Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) establishes that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. The 2002 CSTO charter reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories are prohibited from joining other military alliances.[5]
Operational procedures
Similar to NATO, the CSTO maintains a Parliamentary Assembly.[6]
CSTO employs a "rotating presidency" system in which the country leading the CSTO alternates every year.[7]
In order to deploy military bases of a third country in the territory of the CSTO member-states, it is necessary to obtain the official consent of all its members.[8]
Activities
Military exercises
The CSTO holds yearly military command exercises for the CSTO nations to have an opportunity to improve inter-organizational cooperation. The largest of such exercises was held in Southern Russia and central Asia in 2011, consisting of more than 10,000 troops and 70 combat aircraft.[9]
Peacekeeping force
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) maintains a peacekeeping force that has been deployed to areas of conflict, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The force is composed of troops from member states and is designed to provide stability and security in the region.
On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a United Nations mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[10]
On 4 February 2009, an agreement to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) (Russian: Коллекти́вные си́лы операти́вного реаги́рования (КСОР)) was reached by five of the seven members, with plans finalized on 14 June. The force is intended to be used to repulse military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fight transnational crime and drug trafficking, and neutralize the effects of natural disasters.[12]
Belarus and Uzbekistan initially refrained from signing on to the agreement. Belarus did so because of a trade dispute with Russia, and Uzbekistan due to general concerns. Belarus signed the agreement the following October, while Uzbekistan has never done so. A source in the Russian delegation said Uzbekistan would not participate in the collective force on a permanent basis but would "delegate" its detachments to take part in operations on an ad hoc basis.[12]
The implementation of such projects on complex and unpredictable territory, where the borders of three Central Asian republics directly converge, may give impetus to the strengthening of militarization processes and initiate all kinds of nationalistic confrontations. […] Also, it could lead to the appearance of radical extremist forces that could lead to serious destabilization in this vast region.[13]
History
Foundation
A clickable Euler diagram showing the relationships among various supranational organisations in the territory of the former Soviet Unionv • d • e
On 15 May 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States — Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the Collective Security Treaty (also referred to as the Tashkent Pact or Tashkent Treaty).[14] Three other post-Soviet states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia—signed in 1993 and the treaty took effect in 1994. The CST was set to last for a 5-year period unless extended. On 2 April 1999, six of the nine—all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan—agreed to renew the treaty for five more years. At the same time, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM group, established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and largely seen as intending to counter Russian influence in the region.[15]
The CSTO was founded in 2002 when the six member states agreed to create the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military alliance.[16] As an attempt to develop a successor alliance to the Warsaw Pact, the CSTO is comparatively weak.[17]
2003 to 2012
In 2004 the CSTO was granted Observer status in the UN General Assembly.[18]
During 2005, the CSTO partners conducted some common military exercises.
Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM in 2005 and joined the CSTO in 2006 as a full member and its membership was later ratified by the Uzbek parliament on 28 March 2008.[19]
In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, to broaden cooperation on issues such as security, crime, and drug trafficking.[20]
On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a U.N. mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[21]
On 29 August 2008, Russia announced it would seek CSTO recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three days earlier, on 26 August, Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[22]
In 2009, Belarus boycotted the CSTO summit due to their Milk War with Russia.[23] After refusing to attend a CSTO summit in 2009, Lukashenko said: "Why should my men fight in Kazakhstan? Mothers would ask me why I sent their sons to fight so far from Belarus. For what? For a unified energy market? That is not what lives depend on. No!"[24]
After Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted from office as President of Kyrgyzstan as a result of riots in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, he was granted asylum in Belarus. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko expressed doubt about the future of the CSTO for failing to prevent Bakiyev's overthrow, stating: "What sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed in one of our member states and an anticonstitutional coup d'état takes place, and this body keeps silent?"[25]
Lukashenko had previously accused Russia of punishing Belarus with economic sanctions after Lukashenko's refusal to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stating: "The economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus's closest CSTO ally is trying... to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?"[26]
During a trip to Ukraine to extend Russia's lease of the Crimean port Sevastopol in return for discounted natural gas supplies, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was asked about whether Belarus could expect a similar deal and responded: "Real partnership is one thing and a declaration of intentions is another; reaching agreement on working seriously, meeting each other halfway, helping each other is one thing and making decisions about granting permanent residence to people who have lost their job is another." The Belarusian President defended himself against this criticism by citing former Russian President Vladimir Putin's invitation of Askar Akayev to Russia after he was ousted as President of Kyrgyzstan during the 2005 Tulip Revolution.[27]
The following month, President Medvedev ordered the CEO of Russia's natural gas monopoly Gazprom to cut gas supplies to Belarus in a dispute over outstanding debts.[28] Subsequently, the Russian television channel NTV, run by Gazprom, aired a documentary film which compared Lukashenko to Bakiyev.[29] Then the Russian President's foreign policy adviser Sergei Prikhodko threatened to publish the transcript of a CSTO meeting where Lukashenko said that his administration would recognize Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.[30]
In June 2010, ethnic clashes broke out between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan, leading interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva to request the assistance of Russian troops to quell the disturbances. Kurmanbek Bakiyev denied charges that his supporters were behind the ethnic conflict and called on the CSTO to intervene.[31]Askar Akayev also called for the CSTO to send troops, saying: "Our priority task right now should be to extinguish this flame of enmity. It is very likely that we will need CSTO peacekeepers to do that."[citation needed] The organisation was considered by some a "paper tiger" since it failed to intervene.[32]
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that "only in the case of a foreign intrusion and an attempt to externally seize power can we state that there is an attack against the CSTO", and that, "all the problems of Kyrgyzstan have internal roots", while CSTO Secretary GeneralNikolai Bordyuzha called the violence "purely a domestic affair".[33] Later, however, Bordyuzha admitted that the CSTO response may have been inadequate and claimed that "foreign mercenaries" provoked the Kyrgyz violence against ethnic Uzbek minorities.[34]
On 21 July 2010, interim Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva called for the introduction of CSTO police units to southern Kyrgyzstan saying: "I think it's important to introduce CSTO police forces there, since we're unable to guarantee people's rights on our own." She also added: "I'm not seeking the CSTO's embrace and I don't feel like bringing them here to stay but the bloodletting there will continue otherwise."[35] Only weeks later the deputy chairman of Otubayeva's interim Kyrgyz government complained that their appeals for help from the CSTO had been ignored.[36] The CSTO was unable to agree on providing military assistance to Kyrgyzstan at a meeting in Yerevan, Armenia, which was attended by Roza Otunbayeva as well as Alexander Lukashenko.[37]
The CSTO meeting in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, 8 November 2018
On 10 December 2010, the member states approved a declaration establishing a CSTO peacekeeping force and a declaration of the CSTO member states, in addition to signing a package of joint documents.[38]
Since 21 December 2011, the Treaty parties can veto the establishment of new foreign military bases in the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[8]
On 28 June 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the CSTO.[39]
2013 to 2022
CSTO Summit 2021CSTO Summit 2022
In August 2014, 3,000 soldiers from the members of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan participated in psychological and cyber warfare exercises in Kazakhstan under war games managed by CSTO.[40]
On 19 March 2015, the CSTO Secretary GeneralNikolai Bordyuzha offered to send a peacekeeping mission to Donbas, Ukraine. "The CSTO has a peacekeeping capacity. Our peacekeepers continuously undergo corresponding training. If such a decision is taken by the United Nations, we stand ready to provide peacekeeping units".[41]
In July 2021, CSTO Secretary-General Stanislav Zas was criticised by Armenian politicians for calling an incursion by Azerbaijani forces onto Armenian territory a "border incident", where the CSTO remained inactive during the conflict.[42]
In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of CSTO for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighboring Afghanistan.[43] Thousands of Afghans, including police and government troops, fled to Tajikistan after Taliban insurgents took control of many parts of Afghanistan.[44]
On 5 January 2022, CSTO peacekeepers were announced to be deployed to Kazakhstan in response to anti-government unrest in the country.[45] On 11 January the same year, CSTO forces began their withdrawal from Kazakhstan.[46]
Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 there has been no CSTO involvement or official participation of other CSTO members in the conflict, apart from Belarus which agreed to house Russian troops which then attacked Ukraine from across its border. Following the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, the border between Ukraine and Belarus was cleared of Russian forces.
