E v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Last updated

E v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Royal courts of justice.jpg
Court Court of Appeal (civil division)
Decided2 February 2004 (2004-02-02)
Citation(s) E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 (2 February 2004), Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
Case history
Appealed from Immigration Appeal Tribunal
Court membership
Judges sitting
Case opinions
  • Whether new evidence, if admitted, would demonstrate an error of law
  • New evidence produced after the hearing but before the decision date
  • Failure to consider new evidence in the context of the power to direct a rehearing
Keywords

E v Secretary of State for the Home Department was a landmark Court of Appeal case of 2004 which significantly developed the doctrine of error of fact as a distinct ground which was taken in conjunction with the question of new evidence (or the most recent decision) being considered in order to establish the error. [2] [3] The case laid out in definitive terms the criteria for the court to review a finding of mistake of fact leading to unfairness. [4] [5] In establishing an error of fact according to the requirements, a duty was identified to consider a decision; in particular, the duty to reopen a matter or direct a rehearing. [6] The question of new evidence produced after the hearing but before the decision date was considered within the context of the power of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) to direct a rehearing. [7]

Contents

Facts

Two appellants, who had separately claimed asylum in the United Kingdom, were heard jointly in the Court of Appeal. They were known only as ′E′ and ′R′.

History of ′E′

′E′ was an Egyptian national who came to the UK from Bangladesh in April 2001 and claimed asylum. ′E′ was considered to be sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly since his father was a member of the society. ′E′ had fled Bangladesh claiming the Egyptian authorities were pursuing him. He needed to renew his passport but could not do so without returning to Egypt. If he were to return, he claimed he would be detained and tortured.

The Home Secretary rejected his claim for asylum and on appeal, this refusal was affirmed by the Adjudicator and the IAT. There was a period of over 5 months between the IAT hearing of 22 October 2002 and the issuing of a decision on 4 April 2003. The tribunal accepted that there was evidence that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were, in fact, being imprisoned and subjected to torture, however, the IAT believed that this was not an ongoing situation, and that this had been short-term detentions due largely to the elections held in Egypt during the year 2000. The tribunal found that the Adjudicator was correct in not deeming the claim made by ′E′ to be especially persuasive and that being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood would not necessarily mean that he would be subject to persecution. The tribunal and Adjudicator did not feel that there was any new evidence before them that ′E′ was in any way part of organisations involved in conflict around the world. [2]

′E′ sought permission to appeal the decision, challenging the narrow aspect of the timing of the arrests; in particular, the finding of the link to the year 2000 elections. He was reliant on what was being described as "subsequent objective evidence"  namely the two reports which had emerged after the hearing, but prior to the promulgation of the decision. [8]

History of ′R′

′R′ was an Afghan national who came to the UK in August 2001 and claimed asylum. The grounds for asylum were that ′R′ had converted from Islam to Christianity and if made to return would most likely be subject to severe persecution. The IAT rejected the appeal of ′R′, even though the evidence per se was not in dispute. ′R′ applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal on 1 September 2003. New evidence, in the form of an additional Country Information and Policy Unit (CIPU) report of April 2003 was put forward to help substantiate the seriousness of the risk of persecution. Anyone suspected or even accused of conversion to Christianity could face severe punishment and in all likelihood, could be put to death. [9]

Permission to appeal was refused by the IAT because they felt the appeal grounds were inadequate as the CIPU report arrived after the hearing, and they could only decide an appeal on the evidence before them at the time. [2]

Decision

The appeal was allowed on the specific ground that in both the cases of ′E′ and ′R′, the IAT was wrong in failing to consider the new evidence in the context of the tribunal′s discretion to direct a rehearing, and that this evidence was credible and capable, had it been admitted, of demonstrating that there had been an error of law.

The prior position that appeals could only proceed on a matter of law was modified, as the court felt that adhering to this rigidly might lead to unfairness and that a mistake of fact could constitute an error of law. This was considered particularly important in cases where there is a statutory context and the parties are intent on co-operation, even in the absence of a duty to work together.

Finding of unfairness

The applicants relied on Lord Slynn′s statement as to what represented the law in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A (1999). [10] The CICB case engendered the following prerequisites for a finding of unfairness: [11]

  • There must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter;
  • Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been established, in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable;
  • Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake;
  • Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal′s reasoning.

