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In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a great power nor a superpower, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition.
The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system. In the late 16th century, Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states: grandissime (great powers), mezano (middle powers), and piccioli (small powers). According to Botero, a mezano or middle power "has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others." [1]
No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers, aside from the broad idea that middle powers are states that have a 'moderate' ability to influence the behaviour of other states, in contrast to small power, which have 'little' ability to influence. Some researchers use Gross National Product (GNP) statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small", however that is defined. However, economy is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers.
According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham:
Middle power status is usually identified in one of two ways. The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers (or great powers), middle powers or small powers. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. This posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their foreign policy behaviour – middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. [2]
According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University:
All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region. [3]
Another definition, by the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), a program of the Global Security Institute, is that "middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility." [4] Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, and every state participant of the NATO nuclear sharing, would not be middle powers.
According to Laura Neak of the International Studies Association:
Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior–called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War. [5]
According to international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has often been assumed. [6] According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather, 'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge. Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as 'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights, environment, and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building." [7] At the same time, scholars have identified relations of antagonism and competition between middle powers, as well as their ability to use soft power to attain their goals, as in the case of Egypt-Israeli rivalry in Africa. [8]
Characteristics of middle power diplomacy include: [7]
The Middle Powers Initiative highlights the importance of middle powers diplomacy. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.
The term first entered Canadian political discourse after World War II. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, for example, called Canada "a power of the middle rank" and helped to lay out the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. When he was advocating for Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council, he said that while "...the special nature of [Canada's] relationship to the United Kingdom and the United States complicates our responsibilities," Canada was not a "satellite" of either but would "continue to make our decisions objectively, in the light of our obligations to our own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community." [10] Canadian leaders believed Canada was a middle power because it was a junior partner in larger alliances (e.g. NATO, NORAD), was actively involved in resolving disputes outside its own region (e.g. Suez Crisis), was not a former colonial power and therefore neutral in anti-colonial struggles, worked actively in the United Nations to represent the interests of smaller nations and to prevent the dominance of the superpowers (often being elected to the United Nations Security Council for such reasons), and because it was involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the world.
In March 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd defined his country's foreign policy as one of "middle power diplomacy", along the lines of similar criteria. Australia would "influence international decision-makers" on issues such as "global economic, security and environmental challenges". [11]
American political analyst Cliff Kupchan describes middle powers as "countries with significant leverage in geopolitics" but that are "less powerful than the world’s two superpowers—the United States and China." [12] Nevertheless, Kupchan argues that middle powers—particularly in the Global South—have more power, agency, and "geopolitical heft" in the 21st century (namely the 2020s) than at any time since the Second World War. He identifies Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey as leading middle powers and describes them as "swing states" that are capable of creating new power dynamics due to their nonalignment with most great powers. [12] Among the shared characteristics of these six nations are membership in the G20; large and fast-growing economies; and active diplomatic involvement in major events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and international climate action. [12]
Kupchan attributes the emergence of stronger middle powers to several historical developments in the international system, including the weaker bipolarity between the U.S. and China (as opposed to the stricter allegiances of the Cold War and the subsequent U.S. hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the gradual trend of deglobalization, which has fostered regionalized geopolitical and geoeconomic relationships wherein middle powers have comparatively greater influence; for example, the fragmenting of the international energy market has purportedly given Saudi Arabia, a major energy exporter, far more weight in now-smaller regional markets. Kupchan also notes the ability of these middle powers to capitalize on rivalries between the major powers in order to further their own influence, interests, or foreign policy initiatives.
The overlaps between the lists of middle powers and great powers show that there is no unanimous agreement among authorities. [13]
Nations such as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are generally considered to be great powers due to their economic, military or strategic importance, their status as recognized nuclear powers and their permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Some academics also believe that Germany and Japan are great powers, albeit due to their large, advanced economies and global influence rather than military and strategic capabilities; [14] yet sources have at times referred to these nations as middle powers. [15] [16]
Some in the field of international relations, such as John Kirton and Roberto Gimeno claim that Italy is a great power due to its status and membership in the G7 and NATO Quint. [17] [18] Moreover, according to a 2014 report by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Italy is listed among the great powers. [19] Although broad academic support for India as a great power is uncommon, some in the field of political science, such as Malik Mohan and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, consider India to be a great power as well. [20] [21] Likewise, Brazil is sometimes referred as a great power due to its economic power and influence, [22] [23] with Italy at times being considered a great power due to these factors as well as its cultural power.
