Muslim Brotherhood

Last updated

Society of the Muslim Brothers
جماعة الإخوان المسلمين
Leader Mohammed Badie
Spokesperson Gehad El-Haddad
Founder Hassan al-Banna
Founded22 March 1928;96 years ago (1928-03-22)
Ismailia, Kingdom of Egypt
Headquarters Cairo, Egypt (historical)
Unclear (present)
Ideology Pan-Islamism [1]
Sunni Islamism [2]
Neo-Sufism [3]
Qutbism [4] [5]
Religious conservatism [6]
Salafism [7] [8]
Anti-imperialism [9] [10]
Social conservatism [11]
Anti-Zionism [12]
Anti-communism [13]
Political position Right-wing [14] [15]
AlliesState allies:

Non-state allies:

Designated as a terrorist group byFull organisation:

Affiliated militant groups only:

Party flag
Flag of the Muslim Brotherhood.png
Website (English) (Arabic)

The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Arabic : جماعة الإخوان المسلمينJamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), better known as the Muslim Brotherhood (الإخوان المسلمونal-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) is a transnational Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928. [27] Al-Banna's teachings spread far beyond Egypt, influencing today various Islamist movements from charitable organizations to political parties. [28]


Initially, as a Pan-Islamic, religious, and social movement, it preached Islam in Egypt, taught the illiterate, and set up hospitals and business enterprises. It later advanced into the political arena, aiming to end British colonial control of Egypt. The movement's self-stated aim is the establishment of a state ruled by sharia law under a caliphate [29] –its most famous slogan is "Islam is the solution". Charity is a major aspect of its work. [1]

The group spread to other Muslim countries but still has one of its largest organizations in Egypt, despite a succession of government crackdowns from 1948 up until the present. [30] It remained a fringe group in the politics of the Arab World until the 1967 Six-Day War, when Islamism managed to replace popular secular Arab nationalism after a resounding Arab defeat by Israel. [31] The movement was also supported by Saudi Arabia, with which it shared mutual enemies like communism. [32]

The Arab Spring brought it legalization and substantial political power at first, but as of 2013 it has suffered severe reversals. [33] The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in 2011 and won several elections, [34] including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first president to gain power through an election. [35] A year later, following massive demonstrations and unrest, he was overthrown by the military and placed under house arrest; with a later review finding that the group failed to moderate its views or embrace democratic values during its time in power. [36] The group was then banned in Egypt and declared a terrorist organization. The Persian Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed suit, driven by the perception that the Brotherhood is a threat to their authoritarian rule. [37] [ failed verification ]

The group's founder accepted the utility of political violence [38] and members of Brotherhood conducted assassinations and attempted assassinations on Egyptian state figures during his lifetime, including Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud El Nokrashi in 1948. [39] Sayyid Qutb, one of the group's most prominent thinkers, promoted takfirism in Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), a doctrine that permits "the stigmatisation of other Muslims as infidel or apostate, and of existing states as unIslamic, and the use of extreme violence in the pursuit of the perfect Islamic society"; this doctrine continues to inspire many Jihadist movements. [40] [41] The group abandoned the use of violence in the 1970s. However, Hamas, a Palestinian militant group that currently controls the Gaza Strip, is an off-shoot of the Brotherhood that continues to use violence. The Brotherhood itself claims to be a peaceful, democratic organization, and that its leader[ who? ] "condemns violence and violent acts". [42]

Today, the primary state backers of the Muslim Brotherhood are Qatar and the AKP-ruling Turkey. [43] As of 2015, it is considered a terrorist organization by the governments of Bahrain, [44] Egypt, [45] Russia, [46] Syria, [47] Saudi Arabia [48] and the United Arab Emirates. [49]

Foundation and history in Egypt

Early years

Formative period (1928–1936)

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna Hassan al-Banna.jpg
The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna

Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Ismailia in March 1928 along with six workers of the Suez Canal Company, as a Pan-Islamic, religious, political, and social movement. [50] They appointed Al-Banna as their leader and vowed to work for Islam through Jihad and revive Islamic Brotherhood. Thus, the Muslim Brothers were born; under the pledge that its members would

be soldiers in the call to Islam, and in that is the life for the country and the honour for the Umma ... We are brothers in the service of Islam.. Hence we are the "Muslim Brothers". [51] [52]

The Suez Canal Company helped Banna build the mosque in Ismailia that would serve as the Brotherhood's headquarters, according to Richard P. Mitchell's The Society of Muslim Brothers. [53] According to al-Banna, contemporary Islam had lost its social dominance, because most Muslims had been corrupted by Western influences. Sharia law based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah were seen as laws passed down by God that should be applied to all parts of life, including the organization of the government and the handling of everyday problems. [54]

Al-Banna was populist in his message of protecting workers against the tyranny of foreign and monopolist companies. It founded social institutions such as hospitals, pharmacies, schools, etc. Al-Banna held highly conservative views on issues such as women's rights, opposing equal rights for women, but supporting the establishment of justice towards women. [55] The Brotherhood grew rapidly going from 800 members in 1936, to 200,000 by 1938 and over 2 million by 1948. [56]

Entry into politics (1936–1939)

As its influence grew, it opposed British rule in Egypt starting in 1936. [57]

al-Banna had been in contact with Amin al-Husseini since 1927. [58]

A central concern for the early Muslim Brotherhood was its pro-Arab activism for the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine, which in 1936–1939 culminated in the great Arab revolt. [59] While absent before the outbreak of the revolt, [60] the Brotherhood now began to make use of aggressive anti-Jewish rhetorics which also targeted the Jewish community in Egypt. [59] The official weekly of the Brotherhood, al-Nadhir, published a series of articles titled "The Danger of Jews", warning of alleged Jewish plots against Islam like Freemasonry or Marxism. [61] In 1938 al-Nadhir demanded from Egypt's Jews to either adopt an openly anti-Zionist stance or to face "hostility". It also criticized the prominent role of Jews in Egypt's society and their prominence in journalism, commercial spheres and the entertainment industry. al-Nadhir even called for a boycott and their expulsion, "for they have corrupted Egypt and its population." [59] In another instance the Jews were referred to as a "societal cancer". [60] The Brotherhood eventually distributed a list of Jewish business owners and called for their boycott, [62] claiming that they supported the Zionists. [63] Such conflations of Jews and Zionists were common. [61] [64]

In the years preceding World War II the Muslim Brothers grew connections with Nazi Germany, maintained via the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro in Cairo and Amin al-Husseini, [65] who himself received funds from the Abwehr. [66] Being interested in strengthening a militant anti-British organization, Germany may have funded the Brotherhood as early as 1934. One later British source claimed that in 1936 alone, Germany transferred over £5.000. [65] al-Banna and other members of the Brotherhood voiced admiration for aspects of Nazi ideology, including its militarism and its centralization revolving around a charismatic leader, [67] but opposed others like its racial policies and ethnic nationalism. [68] The outbreak of the war ended the relationship between Germany and the Muslim Brothers. [69] al-Banna denied that he had ever received German funding. [70] Italian funding of the Brotherhood is unlikely, as the latter vehemently opposed the Italian occupation of Libya. [69]

World War II (1939–1945)

Over the course of the war, the Brotherhood displayed pro-Axis sympathies. Worried, the British kept the Brotherhood under firm control by temporarily banning its newsletters, surveiling its meetings and arresting various provincial leaders. al-Banna himself was briefly taken into custody and eventually acknowledged his loyalty to the British, although the latter remained suspicious. [71]

A gathering of senior youth scouts (jawala, lit. "travellers") in the 1940s. Jawwalah of Muslim Brotherhood 1940s.jpg
A gathering of senior youth scouts (jawala, lit. "travellers") in the 1940s.

Between 1938 and 1940 [72] or 1941 [73] the Brotherhood formed an armed wing called the "Secret Apparatus" (al-Nizam al-Khas), [72] also known as "Special Apparatus". [74] This group was a successor [75] of the "battalions" (kata'ib) established in late 1937. [76] Its goal was to fight the British until their expulsion from Egypt, British collaborators as well as the Zionists. [77] It also protected the Brotherhood against the police and infiltrated the Communist movement. [78] The "Secret Apparatus" was led by a committee of five, with each of them commanding one tightly knit cell. [79] Only the most committed members, [73] mostly young students or men with salaried jobs, [79] were invited to join. New members of the "Secret Apparatus" were taught to obey, were given weapons, [73] underwent heavy physical training and were taught the concepts of Jihad and underground operations. The result was a zealous elite force. [79] Its first operation was allegedly towards the end of World War II, when members of the group threw a bomb at a British club. [73] Militarized youth sections were also raised, namely the junior kashafa ("scouts") and the more senior jawala ("travellers"). [80]

Post–World War II

Conflict in Palestine and Egypt (1945–1952)

After the war the Brotherhood lobbied [81] for granting Amin al-Husseini, who had served as German propaganda mouthpiece between 1941 and 1945, [82] asylum in Egypt. In May 1946 al-Husseini managed to escape from French imprisonment and arrived in Cairo. He received a warm welcome, especially by al-Banna, who ennobled him to a "miracle of a man" with "a divine spark in his heart which makes him above human beings", followed by a martial pledge of loyalty against the Zionists. [83] Soon after his arrival the Arab League established the Arab Higher Executive (rebranded as Arab Higher Committee in January 1947) as supreme Palestinian party with Amin al-Husseini as Cairo-based chairman. [84] al-Banna designated al-Husseini a local Brotherhood leader to spread the influence of the new Palestinian branch established in October 1945. [85] Another small branch was founded in Jordan at the turn of 1946. [86]

Muslim Brotherhood fighters in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War Ikhwan48-1.gif
Muslim Brotherhood fighters in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War

The Brotherhood opposed the UN's involvement in Palestine from April 1947, with the latter eventually voting for its partition into a Jewish and an Arab state in November 1947. Consequently, the society prepared for war, [87] with volunteers entering Palestine as early as October 1947. [88] By 30th November 1947 Palestine descended into a civil war fought between the Yishuv and al-Husseini's Arab Higher Committee, eventually ending in a Palestinian defeat by May 1948. [89] Of the 10,000 fighters al-Banna had promised in October 1947 [87] some 1.500 were present by March 1948. [90] The fighters came from all three branches and were originally engaged in guerilla activities. [91] The end of Mandatory Palestine and Israel's declaration of independence on 14 May resulted in an invasion by five Arab states in 15 May, among them Egypt. [92] Brotherhood fighters assisted the Egyptian army northeast of Gaza, although some were also active in the West Bank. [91] The volunteers suffered a few hundred casualties dead and wounded and had only a limited impact on the course of the war, [93] although they played a decisive role in several engagements. [94] The war was an Arab failure, resulting in a truce fiercely opposed by the Muslim Brothers. [93] [94]

Prime minister Nokrashy Pasha, who was shot by a Brotherhood assassin after outlawing the society in 1948 Mahmoud an-Nuqrashi Pasha.jpg
Prime minister Nokrashy Pasha, who was shot by a Brotherhood assassin after outlawing the society in 1948

On 2 November 1945 the Brotherhood organized a general strike protesting the Balfour declaration that eventually escalated into deadly riots targeting Jews and foreigners. [95]

In March 1948 the "Secret Apparatus" assassinated a respected judge for issuing a life sentence against a Muslim Brother for attacking British soldiers. [96] In late 1948 the Brotherhood was estimated to have 2,000 branches and 500,000 members or sympathizers. [97] In November, following several bombings and alleged assassination attempts by the Brotherhood, the Egyptian government arrested 32 leaders of the Brotherhood's "Secret Apparatus" and banned the Brotherhood. [98] It was accused of preparing the overthrow of the government, linked to a jeep loaded with weapons. [99] The headquarters were closed and its funds confiscated, while 4,000 Brothers were detained [100] and al-Banna was placed under temporary house arrest. [99] The reaction to the dissolution was the assassination of prime minister Nokrashy Pasha in 28 December by a young "Secret Apparatus" member. [100] al-Banna claimed that the killer acted independently [101] and publicly denounced his faith. [102] After a failed yet lethal bombing in mid-January 1949 which was intended to destroy legal evidence pending against the Brotherhood [103] al-Banna himself was killed in 12 February [100] by vengeful Nokrashy supporters. [104]

In 1952, members of the Muslim Brotherhood were accused of taking part in the Cairo Fire that destroyed some 750 buildings in downtown Cairo – mainly night clubs, theatres, hotels, and restaurants frequented by British and other foreigners. [105]

Dissolution under the "Free Officers" and Nasser (1952–1970)

Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb, who was executed in 1966 Sayyid Qutb.jpg
Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb, who was executed in 1966

In 1952 Egypt's monarchy was overthrown by a group of nationalist military officers (Free Officers Movement) who had formed a cell within the Brotherhood during the first war against Israel in 1948. [106] However, after the revolution Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the 'free officers' cell, after deposing the first President of Egypt, Muhammad Neguib, in a coup, quickly moved against the Brotherhood, blaming them for an attempt on his life. The Brotherhood was again banned and this time thousands of its members were imprisoned, many being tortured and held for years in prisons and concentration camps. In the 1950s and 1960s many Brotherhood members sought sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. [107] From the 1950s, al-Banna's son-in-law Said Ramadan emerged as a major leader of the Brotherhood and the movement's unofficial "foreign minister". Ramadan built a major center for the Brotherhood centered on a mosque in Munich, which became "a refuge for the beleaguered group during its decades in the wilderness". [108]

In the 1970s after the death of Nasser and under the new President (Anwar Sadat), the Egyptian Brotherhood was invited back to Egypt and began a new phase of participation in Egyptian politics. [109]

Mubarak era

During the Mubarak era, observers both defended and criticized the Brotherhood. It was the largest opposition group in Egypt, calling for "Islamic reform", and a democratic system in Egypt. It had built a vast network of support through Islamic charities working among poor Egyptians. [110] According to ex-Knesset member and author Uri Avnery the Brotherhood was religious but pragmatic, "deeply embedded in Egyptian history, more Arab and more Egyptian than fundamentalist". It formed "an old established party which has earned much respect with its steadfastness in the face of recurrent persecution, torture, mass arrests and occasional executions. Its leaders are untainted by the prevalent corruption, and admired for their commitment to social work". [111] It also developed a significant movement online. [112] [113]

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood became "in effect, the first opposition party of Egypt's modern era". Despite electoral irregularities, including the arrest of hundreds of Brotherhood members, and having to run its candidates as independents (the organization being technically illegal), the Brotherhood won 88 seats (20% of the total) compared to 14 seats for the legal opposition. [114]

During its term in parliament, the Brotherhood "posed a democratic political challenge to the regime, not a theological one", according to one The New York Times journalist, [114] while another report praised it for attempting to transform "the Egyptian parliament into a real legislative body", that represented citizens and kept the government "accountable". [114] [115]

But fears remained about its commitment to democracy, equal rights, and freedom of expression and belief—or lack thereof. [116] In December 2006, a campus demonstration by Brotherhood students in uniforms, demonstrating martial arts drills, betrayed to some such as Jameel Theyabi, "the group's intent to plan for the creation of militia structures, and a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'". [117] Another report highlighted the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts in Parliament to combat what one member called the "current US-led war against Islamic culture and identity," forcing the Minister of Culture at the time, Farouk Hosny, to ban the publication of three novels on the ground they promoted blasphemy and unacceptable sexual practices. [118] In October 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a detailed political platform. Among other things, it called for a board of Muslim clerics to oversee the government, and limiting the office of the presidency to Muslim men. In the "Issues and Problems" chapter of the platform, it declared that a woman was not suited to be president because the office's religious and military duties "conflict with her nature, social and other humanitarian roles". While proclaiming "equality between men and women in terms of their human dignity", the document warned against "burdening women with duties against their nature or role in the family". [119]

Internally, some leaders in the Brotherhood disagreed on whether to adhere to Egypt's 32-year peace treaty with Israel. A deputy leader declared the Brotherhood would seek dissolution of the treaty, [120] while a Brotherhood spokesman stated the Brotherhood would respect the treaty as long as "Israel shows real progress on improving the lot of the Palestinians". [121]

2011 revolution and after

Following the 2011 Egyptian revolution and fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood was legalized [122] and was at first very successful, dominating the 2011 parliamentary election and winning the 2012 presidential election, before the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi a year later, leading to a crackdown on the Brotherhood again.

