| United States v. Bagley | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Full case name | United States v. Bagley |
| Citations | 473 U.S. 667 ( more ) |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Blackmun, joined by O'Conner; Burger, White, Rehnquist (Parts I & II) |
| Concurrence | White, joined by Burger, Rehnquist |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan |
| Dissent | Stevens |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. XIV | |
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), was a Supreme Court of the United States case that established the standard for materiality under Brady v. Maryland.
In Brady v. Maryland (1963), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense. The only requirements being that the evidence is favorable to the defendant and material. [1] : 4 Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court defined what it meant for evidence to be material in a case called United States v. Agurs (1976). [2] In Agurs, the Court set two different standards of materiality based on whether or not the defendant requested the nondisclosed evidence. [2]
Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on 15 counts of violating federal narcotic and firearm statutes in the Western District of Washington in October 1977. In preparation for trial, to be held in December, Bagley's counsel filed a discovery motion that requested information on the witnesses the prosecution intended to call, their criminal records, and any promises made to them in exchange for testimony. [3] At Bagley's bench trial, two state law-enforcement officers testified as the prosecution's principal witnesses. The officers had assisted the ATF in their investigation of Bagley. The prosecution did not notify the defendant of any promises made to them in exchange for testimony, as required. [3] Mr. Bagley was subsequently found guilty of all the narcotics charges but not guilty for all of the firearms charges. [4]
In 1980, while incarcerated for the narcotic charges, Bagley filed a Freedom of Information Act request and received response copies of ATF contracts that the principal witnesses had signed three years prior. [4] These forms were entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor" and indicated $300 was to be paid to the witnesses. Each form stated that the principal witnesses would: [4]
[P]rovide information regarding T–I and other violations committed by Hughes A. Bagley, Jr.; that he will purchase evidence for ATF; that he will cut [sic ] in an undercover capacity for ATF; that he will assist ATF in gathering of evidence and testify against the violator in federal court.
Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under Brady v. Maryland, arguing that his right to due process had been violated by the prosecution's failure to disclose these forms. [4] The district court ruled against Bagley but was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. [4]
In the first part of the Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion for the court, the factual and procedural history was laid out; Part I ended with the Court's ruling to reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. [5]
The District Court, in denying to vacate Bagley's sentence, had found that had the existence of the agreements been disclosed during trial, the disclosure would have had no effect upon its finding that the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was guilty of the offenses for which he had been convicted. [6] The District Court had reasoned that the witness testimony largely focused to the firearms charges, which Bagley had been acquitted on, and only briefly concerned the narcotics charge. [6] The District Court had also said that on cross-examination, Bagley's attorney had not sought to discredit their testimony as to the facts of distribution but rather sought to show that the controlled substances in question came from supplies that had been prescribed for Bagley's personal use and that the witnesses' answers there tended to be favorable. [6] Thus, the claimed impeachment evidence would not have been helpful and would not have affected the outcome of the trial. [6]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision in Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462 (1983). [6] The Court of Appeals began by noting that, according to precedent, prosecutorial failure to respond to a specific Brady request is properly analyzed as error, and a resulting conviction must be reversed unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [6] The court then noted that the District Judge who had presided over the bench trial concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the ATF agreement would not have affected the outcome. [7] The Court of Appeals, however, stated that it disagreed with this conclusion, in particular, with the Government's premise that the testimony was exculpatory on the narcotics charges, and that Bagley therefore would not have sought to impeach "his own witness."
The Blackmun opinion characterized the Court of Appeals reversal as having been based on the theory that the Government's failure to disclose the requested Brady information that respondent could have used to conduct an effective cross-examination impaired respondent's right to confront adverse witnesses, as the Court of Appeals opinion had concluded by saying:
"[W]e hold that the government's failure to provide requested Brady information to Bagley so that he could effectively cross-examine two important government witnesses requires an automatic reversal."