See also

Related Research Articles

The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) was a tribunal constituted in the United Kingdom with jurisdiction to hear appeals from many immigration and asylum decisions. It was created on 4 April 2005, replacing the former Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA), and fell under the administration of the Tribunals Service.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Natural justice</span> Concept in UK law

In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing. While the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by the general "duty to act fairly".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Legitimate expectation</span> Legal doctrine regarding provided rights and services

The doctrine of legitimate expectation was first developed in English law as a ground of judicial review in administrative law to protect a procedural or substantive interest when a public authority rescinds from a representation made to a person. It is based on the principles of natural justice and fairness, and seeks to prevent authorities from abusing power.

Sir Patrick Elias, PC, is a retired Lord Justice of Appeal.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stephen Sedley</span> British lawyer

Sir Stephen John Sedley is a British lawyer. He worked as a judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales from 1999 to 2011 and was a visiting professor at the University of Oxford from 2011 to 2015.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">English contract law</span> Law of contracts in England and Wales

English contract law is the body of law that regulates legally binding agreements in England and Wales. With its roots in the lex mercatoria and the activism of the judiciary during the industrial revolution, it shares a heritage with countries across the Commonwealth, from membership in the European Union, continuing membership in Unidroit, and to a lesser extent the United States. Any agreement that is enforceable in court is a contract. A contract is a voluntary obligation, contrasting to the duty to not violate others rights in tort or unjust enrichment. English law places a high value on ensuring people have truly consented to the deals that bind them in court, so long as they comply with statutory and human rights.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Kingdom administrative law</span>

United Kingdom administrative law is part of UK constitutional law that is designed through judicial review to hold executive power and public bodies accountable under the law. A person can apply to the High Court to challenge a public body's decision if they have a "sufficient interest", within three months of the grounds of the cause of action becoming known. By contrast, claims against public bodies in tort or contract are usually limited by the Limitation Act 1980 to a period of 6 years.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Legitimate expectation in Singapore law</span> Singapore legal doctrine allowing judicial review

The doctrine of legitimate expectation in Singapore protects both procedural and substantive rights. In administrative law, a legitimate expectation generally arises when there has been a representation of a certain outcome by the public authorities to an individual. To derogate from the representation may amount to an abuse of power or unfairness. The doctrine of legitimate expectation as a ground to quash decisions of public authorities has been firmly established by the English courts. Thus, where a public authority has made a representation to an individual who would be affected by a decision by the authority, the individual has a legitimate expectation to have his or her views heard before the decision is taken. Alternatively, an individual may also have a legitimate expectation to a substantive right. The recognition of substantive legitimate expectations is somewhat controversial as it requires a balancing of the requirements of fairness against the reasons for any change in the authority's policy. This suggests the adoption of a free-standing proportionality approach, which has been said not to apply in administrative law.

<i>HJ and HT v Home Secretary</i>

HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 is a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom concerning two men, from Iran and Cameroon respectively, claiming asylum in the United Kingdom on the grounds of their homosexuality. The men's claims had previously been turned down on the basis they would not face persecution in their own countries if they would conceal their sexuality. The appeal therefore centred on the question as to whether the men on their return could reasonably be expected to tolerate this requirement of discretion; the so-called 'discretion' or 'reasonable tolerability' test. Interventions were made by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Precedent fact errors in Singapore law</span> Singaporean legal doctrine

Errors as to precedent facts, sometimes called jurisdictional facts, in Singapore administrative law are errors committed by public authorities concerning facts that must objectively exist or not exist before the authorities have the power to take actions or make decisions under legislation. If an error concerning a precedent fact is made, the statutory power has not been exercised lawfully and may be quashed by the High Court if judicial review is applied for by an aggrieved person. The willingness of the Court to review such errors of fact is an exception to the general rule that the Court only reviews errors of law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Administrative law in Singapore</span> Law of Singapores government agencies

Administrative law in Singapore is a branch of public law that is concerned with the control of governmental powers as exercised through its various administrative agencies. Administrative law requires administrators – ministers, civil servants and public authorities – to act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the law. Singapore administrative law is largely based on English administrative law, which the nation inherited at independence in 1965.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Illegality in Singapore administrative law</span> Singaporean judicial review doctrine

Illegality is one of the three broad headings of judicial review of administrative action in Singapore, the others being irrationality and procedural impropriety. To avoid acting illegally, an administrative body or public authority must correctly understand the law regulating its power to act and to make decisions, and give effect to it.