On 30 April 2011, the Brotherhood launched a new party called the Freedom and Justice Party, which won 235 of the 498 seats in the 2011 Egyptian parliamentary elections, far more than any other party. [123] [124] The party rejected the "candidacy of women or Copts for Egypt's presidency", but not for cabinet positions. [125]

Then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meeting with then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, May 2013 Secretary Kerry Meets With Egyptian President Morsy in Addis Ababa (2).jpg
Then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meeting with then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, May 2013

The Muslim Brotherhood's candidate for Egypt's 2012 presidential election was Mohamed Morsi, who defeated Ahmed Shafiq—the last prime minister under Mubarak's rule—with 51.73% of the vote. [126] Although during his campaign Morsi himself promised to stand for peaceful relations with Israel, [127] some high level supporters and former Brotherhood officials (from the organization's 15-member Guidance Council) reiterated hostility towards Zionism. [128] For example, Egyptian cleric Safwat Hegazi spoke at the announcement rally for the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Morsi and expressed his hope and belief that Morsi would liberate Gaza, restore the Caliphate of the "United States of the Arabs" with Jerusalem as its capital, and that "our cry shall be: 'Millions of martyrs march towards Jerusalem.'" Within a short period, serious public opposition developed to President Morsi. In late November 2012, he "temporarily" granted himself the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts, on the grounds that he needed to "protect" the nation from the Mubarak-era power structure. [129] [130] He also put a draft constitution to a referendum that opponents complained was "an Islamist coup". [131] These issues [132] —and concerns over the prosecutions of journalists, the unleashing of pro-Brotherhood gangs on nonviolent demonstrators, the continuation of military trials, new laws that permitted detention without judicial review for up to 30 days, [133] brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets starting in November 2012. [134] [135]

By April 2013, Egypt had "become increasingly divided" between President Mohamed Morsi and "Islamist allies" and an opposition of "moderate Muslims, Christians and liberals". Opponents accused "Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to monopolize power, while Morsi's allies say the opposition is trying to destabilize the country to derail the elected leadership". [136] Adding to the unrest were severe fuel shortages and electricity outages, which raised suspicions among some Egyptians that the end of gas and electricity shortages since the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi was evidence of a conspiracy to undermine him, although other Egyptians say it was evidence of Morsi's mismanagement of the economy. [137]

On 3 July 2013, Mohamed Morsi was removed from office and put into house arrest by the military, [138] that happened shortly after mass protests against him began. [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] demanding the resignation of Morsi. There were also significant counter-protests in support of Morsi; [144] those were originally intended to celebrate the one-year anniversary of Morsi's inauguration, and started days before the uprising. On 14 August, the interim government declared a month-long state of emergency, and riot police cleared the pro-Morsi sit-in during the Rabaa sit-in dispersal of August 2013. Violence escalated rapidly following armed protesters attacking police, according to the National Council for Human Rights' report; [145] this led to the deaths of over 600 people and injury of some 4,000, [146] [147] with the incident resulting in the most casualties in Egypt's modern history. [148] In retaliation, Brotherhood supporters looted and burned police stations and dozens of churches in response to the violence, though a Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson condemned the attacks on Christians and instead blamed military leaders for plotting the attacks. [149] The crackdown that followed has been called the worst for the Brotherhood's organization "in eight decades". [150] By 19 August, Al Jazeera reported that "most" of the Brotherhood's leaders were in custody. [151] [152] On that day Supreme Leader Mohammed Badie was arrested, [153] crossing a "red line", as even Hosni Mubarak had never arrested him. [154] On 23 September, a court ordered the group outlawed and its assets seized. [155] Prime Minister, Hazem Al Beblawi on 21 December 2013, declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation after a car bomb ripped through a police building and killed at least 14 people in the city of Mansoura, which the government blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, despite no evidence and an unaffiliated Sinai-based terror group claiming responsibility for the attack. [156]

A group of pro-Brotherhood protesters holding the Rabia sign and making the associated gesture during a pro-Brotherhood protest held in October 2013 Anti-coup protesters with R4bia sign in Nasr City-Cairo 11-Oct-2013.jpg
A group of pro-Brotherhood protesters holding the Rabia sign and making the associated gesture during a pro-Brotherhood protest held in October 2013

On 24 March 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced 529 members of the Muslim Brotherhood to death [157] following an attack on a police station, an act described by Amnesty International as "the largest single batch of simultaneous death sentences we've seen in recent years [...] anywhere in the world". [158] By May 2014, approximately 16,000 people (and as high as more than 40,000 by what The Economist calls an "independent count"), [159] mostly Brotherhood members or supporters, have allegedly been arrested by police since the 2013 uprising. [160] On 2 February 2015, an Egyptian court sentenced another 183 members of the Muslim Brotherhood to death. [161]

An editorial in The New York Times claimed that "leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, which became the leading political movement in the wake of Egypt's 2011 popular uprising, are languishing in prison, unfairly branded as terrorists. ... Egypt's crushing authoritarianism could well persuade a significant number of its citizens that violence is the only tool they have for fighting back". [162]

Mohamed Morsi was sentenced to death on 16 May 2015, along with 120 others. [163]

The Muslim Brotherhood claimed that Muslims did not carry out the Botroseya Church bombing and claimed it was a false flag conspiracy by the Egyptian government and Copts, in a statement released in Arabic on the FJP's website, [164] but its claim was challenged by 100 Women participant Nervana Mahmoud [165] [166] [ non-primary source needed ] and Hoover Institution and Hudson Institute fellow Samuel Tadros. [167] [ non-primary source needed ] The Muslim Brotherhood released an English-language commentary on the bombing and said it condemned the terrorist attack. [168]

Qatar-based Muslim Brotherhood members are suspected to have helped a Muslim Brotherhood agent carry out the bombing, according to the Egyptian government. [169] [170] [171] The Qatar-based supporter was named as Mohab Mostafa El-Sayed Qassem. [172] [173] [174] The terrorist was named as Mahmoud Shafiq Mohamed Mostaf. [175]

The Arabic-language website of the Muslim Brotherhood commemorated the anniversary of the death of its leader, Hassan al-Banna, and repeated his words calling for the teachings of Islam to spread all over the world and to raise the "flag of Jihad", taking their land, "regaining their glory", "including diaspora Muslims" and demanding an Islamic state and a Muslim government, a Muslim people, a Muslim house, and Muslim individuals. [176]

Mekameleen TV, a Turkey-based free-to-air satellite television channel run by exiled Brotherhood supporters, mourned his death and claimed it was "martyrdom". Mekameleen supports the Brotherhood. [177] Condolences were sent upon Omar Abdel Rahman's death by the website of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. [178]


How much of the blame for the fall from power in Egypt of the Brotherhood and its allied Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) can be placed on the Brotherhood, and how much of it can be placed on its enemies in the Egyptian bureaucracy, media and security establishment is disputed. The Mubarak government's state media portrayed the Brotherhood as secretive and illegal, [179] and numerous TV channels such as OnTV spent much of their air time vilifying the organization. [180] But the Brotherhood took a number of controversial steps and also acquiesced to or supported crackdowns by the military during Morsi's presidency. [181] Before the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood's supporters appeared at a protest at Al-Azhar University wearing military-style fatigues, after which the Mubarak government accused the organization of starting an underground militia. [182] When it came to power, the Muslim Brotherhood indeed tried to establish armed groups of supporters and it sought official permission for its members to be armed. [183]

General leaders

Supreme guides or General leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood have been:

Mohammed Badie, the current leader Mohammed Badiea.jpg
Mohammed Badie, the current leader

Presence outside of Egypt

In the Middle East


Following parliamentary elections in 2002, Al Menbar became the largest joint party with eight seats in the forty-seat Chamber of Deputies. Prominent members of Al Menbar include Dr. Salah Abdulrahman, Dr. Salah Al Jowder, and outspoken MP Mohammed Khalid. Additionally, it has strongly opposed the government's accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. [184]


Although Iran is a predominately Shi'ite Muslim country and the Muslim Brotherhood has never attempted to create a branch for Shi'ites, [185] Olga Davidson and Mohammad Mahallati claim the Brotherhood has had influence among Shia in Iran. [186]

Iranian Call and Reform Organization, a Sunni Islamist group active in Iran, has been described as an organization "that belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood" [187] or "Iranian Muslim Brotherhood", [188] while it has officially stated that it is not affiliated with the latter. [189]


Erdogan performing the Rabaa gesture (which is used by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Egypt protesting against the post-Brotherhood authorities) Erdogan gesturing Rabia.jpg
Erdoğan performing the Rabaa gesture (which is used by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Egypt protesting against the post-Brotherhood authorities)

The Turkish AKP, the ruling party of Turkey, publicly supported the Muslim Brotherhood during and a few months after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. [190] [191] Then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed in an interview that this was because "Turkey would stand by whoever was elected as a result of legitimate elections." [192] According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, each year after Morsi's overthrow has seen the AKP "significantly detach itself from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt." [193]


The Iraqi Islamic Party was formed in 1960 as the Iraqi branch of the Brotherhood, [194] but was banned from 1961 during the nationalist rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim. As government repression hardened under the Baath Party from February 1963, the group was forced to continue underground. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in 2003, the Islamic Party has reemerged as one of the main advocates of the country's Sunni community. Its leader is Iraqi Vice-president Tariq Al-Hashimi.

The Muslim Brotherhood was an active participation in the "Faith Campaign". [195]

Khaled al-Obaidi said that he received a death threat and was declared a non-Muslim by the Muslim Brotherhood. [196] [ non-primary source needed ]

Also, in the north of Iraq there are several Islamic movements inspired by or part of the Muslim Brotherhood network. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), a small political party holding 10 seats in the Kurdish parliament, was believed to be supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 90's. [197] The group leaders and members have been continuously arrested by Kurdish authorities.


'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, the brother of the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna, went to Mandatory Palestine and established the Muslim Brotherhood there in 1935. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, eventually appointed by the British as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in hopes of accommodating him, was the leader of the group in Palestine. [198] Another important leader associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, an inspiration to Islamists because he had been the first to lead an armed resistance in the name of Palestine against the British in 1935. [199]

Brotherhood members fought alongside the Arab armies during the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, and, after Israel's creation, the ensuing Palestinian refugee crisis encouraged more Palestinian Muslims to join the group. After the war, in the West Bank, the group's activity was mainly social and religious, not political, so it had relatively good relations with Jordan during the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank. In contrast, the group frequently clashed with the Egyptian government that controlled the Gaza Strip until 1967. [200]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood's goal was "the upbringing of an Islamic generation" through the restructuring of society and religious education, rather than opposition to Israel, and so it lost popularity to insurgent movements and the presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir. [201] Eventually, however, the Brotherhood was strengthened by several factors:

  1. The creation of al-Mujamma' al-Islami, the Islamic Center in 1973 by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin had a centralizing effect that encapsulated all religious organizations.
  2. The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine was created from a merger of the branches in the West Bank and Gaza and Jordan.
  3. Palestinian disillusion with the Palestinian militant groups caused them to become more open to alternatives.
  4. The Islamic Revolution in Iran offered inspiration to Palestinians. The Brotherhood was able to increase its efforts in Palestine and avoid being dismantled like militant groups because it did not focus on the occupation. While militant groups were being dismantled, the Brotherhood filled the void. [202]

In 2006, the Brotherhood supported Hezbollah's military action against Israel. It does not recognize the State of Israel. [203]


Between 1967 and 1987, the year Hamas was founded, the number of mosques in Gaza tripled from 200 to 600, and the Muslim Brotherhood named the period between 1975 and 1987 a phase of "social institution building." [12] During that time, the Brotherhood established associations, used zakat (alms giving) for aid to poor Palestinians, promoted schools, provided students with loans, used waqf (religious endowments) to lease property and employ people, and established mosques. Likewise, antagonistic and sometimes violent opposition to Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other secular nationalist groups increased dramatically in the streets and on university campuses. [204]

In 1987, following the First Intifada, the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas [202] [205] was established from Brotherhood-affiliated charities and social institutions that had gained a strong foothold among the local population. During the First Intifada (1987–93), Hamas militarized and transformed into one of the strongest Palestinian militant groups.

