Douglas Woodall

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Douglas Robert Woodall (born November 1943 in Stoke-on-Trent) is a British mathematician and election scientist. He studied mathematics at the University of Cambridge and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Nottingham in 1969, his thesis being "Some results in combinatorial mathematics". He worked in the Department of Mathematics from 1969 until his retirement in 2007, as researcher, lecturer, associate professor and reader. [1] He devised the later-no-harm criterion, a voting system criterion in the comparison of electoral systems, and demonstrated it is compatible with the monotonicity criterion by developing his method of descending solid coalitions as an improvement on instant-runoff voting. He also contributed to the problem of fair cake-cutting, for example, by presenting an algorithm for finding a super-proportional division.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Condorcet method</span> Pairwise-comparison electoral system

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Droop quota</span> Quantity of votes in election studies

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Monotonicity criterion</span> Property of electoral systems

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Schulze STV</span> Proportional-representation ranked voting system

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The later-no-help criterion is a voting system criterion formulated by Douglas Woodall. The criterion is satisfied if, in any election, a voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate can not cause a more-preferred candidate to win. Voting systems that fail the later-no-help criterion are vulnerable to the tactical voting strategy called mischief voting, which can deny victory to a sincere Condorcet winner.

Homogeneity is a common property for voting systems. The property is satisfied if, in any election, the result depends only on the proportion of ballots of each possible type. Specifically, if every ballot is replicated the same number of times, then the result should not change.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">STAR voting</span> Single-winner electoral system

STAR voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections. The name stands for "Score then Automatic Runoff", referring to the fact that this system is a combination of score voting, to pick two finalists with the highest total scores, followed by an "automatic runoff" in which the finalist who is preferred on more ballots wins. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sincere favorite criterion</span> Criterion that prevents lesser-evil voting

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References

  1. "Extracts from D. R. Woodall's CV". www.maths.nottingham.ac.uk. Retrieved 2022-05-17.