Mullaney v. Wilbur | |
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Argued January 15, 1975 Decided June 9, 1975 | |
Full case name | Mullaney v. Wilbur |
Citations | 421 U.S. 684 ( more ) 95 S. Ct. 1881; 44 L. Ed. 2d 508; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 70 |
Case history | |
Prior | On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit |
Holding | |
The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Powell, joined by unanimous |
Concurrence | Rehnquist, joined by Burger |
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), is a criminal case in which a unanimous court struck down a state statute requiring a defendant to prove the defense of provocation to downgrade a murder conviction to manslaughter. [1] :17 Previous common law, such as in Commonwealth v. York (1845), allowed such burden on the defense. [1] :17
Maine's statute [2] defined murder as unlawfully killing with malice, with malice defined as deliberate and unprovoked cruelty, and added that killings were presumed to be unprovoked unless the defense proved provocation by a preponderance of the evidence. [1] :17 Justice Powell delivered the opinion for the court that provocation was a crucial part of the charge in that it determined "the degree of culpability attaching to the criminal homicide". [1] :17
States were able to circumvent this decision by careful wording, as in Patterson v. New York , in which provocation, or "extreme emotional disturbance", was classified as an allowable defense excuse, not as a listed element. [1] :17
Murder is the unlawful killing of another human without justification or valid excuse, especially the unlawful killing of another human with malice aforethought. This state of mind may, depending upon the jurisdiction, distinguish murder from other forms of unlawful homicide, such as manslaughter. Manslaughter is killing committed in the absence of malice, brought about by reasonable provocation, or diminished capacity. Involuntary manslaughter, where it is recognized, is a killing that lacks all but the most attenuated guilty intent, recklessness.
The gay panic defense is a legal strategy in which a defendant claims they acted in a state of violent temporary insanity, committing assault or murder, because of unwanted same-sex sexual advances. Broadly, a defendant may allege to have found the same-sex sexual advances so offensive or frightening that they were provoked into reacting, were acting in self-defense, were of diminished capacity, or were temporarily insane, and that this circumstance is exculpatory or mitigating.
In English law, the benefit of clergy was originally a provision by which clergymen could claim that they were outside the jurisdiction of the secular courts and be tried instead in an ecclesiastical court under canon law. Various reforms limited the scope of this legal arrangement to prevent its abuse. Eventually the benefit of clergy evolved into a legal fiction in which first-time offenders could receive lesser sentences for some crimes. The legal mechanism was abolished in 1827 with the passage of the Criminal Law Act 1827
In law, provocation is when a person is considered to have committed a criminal act partly because of a preceding set of events that might cause a reasonable person to lose self control. This makes them less morally culpable than if the act was premeditated (pre-planned) and done out of pure malice. It "affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral blameworthiness".
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