The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 was the first time since the Sudanese coup of 1989 that brought Omar al-Bashir to power, that a Muslim Brotherhood group ruled a significant geographic territory. [206] However, the 2013 overthrow of the Mohammad Morsi government in Egypt significantly weakened Hamas's position, leading to a blockade of Gaza and economic crisis. [207]


The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan originates from the merging of two separate groups which represent the two components of the Jordanian public: the Transjordanian and the West Bank Palestinian. [208]

On 9 November 1945 the Association of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jam'iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) was officially registered and Abu Qura became its first General Supervisor. [208] Abu Qura originally brought the Brotherhood to Jordan from Egypt after extensive study and spread of the teachings of Imam Hasan al-Banna. [208] While most political parties and movements were banned for a long time in Jordan such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Brotherhood was exempted and allowed to operate by the Jordanian monarchy. In 1948, Egypt, Syria, and Transjordan offered "volunteers" to help Palestine in its war against Israel. Due to the defeat and weakening of Palestine, the Transjordanian and Palestinian Brotherhood merged. [208]

The newly merged Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was primarily concerned with providing social services and charitable work as well as with politics and its role in the parliament. It was seen as compatible with the political system and supported democracy without the forced implementation of Sharia law which was part of its doctrine. [209] However, internal pressures from younger members of the Brotherhood who called for more militant actions as well as his failing health, Abu Qura resigned as the leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. On 26 December 1953, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, was elected by the movement's administrative committee as the new leader of the Transjordanian Brotherhood and he retained this position until 1994. Khalifa was different from his predecessor and older members of the organization because he was not educated in Cairo, he was educated in Syria and Palestine. He established close ties with Palestinian Islamists during his educational life which led him to be jailed for several months in Jordan for criticizing Arab armies in the war. [208]

Khalifa also reorganized the Brotherhood and applied to the government to designate the Brotherhood as "a comprehensive and general Islamic Committee, instead of the previous basis of operation under the "Societies and Clubs Law". This allowed the Brotherhood to spread throughout the country each with slight socioeconomic and political differences although the majority of the members were of the upper middle class. The radicalization of the Brotherhood began to take place after the peace process between Egypt and Israel, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, as well as their open criticism towards the Jordan-US relationship in the 1970s. Support for the Syrian branch of the Brotherhood also aided the radicalization of the group through open support and training for the rebel forces in Syria. The ideology began to transform into a more militant one which without it would not have the support of the Islamic radicals. [210]

The Jordanian Brotherhood has formed its own political party, the Islamic Action Front. In 1989 they become the largest group in parliament, with 23 out of 80 seats, and 9 other Islamist allies. [211] A Brother was elected president of the National Assembly and the cabinet formed in January 1991 included several MBs. [212]

In 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood "mobilized popular protests on a larger, more regular, and more oppositional basis than ever before". [213] and had uniquely positioned themselves as "the only traditional political actor to have remained prominent during [the] new phase of post-Arab Spring activism" [213] which led King Abdullah II and then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit to invite the Muslim Brotherhood to join Bakhit's cabinet, an offer they refused. [214] The Muslim Brotherhood also boycotted the 2011 Jordanian municipal elections and led the 2011–12 Jordanian protests demanding a constitutional monarchy and electoral reforms, which resulted in the firing of Prime Minister Bakhit and the calling of early general elections in 2013. [213]

As of late 2013, the movement in Jordan was described as being in "disarray". [215] The instability and conflict with the monarchy has led the relationship between the two to crumble. In 2015, some 400 members of the Muslim Brotherhood defected from the original group including top leaders and founding members, to establish another Islamic group, with an allegedly moderate stance. The defectors said that they didn't like how things were run in the group and due to the group's relations with Hamas, Qatar and Turkey, which put suspicion on the group questioning if they are under the influence and working for the benefit of these states and organizations on the expense of the Jordanian state. [216]

On 13 April 2016, Jordanian police raided and shut the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Amman. This comes despite the fact that the Jordanian branch cut ties with the mother Egyptian group in January 2016, a designated terrorist organization, a move that is considered to be exclusively cosmetic by experts. Jordanian authorities state that the reason of closure is because that the Brotherhood is unlicensed and is using the name of the defectors' licensed group. This comes after the Jordanian senate passed a new legislation for the regulation of political parties in 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood did not adhere by the regulations of the new law and so they did not renew their membership. [217]

In 2020, a Jordanian Court of Cassation decided that the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood will be dissolved after the branch did not renew its license after a new law was issued on organizations. [218]


In 1999 the Muslim Brotherhood was disbanded in Qatar. The country's longstanding support for the group has been often explained as determined by a strategic calculus that limited the role played by religion in Qatar. [219] As the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Doha-based branch of Georgetown University, Mehran Kamrava, posited, Qatar presenting itself as the state patron of the Muslim Brotherhood has caused religion in Qatar to not "play any role in articulating or forming oppositional sentiments." [219]

Qatar's patronage has been primarily expressed through the ruling family's endorsement of Muslim Brotherhood's most representative figures, especially Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Qaradawi is a prominent, yet controversial Sunni preacher and theologian who continues to serve as the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. An Egyptian citizen, Qaradawi fled Egypt for Qatar in 1961 after being imprisoned under President Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1962 he chaired the Qatari Secondary Institute of Religious Studies, and in 1977 he founded and directed the Shariah and Islamic Studies department at the University of Qatar. [220] He left Qatar to return to Egypt shortly before the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

For twenty years, Qaradawi has hosted a popular show titled Shariah and Life on the Qatari-based media channel Al-Jazeera, a government sponsored channel notoriously supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamism and often designated as a propaganda outlet for the Qatari government. [221] [222] [223] From that platform, he has promoted his Islamist—and often radical views—on life, politics, and culture.

His positions, as well as his controversial ties to extremist and terrorist individuals and organizations, made him persona non grata to the U.S., UK and French governments respectively in 1999, 2008, and 2012. [224] [225]

Before 2013, however, Qatar had made a substantial investment on Morsi's leadership and had devolved about $10 million to Egypt since Morsi was elected, allegedly also to "buy political advantage" in the country. [226] [227]

In December 2019, Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told CNN in an interview that Qatar never supported Muslim Brotherhood and does not fund terrorism. [228]


Egyptian Brethren came to Kuwait in the 1950s as refugees from Arab nationalism and integrated into the education ministry and other parts of the state. The Brotherhood's charity arm in Kuwait is called Al Eslah (Social Reform Society) [229] and its political arm is called the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) or "Hadas". [230] [231] Members of ICM have been elected to parliament and served in the government and are "widely believed to hold sway with the Ministry of Awqaf" (Islamic endowment) and Islamic Affairs, but have never reached a majority or even a plurality—"a fact that has required them to be pragmatic about working with other political groups". [229] During the invasion of Kuwait, the Kuwait MB (along with other MB in the Gulf States) supported the American-Saudi coalition forces against Iraq and "quit the brotherhood's international agency in protest" over its pro-Sadam stand. [232] However following the Arab Spring and the crackdown on the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Saudi government has put "pressure on other states that have Muslim Brotherhood adherents, asking them to decree that the group is a terrorist organization", and the local Kuwaiti and other Gulf state Brotherhoods have not been spared pressure from their local governments. [229]

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia helped the Brotherhood financially for "over half a century", [233] [234] but the two became estranged during the Gulf War, and enemies after the election of Mohamed Morsi. Inside the kingdom, before the crushing of the Egyptian MB, the Brotherhood was called a group whose "many quiet supporters" made it "one of the few potential threats" to the royal family's control. [235]

The Brotherhood first had an impact inside Saudi Arabia in 1954 when thousands of Egyptian Brethren sought to escape president Gamal Abdel Nasser's clampdown, while (the largely illiterate) Saudi Arabia was looking for teachers—who were also conservative pious Arab Muslims—for its newly created public school system. [236] The Muslim Brotherhood's brand of Islam and Islamic politics differs from the Salafi creed called Wahhabiyya, officially held by the state of Saudi Arabia, and MB members "obeyed orders of the ruling family and ulama to not attempt to proselytize or otherwise get involved in religious doctrinal matters within the Kingdom. Nonetheless, the group "methodically ... took control of Saudi Arabia's intellectual life" by publishing books and participating in discussion circles and salons held by princes. [237] Although the organization had no "formal organizational presence" in the Kingdom, [238] (no political groups or parties are allowed to operate openly) [234] MB members became "entrenched both in Saudi society and in the Saudi state, taking a leading role in key governmental ministries". [239] In particular, many established themselves in Saudi educational system. One expert on Saudi affairs (Stephane Lacroix) has stated: "The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change—if at all. Islamists see education as their base" in Saudi Arabia. [240]

Relations between the Saudi ruling family and the Brotherhood became strained with Saudi opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the willingness of Saudi government to allow US troops to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq. [239] The Brotherhood supported the Sahwah ("Awakening") movement that pushed for political change in the Kingdom. [241] In 2002, the then Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and was "the source of all problems in the Islamic world". [233] The ruling family was also alarmed by the Arab Spring and the example set by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with president Mohamed Morsi bringing an Islamist government to power by means of popular revolution and elections. [242] Sahwa figures published petitions for reform addressed to the royal government (in violation of Wahhabi quietist doctrine). After the overthrow of the Morsi government in Egypt, all the major Sahwa figures signed petitions and statements denouncing the removal of Morsi and the Saudi government support for it. [239]

In March 2014, in a "significant departure from its past official stance" the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization", followed with a royal decree announced that, from now on,

belonging to intellectual or religious trends or groups that are extremist or categorized as terrorist at the local, regional or international level, as well supporting them, or showing sympathy for their ideas and methods in whichever way, or expressing support for them through whichever means, or offering them financial or moral support, or inciting others to do any of this or promoting any such actions in word or writing

will be punished by a prison sentence "of no less than three years and no more than twenty years". [239]


The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was founded in the 1930s (according to or in 1945, a year before independence from France, (according to journalist Robin Wright). In the first decade or so of independence it was part of the legal opposition, and in the 1961 parliamentary elections it won ten seats (5.8% of the house). But after the 1963 coup that brought the secular Ba'ath Party to power it was banned. [243] It played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based movement that opposed the secularist, pan-Arabist Ba'ath Party. This conflict developed into an armed struggle that continued until culminating in the Hama uprising of 1982, when the rebellion was crushed by the military. [244]

Membership in the Syrian Brotherhood became a capital offense in Syria in 1980 (under Emergency Law 49, which was revoked in 2011), but the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Palestinian group, Hamas, was located in the Syria's capital Damascus, where it was given Syrian government support. This has been cited as an example of the lack of international centralization or even coordination of the Muslim Brotherhood. [245]

The Brotherhood is said to have "resurrected itself" and become the "dominant group" in the opposition by 2012 during the Syrian Civil War according to the Washington Post newspaper. [246] But by 2013 another source described it as having "virtually no influence on the conflict". [247] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad welcomed the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and remarked that "Arab identity is back on the right track after the fall from power of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which had used religion for its own political gain". [248]

United Arab Emirates

Muslim Brotherhood presence in the United Arab Emirates began with the formation of the Al Islah group in the United Arab Emirates in 1974 with the approval of Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum. [249]

Al Islah in the UAE has openly stated that it shares ideology with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. [250] Al Islah has criticized the UAE for the country's religious tolerance and presence of community Christian churches in the UAE. [251] Since its formation, its members have sought to impose control on state social issues, such as promoting several measures limiting the rights of women. [252] [253] Emirati Al Islah member Tharwat Kherbawi said the Muslim Brotherhood finds the present UAE government to be an "impediment", and the country itself to be a "treasure and a crucial strategic and economic prize". [254]

Al Islah was reported to have been secretly forming a military wing that has sought to recruit retired military officers and young Emiratis and is alleged to have plotted the overthrow of the current government and the establishment of an Islamist state in the UAE. [249] [255]

In March 2013, a trial began in Abu Dhabi for 94 individuals linked to Al Islah for an attempted coup on the government. [256] Of the 94, 56 suspects received prison sentences ranging between three and ten years. Eight suspects were sentenced in absentia to 15 years in jail and 26 were acquitted. [257]

On 7 March 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood was designated as a terrorist group by the UAE government. [49]


The Muslim Brothers fought with North Yemen in the NDF rebellion as Islamic Front. The Muslim Brotherhood is the political arm of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, commonly known as Al-Islah. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh made substantial efforts to entrench the accusations of being in league with Al Qaeda. [258]

The Treasury Department of the US used the label "Bin Laden loyalist" for Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood's leader. [259]

Rest of Africa


The Muslim Brotherhood reached Algeria during the later years of the French colonial presence in the country (1830–1962). Sheikh Ahmad Sahnoun led the organization in Algeria between 1953 and 1954 during the French colonialism. Brotherhood members and sympathizers took part in the uprising against France in 1954–1962, but the movement was marginalized during the largely secular FLN one-party rule which was installed at independence in 1962. It remained unofficially active, sometimes protesting the government and calling for increased Islamization and Arabization of the country's politics. [260]

When a multi-party system was introduced in Algeria in the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, previously known as Hamas), led by Mahfoud Nahnah until his death in 2003 (he was succeeded by present party leader Boudjerra Soltani). The Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria did not join the Front islamique du salut (FIS), which emerged as the leading Islamist group, winning the 1991 elections and which was banned in 1992 following a military coup d'état, although some Brotherhood sympathizers did. The Brotherhood subsequently also refused to join the violent post-coup uprising by FIS sympathizers and the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) against the Algerian state and military which followed, and urged a peaceful resolution to the conflict and a return to democracy. It has thus remained a legal political organization and enjoyed parliamentary and government representation. In 1995, Sheikh Nahnah ran for President of Algeria finishing second with 25.38% of the popular vote. During the 2000s (decade), the party—led by Nahnah's successor Boudjerra Soltani—has been a member of a three-party coalition backing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.


