Dusky v. United States | |
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Decided April 18, 1960 | |
Full case name | Milton Dusky v. United States |
Citations | 362 U.S. 402 ( more ) 80 S. Ct. 788; 4 L. Ed. 2d 824; 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1307 |
Case history | |
Prior | 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959) |
Subsequent | 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961) |
Holding | |
The competency standard for standing trial: whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Per curiam |
Wikisource has original text related to this article: |
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed a defendant's right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial. [1] The Court outlined the basic standards for determining competency. [2]
Milton Dusky, a 33-year-old man, was charged with assisting in the kidnapping and rape of an underage female. He was clearly suffering from schizophrenia but was found competent to stand trial and received a sentence of 45 years. On petition of writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the petitioner requested for his conviction to be reversed on the grounds that he was not competent to stand trial at the time of the proceeding. [2]
Upon reviewing the evidence, the court decided to grant the writ of certiorari. The court ruled that to be competent to stand trial the defendant must have a "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." [1] The court made clear that a brief mental status exam was insufficient. His case was remanded for retrial, at which time his sentence was reduced to 20 years. [2]
This case set the current standard for adjudicative competence in the United States. Although the statutes addressing competency vary from state to state in the United States, the two elements outlined in the decision are held in common:
Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran (1993), the Supreme Court held that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for standing trial established in Dusky. [4] In Indiana v. Edwards (2008), however, the Supreme Court made a distinction between competence to waive counsel (CTWC), which was the subject of Godinez, and competence to represent oneself (CTRO). The majority opinion, authored by Breyer, noted, "In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel." However, the court did not actually provide a CTRO standard, opting instead to leave this to legislatures and lower courts. [5]
Felhous (2011) argues that many state statutes and the federal statute do not incorporate the rationality standard enunciated in Dusky, and that various post-Dusky court decisions had not consistently affirmed the rationality standard. [6]
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied most of the protections of this amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In United States and Canadian law, competence concerns the mental capacity of an individual to participate in legal proceedings or transactions, and the mental condition a person must have to be responsible for his or her decisions or acts. Competence is an attribute that is decision-specific. Depending on various factors which typically revolve around mental function integrity, an individual may or may not be competent to make a particular medical decision, a particular contractual agreement, to execute an effective deed to real property, or to execute a will having certain terms.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings.
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Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), is a decision in which the United States Supreme Court imposed stringent limits on the right of a lower court to order the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant who had been determined to be incompetent to stand trial for the sole purpose of making them competent and able to be tried. Specifically, the court held that lower courts could do so only under limited circumstances in which specified criteria had been met. In the case of Charles Sell, since the lower court had failed to determine that all the appropriate criteria for court-ordered forcible treatment had been met, the order to forcibly medicate the defendant was reversed.
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Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that determined a U.S. state violated due process by involuntarily committing a criminal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of his permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.
Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 is a landmark case in which District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that a judge could not impose an insanity defense over the defendant's objections.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), was a landmark decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a defendant was competent to stand trial, they were automatically competent to plead guilty, and thereby waive the panoply of trial rights, including the right to counsel.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, per Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the state may not force a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination solely for the purposes of sentencing. Any such examination violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination as well as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and is therefore inadmissible at sentencing.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a Missouri trial court deprived a defendant of due process by failing to order a competency examination after he was hospitalized following an attempted suicide and as a result missed a portion of his trial for a capital offense.
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court reversed an Oklahoma court decision holding that a defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial unless he proves otherwise by the second highest legal standard of proof, that of clear and convincing evidence, ruling that to be unconstitutional. The court said the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the standard for competency to stand trial was not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself.
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