After the start of renewed fighting between Armenia and former member Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the treaty, and a CSTO mission including CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas and Anatoly Sidorov was sent to monitor the situation along the border.[47][48]Similar events also took place near the Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border throughout 2022.
After the CSTO mission took a rather uncommitted position in the conflict, criticism towards CSTO membership inside Armenian political circles increased, with the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, even stating that he saw no more hope for the CSTO.[49] The lack of Russian support during the conflict prompted a national debate in Armenia, as an increasing percentage of the population indicated doubt as to whether it is beneficial to continue CSTO membership, calling for realignment of the state with NATO instead.[50] This coincided with a visit from Speaker of the United States House of RepresentativesNancy Pelosi to Yerevan on 17 September 2022, largely seen as an effort to reorient the security alliance structure of Armenia.[51]
To discuss the results of the CSTO mission sent on 15 September 2022, an extraordinary session of the CSTO was held via videoconference on 28 October 2022. With the leaders of all member states and CSTO Secretary GeneralStanislav Zas in attendance, the meeting was chaired by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who concurred with the report presented by the Secretary General while also reiterating the importance for a clear political assessment of Azerbaijani aggression and a roadmap for the restoration of Armenian territorial integrity.[52][53]
A regular Collective Security Council meeting took place on 23 November 2022 with the leaders of all CSTO members present to discuss matters of international and regional security.[54] After Pashinyan refused to sign the joint declaration because it did not "reach a decision on a CSTO response to Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia", speculation arose regarding the continuation of the CSTO.[55][56] Secretary General Stanislas Zas indicated that, though numerous measures in the diplomatic as well as military spheres were generally agreed upon, no consensus regarding the situation on the border could be reached.[57] On the occasion of the meeting and in the midst of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that many in their countries had started to discuss the possibility that the CSTO may cease to exist if Russia loses its war in Ukraine.[58][59] He later expanded on his opinion on the matter, stating that the CSTO will continue on and nobody will fall, if there is unity.[58] Meanwhile, during the meeting in Yerevan, large groups of protestors gathered and called for the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO and for the country to develop closer relations with the United States and the West.[50] In the aftermath of the meeting, the US think tank The National Interest released an analysis on the current state of the CSTO, concluding that, while the alliance is in a fragile state, only few other nations could fill the void created by a possible Russian exit and step in as a power broker in the region.[60] Economic dependencies between the member states have also increased since the start of the invasion and would dissuade the alliance from splitting up.[60]
The diplomatic friction continued into January 2023, after Pashinyan refused to hold common military drills, because the organisation did not unequivocally condemn Azerbaijan over its perceived aggression.[61] In response, Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary of the President of Russia, stated that Armenia remains a very close ally and promised to continue the dialogue.[62] To mend their ties, Sergey Lavrov offered the deployment of a CSTO mission along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on 2 February 2023 within one or two days, "if our Armenian allies, friends are still interested in it like before".[63]
Meeting of the Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Minsk (May 2023)
On 3 September 2023, during an interview, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake." Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to uphold the ceasefire deal of failing to do their job. Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, most notably with the European Union and the United States.[66]
Armenia declined participating in military exercises and the CIS summit in Kyrgyzstan in October 2023 and asked for Russian peacekeeping forces to return to Russia.[68] The Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, went further in late October saying he saw "no advantage" in the presence of Russian troops in Armenia. Currently around 10,000 Russian troops are in stationed in Gyumri.[69]