A group of the Muslim Brotherhood came to the Libyan kingdom in the 1950s as refugees escaping crackdown by the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, but it was not able to operate openly until after the First Libyan Civil War. They were viewed negatively by King Idris of Libya who had become increasingly wary of their activities. Muammar Gaddafi forbade all forms of Islamism in Libya and was an archenemy to the Muslim Brotherhood for long time. The group held its first public press conference on 17 November 2011, and on 24 December the Brotherhood announced that it would form the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and contest the General National Congress elections the following year. [261] [262] The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has "little history of interactions with the masses." [263]

Despite predictions based on fellow post-Arab Spring nations Tunisia and Egypt that the Brotherhood's party would easily win the elections, it instead came a distant second to the National Forces Alliance, receiving just 10% of the vote and 17 out of 80 party-list seats. [264] Their candidate for Prime Minister, Awad al-Baraasi was also defeated in the first round of voting in September, although he was later made a Deputy Prime Minister under Ali Zeidan. [265] [266] A JCP Congressman, Saleh Essaleh is also the vice speaker of the General National Congress. [267]

The Party of Reform and Development is led by Khaled al-Werchefani, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. [268]

Sallabi, the Head of Homeland Party, has close ties to Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood. [269] [270]

The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya has come under widespread criticism, particularly for their alleged ties with extremist organizations operating in Libya. [271] In fact, the text of the U.S. Congress Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015 directly accuses the militias of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood of "joining forces with United States designated terrorist organizations, particularly Ansar al-Sharia" who the United States blames for the attack on its compound in Benghazi. [272] [273] There have been similar reports that those tasked with guarding the Benghazi consulate on the night of the assault were connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. [274]

The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has lost much of its popular support since 2012 as the group was blamed for divisions in the country. Secular Libyan politicians have continued to voice concerns of the Brotherhood's ties to extremist groups. In October 2017, spokesman of the Libyan National Army (LNA) colonel Ahmed Al Masmary claimed that "branches of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated to al-Qaeda" had joined forces with ISIS in Libya. [275] In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won only 25 of the 200 available seats. [276]


Changes to the demographic and political makeup of Mauritania in the 1970s heavily contributed to the growth of Islamism within Mauritanian society. Periods of severe drought resulted in urbanization, as large numbers of Mauritanians moved from the countryside to the cities, particularly Nouakchott, to escape the drought. This sharp increase in urbanization resulted in new civil associations being formed, and Mauritania's first Islamist organisation, known as Jemaa Islamiyya (Islamic Association) was formed by Mauritanians sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. [277]

There was increased activism relating to the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, partially driven by members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. [277]

In 2007 the National Rally for Reform and Development, better known as Tewassoul, was legalized as a political party. The party is associated with the Mauritanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. [277]


The Justice and Development Party was the largest vote-getter in Morocco's 2011 election, and as of May 2015, held the office of Prime Minister. [33] It is historically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, [278] [279] [280] [281] however, despite this, PJD was never an official branch [278] and the party has reportedly "ostentatiously" praised the King of Morocco, while "loudly insisting that it is in no sense whatsoever a Muslim Brotherhood party". [33]


Al-Islah has been described as "a generally nonviolent and modernizing Islamic movement that emphasizes the reformation and revival of Islam to meet the challenges of the modern world", whose "goal is the establishment of an Islamic state" and which "operates primarily in Mogadishu". [282]


An offshoot of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Charter Front grew during the 1960, with Islamic scholar Hasan al-Turabi becoming its Secretary general in 1964. [283] [ need quotation to verify ] The Islamic Charter Front (ICM) was renamed several times most recently being called the National Islamic Front (NIF). The Muslim Brotherhood/NIF's main objective in Sudan was to Islamize the society "from above" and to institutionalize the Islamic law throughout the country where they succeeded. To that end the party infiltrated the top echelons of the government where the education of party cadre, frequently acquired in the West, made them "indispensable". This approach was described by Turabi himself as the "jurisprudence of necessity". [284] [ need quotation to verify ]

Meeting resistance from non-Islamists, from already established Muslim organisations, and from non-Muslims in the south, the Sudanese NIF government under Turabi and the NIF organized a coup to overthrow a democratically elected government in 1989, organized the Popular Defense Force which committed "widespread, deliberate and systematic atrocities against hundreds of thousands of southern civilians" in the 1990s. [285] The NIF government also employed "widespread arbitrary and extrajudicial arrest, torture, and execution of labor union officials, military officers, journalists, political figures and civil society leaders". [285] [ need quotation to verify ]

The NCP was dissolved in the aftermath of the military takeover on 11 April 2019. [286]



Muslim Brotherhood organisations in Europe find themselves in different circumstances compared to their counterparts in the Muslim World, as they in Europe operate in societies which do not have a Muslim majority. The first Brotherhood members active in Europe migrated from the Middle East during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Some were in the leadership of the Egyptian Brotherhood who fled the dictatorship of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Most were foreign students who already had Brotherhood sympathies while others were experienced militants. Together they continued their Islamic activities in the destination countries, where Europe's freedoms allowed them to openly conduct activities which had been banned in the Muslim countries of origin. [287]

Student groups affiliated to the MB grew into organizations and they often structured their mosques as community centres. Following al-Banna's organizational model they founded women's groups, think tanks and schools. This growth was funded by both public and private donors in the Arab gulf countries. [287]

By establishing a multitude of organizations devoted to anything from education, financial investments, political lobbying and charity they supported the growing Muslim populations of Europe and sought to shape the direction of Islam in Europe. Thereby the brothers created a de facto branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in every European country. To increase their potential for gaining influence, the organisations established by the MB are often given names which portray a facade of broad representation (e.g. "Muslim association of European Country") or religious moderation (e.g. "Islamic Co-Existence Alliance"). This is in contrast to the views propagated by many speakers at MB events where the Western countries are condemned as being corrupt, unjust and immoral along with a narrative where Muslims are portrayed as better, but beleaguered. On certain issues such as religious freedom, women's rights and homosexuality Brotherhood spokespersons espouse ideas contrary to mainstream European values and basic human rights. [287]

The pan-European umbrella organization of the Brotherhood in Europe is the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe which was founded in 1989 and in 2020 changed its name to Council of European Muslims. It has its headquarters a few blocks away from key European Union institutions in Brussels. [287]


The brotherhood's build-up in France started with Union des organisations islamiques en France (UOIF) which later changed its name to Musulmans de France. The organization primarily consisted of foreign students who entered France from Tunisia and Morocco. By 2020, there were 147 mosques and 18 Islamic schools associated with the brotherhood. UOIF has about 50 000 members distributed among 200 member organizations. [288]

The Brotherhood pursues a communitarianist philiosophy and works against Muslims adopting liberal lifestyles and becoming assimilated into French society. In the long term, they aim towards entering politics by increasing the number of Muslims until they can form a political party of their own. [288]


The Islamic Community of Germany (de: Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V, IGD) being constituent and founding organisation of the MB umbrella organisation FIOE, the MB is active in Germany with the IGD as a proxy. IGD members take care to not publicly declare their affiliation to the MB. [289]


The Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Russia as a terrorist organisation. [290]

As affirmed on 14 February 2003 by the decision of the Supreme Court of Russia, the Muslim Brotherhood coordinated the creation of an Islamic organisation called The Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Forces of Caucasian Mujahedeen  [ ru ] (Russian : Высший военный маджлисуль шура объединённых сил моджахедов Кавказа), led by Ibn Al-Khattab and Basaev; an organisation that committed multiple terror-attack acts in Russia and was allegedly financed by drug trafficking, counterfeiting of coins and racketeering. [290]

United Kingdom

The Muslim Brotherhood uses London as an administration base. [291] [292]

The first Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organisations in the UK were founded in the 1960s, which comprised exiles and overseas students. [293] They promoted the works of Indian theologician Abu A'la Mawdudi and represented the Jama'at-e-Islami. In their initial phase they were politically inactive in the UK as they assumed they would return to their home countries and instead focused on recruiting new members and to support the MB in the Arab world. [293]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MB and its associated organisations changed to a new strategy of political activity in western countries with the purpose to promote the MB overseas but also preserve the autonomy of Muslim communities in the UK. [293]

In the 1990s, the MB established publicly visible organisations and ostensibly "national" organisations to further its agenda, but membership in the MB was and remains a secret. [293] The MB dominated the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and founded the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). MAB became politically active in foreign policy issues such as Palestine and Iraq, while MCB established a dialogue with the then governments. [293]

Since 2001, the ISB has distanced itself from Muslim Brotherhood ideology along with the MCB. [293]

In April 2014, David Cameron, who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the time, launched an investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the UK and its alleged extremist activities. [294]

In a 2015 government report, the MB was found to not have been linked to terrorist related activity against in the UK and MAB has condemned Al-Qaeda terrorist activity in the UK. [293]

Other states


The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is an Arab street gang in Sydney that uses the same name as the Muslim Brotherhood. [295]

In 2013, members of Sydney's Egyptian community reported that the Muslim Brotherhood had opened an office in Western Sydney, following the election and later overthrowing of Egyptian President Mursi, both of which caused protests in Sydney. [296]


Several parties and organizations in Indonesia are linked or at least inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, although none have a formal relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked parties is the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), [297] [298] which gained 6.79% of votes in the 2014 legislative election, down from 7.88% in the 2009 election. The PKS's relationship with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was confirmed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader. [299] [ need quotation to verify ]


The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the oldest and largest mainstream Islamist party in Malaysia, has close personal and ideological ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. [300] [301] Founded in 1951, PAS's founders were exposed to the ideas and teachings while they were studying in Cairo during the 1940s. PAS was the main rival to the Malay nationalist United Malays National Organisation, which dominated Malaysian politics until 2018. Due to changes in political situation created by Pakatan Harapan (PH)'s win in 2018 election, PAS has made a cooperation pact with UMNO in 2019. [302] Together with a former PH component party (BERSATU) both parties ultimately took over the government during 2020-21 Malaysian political crisis. [303] According to the think tank Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs' CEO Wan Saiful Wan Jan, PAS is regarded by the Muslim Brotherhood as an electorally successful Islamic political party; PAS has governed the state of Kelantan since 2002. PAS representatives are often invited to Muslim Brotherhood speaking engagements overseas. In 2012, PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang spoke alongside Muslim Brotherhood scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi at a speaking event in London. [304] In April 2014, PAS leader Abdul Awang spoke out against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates' decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. [305]

According to Bubalo and Fealy, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) was inspired or influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. [306]

New Zealand

In 2016, it was reported that a Muslim Brotherhood cell was active in northwestern Christchurch. [307]

United States

According to a 2004 article by The Washington Post , U.S. Muslim Brotherhood supporters "make up the U.S. Islamic community's most organized force" by running hundreds of mosques and business ventures, promoting civic activities, and setting up American Islamic organizations to defend and promote Islam. [308] In 1963, the U.S. chapter of Muslim Brotherhood was started by activists involved with the Muslim Students Association (MSA). [233] U.S. supporters of the Brotherhood also started other organizations including: North American Islamic Trust in 1971, the Islamic Society of North America in 1981, the American Muslim Council in 1990, the Muslim American Society in 1992 and the International Institute of Islamic Thought in the 1980s. [233] In addition, according to An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America, the "Understanding of the Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America", and a relatively benign goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America is identified as the following:

Establishing an effective and a stable Islamic movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims' causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims' efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic state wherever it is. [309] [310]

The process of settlement is a 'Civilization-Jihadist Process' with all the word means. The Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion [Islam] is made victorious over all other religions. [309] [310]

During the Holy Land Foundation trial in 2007, several documents pertaining to the Brotherhood were unsuccessful in convincing the courts that the Brotherhood was involved in subversive activities. In one, dated 1984 called "Ikhwan in America" (Brotherhood in America), the author alleges that the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the US include going to camps to do weapons training (referred to as special work by the Muslim Brotherhood), [311] as well as engaging in counter-espionage against U.S. government agencies such as the FBI and CIA (referred to as Securing the Group). [311] Another (dated 1991) outlined a strategy for the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States that involved "eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within". [312] [313] [310]

Penned in May 1991 by a man named Mohamed Akram Adlouni, the 'Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America' was discovered during an FBI raid of a Virginia home in 2004. The document was admitted as an exhibit to the court during the 2007 Holy Land Foundation trial, in which that group was charged with laundering money. After the trial, the document became public. But, according to a 2009 opinion by the presiding judge, the memo was not considered 'supporting evidence' for that alleged money laundering scheme, nor any other conspiracy. [314]

The documents continue to be widely publicized in American conservative circles. [312]

U.S. Congress attempts to pass legislation criminalizing the group, put forward by the 114th Congress, were defeated. The Bill, called the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015, was introduced to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX). In it the bill states that the Department of State should designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. If passed, the bill would have required the State Department to report to Congress within 60 days whether or not the group fits the criteria, and if it did not, to state which specific criteria it had not met. [315]

This bill came after a handful of foreign countries made similar moves in recent years including Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others, and after, according to Cruz, recent evidence emerged suggesting that the group supports terrorism. The senator further alleged that the group's stated goal is to wage violent jihad against its enemies, which includes the United States, and the fact that the Obama administration has listed numerous group members on its terror list. Cruz further stated that the bill would "reject the fantasy that [the] parent institution [of the Muslim Brotherhood] is a political entity that is somehow separate from these violent activities". [316]

The bill identifies three Muslim Brotherhood entities in the U.S. including the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), a non-profit group denounced by the UAE for its MB ties. The other two entities are the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). [317]

Conservatives in the Congress believe that the group is a breeding ground for radical Islam. Previous attempts were made in the previous year by Representative Michele Bachmann (R-MN), but it failed largely due to her allegation that Huma Abedin, Hillary Clinton's aide, had links to the organization, a statement which was dismissed by establishment Democrats and Republicans. [316]

In February 2016, the House Judiciary Committee approved the legislation in a 17 to 10 vote, which if enacted could increase grounds for enforcing criminal penalties and give permission to the Secretary of Treasury to block financial transactions and freeze assets of anyone who has showed material support for the group. Scholars against this classification claim that the group simply promotes Islamism, or the belief that society should be governed according to Islamic values and Sharia law. [318]

Past U.S. presidential administrations have examined whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and have decided not to do so. [319] During the George W. Bush administration, the U.S. government investigated the Brotherhood and associated Islamist groups, but "after years of investigations, ... the U.S. and other governments, including Switzerland's, closed investigations of the Brotherhood leaders and financial group for lack of evidence, and removed most of the leaders from sanctions lists." [320] The Obama administration was also pressured to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, but did not do so. [321] [322] During the Donald Trump administration, there were serious steps towards designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. [323]


The Brotherhood's English-language website describes its principles as including firstly the introduction of the Islamic Sharia as "the basis for controlling the affairs of state and society" and secondly, working to unify "Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberate them from foreign imperialism". [324] The Brotherhood is heavily influenced by the early Salafiyya movement and regularly advocates Salafi revivalist themes that address the contemporary challenges faced by Muslims, calling for the establishment of an Islamic state through implementation of the Shari'ah and Jihad against disbelievers. Science and technology should be harnessed through Islamic means to revive the Islamic prowess and Jihad should be waged personally as well as communally to bring forth effective political transformations. [7] The Brotherhood share common creedal beliefs with other Salafiyya movements, such as i) strict monotheism with regard to Divine attributes, ii) purifying Islam from accretions and folk practices associated with Sufism, and iii) focusing on the moral integrity of individuals through Tazkiyya. [8] Activist Salafis have a historical tradition of influential political activism across the various branches and affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. [325]

