though trying to avoid those taxes which they were constitutionally barred from imposing, such as "excise" taxes. The interpretation as to what constitutes an excise became a critical issue.
The definition of "customs and excise" has been considered by the High Court of Australia on a number of occasions. Generally, a customs duty is a tax imposed on goods entering a jurisdiction. An excise is a type of sales tax on goods, and the High Court has interpreted what constitutes an excise broadly. The High Court has found that any tax that imposes a tax up to and including the point of sale is an "excise", thereby striking out State sales taxes. For example, in Ha v New South Wales (1997) a State tobacco licence fee, which consisted of a fixed amount plus an amount calculated by reference to the value of tobacco sold, was struck down as an excise.
Section 114 provides that the Commonwealth cannot tax state property, nor States tax Commonwealth property, without the consent of the other. The entity that is claiming the exemption must actually be a State or the Commonwealth and an entity that is controlled by a State will not be covered. For example, a building society controlled by a State has been determined not to be the State, as it was only controlled by state laws relating to building societies. The courts have dealt with cases as to whether a tax is levied on property or something else. For example, a fringe benefits tax (FBT) is not a tax on property; it is a transaction affected by FBT which can result in a State being liable for FBT. [7] Similarly, the Commonwealth can impose a tax on a state employee. The Commonwealth is exempt from some state taxes, such as land taxes and stamp duties, being taxes on property. In the case of local council rates, the Commonwealth claims exemption from rates, but "contributes" to local government in the form of grants to at least cover services provided, such as electricity, sewerage, rubbish disposal and the like, but not for road works, parks, general administrative expenses, etc.
Section 96 (as still effective) provides:
The High Court has interpreted "terms and conditions" very broadly. In South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 (the First Uniform Tax case) the scheme for the Commonwealth to take over the income tax field was upheld. The condition imposed by the States Grant Act was that a state not impose its own income tax. The Income Tax Act 1942, set high tax rates (i.e. that would reflect the combined current Commonwealth and State taxes) which made imposing State taxes unattractive or impossible. This was because the Income Tax Assessment Act 1942 required Commonwealth tax to be paid before State taxes. In effect, the scheme meant either the States had to accept grants and stop taxing, or decline grants and try to collect tax at rates which were unsustainable.
There was an opinion that the 1942 scheme was upheld on the basis of the defence power in section 51(vi). [1] The Commonwealth re-enacted the scheme after the war, and there was a second constitutional challenge. The scheme was again upheld in 1957 on the basis of section 96, in Victoria v Commonwealth (the Second Uniform Tax case). [8]
In introducing the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the Commonwealth agreed to distribute GST revenues to the States according to a formula set by the Commonwealth Grants Commission.
Section 53, [3] and section 55, [4] prescribe procedural requirements on tax laws.
Section 53, in part, prevents the Senate from introducing or amending any bill dealing with taxation, revenues or appropriation. This section limits the power of the Senate and reflects a constitutional distinction between the House of Representatives, as the house of the people and the chamber to which the government is responsible, and the Senate, as the house of the states. However, the Senate may still request omissions from or amendments to any such bill (in which case the House of Representatives deals with the request as it sees fit), or block its passage entirely.
Section 53 does not apply to bills imposing or appropriating fines or other pecuniary penalties, or fees for licensing or services. The question of when a charge (e.g., an airport entry charge) is a tax, as opposed to a fine or a fee, has been a litigated issue.
Section 55 requires that legislation imposing tax deal only with imposing tax and that other purported provisions in a piece of taxation legislation be of no effect. [4] Furthermore, laws imposing taxation (except customs duties or excise) shall deal with 'one subject of taxation only', while laws imposing customs shall deal only with customs, and laws of excise only excise. If a law containing a tax provision is found to include any non-tax provisions, the court will render the non-tax provisions inoperative. In practice, if the tax provision is introduced in an amending instrument, the court will most likely strike down the amending instrument rather than render the entire law inoperative, this is what occurred in Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth . [9] The purpose of this section is to protect the powers of the Senate to amend bills. According to section 53, [3] the Senate cannot amend or originate taxation bills (see above). Thus, without the restrictions imposed by section 55, the House of Representatives could prevent the Senate from amending any bill simply by putting something into it concerning taxation. This section effectively prohibits riders on money bills such as are common in the United States, or omnibus bills including non-financial measures such as in Canada, and also results in Australian tax law being made up of several pieces of legislation: for example, some Acts setting out how and when tax is to be calculated and paid, while others actually impose the tax.
Australian labour law concerns Commonwealth, state, and common law on rights and duties of workers, unions and employers in Australia. Australian labour law, has a dual structure, where some employment issues and relationships are governed by Commonwealth laws, and others are governed by state laws or the common law. It shares a heritage with laws across the Commonwealth of Nations, UK labour law and standards set by the International Labour Organization, the Australian legislature and courts have a built a comprehensive charter of rights at work.
Section 51 of the Constitution of Australia grants legislative powers to the Australian (Commonwealth) Parliament only when subject to the Constitution. When the six Australian colonies joined together in Federation in 1901, they became the original States and ceded some of their powers to the new Commonwealth Parliament. There are 39 subsections to section 51, each of which describes a "head of power" under which the Parliament has the power to make laws.