On 23 February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, confirmed that Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO. Pashinyan stated, "We have now in practical terms frozen our participation in this treaty" and "membership of the CSTO was under review" during a live broadcast interview.[70] On 28 February 2024, during a speech made in the National Assembly, Pashinyan further stated that the CSTO is "a threat to the national security of Armenia". Responding to Pashinyan's remarks, Dmitri Peskov stated that the CSTO charter does not include provisions for a "frozen membership" status.[71] On 12 March, Pashinyan said that the CSTO needed to clarify "what constitutes Armenia's sovereign territory", as the organization had not come to Armenia's defence when requested following Azerbaijani troops crossing the border into Armenia's internationally recognized territory. Pashinyan said that if the CSTO's response did not align with Armenia's expectations, the country would officially withdraw from the organization.[72] On 8 May 2024, Armenia announced it had stopped making financial contributions to the CSTO,[73] leading Russia to state that it was still obligated to pay its membership dues.[3] On 12 June 2024, Armenia announced that it would formally withdraw from the alliance at an unspecified later date,[3] with Pashinyan stating, "We will leave. We will decide when to exit...Don't worry, we won't return".[74]
A July 2024 Gallup opinion poll noted a 7% increase in support for Armenia's membership in NATO, with 29% of respondents believing Armenia should strive for NATO membership. Meanwhile, support for Armenia's membership in the CSTO decreased by 10%, with only 16.9% believing Armenia should maintain its membership in the CSTO.[75]
On 4 December 2024, during parliamentary discussions in the National Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated "we already consider ourselves outside the CSTO" and "I believe we have crossed the point of no return" in regards to Armenia's membership status with the CSTO.[80]
In May 2007, the CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha suggested Iran could join the CSTO saying, "The CSTO is an open organization. If Iran applies in accordance with our charter, we will consider the application".[87] If Iran joined it would be the first state outside the former Soviet Union to become a member of the organization.
In 2021, Uzbekistan, after becoming observer to EAEU on 11 December 2020,[88] conducted a bilateral military exercise with Russia and trilateral military exercise with Russia and Tajikistan, while its president joined a CSTO meeting as a guest, sparking rumours about potential reentry into CSTO.[89]
The current secretary general is former Kazakh Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov, who took office on 1 January 2023.
Policy agenda
Information technology and cyber security
The member states adopted measures to counter cyber security threats and information technology crimes in a Foreign Ministers Council meeting in Minsk, Belarus.[90] Foreign Minister Abdrakhmanov put forward a proposal to establishing a Cyber Shield system.[90]
1 2 Armenia has de facto "frozen" its membership since February 2024,[1][2] and in June announced its intention to formally withdraw from the alliance.[3]
Azerbaijani: Kollektiv Təhlükəsizlik Müqaviləsi Təşkilatı (KTMT)
Georgian:კოლექტიური უსაფრთხოების ხელშეკრულების ორგანიზაცია, romanized:k'olekt'iuri usaprtkhoebis khelshek'rulebis organizatsia
Uzbek: Коллектив хавфсизлик шартномаси ташкилоти (КХШТ), romanized:Kollektiv xavfsizlik shartnomasi tashkiloti (KXShT)
↑ The reserve military of Armenia consists mostly of ex-conscripts who have seen service within the last 15 years.
↑ The potential reserve personnel of Russia may be as high as 20million, depending on how the figures are counted. However, an estimated 2million have seen military service within the last fiveyears.
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↑ Miller, Jonathan Berkshire (23 September 2011). "Russia Launches War Games". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 26 September 2011. Retrieved 26 September 2011.
↑ Gärtner, Heinz (2023). "Great Power Conflict". China and Eurasian powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace. Mher Sahakyan. New York: Routledge. pp.xxiv. ISBN978-1-003-35258-7. OCLC1353290533.
↑ Mghdesyan, Arshaluis (26 September 2022). "Armenians Decry CSTO Inaction". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Archived from the original on 12 October 2022. Retrieved 12 October 2022.
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