Its founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was influenced by pan-Islamic scholars Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (who attacked the taqlid of the official `ulama , and he insisted that only the Quran and the best-attested hadiths should be sources of the Sharia), [326] with the group structure and approach being influenced by Sufism. [327] [328] However, Al-Banna avoided controversies over doctrine and would distance himself from the anti-Sufi dogmas of Rashid Rida. As a teen, Al-Banna had been initiated into the Hasafi branch of Shadhiliyya order and was not hostile to various Sufi practices condemned as aspects of polytheism by Rida. While Al-Banna agreed with Rida on the need to purify religious practices of illegitimate innovations, he saw nothing wrong with visits to the graves of Awliyaa (saints) so long as one did not seek their intercession. He would later declare the Hasafiyya society as a precursor to the Muslim Brotherhood; [329] [330] [331] while also acknowledging his debt to the Salafiyya tradition. [52]

Al-Banna downplayed doctrinal differences between schools (acknowledging Shi'ism as a valid "fifth school", [332] [333] while declaring Ahmadiyya and the Islam-related Baháʼí and Druze religions to be takfir ) emphasizing the political importance of worldwide unity of the ummah . [333] In the few occasions a mature Al-Banna did address theology, he espoused Salafi views by expressing his dislike of Ilm al-Kalam , philosophy, etc. and seeking his preference to draw directly from Qur'an , Sunnah and Salaf . However he would not openly side with Atharis against the Ash'aris, instead lumping all the medieval theological debates as irrelevant. While his religious activism resembled Ibn Taymiyya, Banna's approach to theological prioritisation was imparted through Sufi-inspired Ghazalian expressions. [334] After the creation of Muslim Brotherhood organisation, Al-Banna would not maintain formal affiliations with Sufi orders. While the Brothers acknowledged the validity of the true spiritual Tasawwuf , they would be critical of institutionalised Sufi orders; which in their view led to divisions amongst the Muslims. [335]

As Islamic Modernist beliefs were co-opted by secularist rulers and official ulama, the Brotherhood has become traditionalist and conservative, "being the only available outlet for those whose religious and cultural sensibilities had been outraged by the impact of Westernization". [336] Al-Banna believed the Quran and Sunnah constitute a perfect way of life and social and political organization that God has set out for man. Islamic governments must be based on this system and eventually unified in a Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood's goal, as stated by its founder al-Banna was to drive out British colonial and other Western influences, reclaim Islam's manifest destiny—an empire, stretching from Spain to Indonesia. [337] The Brotherhood preaches that Islam will bring social justice, the eradication of poverty, corruption and sinful behavior, and political freedom (to the extent allowed by the laws of Islam). Blended with methods of modern social sciences, some key thinkers of Brotherhood have also contemplated the Islamic perspective on bureaucratic effectiveness, mapping out solutions to problems of formalism and irresponsiveness to public concerns in public administration, which pertains to the pro-democratic tenets of Muslim Brotherhood. [338] Such variations of thoughts have also purportedly negated the realities of contemporary Muslim countries as their authors have proclaimed. [339]

On the issue of women and gender the Muslim Brotherhood interprets Islam conservatively. Its founder called for "a campaign against ostentation in dress and loose behavior", "segregation of male and female students", a separate curriculum for girls, and "the prohibition of dancing and other such pastimes ... " [55]

There have been breakaway groups from the movement, including the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Takfir wal-Hijra. [340] Prominent figures of the Brotherhood include Sayyid Qutb, a highly influential thinker of Islamism, and the author of Milestones . [341] Osama bin Laden criticized the Brotherhood, and accused it of betraying jihad and the ideals of Qutb. [342] [343]

Stance on democracy, civil rights and secularism

According to Deputy of the Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Habib, the Muslim Brotherhood believes in implementing various political reforms for enabling freedom of assembly, press freedoms, democracy, political pluralism, peaceful transition of power, etc.

We believe that the political reform is the true and natural gateway for all other kinds of reform. We have announced our acceptance of democracy that acknowledges political pluralism, the peaceful rotation of power and the fact that the nation is the source of all powers. As we see it, political reform includes the termination of the state of emergency, restoring public freedoms, including the right to establish political parties, whatever their tendencies may be, and the freedom of the press, freedom of criticism and thought, freedom of peaceful demonstrations, freedom of assembly, etc. It also includes the dismantling of all exceptional courts and the annulment of all exceptional laws, establishing the independence of the judiciary, enabling the judiciary to fully and truly supervise general elections so as to ensure that they authentically express people's will, removing all obstacles that restrict the functioning of civil society organizations, etc. [344]

However, the Brotherhood is opposed to secularism and seeks the implementation of Shari'a (Islamic law) as the basis of Egyptian legal system and insists on complying the political system with Islamic legal precepts. When asked whether the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish a religious theocracy; the same spokesperson replied:

This concern stems from a wrong understanding of the nature of Islam. To those who speak about a religious state, in the same ecclesiastical meaning given to it in Europe in the Middle Ages, when the church had hegemony over a State's authorities, we wish to say that the issue here is completely different. The Muslim Brotherhood has gone through the latest legislative elections on the basis of a clear-cut program under the slogan "Islam is the Solution", given the fact that Islam, as Imam el-Banna said, is a comprehensive program that encompasses all aspects of life: it is a state and a country, a government and people, ethics and power, mercy and justice, culture and law, science and justice, resources and wealth, defense and advocacy, an army and an idea, a true belief and correct acts of worship. [344]


The Brotherhood's "most frequently used slogan" (according to the BBC) is "Islam is the Solution" (الإسلام هو الحل). [345] According to academic Khalil Yusuf, its motto "was traditionally" "Believers are but Brothers." [346]

Hasan Al-Banna presented the reform programme of the Muslim Brothers as one that sought to encompass every sphere of life; defining the movement as:

a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea [347]

Strategy and organization

The Muslim Brothers consider their movement to be the practical extension of the pan-Islamist movement championed by Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida. Afghani is regarded as the ‘caller’ or ‘announcer’ (mu'adhdhin, sarkha); Rida as the ‘archivist’ or ‘historian’ (sijal, mu'arrikh) and Banna was seen as the ‘builder' (bani) of the Islamic renaissance movement. Afghani was considered as the spiritual father of the movement and as a fiery defender of the faith against both internal corruption and external encroachment. ‘Abduh was viewed as "a well-meaning shaykh who inspired reforms in the Azhar". The methodology of the Brotherhood was characterised by the scholarly orthodoxy and conservatism of Muhammad Rashid Rida. [348] Like Rida, Banna too advocated a conservative revival to values of early Muslim generations and viewed Islam to be a comprehensive faith, outlining it as: "a faith and a ritual, a nation (watan) and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword". [349] The Muslim Brotherhood movement sought the re-establishment of a World Islamic Caliphate which was envisaged to come through several Islamic national states, united in a league, and appointing a single leader to rule over them after Shura (consultation). This vision was based upon the Islamic state doctrines of Muhammad Rashid Rida. However, Al-Banna prioritised the immediate form of governance that the Brotherhood had to establish and did not advocate the radical overthrow of these structures, instead preferring gradualism. He favored a constitutional government with a representative parliamentary system that implemented Islamic law ( Sharia ). The aim for Caliphate was more of an utopian ideal than an explicit and practical political goal which was the construction of Islamic national units which would then bond together towards a global Islamic polity. [350]

The Muslim Brotherhood's position on political participation varied according to the "domestic situation" of each branch, rather than ideology. For many years its stance was "collaborationist" in Kuwait and Jordan; for "pacific opposition" in Egypt; "armed opposition" in Libya and Syria. [351] It was written on 1 December 1982, by Yusuf al-Qaradawi at the culmination of a series of two meetings held in 1977 and 1982 in Lugano, Switzerland. [352] The treaty instructs Brotherhood members to show "flexibility" when it comes to their activity outside the Islamic world, encouraging them to temporarily adopt Western values without deviating from their "basic [Islamic] principles." [353]

The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational organization as opposed to a political party, but its members have created political parties in several countries, such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, and the former Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. These parties are staffed by Brotherhood members, but are otherwise kept independent from the Muslim Brotherhood to some degree, unlike Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is highly centralized. [354] The Brotherhood has been described as a "combination of neo-Sufic tariqa" (with al-Banna as the original murshid i.e., guide of the tariqa) "and a political party". [326] The Egyptian Brotherhood has a pyramidal structure with "families" (or usra, which consists of four to five people and is headed by a naqib, or "captain") [355] [356] at the bottom, "clans" above them, "groups" above clans and "battalions" or "phalanxes" above groups. [326] [357] Potential Brethren start out as Muhib or "lovers", and if approved move up to become a muayyad, or "supporter", then to muntasib or "affiliated", (who are nonvoting members). If a muntasib "satisfies his monitors", he is promoted to muntazim, or "organizer", before advancing to the final level—ach 'amal, or "working brother". [355] With this slow careful advancement, the loyalty of potential members can be "closely probed" and obedience to orders assured. [355]

At the top of the hierarchy is the Guidance Office (Maktab al-Irshad), and immediately below it is the Shura Council. Orders are passed down through a chain of command: [358]

The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to build a transnational organization. In the 1940s, the Egyptian Brotherhood organized a "section for Liaison with the Islamic World" endowed with nine committees. [359] Groups were founded in Lebanon (1936), in Syria (1937), and Transjordan (1946). It also recruited members among the foreign students who lived in Cairo where its headquarters became a center and a meeting place for representatives from the whole Muslim world. [360]

In each country with an MB there is a Branch committee with a Masul (leader) appointed by the General Executive leadership with essentially the same Branch-divisions as the Executive office. "Properly speaking" Brotherhood branches exist only in Arab countries of the Middle East where they are "in theory" subordinate to the Egyptian General Guide. Beyond that the Brotherhood sponsors national organizations in countries like Tunisia ( Ennahda Movement ), Morocco (Justice and Charity party), Algeria (Movement of Society for Peace). [185] Outside the Arab world it also has influence, with former President of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, having adopted MB ideas during his studies at Al-Azhar University, and many similarities between mujahideen groups in Afghanistan and Arab MBs. [185] Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia in Malaysia is close to the Brotherhood. [185] According to scholar Olivier Roy, as of 1994 "an international agency" of the Brotherhood "assures the cooperation of the ensemble" of its national organizations. The agency's "composition is not well known, but the Egyptians maintain a dominant position". [185]


The Brotherhood was criticised by Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the Deputy Emir of al-Qaeda, in 2007 for its refusal to advocate the violent overthrow of the Mubarak government. Essam el-Erian, a top Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure, denounced the al-Qaeda leader: "Zawahiri's policy and preaching bore dangerous fruit and had a negative impact on Islam and Islamic movements across the world". [361]

Dubai police chief, Dhahi Khalfan accused Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood of an alleged plot to overthrow the UAE government. He referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as "dictators" who want "Islamist rule in all the Gulf States". [362]


Numerous officials and reporters question the sincerity of the Muslim Brotherhood's pronouncements. These critics include, but are not limited to:

Status of non-Muslims

Response to criticisms

According to authors writing in the Council on Foreign Relations magazine Foreign Affairs : "At various times in its history, the group has used or supported violence and has been repeatedly banned in Egypt for attempting to overthrow Cairo's secular government. Since the 1970s, however, the Egyptian Brotherhood has disavowed violence and sought to participate in Egyptian politics". [373] Jeremy Bowen, the Middle East editor for the BBC, called it "conservative and non-violent". [374] The Brotherhood "has condemned" terrorism and the 9/11 attacks. [375] [376]

The Brotherhood itself denounces the "catchy and effective terms and phrases" like "fundamentalist" and "political Islam" which it claims are used by "Western media" to pigeonhole the group, and points to its "15 Principles" for an Egyptian National Charter, including "freedom of personal conviction ... opinion ... forming political parties ... public gatherings ... free and fair elections ..." [324]

Similarly, some analysts maintain that whatever the source of modern Jihadi terrorism and the actions and words of some rogue members, the Brotherhood now has little in common with radical Islamists and modern jihadists who often condemn the Brotherhood as too moderate. They also deny the existence of any centralized and secretive global Muslim Brotherhood leadership. [377] Some claim that the origins of modern Muslim terrorism are found in Wahhabi ideology, not that of the Muslim Brotherhood. [378] [379]

According to anthropologist Scott Atran, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood even in Egypt has been overstated by Western commentators. He estimates that it can count on only 100,000 militants (out of some 600,000 dues paying members) in a population of more than 80 million, and that such support as it does have among Egyptians—an often cited figure is 20 percent to 30 percent—is less a matter of true attachment than an accident of circumstance: secular opposition groups that might have countered it were suppressed for many decades, but in driving the Egyptian revolution of 2011, a more youthful constellation of secular movements has emerged to threaten the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance of the political opposition. [380] This has not yet been the case, however, as evidenced by the Brotherhood's strong showing in national elections. Polls also indicate that a majority of Egyptians and other Arab nations endorse laws based on "Sharia". [381] [382]

Foreign relations

Countries that ban Muslim Brotherhood, as of August 2021 Map of countries that ban Muslim Brotherhood.svg
Countries that ban Muslim Brotherhood, as of August 2021

On 29 June 2011, as the Brotherhood's political power became more apparent and solidified following the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the United States announced that it would reopen formal diplomatic channels with the group, with whom it had suspended communication as a result of suspected terrorist activity. The next day, the Brotherhood's leadership announced that they welcomed the diplomatic overture. [383]

In September 2014, Brotherhood leaders were expelled from Qatar. The New York Times reported: "Although the Brotherhood's views are not nearly as conservative as the puritanical, authoritarian version of Islamic law enforced in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis and other gulf monarchies fear the group because of its broad organization, its mainstream appeal and its calls for elections". [384]

Designation as a terrorist organization

Countries and organizations below have officially listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

Libya's Tobruk-based House of Representatives also designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group on May 14, 2019. [395]

Outside the Middle East

In February 2003, the Supreme Court of Russia banned the Muslim Brotherhood, labelling it as a terrorist organization, and accusing the group of supporting Islamist rebels who want to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus. [396] [397]