The majority opinion continued by discussing that the basis for Brady was the requirement of due process. [8] The Court reiterated that the due process requirement was not to displace the adversarial system, but to ensure that there was no miscarriage of justice. Prosecutors only had to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. [8] This information under Brady and its progeny had to be material and exculpatory, which would include impeachment evidence. [9]
The Court held that the constitutional error, if any, was in the Government's failure to assist the defense by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting the cross-examination, and that suppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. [10] It held that this only occurs if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. [10]
Only Justices Harry Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor signed onto Part III of the majority opinion where they adopted the Strickland v. Washington standard for prejudicial deficient performance by counsel as the new standard for materiality under Brady. [2] Under that standard, nondisclosed evidence is material if it has a "reasonable probability" to alter the trial result. [2] By doing so, the opinion framed the standard as flexible enough to cover previous scenarios where the defendant requested or did not request the evidence in question. [2] The opinion further defined "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." [11]
The Blackmun opinion permitted trial courts to make an additional inquiry in specific request cases (i.e., when the defendant asked for the nondisclosed evidence specifically), to determine whether the defendant's case was adversely affected by the withholding. [12]
Justice Blackmun finished the opinion by reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case to that court for a determination whether there is a reasonable probability the trial's result would have been different, had the inducement offered by the Government been disclosed. [13]
Justice Byron White wrote a concurrence that was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. [3] The three signed onto the new "reasonable probability" standard discussed in Part III but did not join the Blackmun opinion's statements regarding specific requests. [3]
Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice William J. Brennan Jr., [3] stated
"When the Government withholds from a defendant evidence that might impeach the prosecution's only witnesses, that failure to disclose cannot be deemed harmless error. Because that is precisely the nature of the undisclosed evidence in this case, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and would not remand for further proceedings.
Marshall further wrote that the majority opinion's characterization of the witness testimony was inaccurate; that Bagley's attorney had tried to impeach O'Connor, by asking him whether two ATF agents had pressured him or had threatened that his job might be in jeopardy, in order to get him to cooperate, but that O'Connor had answered in the negative, so he stopped this line of questioning. [15] Bagley's attorney even had attempted to argue to the District Court, in his closing argument, that the witnesses, O'Connor and Mitchell, had "fabricated" their accounts, but the court rejected the proposition. [16]
Marshall's dissent stated "Whatever the applicable standard of materiality . . . in this instance it undoubtedly is well met." [17] The dissent continued to say that the prosecutor's duty is straightforward, that they must divulge all evidence that reasonably appears favorable to the defendant, erring on the side of disclosure, but that the Court offered a complex alternative, defining the right not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial. [18] Marshall believed the standard would allow prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously exculpatory evidence. [19]
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent to say that he agreed the Court of Appeals misdescribed the rule stated in Brady, but disagreed with the Court's unwarranted decision to rewrite the rule itself. [20]
Bagley has been criticized by scholars for requiring prosecutors to make disclosure decisions based upon their post-hoc view of how the trial will go. [21] [22] Gerald Fowke stated that "[t]he chasm between 'a reasonable probability' and 'sufficien[cy] to undermine confidence in the outcome' cannot be bridged by defining the former with the latter" because probabilities are objective, and confidence is subjective. [21]
In jurisprudence, prosecutorial misconduct or prosecutorial overreach is "an illegal act or failing to act, on the part of a prosecutor, especially an attempt to sway the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or to impose a harsher than appropriate punishment." It is similar to selective prosecution. Prosecutors are bound by a sets of rules which outline fair and dispassionate conduct.
Discovery, in the law of common law jurisdictions, is a phase of pretrial procedure in a lawsuit in which each party, through the law of civil procedure, can obtain evidence from other parties by means of methods of discovery such as interrogatories, requests for production of documents, requests for admissions and depositions. Discovery can be obtained from nonparties using subpoenas. When a discovery request is objected to, the requesting party may seek the assistance of the court by filing a motion to compel discovery. Conversely, a party or nonparty resisting discovery can seek the assistance of the court by filing a motion for a protective order.
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that, in a criminal proceeding in federal court, a defendant who does not alert the district court to a possible violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must show on appeal that the violation affirmatively affected his rights in order to obtain reversal of his conviction by guilty plea. Rule 11, which pertains to criminal prosecutions in United States federal courts only, governs the offering of plea bargains to criminal defendants and the procedures district courts must employ to ensure that the defendant knows of and properly waives his trial-related constitutional rights.
