Section 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution is a subsection of Section 51 of the Australian Constitution that gives the Commonwealth Parliament the power to legislate with respect to "foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth". This power has become known as "the corporations power", the extent of which has been the subject of numerous judicial cases.
After the High Court's decision in Huddart, Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead (1909), [1] the "corporations" power was largely ignored as a basis for Commonwealth legislation. The majority judges agreed in this case that the power should be construed narrowly, though they were unable to agree on any appropriate interpretation. Their approach reflected the perceived need to protect "the reserved powers of the States", an idea abandoned in 1920 as a result of the Engineer' case . [2] Justice Issacs dissent in Huddart, Parker & Co. gave a broad meaning to s 51(xx) but attempted to set limits to the power, in particular pointing out:
It was not until 1971, when Huddart, Parker & Co. was overruled in Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd , [3] that the modern development of the power began. In that case, the leading judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Barwick, who, although agreeing that Isaacs' dissent in Huddart, Parker & Co. conformed to the reasoning in Engineers, refused to define the scope of the corporations power. He stated instead that "the decision as to the validity of particular laws yet to be enacted must remain for the Court when called upon to pass upon them".
The High Court in New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) (the Incorporation Case) [4] confirmed that the ambit of the corporations power extends only to corporations that have already been formed, and, therefore, it does not include the power to incorporate them. It extends only to domestic corporations of a trading or financial character, and to all corporations formed outside Australia, and they are collectively referred to as "constitutional corporations". [5]
In most of the early cases, the question of what aspects or activities of a corporation can be regulated under s 51(xx) was not directly addressed. Some incidental points were clarified in R v Australian Industrial Court; Ex parte CLM Holdings Pty Ltd. [6] That case established that, where the activities of a s 51(xx) corporation were validly regulated, the conduct of individual persons taking part in those activities, such as company directors, could incidentally be regulated as well.
In Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, [7] the Court still did not deal directly with the regulation of a corporation's activities. The whole Court upheld a section that protected a corporation against a secondary boycott. The legislative purpose thus upheld was protection of corporations rather than regulation of them. The case also provided an opportunity for extensive discussion of how far the "corporations" power might extend.
The WorkChoices case provides the current definition for the extent of the corporations power, as noted in its majority opinion:
Whether a corporation falls within the group of "trading or financial corporations" has been the focus of much attention and debate. The dominant issues revolve around the type of corporation and the nature of the activities that characterise it as falling within s. 51(xx). In that regard:
Australian constitutional law is the area of the law of Australia relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitution of Australia. Legal cases regarding Australian constitutional law are often handled by the High Court of Australia, the highest court in the Australian judicial system. Several major doctrines of Australian constitutional law have developed.
The 1913 Australian referendum was held on 31 May 1913. It contained six referendum questions and was held in conjunction with the 1913 federal election.
The Constitution Alteration Bill 1910, was put to voters for approval in a referendum held in the 1911 referendums. The bill sought to alter the Australian Constitution to extend the Commonwealth power in respect of trade and commerce, the control of corporations, labour and employment and combinations and monopolies. All of the proposed changes were contained within the one question.
The Constitution Alteration (Corporations) Bill 1912, was an unsuccessful proposal to alter the Australian Constitution to extend the Commonwealth legislative power in respect to corporations that was put to voters for approval in a referendum held in 1913.
R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia, known as the Boilermakers' Case, was a 1956 decision of the High Court of Australia which considered the powers of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to punish the Boilermakers' Society of Australia, a union which had disobeyed the orders of that court in relation to an industrial dispute between boilermakers and their employer body, the Metal Trades Employers' Association.
Section 109 of the Constitution of Australia is the part of the Constitution of Australia that deals with the legislative inconsistency between federal and state laws, and declares that valid federal laws override inconsistent state laws, to the extent of the inconsistency. Section 109 is analogous to the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution and the paramountcy doctrine in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence in one jurisdiction is considered persuasive in the others.
Section 51(i) of the Australian Constitution enables the Parliament of Australia to make laws about:
The reserved powers doctrine was a principle used by the inaugural High Court of Australia in the interpretation of the Constitution of Australia, that emphasised the context of the Constitution, drawing on principles of federalism, what the Court saw as the compact between the newly formed Commonwealth and the former colonies, particularly the compromises that informed the text of the constitution. The doctrine involved a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the specific powers of the Federal Parliament to preserve the powers that were intended to be left to the States. The doctrine was challenged by the new appointments to the Court in 1906 and was ultimately abandoned by the High Court in 1920 in the Engineers' Case, replaced by an approach to interpretation that emphasised the text rather than the context of the Constitution.