In an interview published on March 1, 2014, the Aga Khan IV spoke well of the Muslim Brotherhood - praising the way they "act in civil society". [398]

In January 2017, during his confirmation hearing, the former U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, referred to the Muslim Brotherhood, along with Al-Qaeda, as an agent of radical Islam—a characterization that Human Rights Watch member Sarah Leah Whitson criticized on social media, disseminating a statement from the HRW Washington director saying that the conflation of the group with violent extremists was inaccurate. [399] The following month, The New York Times reported that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump was considering an order designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization. [322] [400]

The Muslim Brotherhood was criticized by Secretary Tillerson. [401] The terrorist designation for the Muslim Brotherhood is opposed by Human Rights Watch and The New York Times, both liberal-leaning institutions. [402] The potential terrorist designation was criticized, in particular, by Human Rights Watch member Laura Pitter. [400] The New York Times set forth its opposition in an editorial that claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood is a collection of movements, and argued that the organization as a whole does not merit the terrorist designation: "While the Brotherhood calls for a society governed by Islamic law, it renounced violence decades ago, has supported elections and has become a political and social organization". [403] The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization is opposed by the Brennan Center for Justice, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Council on American-Islamic Relations and American Civil Liberties Union. [404]

Human Rights Watch and its director Kenneth Roth oppose proposals to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. [405]

Gehad El-Haddad, a Muslim Brotherhood member, denied that terrorism was practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood in an editorial published by The New York Times. [406]

In a report by the Carnegie Middle East Center, Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne argued that "designating the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization may actually backfire," writing: "The sweeping measure to declare the Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization now being contemplated not only does not accord with the facts, but is also more likely to undermine than achieve its ostensible purpose and could result in collateral damage affecting other U.S. policy goals. The greatest damage might be in the realm of public diplomacy, as using a broad brush to paint all Muslim Brotherhood organizations as terrorists would be understood by many Muslims around the world as a declaration of war against non-violent political Islamists—and indeed against Islam itself." [407]

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt avoids directly implicating itself materially in terrorism while it supports terrorism with words and encourages it, according to WINEP fellow Eric Trager, who advocated pushing them into a corner instead of designating them due to issues with materially connecting them to terrorism other than with their words. [408]

The editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post oppose designation of the group as a terrorist organization. [403] [409]

Civil rights lawyer and adjunct professor of law Arjun Singh Sethi wrote that the push to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization was based on anti-Islamic conspiracy theories, noting that "Two previous U.S. administrations concluded that it does not engage in terrorism, as did a recent report by the British government." [410]

Ishaan Tharoor of The Washington Post condemned the movement to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist group. [411]

A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence report from January 2017 warned that designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization "may fuel extremism" and harm relations with U.S. allies. The report noted that the Brotherhood had "rejected violence as a matter of official policy and opposed al-Qa'ida and ISIS" and that while "a minority of MB [Muslim Brotherhood] members have engaged in violence, most often in response to harsh regime repression, perceived foreign occupation, or civil conflicts", designation of the organization as a terrorist group would prompt concern from U.S. allies in the Middle East "that such a step could destabilize their internal politics, feed extremist narratives, and anger Muslims worldwide." The CIA analysis stated: "MB groups enjoy widespread support across the Near East-North Africa region and many Arabs and Muslims worldwide would view an MB designation as an affront to their core religious and societal values. Moreover, a US designation would probably weaken MB leaders' arguments against violence and provide ISIS and al-Qa'ida additional grist for propaganda to win followers and support, particularly for attacks against US interests." [412]

An article in The Atlantic against designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization was written by Shadi Hamid. [413]

Relationship to diplomatic crises in Qatar

Qatar's relationship with Muslim Brotherhood has been a persistent point of contention between Qatar and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt, which view the Brotherhood as a serious threat to social stability in those countries. [414]

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Qatar allowed some Brotherhood members who fled Egypt to live in the country. The Qatar-based Al Jazeera "housed them in a five-star Doha hotel and granted them regular airtime for promoting their cause"; the station also broadcast protests against the post-Brotherhood authorities in Egypt by the Brotherhood, "and in some cases allegedly paid Muslim Brothers for the footage." [414] Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain said that Qatar had violated the Gulf Cooperation Council rule against interference in the internal affairs of other members, and in March 2014 all three countries withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. After two months of diplomatic tensions the issue was resolved, with Brotherhood leaders departing from Doha later in 2014. [414]

However, "from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE's standpoint, Qatar never lived up to the 2014 agreement and continued to serve as the nexus of the Brotherhood's regional networks." [414] This led to the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, which is viewed as being precipitated in large part by a conflict over the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt made 13 demands of the government of Qatar, six of which reflect the group's opposition to Qatar's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and demand that the country cut ties to the Brotherhood. [414]

See also

Related Research Articles

Islamism is a religio-political ideology. The advocates of Islamism, also known as "al-Islamiyyun", are dedicated to realizing their ideological interpretation of Islam within the context of the state or society. The majority of them are affiliated with Islamic institutions or social mobilization movements, often designated as "al-harakat al-Islamiyyah." Islamists emphasize the implementation of sharia, pan-Islamic political unity, the creation of Islamic states,, and rejection of non-Muslim influences—particularly Western or universal economic, military, political, social, or cultural.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Salafi movement</span> Sunni Islamic reformist movement

The Salafi movement or Salafism is a revival movement within Sunni Islam, which was formed as a socio-religious movement during the late 19th century and has remained influential in the Islamic World for over a century. The name "Salafiyya" refers to advocacy of a return to the traditions of the "pious predecessors", the first three generations of Muslims, who are believed to exemplify the pure form of Islam. In practice, Salafis maintain that Muslims ought to rely on the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Ijma (consensus) of the salaf, giving these writings precedence over later religious interpretations. The Salafi movement aimed to achieve a renewal of Muslim life and had a major influence on many Muslim thinkers and movements across the Islamic world.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization that was founded in Ismailia, Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in March 1928 as an Islamist religious, political, and social movement. The group spread to other Muslim countries but has its largest, or one of its largest, organizations in Egypt, where for many years it has been the largest, best-organized, and most disciplined political opposition force, despite a succession of government crackdowns in 1948, 1954, 1965 after plots, or alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered. Following the 2011 Revolution the group was legalized, and in April 2011 it launched a civic political party called the Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) to contest elections, including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first democratically elected president. One year later, however, following massive demonstrations, Morsi was overthrown by the military and arrested. As of 2014, the organization has been declared a terrorist group by Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and is once again suffering a severe crackdown.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mohammed Mahdi Akef</span> Seventh General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Mohammed Mahdi Akef was the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egypt-based Islamic political movement, from 2004 until 2010. He assumed the post, that of "general guide" upon the death of his predecessor, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi. Akef was arrested on 4 July 2013. On 14 July 2013 Egypt's new prosecutor general Hisham Barakat ordered his assets to be frozen.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al-Islah (Yemen)</span> Political party in Yemen

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, frequently called al-Islah, is a Yemeni Sunni Islamist movement established in 1990 by Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, with Ali Saleh's blessing. The first article of Islah basic law defines it as "a popular political organization that seeks reform of all aspects of life on the basis of Islamic principles and teachings".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt</span> Sunni Islamist movement in Egypt

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamist religious, political, and social movement, with adherents estimated to number between 2 and 2.5 million. Founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the group spread to other Muslim countries but has its largest organization in Egypt, despite government crackdowns in 1948, 1954, 1965 and 2013, after plots, or alleged plots, of assassination and overthrow were uncovered.

The al‑Nour Party, or "Party of The Light", was one of the political parties created in Egypt after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. It has an ultra-conservative, Islamist ideology, which believes in implementing strict Sharia law. It has been described as the political arm of the Salafi Call Society, and "by far the most prominent" of the several new Salafi parties in Egypt, which it has surpassed by virtue of its "long organizational and administrative experience" and "charismatic leaders". Its political aim is to establish a theocratic state on the lines of Wahhabism like in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was found to be the main financer of the party according to the public German television news service ARD.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mohamed Morsi</span> President of Egypt from 2012 to 2013

Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Eissa al-Ayyat was an Egyptian politician, engineer, and professor who served as the fifth president of Egypt, from 2012 to 2013, when General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed him from office in a coup d'état after protests in June. An Islamist affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood organization, Morsi led the Freedom and Justice Party from 2011 to 2012.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ali al-Sallabi</span> Libyan Islamist

Ali Muhammad al-Sallabi, or al-Salabi is a Muslim historian, religious scholar and Islamist politician from Libya. He was arrested by the Gaddafi regime, then left Libya and studied Islam in Saudi Arabia and Sudan during the 1990s. He then studied in Qatar under Yusuf al-Qaradawi and returned to Libya during the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi and distributed weapons, money, and aid to Islamist groups in the country. His actions were criticized by members of the internationally recognized Libyan government under the National Transitional Council who he in turn criticized as being secular.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International Union of Muslim Scholars</span> International Muslim organization

The International Union of Muslim Scholars is an organization of Muslim Islamic theologians headed by Ahmad al-Raysuni described as the "supreme authority of the Muslim Brotherhood", founded in 2004, and with headquarters in Qatar and Dublin.

Al Islah was an Islamist group based in the United Arab Emirates that was highly affiliated and considered part of the Muslim Brotherhood. The political group was banned and was designated as a terrorist group after attempting to form a military wing for a coup d'état against the government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2013 Egyptian coup d'état</span> Military coup overthrowing Mohamed Morsi

The 2013 Egyptian coup d'etat took place on 3 July 2013. Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led a coalition to remove the democratically elected President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi from power and suspended the Egyptian constitution of 2012. The move came after the military's ultimatum for the government to "resolve its differences" with protesters during widespread national protests. The military arrested Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and declared Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour as the interim president of Egypt. The announcement was followed by demonstrations and clashes between supporters and opponents of the move throughout Egypt.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt)</span> Political party in Egypt

The Freedom and Justice Party is an Egyptian Islamist political party. The ex-president of the party, Mohamed Morsi, won the 2012 presidential election, and in the 2011 parliamentary election it won more seats than any other party. It is nominally independent, but has strong links to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the largest political group in Egypt. The party was banned and dissolved in 2014; however, it continues to function underground.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Egypt–Qatar relations</span> Bilateral relations

Egypt–Qatar relations are the bilateral relations between the State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt. They first began in 1972.

Islamism a religio-political ideology that seeks to revive Islam to its past assertiveness and glory, purify it of foreign elements, reassert its role into "social and political as well as personal life" where "government and society are ordered in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam".

Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, Salafism and Wahhabism — along with other Sunni interpretations of Islam favored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies — achieved a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict</span> Indirect conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in an ongoing struggle for influence in the Middle East and other regions of the Muslim world. The two countries have provided varying degrees of support to opposing sides in nearby conflicts, including the civil wars in Syria and Yemen; and disputes in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, and Iraq. The struggle also extends to disputes or broader competition in other countries globally including in West, North and East Africa, South, Central, Southeast Asia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.

Mohamed Soudan is an Egyptian politician who is a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization and its now defunct political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). He was foreign relations secretary underneath previous president, Mohamed Morsi, who was ousted in June 2013 after massive opposition demonstrations. Following the 2013 Egyptian coup, Soudan fled to the U.K., where he has been living ever since.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict</span> Diplomatic issue between Qatar and Saudi Arabia

The Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict refers to the ongoing struggle for regional influence between Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), both of which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It is sometimes called the New Arab Cold War. Bilateral relations have been especially strained since the beginning of the Arab Spring, that left a power vacuum both states sought to fill, with Qatar being supportive of the revolutionary wave and Saudi Arabia opposing it. Both states are allies of the United States, and have avoided direct conflict with one another.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey</span> Activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey

The Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey refers to the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, as well as the Turkish branch of the organisation.