Australian constitutional law is the area of the law of Australia relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitution of Australia. Several major doctrines of Australian constitutional law have developed.
The law of Australia comprises many levels of codified and uncodified forms of law. These include the Australian Constitution, legislation enacted by the Federal Parliament and the parliaments of the states and territories of Australia, regulations promulgated by the Executive, and the common law of Australia arising from the decisions of judges.
Section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution of Australia is a provision in the Australian Constitution which empowers the Australian Parliament to legislate on matters referred to it by any state. As Australia is a federation, both states and the Commonwealth have legislative power, and the Australian Constitution limits Commonwealth power. Section 51(xxxvii) allows for a degree of flexibility in the allocation of legislative powers.
R v Barger is a High Court of Australia case where the majority held that the taxation power could not be used by the Australian Parliament to indirectly regulate the working conditions of workers. In this case, an excise tariff was imposed on manufacturers, with an exemption being available for those who paid "fair and reasonable" wages to their employees.
Fairfax v Commissioner of Taxation is a High Court of Australia case that considered the scope of the taxation power in section 51(ii) of the Constitution.
South Australia v Commonwealth is a decision of the High Court of Australia that established the Commonwealth government's ability to impose a scheme of uniform income tax across the country and displace the State. It was a major contributor to Australia's vertical fiscal imbalance in the spending requirements and taxing abilities of the various levels of government, and was thus a watershed moment in the development of federalism in Australia.
Victoria v Commonwealth, is a High Court of Australia case that affirmed the Commonwealth government's ability to impose a scheme of uniform income tax, adding to Australia's vertical fiscal imbalance in the spending requirements and taxing abilities of the various levels of government.
Pye v Renshaw, is a High Court of Australia case that deals with the interaction between section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, and section 96 of the Constitution.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), was a United States Supreme Court case in which a taxpayer challenged the validity of a federal income tax on corporations. The privilege of incorporation is a state function, and the challengers argued that only the states should tax corporations. The Court ruled that the privilege of operating in corporate form is valuable and justifies imposition of a federal income tax:
The Constitution of Australia, commonly referred to as the Australian Constitution, is the supreme law which constitutes the Commonwealth of Australia, the federal nation known as Australia. It provides the legal framework for the Australian federal government and for government in the States and Territories of Australia.
Pape v Commissioner of Taxation is an Australian court case concerning the constitutional validity of the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Act 2009 (Cth) which seeks to give one-off payments of up to $900 to Australian taxpayers. The decision of the High Court of Australia was announced on 3 April 2009, with reasons to follow later.
The fiscal imbalance in Australia is the disparity between the revenue generation ability of the three levels of governments in Australia relative to their spending obligations; but in Australia the term is commonly used to refer more specifically to the vertical fiscal imbalance, the discrepancy between the federal government's extensive capacity to raise revenue and the responsibility of the States to provide most public services, such as physical infrastructure, health care, education etc., despite having only limited capacity to raise their own revenue. In Australia, vertical fiscal imbalance is addressed by the transfer of funds as grants from the federal government to the states and territories.
Section 96 of the Constitution of Australia authorises the Australian (Commonwealth) Parliament to grant financial assistance to any state on the terms and conditions that it sees fit, subject to acceptance by the state(s) concerned. The expanded use of the power under section 96 has added to Australia's vertical fiscal imbalance and enabled the Commonwealth to have a significant influence over matters that would otherwise be constitutionally State responsibilities.
Section 99 of the Constitution of Australia, is one of several important non-discrimination provisions that govern actions of the Commonwealth and the various States.
Section 90 of the Constitution of Australia prohibits the States from imposing customs duties and of excise. The section bars the States from imposing any tax that would be considered to be of a customs or excise nature. While customs duties are easy to determine, the status of excise, as summarised in Ha v New South Wales, is that it consists of "taxes on the production, manufacture, sale or distribution of goods, whether of foreign or domestic origin." This effectively means that States are unable to impose sales taxes.
Deakin v Webb was one of a series of cases concerning whether the States could tax the income of a Commonwealth officer. The High Court of Australia overruled a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, holding that the States could not tax the income of a Commonwealth officer. This resulted in conflict with the Privy Council that was ultimately resolved by the passage of Commonwealth law in 1907 to permit the States to tax the income of a Commonwealth officer. The constitutional foundation of the decision was overturned by the subsequent decision of the High Court in the 1920 Engineers' Case.
Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW), and Flint v Webb, were the last of a series of cases concerning whether the States could tax the income of a Commonwealth officer which had resulted in conflict between the High Court and the Privy Council. The two cases were heard together, however two separate judgments were issued with Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) addressing the substantive issues, and Flint v Webb addressing the applications for a certificate to appeal to the Privy Council. The judgement of Griffith CJ in Flint v Webb suggested two ways in which that conflict could be resolved. Both suggestions were adopted by the Commonwealth Parliament by legislation that permitted the States to tax the income of a Commonwealth officer, and gave the High Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction on such constitutional questions. The constitutional foundation of the decision was overturned by the subsequent decision of the High Court in the 1920 Engineers' case.