In Australian constitutional law, chapter III courts are courts of law which are a part of the Australian federal judiciary and thus are able to discharge Commonwealth judicial power. They are so named because the prescribed features of these courts are contained in chapter III of the Australian Constitution.
New South Wales v The Commonwealth, the Incorporation Case, was a decision handed down in the High Court of Australia on 8 February 1990 concerning the corporations power in s51(xx) of the Commonwealth Constitution. The states of New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia brought an application seeking a declaration as to the validity of certain aspects of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth).
R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry is a 1936 High Court of Australia case where the majority took a broad view of the external affairs power in the Constitution but held that the interstate trade and commerce power delineated trade and commerce within a state, rejecting an argument that the power extended to activities that were commingled with interstate activities. The court set aside the conviction of daredevil pilot Goya Henry for breach of the regulations as they went further than was necessary to carry out and give effect to the convention.
Section 51(vi) of the Australian Constitution, commonly called the defence power, is a subsection of Section 51 of the Australian Constitution that gives the Commonwealth Parliament the right to legislate with respect to the defence of Australia and the control of the defence forces. The High Court has adopted a different approach to the interpretation of the defence power, which emphasises the purpose of the legislation, primarily the defence of Australia, rather than the subject matter.
Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales , was a High Court of Australia case about the validity of Commonwealth regulations about intrastate air navigation. Although the Commonwealth has the power to regulate interstate air navigation under s 51(i) of the Constitution, it can only regulate intrastate air navigation under the implied incidental power attached to that head of power. It was held that intrastate air navigation can be regulated to the extent that it provides for the safety of, or prevention of physical interference with, interstate or foreign air navigation.
Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd, also known as the Concrete Pipes Case, is a High Court of Australia case that discusses the scope of the corporations power in section 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution. This was an important case in Australian constitutional law because it overruled the decision in the earlier case of Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead, which held that the corporations power only extended as far as the regulation of their conduct in relation to their transactions with or affecting the public. Since this case, the Commonwealth has had at least the ability to regulate the trading activities of trading corporations, thus opening the way for an expansion in Commonwealth power.
Australian corporations law has historically borrowed heavily from UK company law. Its legal structure now consists of a single, national statute, the Corporations Act 2001. The statute is administered by a single national regulatory authority, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC).
New South Wales v Commonwealth, commonly known as the Wheat case, or more recently as the Inter-State Commission case, is a landmark Australian judgment of the High Court made in 1915 regarding judicial separation of power. It was also a leading case on the freedom of interstate trade and commerce that is guaranteed by section 92 of the Constitution.
In Australia, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity defines the circumstances in which Commonwealth laws can bind the States, and where State laws can bind the Commonwealth. This is distinct from the doctrine of crown immunity, as well as the rule expressed in Section 109 of the Australian Constitution which governs conflicts between Commonwealth and State laws.
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead is a leading decision by the High Court of Australia that dealt with two issues under the Australian Constitution, the identification and extent of judicial power that is vested in the courts and the corporations power of the Parliament. The Court unanimously held that the inquiry provisions of the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 were not an exercise of judicial power. The judgement of Griffith CJ in particular continues to be cited in relation to its examination of the identification and extent of judicial power. The court, however, divided on the proper approach to the corporations power. The majority, Griffith CJ, Barton & O'Connor JJ, strongly influenced by the now discredited doctrine of reserved State powers, held that the corporations power was to be construed narrowly because the trade and commerce power did not include intrastate trade and commerce. While the reserved powers doctrine was unambiguously rejected by the High Court in 1920, Huddart, Parker was not formally overruled by the High Court until Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971).
Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow & Co, commonly known as Whybrow's case or the Boot Trades case, was the third of a series of decisions of the High Court of Australia in 1910 concerning the boot manufacturing industry and the role of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in preventing and settling industrial disputes. In doing so the High Court considered the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament to provide for common rule awards and the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant prohibition against the Arbitration Court. The majority held in Whybrow that the Arbitration Court could not make an award that was inconsistent with a State law, but that different minimum wages were not inconsistent as it was possible to obey both laws. In Whybrow the High Court established the doctrine of ambit, with the emphasis on the precise claim made and refused, and the practice with respect to "paper disputes" being treated "prima facie as genuine and real", with the majority holding that the High Court had power to order prohibition to correct jurisdictional error as part of its original jurisdiction. Finally in Whybrow the High Court unanimously held that the Federal Parliament had no constitutional power to provide for common rule awards.
Section 122 of the Constitution of Australia deals with matters relating to the governance of Australian territories. It gives the Commonwealth Parliament complete legislative power over the territories. This power is called the territories power. The extent and terms of the representation of the territories in the House of Representatives and the Senate are also stated as being at the discretion of the Commonwealth Parliament.