The following eight countries have at some point in the post–Cold War era been considered great powers but also middle powers by academics or other experts:
The United States [44] [45] and China [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] are considered by many scholars to exceed the traditional criterion of great power, or instead to be superpowers, and are therefore not listed. [51] [52] [53] [54]
As with the great powers, there is no unanimous agreement among authorities as to which countries are considered middle powers. Lists are often the subject of much debate and tend to place comparatively large countries (e.g. Argentina) alongside relatively small ones (e.g. Norway). [55] Clearly not all middle powers are of equal status; some are considered regional powers and members of the G20 (e.g. Australia), while others could very easily be considered small powers (e.g. Czech Republic). [56] Some larger middle powers also play important roles in the United Nations and other international organisations such as the WTO.
The following is a list of 51 countries that have been, at some point in time since the post–Cold War era, considered middle powers by academics or other experts (Members of the G-20 major economies are in bold font, except for the EU member states which are attended under a collective membership of the EU):
"View the ratification status by country or by treaty". tbinternet.ohchr.org. Retrieved 15 February 2024.
Singapore maintains diplomatic relations with 189 UN member states. The three exceptions are the Central African Republic, Monaco and South Sudan.
Superpower describes a state or supranational union that holds a dominant position characterized by the ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale. This is done through the combined means of economic, military, technological, political, and cultural strength as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. Traditionally, superpowers are preeminent among the great powers. While a great power state is capable of exerting its influence globally, superpowers are states so influential that no significant action can be taken by the global community without first considering the positions of the superpowers on the issue.
Superpower collapse is the societal collapse of a superpower. The term is most often used to describe the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss of the United Kingdom's superpower status through the decline of the British Empire.
In politics, soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce. It involves shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. Soft power is non-coercive, using culture, political values, and foreign policies to enact change. In 2012, Joseph Nye of Harvard University explained that with soft power, "the best propaganda is not propaganda", further explaining that during the Information Age, "credibility is the scarcest resource".
In international relations, power is defined in several different ways. Material definitions of state power emphasize economic and military power. Other definitions of power emphasize the ability to structure and constitute the nature of social relations between actors. Power is an attribute of particular actors in their interactions, as well as a social process that constitutes the social identities and capacities of actors.
A great power is a sovereign state that is recognized as having the ability and expertise to exert its influence on a global scale. Great powers characteristically possess military and economic strength, as well as diplomatic and soft power influence, which may cause middle or small powers to consider the great powers' opinions before taking actions of their own. International relations theorists have posited that great power status can be characterized into power capabilities, spatial aspects, and status dimensions.
In international relations, multilateralism refers to an alliance of multiple countries pursuing a common goal.
In international relations, regional power, since the late 20th century has been used for a sovereign state that exercises significant power within a given geographical region. States that wield unrivaled power and influence within a region of the world possess regional hegemony.
The Chinese Century is a neologism suggesting that the 21st century may be geoeconomically or geopolitically dominated by the People's Republic of China, similar to how the "American Century" refers to the 20th century and the "British Centuries" to the 18th and 19th, same in the 17-18th centuries dominated by France and the 15-16th centuries dominated by Spain. The phrase is used particularly in association with the prediction that the economy of China may overtake the economy of the United States to be the largest in the world. A similar term is China's rise or rise of China.
Economic diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that uses the full spectrum of economic tools of a state to achieve its national interests. The scope of economic diplomacy can encompass all of the international economic activities of a state, including, but not limited to, policy decisions designed to influence exports, imports, investments, lending, aid, free trade agreements, among others.
A potential superpower is a state or other polity that is speculated to be or have the potential to become a superpower, a state or supranational union that holds a dominant position characterized by the ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale through economic, military, technological, political, and/or cultural means.
A maritime power is a nation with a very strong navy, which often is also a great power, or at least a regional power. A maritime power is able to easily control their coast, and exert influence upon both nearby and far countries. A nation that dominates the world navally is known as a maritime superpower. Many countries that become maritime powers become strong to defend themselves from an extant threat, as the USSR did during the Cold War to defend itself from the United States Navy. In that scenario, it is common for the emerging maritime power to focus largely upon area denial tactics, rather than power projection.
An emerging power or rising power is a state or union of states with significant rising influence in global affairs. Such a power aspires to have a more powerful position or role in international relations, either regionally or globally, and possess sufficient resources and levels of development that such goals are potentially achievable.
The Belt and Road Initiative, known within China as the One Belt One Road or OBOR/1B1R for short, sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in more than 150 countries and international organizations. It is considered a centerpiece of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping's foreign policy. The BRI forms a central component of Xi's "Major Country Diplomacy" strategy, which calls for China to assume a greater leadership role for global affairs in accordance with its rising power and status. It has been compared to the American Marshall Plan. As of August 2023, 155 countries were listed as having signed up to the BRI. The participating countries include almost 75% of the world's population and account for more than half of the world's GDP.
