The Crooks Report, officially A Review of the Belize Police Department, is a 2008 green paper on policing in Belize, written by Harold Crooks (a Jamaican consultant), and commissioned by the interior ministry of Belize. It was released in full by early 2010. The report is notable for having been endorsed by the Ministry and Police Department, despite the heavy criticism it contained, and despite subsequent criticisms regarding the lack of progress on the implementation of its recommendations.
Joint coxswain training of Belizean police officer, soldier, and coast guard (left) by US Coast Guard (right) in 2007
The 1980s saw the rise of gangs in Belize, introduced by US deportees and especially adopted by locals upon the release of Colors.[1] This was followed by an alarming wave of violent crime which only worsened in the 2000s.[n 1] Thus prompted, the Police Department started proposing and adopting a number of novel (to them) measures aimed at curbing the violence.[n 2] By 10 April 2008, the Department's governing body (Ministry of National Security) commissioned Harold Crooks, a Jamaican consultant, to review their progress so far, and to identify appropriate steps not yet taken.[n 3] Crooks elaborated their report over a six-month period from 2 June, and presented it to the Minister, Carlos Perdomo, on 30 November 2008.[n 4]
Contents
The Report is very critical of the Department's capacity to implement their own self-imposed measures, partly because they were very ambitious, and partly because the Department had very little in way of accountability, and very much in the way of corruption.[n 5]The Report makes 167 recommendations for policing reform, presented in nine sections spanning 174 pages.[2]
According to Carlos Barrachina and Alejandro Monjaraz (of the University of Quintana Roo), the Report's recommended measures regarding professionalisation were 'the most important,' noting it 'clearly indicates the need' to standardise and modernise police training (initial and continuous), practice, and advancement.[n 6] According to Jennifer Peirce and Alexandre Veyrat-Pontet (of the Inter-American Development Bank), the Report showed the 'police force needs to be better equipped and trained and more effectively deployed,' underscoring the 'added challenges and complexities brought on by transnational crime dynamics, increased drug trafficking, and youth gang dynamics' which traditional (amateur) community policing was 'not equipped to overcome.'[n 7] According to Raymond Shepherd (of the US Army Command and General Staff College), the Report most significantly identified and recommended a myriad sorely needed improvements to human capital.[n 8]
Responses
Upon the Report's presentation, News 5 noted it 'blasted the police and should serve as a wake up call for early reform.'[3] The Minister, Perdomo, praised it for being an 'in depth' and 'critical' analysis, voicing support for its implementation.[4] By January 2009, the Ministry had approved most of the recommendations and charged the Department with their implementation 'over the next few years.'[5] By 2012, 7 News commented the Report was 'gather[ing] dust on some disused shelf' at the Department, observing that the promised reforms had not materialised 'in any tangible way.'[6] By 2013, Peirce and Veyrat-Pontet could not 'determine which of its recommendations, if any, were implemented.'[7] Over a decade after the Ministry's commitment (in 2021), former permanent secretary of the same, George Lovell, noted 'only temporary solutions have been achieved, and on every occasion, those solutions bring us back to the same environment where crime and violence persist,' asserting the Ministry had 'not taken advantage' of the Report (and similar green papers).[8]
Peirce and Veyrat-Pontet called the Report a 'strong policy document,' noting it 'sets out a clear action plan for reforming' the Department.[n 9] Barrachina and Monjaraz deemed reactions to the Report 'quite positive,' noting it was adopted as a 'foundational document,' with the incoming Barrow government reoganising the Ministry and appointing a new commissioner (Crispin Jeffries) to effectively implement the Report's recommendations.[n 10] They praised Crooks for drafting 'a highly critical report in which he analysed point by point the main problems of the Belize police force,' calling the Report 'an excellent analysis' of the Department.[9]
↑ Barrachina, pp.56–57; Peirce, pp.18–19. In their 2000–2005 and 2006–2010 Policing Plans (Barrachina, pp.56–57). The Department was founded in 1886 by MD Allen with 60 Barbadian officers (Barrachina, p.56), though constables were being appointed at least as early as 1794 (Burdon, p.211). The crime wave led to heavier reliance on the military for domestic law enforcement, and the militarisation of police (Shepherd, pp.1–3, 30–31).
↑ Barrachina, p.57; Peirce, p.13; 5 a; 7 a; Crooks, Appendix 1A. Verbatim, Crooks was 'to honestly and objectively evaluate the weaknesses and strengths within the Belize Police Department and to propose changes' (Crooks, p.ii). Crooks, a graduate of the UWI law school and criminology lecturer there, had 22 years of experience in the Jamaican police, including three as national security advisor to the Jamaican government (5 a). He was convicted 'of having sexual relations with a 16 year old girl' in July 2012 (7 c).
↑ Barrachina, p.57; 5 b. The Report was embargoed until (at the latest) March 2010 (Shepherd, p.124), though a 28-page executive summary was released on 28 January 2009 (7 b).
↑ Barrachina, p.57. Barrachina, p.56 noted goals in the Department's Policing Plans (and the Crooks Report too) were 'very difficult to achieve' despite being regarded as 'necessary.' The Report deemed only five of 28 targets set by the first Policing Plan as met, noting performance on the second Plan was 'very difficult to measure [in 2008]' (Barrachina, p.57).
↑ Barrachina, pp.57, 61. Per Barrachina, pp.57–58, main conclusions were criminal investigations (rudimentary, amateur, lacking), public trust in and thus cooperation with police (declining), data for and practice of investigations, intelligence, and forensics (limited, lacking, poor), deliverable results and perception of (lacking), corruption and perception of (growing), complaints against police (urgent), internal affairs office (very small), political will to meet internal modernisation goals (none), leadership practice (traditional, not proactive, not effective, not adaptive), and respect for human rights in training, operations, and management (weak).
↑ Peirce, pp.13, 18. Per Peirce, p.13, key challenges identified were technology for investigations (lacking), policing legislation (inadequate), standard operating procedures for investigations and internal affairs (lacking), leadership practice and structures (poor), discipline (lacking), complaints against police (rising), corruption (present), and officers' working conditions (poor).
↑ Shepherd, pp.27–31, 99–100. Per Shepherd, pp.27–31, 99–100, main findings were quality assurance (weak), follow through on performance indicators (weak), investigations (chronically underdeveloped, increasingly ineffective, not proactive), support and analysis processes for investigations (ineffective), collaboration with other agencies (little or none), governing Ministry leadership (not clear), means to measure performance (absent), focus of leadership (micromanaging, not leading), focus of officers' work (administrative, not policing), training in community policing (inadequate), and training in ethical policing and leadership (inadequate).
↑ Peirce, pp.23, 25. They recommended its implementation, adding there was 'significant scope for building community policing as a central pillar' of the Department (Peirce, pp.25–26).
↑ Barrachina, pp.57, 61. The Department's governing body is now the Ministry of Home Affairs (BBN a).
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