<i>Re Fong Thin Choo</i>

Re Fong Thin Choo is an administrative law case decided in 1991 by the High Court of Singapore concerning the legality of a demand by the Director-General of Customs and Excise ("DG") that the applicant's company pay S$130,241.30 in customs duty as it had not exported certain goods. The case was presided over by Justice Chan Sek Keong. The Court decided that the DG had failed to take into account relevant evidence adduced by the applicant's company which could have been capable of rebutting the prima facie evidence of non-export, and had thus made an insufficient inquiry before arriving at his decision. Since the DG's demand had been based on an incorrect basis of fact and thus had been made contrary to law, the Court granted the applicant an order of prohibition that barred the DG from deducting the sum from certain bankers' guarantees that the applicant's company had lodged with Customs as security.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Andrew Leggatt</span> British judge (1930–2020)

Sir Andrew Peter Leggatt, PC was a British judge who served as the Lord Justice of Appeal and as a member of the Privy Council. He was noted for his acerbic wit and precise, well-written judgements. As a barrister, his clients included Paul McCartney and Robert Bolt.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Geoffrey Vos</span> British judge (born 1955)

Sir Geoffrey Charles Vos is a judge in England and Wales. Since January 2021, he has held the positions of Master of the Rolls and the Head of Civil Justice in England and Wales.

<i>Huang v Home Secretary</i>

Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 is a UK constitutional law case, concerning judicial review.

<i>R (March) v Secretary of State for Health</i> UK judicial review quashing a decision on the grounds of material error of fact

R (March) v Secretary of State for Health was a 2010 judicial review which challenged the UK Department of Health's decision not to implement Recommendation 6(h) of the Archer Independent Inquiry. The case was important in developing the doctrine of error of fact in public law which previously had not readily been the subject of judicial intervention.

<i>R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A</i> 1999 English House of Lords case

R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A was a 1999 case in the United Kingdom where a decision by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (CICB) not to award compensation was quashed by the House of Lords as it was deemed to be a breach of the rules of natural justice. The case reaffirmed the principle of "misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact" and further developed the doctrine of error of fact, in that a decision could be quashed on the basis of it having taken into account a factual mistake. The case also dealt with the issue of undue delay and guiding principles were laid out.

<i>Watkins v Home Office and others</i> UKHL appeal with important implications for the tort of misfeasance in public office

Watkins v Home Office and others[2006] UKHL 17, was a United Kingdom legal case heard by the House of Lords where the Home Office made an appeal as to whether the tort of misfeasance in public office was actionable in the absence of proof of pecuniary losses or injury of a mental or physical nature. The appeal was upheld, ruling that the tort of misfeasance in public office is never actionable without proof of material damage as defined by Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Michael Fordham (judge)</span> High Court judge

Sir Michael John Fordham,, styled The Hon. Mr Justice Fordham, is a judge of the High Court of England and Wales assigned to the King's Bench Division. He was appointed as a Justice of the High Court on 13 January 2020.

References

  1. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
  2. 1 2 3 E v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 49QB1044 (EWCA (Civ)2004).
  3. Swarbrick, David (7 April 2019). "E v Secretary of State for the Home Department: CA 2 Feb 2004". Swarb.co.uk. Retrieved 14 April 2020.
  4. Fordham, Michael (July 2012). "<P49.2.2>". Judicial Review Handbook (Sixth ed.). Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. p. 510. ISBN   9781849461597. (...considering error of fact as a ground of appeal for ″error of law″)
  5. E v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 49QB1044 , 66(EWCA (Civ)2004)("In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law...").
  6. Fordham, Michael (July 2012). "<6.1.7>". Judicial Review Handbook (Sixth ed.). Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. p. 66. ISBN   9781849461597. ...discussing IAT′s power to direct a rehearing.
  7. Lidbetter, Andrew; Zar, Nusrat; Condliffe, Anna (19 November 2009). "Challenging a decision for mistake of fact". lexology.com. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP. Retrieved 20 April 2020. It has been clear since the Court of Appeal′s decision in E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 that mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness can be a separate head of challenge.
  8. E v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 49QB1044 , 9(EWCA (Civ)2004).
  9. "E v Secretary of State for Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49". Casemine. 2 February 2004. Retrieved 22 April 2020.
  10. E v Secretary of State for Home Department, 49QB1044 , [50](EWCA (Civ)2004).
  11. Fordham, Michael (July 2012). "<49.2.2>". Judicial Review Handbook (Sixth ed.). Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. p. 510. ISBN   9781849461597.