R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A

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R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A
Royal Coat of Arms of the United Kingdom.svg
Court House of Lords
Full case nameRegina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A (A.P.)
Decided25 March 1999
Citation(s)[1999] 2 AC 330, [1999] UKHL 21, [1999] 2 WLR 974
Transcript(s)
Case history
Prior action(s)[1999] 2 AC 330; [1999] 2 WLR 974
Appealed from Court of Appeal
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting Lord Slynn of Hadley
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Lord Nolan
Lord Clyde
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
Keywords
  • Quashing a decision on the basis of mistake
  • Misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact

  • Breach of natural justice
  • Error of fact
  • Review on a procedural point [1]
  • Undue delay
  • Supreme Court Act 1981 (31)

R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A was a 1999 case in the United Kingdom where a decision by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (CICB) not to award compensation was quashed by the House of Lords as it was deemed to be a breach of the rules of natural justice. The case reaffirmed the principle of "misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact" and further developed the doctrine of error of fact, in that a decision could be quashed on the basis of it having taken into account a factual mistake. [2] [3] The case also dealt with the issue of undue delay and guiding principles were laid out. [4]

Contents

Facts

On 25 May 1991, a woman, known only as ′A′, was seriously sexually assaulted by two men during a burglary at her home. In November, some six months later, she sought compensation through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. [5] A's application to the CICB was refused verbally on 31 August 1993, and subsequently in writing by the end of 1993.

Five days after the burglary, ′A′ had been examined by a police doctor who had confirmed that the findings of the examination were consistent with the allegation of buggery. [6] ′A′ was told that she did not need to ask for police statements as they would be produced by the police. When A's claim was heard by the CICB, the report by the police doctor was not included, which led to the Board taking the view that the police witnesses believed that no medical evidence was available to support her claim. [7]

Undue delay

When ′A′ made the application for judicial review, she was considerably out of time as the application had not been made within the 3-month period from the date the grounds arose.

The question of leave had been dealt with by the High Court even though A′s application fell outside the time period provided for in Order 53, rule 4, of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The order was granted on 14 February 1995 by Carnwath J. and was described as ″unambiguous″ by Lord Slynn of Hadley, who went on to say that the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the question of an extension of time.

Effect of the two provisions

Lord Slynn cited two provisions as being relevant to the issue of delay: Order 53, rule 4, of the Rules of the Supreme Court (pertaining to good reason for an extension of time) and Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (which deals with hardship, prejudice, detriment, and the justification for a refusal of leave). [8] A six–point list was set out in order to help elucidate on the effect of the two provisions: [4]

The House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal's reconsideration because the issue of whether it had been demonstrated that there was good reason for an extension of the time period had already been concluded at the point of A′s application for review and no good reason had been shown for extending the period within the meaning of Order 53, r. 4(1).

Judgment

The Law Lords unanimously allowed the appeal, accepting that there was jurisdiction to quash the Board's decision on the ground of taking into account a mistaken fact leading to a breach of the rules of natural justice, which in turn amounted to ″unfairness″. The Lords preferred to base their decision to quash on the ground of unfairness and left the question of review as to error of fact—an area of law in a state of flux—to be considered at a later time. [9] [10]

Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough in his closing comments said that the decision would be remitted to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

See also

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References

  1. "R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A". CMS-lawnow.com. Independent Law Reports. 15 April 1999. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
  2. Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex Parte A (A.P.)(House of Lords25 March 1999). Text
  3. Alder, John (2009). Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th ed.). England: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 318–319. ISBN   9780230576629. Lord Slynn said that ′misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact′ is reviewable but emphasised that this is no more than an application of ordinary review principles.
  4. 1 2 Swarbrick, David (21 March 2019). "Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex Parte A: HL 11 Mar 1999". Swarb.co.uk. Retrieved 25 June 2020.
  5. R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A [1999] UKHL 21 , [1999] 2 AC 330, [1999] UKHL 21, [1999] 2 WLR 974(1999), UKHL
  6. E v Secretary of State for the Home Department , 49QB1044 , 45(EWCA (Civ)2004)("She was examined five days after the burglary by a police doctor who reported that her findings were consistent with the allegation of buggery.").
  7. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex Parte A, 21 (UKHL1999)("... but, having been told that she should not ask for police statements as they would be produced at the hearing, it would not be surprising that she assumed that if there was a report from the Police Doctor, it would be made available with the police report.").
  8. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex Parte A, 21 (UKHL1999)("It seems to me that the two provisions produce the following result ... (Lord Slynn)").
  9. Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex Parte A (A.P.)(House of Lords25 March 1999)("As Lord Slynn has pointed out, it is not necessary for the determination of the present appeal to enter upon the question whether error of fact can without more be relied upon as a ground for judicial review. (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough)"). Text
  10. Fordham, Michael (July 2012). "<P33.3> (Flux)". Judicial Review Handbook (Sixth ed.). Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. p. 382. ISBN   9781849461597. Using unfairness to introduce material error of fact.