In the legal system of the United States, a Brady disclosure consists of exculpatory or impeaching information and evidence that is material to the guilt or innocence or to the punishment of a defendant. The term comes from the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland, in which the Supreme Court ruled that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to a defendant who has requested it violates due process.
Exculpatory evidence is evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal trial that exonerates or tends to exonerate the defendant of guilt. It is the opposite of inculpatory evidence, which tends to present guilt.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that established that the prosecution must turn over all evidence that might exonerate the defendant to the defense. The prosecution failed to do so for Brady, and he was convicted. Brady challenged his conviction, arguing it had been contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Actual innocence is a special standard of review in legal cases to prove that a charged defendant did not commit the crimes that they were accused of, which is often applied by appellate courts to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), was a U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the Fourth Amendment's border search exception and balloon swallowing.
In the United States, the Jencks Act requires the prosecutor to produce a verbatim statement or report made by a government witness or prospective government witness, but only after the witness has testified.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), is a United States Supreme Court case that held that a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Bagley.
In United States criminal procedure, the Federal government and certain states have reciprocal discovery laws that compel defendants to disclose some information to prosecutors before trial. Within the federal court system, this material is referred to as reverse Jencks Act material, after the United States Supreme Court case which established the principle, Jencks v. United States.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the prosecution's failure to inform the jury that a witness had been promised not to be prosecuted in exchange for his testimony was a failure to fulfill the duty to present all material evidence to the jury, and constituted a violation of due process, requiring a new trial. This is the case even if the failure to disclose was a matter of negligence and not intent. The case extended the Court's holding in Brady v. Maryland, requiring such agreements to be disclosed to defense counsel. As a result of this case, the term Giglio material is sometimes used to refer to any information pertaining to deals that witnesses in a criminal case may have entered into with the government.
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), is a United States Supreme Court case that determined the constitutionality of deporting aliens who might give testimony in criminal alien smuggling prosecutions. Because deporting alien witnesses might take away a testimony that would be both “material and favorable” to the defendant, it gives rise to a potential motion from the defense to dismiss the indictment under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided that the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is applicable in state courts as well as federal courts. Jackie Washington had attempted to call his co-defendant as a witness, but was blocked by Texas courts because state law prevented co-defendants from testifying for each other, under the theory that they would be likely to lie for each other on the stand.
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine whether prosecutors in his 1982 death penalty trial violated his right to due process by withholding exculpatory evidence. The defendant, Gary Cone, filed a petition for postconviction relief from a 1982 death sentence in which he argued that prosecutors violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by withholding police reports and witness statements that potentially could have shown that his drug addiction affected his behavior. In an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that Cone was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated Cone's right to due process; the Court noted that "the quantity and the quality of the suppressed evidence lends support to Cone’s position at trial that he habitually used excessive amounts of drugs, that his addiction affected his behavior during his crime spree". In 2016, Gary Cone died from natural causes while still sitting on Tennessee's death row.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court decision that clarified both the scope of the protection against double jeopardy provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the limits of an appellate court's discretion to fashion a remedy under section 2106 of Title 28 to the United States Code. It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. Notwithstanding the power that appellate courts have under section 2106 to "remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances," a court that reverses a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence may not allow the lower court a choice on remand between acquitting the defendant and ordering a new trial. The "only 'just' remedy" in this situation, the Court held, is to order an acquittal.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the knowing use of false testimony by a prosecutor in a criminal case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if the testimony affects only the credibility of the witness and does not directly relate to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that Brady v. Maryland did not require prosecutors to disclose impeachment evidence during plea bargaining.
Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012), is a United States Supreme Court decision clarifying the Brady v. Maryland standard for criminal discovery. Joshua Dressler has called Smith v. Cain the "most recent pronouncement on the discovery issue."
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1976. The case clarified the obligation of a prosecutor to provide exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant.
This article incorporates public domain material from United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667. United States Government. 1985.