Directed verdict for defendant affirmed, Cooper v. State, 1995 OK CR 2, 889 P.2d 293; cert. granted, 516U.S. 910(1995).
Subsequent
None
Holding
Oklahoma's procedural rule that allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent violates due process. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
In this case, the defendant's ability to understand the charges against him and his ability to assist in his own defense was challenged on five separate occasions before and during his trial and sentencing for capital murder, but the trial judge ruled he was competent to stand trial because he did not meet Oklahoma's high standard of proof.[1]
Circumstances
Byron Keith Cooper was charged in 1989 with the murder of an 86-year-old man while in the course of committing burglary. Both before and during his trial, the question of his competency to stand trial was raised five times. The first time the question arose, the trial judge relied on the opinion of a state psychologist in determining to commit the defendant to a state psychiatric hospital for three months of treatment. Upon Cooper's return, the trial judge heard testimony from two state psychologists regarding Cooper's competence, but as these experts disagreed over whether Cooper was competent to stand trial, the judge decided to rule against Cooper and ordered the trial to proceed. After the pretrial hearing was completed, the defense attorney raised the issue of Cooper's competence a third time, telling the court that Cooper's behavior was "odd" and that he refused to communicate with his attorney. The attorney said that it could be a serious matter "if he's not faking". However, the judge declined to review his earlier decision that Cooper was competent to proceed.[1]
On the first day of trial, Cooper's bizarre behavior (such as fleeing from his defense attorney, refusing to change his prison clothes because regular clothes "burned" him, and talking to himself while in the fetal position) induced the court to conduct a further competency hearing. This time the trial judge observed Cooper and heard testimony from people including lay witnesses, defendant Cooper, and a third psychologist who concluded that Cooper was incompetent. While expressing his uncertainty and not disagreeing with the psychologist, the judge ruled against Cooper and ordered the trial to proceed, finally opining:
I think it's going to take smarter people than me to make a decision here. I'm going to say that I don't believe he has carried the burden by clear and convincing evidence of his incompetency and I'm going to say we're going to go to trial.[3]
The trial proceeded with Cooper continuing to act in a bizarre manner and refusing to be near his attorney. Cooper was convicted of first degree murder, and during the sentencing phase of the trial the history of Cooper's childhood abuse was recounted. Finally the defense attorney pleaded for either a mistrial or further evaluation into Cooper's competence, describing Cooper's courtroom behavior:
Without looking for his safety at all and looking what's behind him, when I moved the least bit [toward him] he fell to get away from me. He fell. He hit his head. The thud on that marble when he jackknifed backward off of that railing into that marble could be heard at the back of that courtroom. . . . he's just busted his head, tears are streaming down his eyes and he does not respond in any normal fashion.[4]
In a unanimous verdict, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for further consideration in light of their opinion. The Court held that the State may not proceed with a criminal trial when the defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely than not to be incompetent. Requiring a higher standard of proof, that of "clear and convincing evidence", was too high a standard of proof for a defendant to demonstrate a need for a competency evaluation, increasing the possibility of error to a level "incompatible with the dictates of due process".[5] Criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."[2]
The court used the relevant history of common law regarding competency and the treatment of the insane and also compared Oklahoma's standards with the contemporary practices of other states, finding that only 4 of the 50 states used Oklahoma's heightened standard of proof.[6] They concluded that this "demonstrates that the vast majority of jurisdictions remain persuaded that the heightened standard of proof imposed on the accused in Oklahoma is not necessary to vindicate the State's interest in prompt and orderly disposition of criminal cases."[7] The court found most states uses a burden of proof far lower, or imposed no burden of proof at all, once the competency question is raised.[8]
Significance
The American Academy for Psychiatry and the Law unofficially considers this decision a landmark case in competency to stand trialcase law.[9] The court stated that no one questions the fundamental right of competency to stand trial. As established in Dusky v. United States, a defendant has a fundamental right not to be put to trial unless he has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." A State may not proceed with a criminal trial after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely than not to be incompetent.[1]
The insanity defense, also known as the mental disorder defense, is an affirmative defense by excuse in a criminal case, arguing that the defendant is not responsible for their actions due to a psychiatric disease at the time of the criminal act. This is contrasted with an excuse of provocation, in which the defendant is responsible, but the responsibility is lessened due to a temporary mental state. It is also contrasted with the justification of self defense or with the mitigation of imperfect self-defense. The insanity defense is also contrasted with a finding that a defendant cannot stand trial in a criminal case because a mental disease prevents them from effectively assisting counsel, from a civil finding in trusts and estates where a will is nullified because it was made when a mental disorder prevented a testator from recognizing the natural objects of their bounty, and from involuntary civil commitment to a mental institution, when anyone is found to be gravely disabled or to be a danger to themself or to others.