The People's Republic of China emerged as a great power and one of the three big players in the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC-US-USSR) during the Cold War, after the Korean War in 1950-1953 and the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, with its status as a recognized nuclear weapons state in 1960s. Currently, China has one of the world's largest populations, second largest GDP (nominal) and the largest economy in the world by PPP. China is now considered an emerging global superpower.
The foreign policy of Xi Jinping concerns the policies of the People's Republic of China's Xi Jinping with respect to other nations. Xi became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 and became the President of the People's Republic of China in 2013.
The term foremost power has been used by political scientists and historians to describe the allegedly greatest power in the world, or in a given region, during a certain period of history. Multiple empires have been described as such, often for the same time period, resulting in a problematic assessment of the conflicting scholarly opinions and points of view on the matter. There is therefore a general lack of consensus between the various authors and scholars in reference to the nations and empires that were allegedly the world's most powerful at various points in history.
Energy diplomacy is a form of diplomacy, and a subfield of international relations. It is closely related to its principal, foreign policy, and to overall national security, specifically energy security. Energy diplomacy began in the first half of the twentieth century and emerged as a term during the second oil crisis as a means of describing OPEC's actions. It has since mainly focused on the securitization of energy supplies, primarily fossil fuels, but also nuclear energy and increasingly sustainable energy, on a country or bloc basis.
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(help)Countries such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan, India and European powers like the UK, Germany and France can be considered as middle powers.
The next tier of regional powers — Japan and India — have each lost more ground in 2021 than did China. Both countries have fallen just short of the major power threshold of 40 points in 2021... One result of greater bipolarity is that US allies, such as Japan and Australia, and even key balancing powers, such as India, have never been more dependent on American capacity and willingness to sustain a military balance of power in the region.
The definition of 'middle power' is contested and has been the subject of controversy among scholars. According to the Italian interpretation of this concept, Italy is a middle-ranking power with limited natural and military resources and one that can only achieve its foreign policy goals by expanding its influence in international organisations and through bilateral relations with larger powers.
The next tier of regional powers — Japan and India — have each lost more ground in 2021 than did China. Both countries have fallen just short of the major power threshold of 40 points in 2021... One result of greater bipolarity is that US allies, such as Japan and Australia, and even key balancing powers, such as India, have never been more dependent on American capacity and willingness to sustain a military balance of power in the region.
As long as Russia's rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favouring direct state rule rather than indirect governance, the West will not recognize Russia as a fully fledged great power.
While no longer a superpower (a position it lost in the 1940s), the UK remains much more than a 'middle power'.
The United States beat the regional downward trend, gaining points in five Index measures, and overtaking China in two critical rankings: for diplomatic Influence and future resources. But its gains are dogged by a rapid loss of economic influence.
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(help)The country lost points in half of the Index measures. But this has not narrowed the country's lead over the rest of the region, with lower ranked countries succumbing to their own losses.
The (US) Department of Defense defined the Indo-Pacific as its "priority theater"...This tilt is an acknowledgment of China's increased role in world economics. China's share in world GDP has risen from 4% in 2000 to 16% today. Since it joined the WTO in 2001 and with the unfolding of the economic and financial crises in 2008–2009, which diminished the West's soft power and economic and financial strengths, China has become the world's powerhouse. This has increasingly led to what may be described today as great-power rivalry between China and the US.
a Middle Power like Peru lack the diplomatic and other resources...
Indonesia has for the first time reached a top-ten placement in the Index. Jakarta now outranks Singapore as the most diplomatically influential player in Southeast Asia.
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Uneven economic impacts and recoveries from the pandemic will likely continue to alter the regional balance of power well into the decade. Only Taiwan, the United States and Singapore are now predicted to have larger economies in 2030 than originally forecast prior to the pandemic.
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(help)Uneven economic impacts and recoveries from the pandemic will likely continue to alter the regional balance of power well into the decade. Only Taiwan, the United States and Singapore are now predicted to have larger economies in 2030 than originally forecast prior to the pandemic.
Three middle powers — Vietnam, Australia and Taiwan — were the only countries to gain in comprehensive power in 2020. When neither the United States nor China can establish undisputed primacy in Asia, the actions and choices of middle powers will become more consequential.
Three middle powers — Vietnam, Australia and Taiwan — were the only countries to gain in comprehensive power in 2020. When neither the United States nor China can establish undisputed primacy in Asia, the actions and choices of middle powers will become more consequential.