  1. 1 2 Ghattas, Kim (9 February 2001). "Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". BBC.
  2. Al Jazeera Staff (18 June 2017). "What is the Muslim Brotherhood?". Al Jazeera .
  3. R. Halverson, Jeffrey (2010). Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 62, 65. ISBN   978-0-230-10279-8. Neo-Sufism assumed the basis of a secondary Athari tendency that we find in the thought of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood... Neo-Sufism... was a major influence on the thought of Hasan al-Banna and the development of the Muslim Brotherhood..
  4. "Brotherhood Organizational Coups: Qutbism of Thought and Pragmatism of Politics". 30 June 2022.
  5. "The Muslim Brotherhood's Ties to Extremists".
  6. El-Sherif, Ashraf (21 October 2014). "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Political Islam in Egypt". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  7. 1 2 Sageman, Marc (2004). "Chapter 1: The Origins of the Jihad". Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 7. ISBN   0-8122-3808-7.
  8. 1 2 Lenz-Raymann, Kathrin (2014). "Chapter 3: Salafi Isalm: Social Transformation and Political Islam". Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle: Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia. United Kingdom: Transcript Verlag. p. 80. ISBN   978-3837629040. JSTOR   j.ctv1fxgjp.7.
  9. Chatterjee, Choi (2018). "10: Islamic Fundamentalism in Critical Perspective". The 20th Century: A Retrospective. New York: Routledge. p. 253. ISBN   978-0-8133-2691-7.
  10. K. Gani, Jasmine (21 October 2022). "Anti-colonial connectivity between Islamicate movements in the Middle East and South Asia: the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamati Islam". Post Colonial Studies. 26. Routledge: 55–76. doi: 10.1080/13688790.2023.2127660 . hdl: 10023/26238 . S2CID   253068552.
  11. Gould, J. J. (30 June 2013). "Rick Perry and the Muslim Brotherhood: Compare and Contrast - Mona Eltahawy on social conservatism in Egypt and the U.S." The Atlantic.
  12. 1 2 Strindberg, Anders; Wärn, Mats (2011), Islamism, Polity, p. 87, ISBN   978-0745640624
  13. Johnson, Ian (5 February 2011). "Washington's Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood". The New York Review of Books .
  14. Youssef, Bassem (1 May 2013). "The Muslim Brotherhood's 'right-wing' politics game". Al Arabiya English.
  15. Dreyfuss, Robert (11 February 2011). "What Is the Muslim Brotherhood, and Will It Take Over Egypt?". Mother Jones.
  16. "Iran and Muslim Brotherhood: A Bizarre Alliance of Two Rival Ideologies".
  17. "Why Turkey Chose Qatar". 25 June 2017.
  18. Drevon, Haenni, Jerome, Patrick (2021). How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria. I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute. pp. 18, 29–31. ISSN   1028-3625.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  19. Y. Zelin, Aaron (2022). "2: The Development of Political Jihadism". The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500, Washington DC 20036, USA: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p. 11. ISBN   979-8-9854474-4-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  20. "عن بنا | وكالة أنباء البحرين".
  21. "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood declared 'terrorist group'". BBC News. 25 December 2013.
  22. "Постановление ГД ФС РФ от 12.02.2003 N 3624-III ГД "О Заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "О пресечении деятельности террористических организаций на территории Российской Федерации"" [Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of February 12, 2003 N 3624-III of the State Duma "On the Statement of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation "On the suppression of the activities of terrorist organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation"] (in Russian). Archived from the original on 9 August 2011.
  23. "Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'". BBC News. 7 March 2014.
  24. "Assad says 'factors not in place' for Syria peace talks - World News". 22 October 2013.
  25. "U.A.E. Supports Saudi Arabia Against Qatar-Backed Brotherhood". 9 March 2014.
  26. "Muslim Brotherhood Gangs (Egypt)". Pro-Government Militia. Retrieved 8 April 2023.
  27. Kevin Borgeson; Robin Valeri (9 July 2009). Terrorism in America. Jones and Bartlett Learning. p. 23. ISBN   978-0-7637-5524-9 . Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  28. "Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group?". The New York Times. 30 April 2019. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
  29. Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 1. ISBN   9781474127127. Hassan al Banna, called for the religious reformation of individual Muslims, the progressive moral purification of Muslim societies and their eventual political unification in a Caliphate under sharia law.
  30. Rutherford, Bruce (2008). Egypt After Mubarak. Princeton University Press. p. 99.
  31. "The end of Nasserism: How the 1967 War opened new space for Islamism in the Arab world". Brookings. 5 June 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
  32. "Saudi and the Brotherhood: From friends to foes". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 7 June 2018.
  33. 1 2 3 Ibish, Hussein (5 October 2013). "Is this the end of the failed Muslim Brotherhood project?". The National. Retrieved 8 October 2013.
  34. Wade, Nicholas (30 August 2013). "Egypt: What poll results reveal about Brotherhood's popularity". BBC News. the Brotherhood won Egypt's five democratic votes,
  35. "Egypt's new president to pick woman, Christian VPs". CNN. Retrieved 7 September 2017.
  36. Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 2. ISBN   9781474127127. He concluded that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood did not do enough to demonstrate political moderation or a commitment to democratic values, had failed to convince Egyptians of their competence or good intentions, and had subsequently struggled to draw lessons for what its failure in Egypt meant for its future.
  37. "President Morsi Ousted: First Democratically Elected Leader Under House Arrest". ABC News. Retrieved 7 September 2017.
  38. Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 3. ISBN   9781474127127. Hassan al Banna accepted the political utility of violence, and the Brotherhood conducted attacks, including political assassinations and attempted assassinations against Egyptian state targets and both British and Jewish interests during his lifetime;
  39. Jabr, Karam (1999). "Two Swords.. with the Qur'an in between!". Arab West Reports. Archived from the original on 18 February 2013. Retrieved 24 December 2012.
  40. Moussalli, Ahmad S. (2012). "Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology". In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Political Islam (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 24–26. ISBN   9781138577824. LCCN   2011025970.
  41. Polk, William R. (2018). "The Philosopher of the Muslim Revolt, Sayyid Qutb". Crusade and Jihad: The Thousand-Year War Between the Muslim World and the Global North. The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. pp. 370–380. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1bvnfdq.40. ISBN   978-0-300-22290-6. JSTOR   j.ctv1bvnfdq.40. LCCN   2017942543.
  42. Slocum, Steve (16 July 2019). Why do They Hate Us?: Making Peace with the Muslim World. Top Reads Publishing, LLC. ISBN   9780998683874.
  43. "Why Turkey Chose Qatar". The National Interest . 25 May 2017.
  44. "Bahrain backs Saudi Arabia, UAE, Foreign Minister says". Bahrain News Agency. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  45. "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood declared 'terrorist group'". BBC News. 25 December 2013. Retrieved 18 January 2014.
  46. 1 2 "Resolution of the State Duma, 2 December 2003 N 3624-III GD "on the Application of the State Duma of the Russian Federation" on the suppression of the activities of terrorist organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation" (in Russian). Consultant Plus. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016.
  47. 1 2 "Assad says 'factors not in place' for Syria peace talks". Hurriyet (AFP). 21 October 2013. Retrieved 26 December 2013.
  48. "Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'". BBC News. 7 March 2014. Retrieved 7 March 2014.
  49. 1 2 3 Shahine, Alaa & Carey, Glen (9 March 2014). "U.A.E. Supports Saudi Arabia Against Qatar-Backed Brotherhood". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  50. Mura, Andrea (2012). "A genealogical inquiry into early Islamism: the discourse of Hasan al-Banna" (PDF). Journal of Political Ideologies . 17 (1): 61–85. doi:10.1080/13569317.2012.644986. S2CID   144873457.
  51. Pankhurst, Reza (2013). The Inevitable Caliphate? - A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68–69. ISBN   978-0-19-932799-7.
  52. 1 2 De Bellaigue, Christopher (2017). "Chapter 6: Counter-Enlightenment". The Islamic Enlightenment: The Struggle Between Faith and Reason- 1798 to Modern Times. New York: Liveright Publishing. p. 376. ISBN   978-0-87140-373-5.
  53. Mitchell, Richard Paul (1993). The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford University Press. pp. 68–69. ISBN   9780195084375.
  54. Husaini, Ishak Musa (1956). The Moslem Brethren. Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative. pp. 62–63. [speech by l-Banna] The Brethren understand Islam in its fullest and most comprehensive implications, that it must have supervision over all affairs of individual and collective life and that everything must come under its rule and conform to its teachings. Whoever is a Muslim merely in his worship but imitates the non-believer in all other things is no better than an infidel.
  55. 1 2 "Toward the Light". Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna. Translated by Wendell, Charles. Berkeley. 1978. p. 26f. ISBN   0-520-09584-7.
  56. Husain, Irfan; Cohen, Stephen P. (2012). Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West. Arc Manor LLC. p. 60. ISBN   9781604504781 . Retrieved 20 April 2015.[ permanent dead link ]
  57. Delanoue, G., "al-Ik̲h̲wānal-Muslimūn", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Brill Publishers
  58. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. p. 28.
  59. 1 2 3 Gershoni, Israel; Jankowski, James (2010). Confronting Fascism in Egypt. Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s. Stanford University. pp. 223–224.
  60. 1 2 Berridge, W. J. (2018). Islamism in the Modern World. A Historical Approach. Bloomsburry. p. 78.
  61. 1 2 Mellor, Noha (2017). Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication. Taylor & Francis. p. 107.
  62. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 74–75.
  63. Mellor, Noha (2017). Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication. Taylor & Francis. p. 108.
  64. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. p. 8.
  65. 1 2 Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. pp. 51–52.
  66. Nicosia, Francis R. (2014). Nazi Germany and the Arab World. Harvard University. pp. 108–110.
  67. Gershoni, Israel; Jankowski, James (2010). Confronting Fascism in Egypt. Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s. Stanford University. p. 211.
  68. Gershoni, Israel; Jankowski, James (2010). Confronting Fascism in Egypt. Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s. Stanford University. pp. 216–219.
  69. 1 2 Gershoni, Israel; Jankowski, James (2010). Confronting Fascism in Egypt. Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s. Stanford University. p. 213.
  70. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 52.
  71. Motadel, David (2014). Islam and Nazi Germany's War. Harvard University. p. 112.
  72. 1 2 el Zalaf, Ahmed Abou (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression in Egypt. A History of Secrecy and Militancy in an Islamist Organization. Bloomsbury. p. 22.
  73. 1 2 3 4 Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 69.
  74. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. p. 110.
  75. Mellor, Noha (2017). Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication. Taylor & Francis. p. 112.
  76. el Zalaf, Ahmed Abou (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression in Egypt. A History of Secrecy and Militancy in an Islamist Organization. Bloomsbury. pp. 18–19.
  77. el Zalaf, Ahmed Abou (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression in Egypt. A History of Secrecy and Militancy in an Islamist Organization. Bloomsbury. pp. 22–23.
  78. Mitchell, Richard Paul (1993). The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford University Press. p. 32. ISBN   9780195084375.
  79. 1 2 3 el Zalaf, Ahmed Abou (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression in Egypt. A History of Secrecy and Militancy in an Islamist Organization. Bloomsbury. pp. 24–25.
  80. de Waal, Alex (2004). "On the Failure and Persistance of Jihad". In Alex de Waal (ed.). Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. C. Hurst & Co. p. 55.
  81. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 187–189.
  82. Motadel, David (2014). Islam and Nazi Germany's War. Harvard University. pp. 42–44, 318.
  83. Herf, Jeffrey (2009). Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World. Yale University. pp. 241–245.
  84. Morris, Benny (2008). 1948. A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University. p. 27.
  85. Abu-Amr, Ziad (1994). Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University.
  86. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 134.
  87. 1 2 El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 193–196.
  88. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 135.
  89. Morris, Benny (2008). 1948. A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University. pp. 77–78.
  90. Abu-Amr, Ziad (1994). Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University. p. 4.
  91. 1 2 El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 208–209.
  92. Roberts, Priscilla (2017). Arab-Israeli Conflict. A Documentary and Reference Guide. ABC–CLIO. p. 49.
  93. 1 2 Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 1346.
  94. 1 2 El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 208–210.
  95. El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad (1998). The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question. 1928–1947. Tauris Academic Studies. pp. 176–177.
  96. Mitchell, Richard Paul (1993). The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford University Press. p. 62. ISBN   9780195084375.
  97. Wright, Robin (1985). Sacred Rage. p. 179.
  98. Chamieh, Jebran (1995). Traditionalists, Militants and Liberal in Present Islam. Research and Publishing House. p. 140.
  99. 1 2 Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. pp. 139–140.
  100. 1 2 3 el Zalaf, Ahmed Abou (2022). The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression in Egypt. A History of Secrecy and Militancy in an Islamist Organization. Bloomsbury. pp. 38–39.
  101. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 142.
  102. Mellor, Noha (2017). Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication. Taylor & Francis. p. 42.
  103. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 143.
  104. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West. A History of Enmity and Engagement. Harvard University. p. 96.
  105. Wright, Lawrence (2 June 2008). "The Rebellion Within, An Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism". The New Yorker.
  106. "أسرار حركة الضباط الأحرار والإخوان المسلمون".
  107. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I. B. Tauris. p. 152.
  108. Johnson, Ian (5 February 2011). "Washington's Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood". The New York Review of Books . Archived from the original on 24 December 2015. One of the leaders, according to Eisenhower's appointment book, was "The Honorable Saeed Ramahdan, Delegate of the Muslim Brothers".* The person in question (in more standard romanization, Said Ramadan), was the son-in-law of the Brotherhood's founder and at the time widely described as the group's "foreign minister" (He was also the father of the controversial Swiss scholar of Islam, Tariq Ramadan).
  109. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. p. 83.
  110. "ISocial programs bolster appeal of Muslim Brotherhood". IRIN. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  111. "Our Muslim Brothers". Gush Shalom. June 2012.
  112. Courtney C. Radsch. "Arab Media & Society". Arab media society. Retrieved 11 November 2012.
  113. Lynch, Marc (5 March 2007). "Brotherhood of the blog". The Guardian. London.
  114. 1 2 3 Traub, James (29 April 2007). "Islamic Democrats". The New York Times. Retrieved 6 September 2011.
  115. "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament". Archived from the original on 1 October 2006. Retrieved 7 June 2017. Samer Shehata from Georgetown University and Joshua Stacher from the British University in Egypt Middle East Report. Fall 2006. 29 November 2009
  116. Fawzi, Sameh (8 December 2005). "Brothers and Others". Al Ahram Weekly. Archived from the original on 20 January 2012. Retrieved 6 September 2011.
  117. "The Brotherhood's Power display". Dar Al-Hayat. 18 December 2006.
  118. Bradley, John R. (2008). Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution. Palgrave MacMillan. p. 62.
  119. Bradley, John R. (2008). Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution. Palgrave MacMillan. p. 65.
  120. "Muslim Brotherhood seeks end to Israel treaty". The Washington Times .
  121. "Live Blog: Egypt in Crisis, Day 8". CBS News . 1 February 2011. Archived from the original on 4 October 2013.