Forensic psychology is the practice of psychology applied to the law. Forensic psychology is the application of scientific knowledge and methods to help answer legal questions arising in criminal, civil, contractual, or other judicial proceedings. Forensic psychology includes research on various psychology-law topics, such as jury selection, reducing systemic racism in criminal law, eyewitness testimony, evaluating competency to stand trial, or assessing military veterans for service-connected disability compensation. The field traces its roots to contributions by Wilhem Wundt, Hugo Münsterberg, and Sigmund Freud among others. Contemporary definitions of forensic psychology recognize that several subfields of psychology apply "the scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge of psychology to the law." The American Psychological Association's Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists reference several psychology subdisciplines, such as social, clinical, experimental, counseling, and neuropsychology.
Together, legal psychology and forensic psychology form the field more generally recognized as "psychology and law". Following earlier efforts by psychologists to address legal issues, psychology and law became a field of study in the 1960s as part of an effort to enhance justice, though that originating concern has lessened over time. The multidisciplinary American Psychological Association's Division 41, the American Psychology-Law Society, is active with the goal of promoting the contributions of psychology to the understanding of law and legal systems through research, as well as providing education to psychologists in legal issues and providing education to legal personnel on psychological issues. Further, its mandate is to inform the psychological and legal communities and the public at large of current research, educational, and service in the area of psychology and law. There are similar societies in Britain and Europe.
In United States and Canadian law, competence concerns the mental capacity of an individual to participate in legal proceedings or transactions, and the mental condition a person must have to be responsible for his or her decisions or acts. Competence is an attribute that is decision-specific. Depending on various factors which typically revolve around mental function integrity, an individual may or may not be competent to make a particular medical decision, a particular contractual agreement, to execute an effective deed to real property, or to execute a will having certain terms.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), is a decision in which the United States Supreme Court imposed stringent limits on the right of a lower court to order the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant who had been determined to be incompetent to stand trial for the sole purpose of making them competent and able to be tried. Specifically, the court held that lower courts could do so only under limited circumstances in which specified criteria had been met. In the case of Charles Sell, since the lower court had failed to determine that all the appropriate criteria for court-ordered forcible treatment had been met, the order to forcibly medicate the defendant was reversed.
In the United States criminal justice system, a competency evaluation is an assessment of the ability of a defendant to understand and rationally participate in a court process.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed a defendant's right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial. The Court outlined the basic standards for determining competency.
United States v. Binion, 132 F. App'x 89, is a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, in upholding the sentencing decision by the trial court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that determined a U.S. state violated due process by involuntarily committing a criminal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of his permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.
Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 is a landmark case in which District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided that a judge could not impose an insanity defense over the defendant's objections.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), was a landmark decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a defendant was competent to stand trial, they were automatically competent to plead guilty, and thereby waive the panoply of trial rights, including the right to counsel.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a Missouri trial court deprived a defendant of due process by failing to order a competency examination after he was hospitalized following an attempted suicide and as a result missed a portion of his trial for a capital offense.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the standard for competency to stand trial was not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court, for the first time, addressed whether the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment allows defendants, who were found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) of a misdemeanor crime, to be involuntarily confined to a mental institution until such times as they are no longer a danger to themselves or others with few other criteria or procedures limiting the actions of the state.
United States federal laws governing offenders with mental diseases or defects provide for the evaluation and handling of defendants who are suspected of having mental diseases or defects. The laws were completely revamped by the Insanity Defense Reform Act in the wake of the John Hinckley Jr. verdict.
The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.
A Marsden motion is the only means by which a criminal defendant can fire a court-appointed attorney or communicate directly with a judge in a California state court. It is based on a defendant's claim that the attorney is providing ineffective assistance or has a conflict with the defendant. The name comes from the case People v. Marsden. A defendant is required to know to make a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, and make one, or the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or the issue cannot be raised on appeal. There is no requirement to notify a defendant of such a requirement.
The Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the Sixth Amendment standard for reversing convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. The Court ruled that when a lawyer's ineffective assistance leads to the rejection of a plea agreement, a defendant is entitled to relief if the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice. In such cases, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires the trial judge to exercise discretion to determine an appropriate remedy.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that clarified the relationship of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to other constitutional rights in criminal procedure. In this case, evidence against the defendant was probably seized illegally, violating the Fourth Amendment, but he lost the chance to argue that point due to his lawyer's ineffectiveness. The prosecution argued that the defendant's attempt to make a Sixth Amendment argument via a habeas corpus petition was really a way to sneak his Fourth Amendment argument in through the back door. The Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the Fourth Amendment issue and the Sixth Amendment issue represented different constitutional values, and had different requirements for prevailing in court, and therefore were to be treated separately by rules of procedure. Therefore, the habeas corpus petition could go forward. In its opinion, the Court also gave guidance on how to apply its decisions in Stone v. Powell and Strickland v. Washington.
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