  122. "'Shariah in Egypt is enough for us,' Muslim Brotherhood leader says". Hürriyet Daily News. 23 May 2011. Archived from the original on 26 July 2011. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
  123. "Interactive: Full Egypt election results". Al Jazeera. 1 February 2012.
  124. Souaiaia, Ahmed (26 January 2012). "Egypt and the Islamists". FPIF. Foreign Policy in Focus. Retrieved 2 June 2012.
  125. "Freedom and Justice Party Open to Copt as Deputy". ikhwanweb. 11 May 2011.
  126. All Things Considered (19 June 2012). "A Look at Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Candidate". NPR. Retrieved 11 November 2012.
  127. "Islamic presidential candidate promises democracy in Egypt". CNN. 15 June 2012. Archived from the original on 23 June 2012.
  128. "Brotherhood of Hate: Muslim Brotherhood's Hatred for Jews and Israel Flourishes in "New" Egypt – Introduction". Anti-Defamation League. 12 December 2011. Archived from the original on 11 December 2012. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
  129. Hendawi, Hamza (28 November 2012). "Egyptian courts suspend work to protest Morsi decrees". Salon. Archived from the original on 9 December 2012. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  130. Dina Bishara (28 November 2012). "Egyptian Labor between Morsi and Mubarak". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 2 December 2012. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  131. El Rashidi, Yasmine (7 February 2013). "Egypt: The Rule of the Brotherhood". The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 24 September 2013. The Islamists' TV channels and press called the completion of the draft constitution an "achievement," "historic," "an occasion," "another step toward achieving the goals of the revolution." The independent and opposition press described it as "an Islamist coup."
  132. "Egypt's Mursi annuls controversial decree, opposition says not enough". Al Arabiya. 9 December 2012. Archived from the original on 9 December 2012. Retrieved 9 December 2012. The two issues – the decree and the referendum – were at the heart of anti-Mursi protests that have rocked Egypt in the past two weeks.
  133. Williams, Daniel (15 August 2013). "Muslim Brotherhood abuses continue under Egypt's military". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 22 August 2013.
  134. David D. Kirkpatrick (26 April 2012). "President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt Said to Prepare Martial Law Decree". The New York Times. Egypt. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  135. McCrumen, Stephanie; Hauslohner, Abigail (5 December 2012). "Egyptians take anti-Morsi protests to presidential palace". The Independent . London. Archived from the original on 25 September 2015. Retrieved 5 December 2012.
  136. "Coptic pope's criticism of president marks trend in Egypt, where no one is above the fray". Associated Press. 9 April 2013. Retrieved 9 April 2013.[ dead link ]
  137. Hubbard, Ben; Kirkpatrick, David D. (10 July 2013). "Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi". The New York Times.
  138. Bowen, Jeremy (1 July 2013). "Egypt's army gives parties 48 hours to resolve crisis". BBC News. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  139. El Rashidi, Yasmine (26 September 2013). "Egypt: The Misunderstood Agony". The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 24 September 2013. ... 3.5 or 33 million Egyptians (the counts vary according to whom you choose to believe) who had taken to the streets on June 30 as part of the Tamarod movement. This protest was a symbolic vote of "no confidence" in President Morsi, urging him to step down, to call early elections, and to hand power to the chief justice in the interim.
  140. "Counting crowds: Was Egypt's uprising the biggest ever?". BBC News. 16 July 2013.
  141. "Protesters across Egypt call for Mohamed Morsi to go". The Guardian. 30 June 2013.
  142. "Top Weekend Links: Millions protest in Egypt to oust Morsi". MSNBC. 1 July 2013.
  143. "Egyptians Want Morsi Removed as Massive Protests Continue in Tahrir Square". U.S. News & World Report. 1 July 2013.
  144. "Morsi Supporters Protest In Egypt's Capital". HuffPost. 12 July 2013. Archived from the original on 16 July 2013.
  145. "Egypt blames Morsi supporters for Rabaa massacre".
  146. "Death toll from Egypt violence rises to 638: Health ministry". Al-Ahram. 15 August 2013. Archived from the original on 16 August 2013. Retrieved 19 August 2013.
  147. Kirkpatrick, David D. (15 August 2013). "Islamists Debate Their Next Move in Tense Cairo". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 17 August 2013. Retrieved 19 August 2013.
  148. " "Memory of a Mass Killing Becomes Another Casualty of Egyptian Protests". The New York Times. 13 November 2013.
  149. Allam, Hisham. "As Egypt Smoulders, Churches Burn". Inter Press Service. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
  150. Kirkpatrick, David; Mayy El Sheikh (20 August 2013). "An Egypt Arrest, and a Brotherhood on the Run". The New York Times. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
  151. "More top Brotherhood members arrested by Egypt prosecutors". Ahram Online. 4 July 2013. Archived from the original on 5 July 2013. Retrieved 4 July 2013.
  152. "Egypt police arrest top Brotherhood leaders". The Jerusalem Post. 3 July 2013. Retrieved 4 July 2013.
  153. "Egyptian military police arrest Brotherhood supreme guide". Egypt Independent. 4 July 2013. Retrieved 4 July 2013.
  154. "Egypt arrests Muslim Brotherhood's top leader". Al Jazeera. 20 August 2013. Retrieved 25 September 2013.
  155. "Egypt Shuts Down Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper". Huffington Post. 25 September 2013. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.
  156. "Egypt PM labels Brotherhood 'terrorist' group after bomb kills 14". Dawn. Agence France-Presse. 24 December 2013. Retrieved 18 January 2014.
  157. "Egyptian Court ordered Death sentence to 529 Members". Dawn. 24 March 2014. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
  158. "Egypt: sentencing to death of more than 500 people is a 'grotesque' ruling". 24 March 2014. Retrieved 25 March 2014.
  159. "A coronation flop: President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi fails to bring enough voters to the ballot box". The Economist.
  160. "Egypt sentences to death 529 supporters of Mohamed Morsi". The Guardian. 24 March 2014.
  161. "Egypt court sentences 183 Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death". Reuters. 2 February 2015. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015.
  162. "Reining in Egypt's Military Aid". The New York Times. 4 October 2014.
  163. Hendawi, Hamza (16 May 2015). "Ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi Sentenced to Death". Archived from the original on 26 May 2015. Retrieved 22 May 2015.
  164. نظمي, جميل (12 November 2016). "أهداف السيسي من تفجير الكاتدرائية.. قراءة في السيناريوهات المحتملة". بوابة الحرية والعدالة. Archived from the original on 11 February 2017.
  165. Mahmoud, Nervana (13 December 2016). "Carnage at the Cathedral". nervana1.
  166. "The #MuslimBrotherhood is equally complicit for the bombing of #Coptic church in #Cairo last Sunday, says @Nervana_1". 14 December 2016. Retrieved 7 June 2017 via Twitter.
  167. Tadros, Samuel (11 December 2016). "The Muslim Brotherhood statement on today's bombing in Coptic Cathedral claims Sisi and Copts involved" . Retrieved 7 June 2017 via Twitter.
  168. "Statement from Muslim Brotherhood official concerning Cairo church bombings". Middle East Monitor. 16 December 2016.
  169. Noueihed, Lin; Hassan, Mohammed (13 December 2016). "Egypt says church bomber linked to Muslim Brotherhood". Reuters. Cairo.
  170. "Egypt accuses Muslim Brotherhood over church attack". FRANCE 24. 13 December 2016.
  171. "The Tale of a Cairo-Based Terrorist Cell, a Suicide Attack, and International Reverberations". Stop Terror Finance. 23 December 2016. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017.
  172. "Doha denies involvement in Cairo church attack". Arab News. DOHA. Agence France-Presse. 15 December 2016.
  173. عطوان, عبد الباري (17 December 2016). "تلاسن حاد بالبيانات بين مصر ومجلس التعاون الخليجي بسبب اتهام قطر بالوقوف خلف تفجير الكنيسة البطرسية الاحد الماضي.. الزياني يشكك.. والخارجية المصرية تؤكد وتطالبه بتحري الدقة.. اين الحقيقة؟". راي اليوم. Archived from the original on 11 February 2017. Retrieved 11 February 2017.
  174. "Egypt says church bomber linked to Muslim Brotherhood". The Nation. 13 December 2016.
  175. Gryboski, Michael (13 December 2016). "22-Y-O Suicide Bomber Who Killed 24 at Cairo's Coptic Church Linked to Terror Group". The Christian Post.
  176. صالح, صالح (12 February 2017). "في ذكرى استشهاد الإمام.. الإخوان على عهد الكفاح ماضون". إخوان أون لاين.
  177. "Egyptian soldiers accused of killing unarmed Sinai men in leaked video". BBC News . 21 April 2017. Retrieved 26 August 2020.
  178. "الإخوان المسلمون ينعون للأمة الشيخ عمر عبدالرحمن". 18 February 2017. Archived from the original on 5 September 2017. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  179. Wickham, Carrie (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 55.
  180. Elmasry, Mohamed (28 June 2013). "Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Discourse". Jadaliyya. Retrieved 8 June 2017.
  181. Iskandar, Adel (2013). Egypt in Flux: Essays on an Unfinished Revolution. Cairo: AUC Press. p. 114.
  182. Wickham, Carrie (2013). The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 121.
  183. Mekela, Juna (2014). "The Arab Spring's Impact on Egypt's Securitocracy". International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 27 (2): 227. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.872531. S2CID   153839873.
  184. "Gulf Daily News". Gulf Daily News. 9 March 2009. Archived from the original on 24 May 2006. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  185. 1 2 3 4 5 Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam . translator Volk, Carol. Harvard University Press. p.  111. ISBN   9780674291409.
  186. "Middle East Roundtable". Archived from the original on 27 June 2011. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  187. Ali, Hadi (14 August 2015). "Kurdistan and the Challenge of Islamism" (Interview). Interviewed by Ali, Rebaz. Hudson Institute. In Iran, there is a big Islamic organization called "Islah and Dawa Group" that belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood. They are not registered as a political group because political activities are not allowed in Iran. Obviously, the regime in Iran is a sectarian regime and will always try to limit the activities of local Sunnis. Islah and Dawa are not happy with the regime's sectarian policies, but I think there is very little they can do if they want to stay away from serious trouble. Because of their Muslim Brotherhood ties, they have good relations with the KIU.
  188. Rasoulpour, Khabat (2013) [1392]. Sociologic explanation of establishment of Iranian Call and Reform Organization (Iranian Muslim Brotherhood) and evolution of its discourse (M.A.) (in Persian). Tarbiat Moallem University. Archived from the original on 5 March 2017. Retrieved 6 April 2017.
  189. Mohsen Ebadi (November 2014) [Aban–Azar 1393]. "A Glance at Muslim Brotherhood in Iran". Chesmandaz-e-Iran (in Persian) (88). Archived from the original on 5 October 2017. Retrieved 6 April 2017.
  190. "Turkey's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood". Al Arabiya. Retrieved 11 November 2016.
  191. "Support for Muslim Brotherhood isolates Turkey". Die Weld. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
  192. "Türbülans seçimlere izin verilmeyecek" . Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  193. "The Seesaw Friendship Between Turkey's AKP and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  194. Alan Godlas (17 July 1968). "The Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq". Archived from the original on 22 August 2010. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  195. Al Aqeedi, Rasha (February 2016). "Hisba in Mosul: Systematic Oppression in the Name of Virtue" (PDF). Occasional Paper. Program on Extremism at George Washington University: 3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 October 2016. Retrieved 13 February 2017.
  196. Al-Obeidi, Khalid (3 August 2016). "خالد العبيدي يرد على تهديدات الاخوان المسلمين باغتياله: لن نتهاون في كشف الفاسدين وحياتي ليست أغلى من اي مقاتل" . Retrieved 7 June 2017 via Twitter.
  197. "Profile: Kurdish Islamist movement". BBC News. 13 January 2003. Retrieved 6 April 2010.
  198. "Saudi newspaper slams Muslim Brotherhood as 'Nazis'". The Jerusalem Post. 19 February 2020. Retrieved 16 July 2020.
  199. Cohen, Amnon (1982). Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967 . Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 144. ISBN   978-0-8014-1321-6.
  200. Shadid, Mohammed K (April 1988). "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza". Third World Quarterly. 10 (2): 658–682. doi:10.1080/01436598808420076. JSTOR   3992661.
  201. Abu-Amr, Ziad (22 March 1994). Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press. ISBN   0253208661.
  202. 1 2 Abu-Amr, Ziad (Summer 1993), "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background", Journal of Palestine Studies, 22 (4): 5–19, doi:10.1525/jps.1993.22.4.00p00027, JSTOR   2538077
  203. "The Muslim Brotherhood". The Week. 18 February 2011. p. 13.
  204. Higgins, Andrew (24 January 2009). "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 29 January 2009. Retrieved 7 June 2017.
  205. "Hamas Charter". Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  206. Schanzer, Jonathan (19 August 2009). "The Talibanization of Gaza: A Liability for the Muslim Brotherhood". Current Trends in Islamist Ideology . 9. Archived from the original on 29 September 2010.
  207. Ibish, Hussein (5 October 2013). "Is this the end of the failed Muslim Brotherhood project?". The National. Retrieved 8 October 2013. Hamas in Gaza is undergoing an unprecedented crisis. It bizarrely made no effort to convince the new Egyptian government that it was not a hostile force, especially with regard to security in Sinai. It is therefore being treated like one. Egypt has imposed an unparalleled blockade, leaving the economy in shambles. For the first time since 2007, it is now possible to imagine a Gaza no longer under Hamas control.
  208. 1 2 3 4 5 Bar, Shmuel (1998). The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. ISBN   9789652240309.
  209. Freij, Hanna (2000). Jordan: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan 1945-1993. Washington.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  210. Leiken, Robert; Brooke, Steven (2007). "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 86, no. 2. pp. 107–121.
  211. Tore Kjeilen (20 September 2000). "Muslim Brotherhood / Jordan". Looklex Encyclopedia. Retrieved 27 August 2010.
  212. Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam . Harvard University Press. p.  128. ISBN   9780674291416 . Retrieved 2 April 2015. The Failure of Political Islam muslim world league.
  213. 1 2 3 Amis, Jacob. "The Jordanian Brotherhood in the Arab Spring". Hudson Institute. Archived from the original on 7 September 2017. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  214. Susser, Asher. "Jordan 2011: Uneasy Lies the Head" (PDF). Brandeis University . Retrieved 5 September 2017. the King himself had entered into dialogue with the organization in early February, just a few days after Bakhit's appointment and following years of estrangement. Bakhit even invited the Brotherhood to join his cabinet.
  215. Ibish, Hussein (5 October 2013). "Is this the end of the failed Muslim Brotherhood project?". The National. Retrieved 8 October 2013. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which seemed to be growing from strength to strength a mere year ago, is in utter disarray.
  216. "Defections threaten Jordan's Brotherhood". 14 January 2016. Archived from the original on 15 April 2016. Retrieved 14 April 2016.
  217. "Jordan shuts down Muslim Brotherhood headquarters". BBC News. 13 April 2016.
  218. "Jordan top court dissolves country's Muslim Brotherhood". MSN. Retrieved 19 July 2020.
  219. 1 2 Bryant, Christa Case (18 April 2014). "Behind Qatar's bet on the Muslim Brotherhood". The Christian Science Monitor . Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  220. "Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (QFIS)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 March 2009. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  221. Kessler, Oren (1 January 2012). "The Two Faces of Al Jazeera". Middle East Quarterly .
  222. "Why Egypt Hates Al Jazeera". Foreign Policy . 19 February 2014. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  223. Kirkpatrick, David D. (7 September 2014). "Qatar's Support of Islamists Alienates Allies Near and Far". The New York Times . Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  224. "Muslim cleric not allowed into UK". BBC. 7 February 2008. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  225. "France election: Sarkozy vows ban on militant preachers". BBC News. 26 March 2012. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  226. "Egypt crisis: Fall of Morsi challenges Qatar's new emir". BBC News. 5 July 2013. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  227. Kerr, Simeon (3 July 2013). "Fall of Egypt's Mohamed Morsi is blow to Qatari leadership" . Financial Times . Archived from the original on 10 December 2022. Retrieved 9 June 2016.
  228. " - Transcripts". Retrieved 25 April 2022.
  229. 1 2 3 Dickinson, Elizabeth (10 March 2014). "Saudi action puts Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait on spot". Al Monitor. Archived from