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Shortly after the invasion began, the three countries came under heavy political pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as from the United Nations, eventually prompting their withdrawal from Egypt.
The crisis strengthened Nasser's standing and led to international humiliation for the British—with historians arguing that it signified the end of its role as a world superpower—as well as the French amid the Cold War.[16][17][18][19][20][21][22] As a result of the conflict, the UN established anemergency force to police and patrol the Egypt–Israel border. For his diplomatic efforts in resolving the conflict through UN initiatives, Canadian external affairs minister Lester B. Pearson received a Nobel Peace Prize.
The Suez Canal opened in 1869, financed by the French and Egyptian governments.[25] The canal was operated by the Suez Company, an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory.
The canal was strategically important, as it provided the shortest ocean link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, Egypt was forced to sell its shares in the operating company to the British government. They obtained a 44% share in the company for £4million (equivalent to £476million in 2023). With the 1882 invasion and occupation of Egypt, the UK took de facto control of the country as well as the canal, its finances and operations.
The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.[26] In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.[27]
Despite this convention, Britain closed the canal on several occasions. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the British denied the Russian Baltic Fleet use of the canal after the Dogger Bank incident and forced it to sail around Africa, giving the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces time to consolidate their position. During the First World War, Britain and France closed the canal to non-Allied shipping.[28]
1945-1952
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain's military complex at Suez was one of the largest military installations in the world. The Suez base was an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, it became a source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.[29]
The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War for oil shipment.[30][31] Western Europe then[when?] imported two million barrels per day from the Middle East, 1,200,000 by tanker through the canal, and another 800,000 via pipeline from the Persian Gulf (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) and Kirkuk (Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline) to the Mediterranean. These pipeline routes were prone to instability, which led British leaders to prefer to use the sea route through the canal.
Egypt's domestic politics were experiencing a radical change. Unrest began to manifest in the growth of radical political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and its presence. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the creation of Israel.[29]
In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years.[32] Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights, as well as the presence of the Suez garrison. This resulted in an escalation in violent hostility towards Britain and its troops in Egypt.[citation needed]
American policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were major colonial powers, and to align Third World nationalists such as Nasser, who resented British and French influence, with the Free World camp.[34][35]
The Eisenhower administration saw the Near East as a gap into which Soviet influence could be projected, and which accordingly required an American-supported NATO-type organisation (the Middle East Defense Organization, or MEDO).[35][36][37] The CIA offered Nasser a $3 million bribe if he would join the proposed Middle East Defense Organization; Nasser took the money, but refused to join.[38] Nasser wanted an Egyptian-dominated Arab League to be the principal defence organisation in the Near East, which might be informally associated with the United States.[citation needed]
Dulles told Eisenhower in May 1953 that the Arab states believed that the United States would back Israel in aggressive expansion, and that the prestige of Western democracy in the Middle East was very low.[39] The immediate consequence was a new policy of "even-handedness" where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in disputes with Israel and Britain in 1953–55.[40][41][42][43]
Most of all, Nasser wanted the United States to supply arms on a generous scale to Egypt.[44] Nasser's anti-Zionism rendered it difficult for the Eisenhower administration to get the approval of Congress necessary to sell weapons to Egypt.[45]
Egypt and Britain
Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw the country strive for rapprochement throughout 1953-54. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the phased evacuation of British Armed Forces troops from the Suez base. Great Britain would withdraw all troops within 20 months, maintain the base, and retain a right to return for seven years. The Suez Company would revert to the Egyptian government in 1968.
Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser saw the entire Middle East as Egypt's rightful sphere of influence, and opposed all Western security initiatives in the Near East. Nasse believed that neither his regime nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world.[citation needed] There was a feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Said, for Arab leadership. The creation of the Baghdad Pact, (later the Central Treaty Organization) a Middle Eastern anti-Communist alliance of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the UK, in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq and sympathetic to Britain.
The close occurrence of the two events was mistakenly interpreted by Nasser as part of coordinated Western effort to push him into joining the Baghdad Pact. The signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid marked the beginning of the end of Nasser's good relations with the Americans.Throughout 1955 and 1956, Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia—whose rulers were hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw Syria, Jordan and Lebanon into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact.
Nasser had first broached the subject of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954, as a way of pressuring the Americans into selling him the arms he desired.[46][47] Instead of siding with either superpower, Nasser tried to have them compete in attempts to buy his friendship.[48] During secret talks with the Soviets in 1955, Nasser's demands for weapons were more than amply satisfied.[49] The news in September 1955 of the Egyptian purchase of a huge quantity of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was seen by the West as a major increase in Soviet influence in the Near East.[50] In Britain, the increase of Soviet influence in the Near East was seen as an ominous development that threatened to put an end to British influence in the region.[51]
Egypt and Israel
Prior to 1955, Nasser had pursued efforts to reach peace with Israel and had worked to prevent cross-border Palestinian attacks.[52] After the February 1955 Israeli raid on the Egyptian Army headquarters in Gaza in retaliation for a Palestinian fedayeen attack that killed an Israeli civilian, Nasser began allowing raids into Israel by the Palestinian militants.[53][52] Egypt established fedayeen bases not just in Gaza but also in Jordan and Lebanon.[54] The raids triggered a series of Israeli reprisal operations.[55][52]
Israel wanted to occupy and annex both the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and exercise control over the Gulf of Aqaba.[56]
The Israelis were concerned by Egypt's procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power.[57] Israel believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to hit Egypt's army.[58] Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.[59]
France and Israel were allied against Egypt, in part due to Egyptian support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) rebels against the French.[60][61][62] The French saw Nasser as a major threat.[63] By early 1955, France was shipping large amounts of weapons to Israel, and by 1956 France agreed to disregard the Tripartite Declaration, and supply even more weapons to Israel.[64][65] In 1956, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres informed the French that Israel had decided upon war with Egypt in 1956.[66] Peres claimed that Nasser was a genocidal maniac intent upon not only destroying Israel, but also exterminating its people, and as such, Israel wanted a war before Egypt received even more Soviet weapons, and there was still a possibility of victory for the Jewish state.[66]
Egyptian policies in 1956
In January 1956, to end the incipient arms race between Egypt, armed by the Soviet Union, and Israel, armed by France, which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent his close friend Robert B. Anderson to serve as a secret envoy, who offered large quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel.[67] Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had conflicting demands and the meetings were unsuccessful.[68][69]
A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally unsuccessful.[70] It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons.[71][72][73] However, the British historian P. J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership meant that peace was unlikely.[74]
Nasser sponsored demonstrations in Amman which led King Hussein of Jordan to dismiss the British Commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb (known to the Arabs as Glubb Pasha) in March 1956.[75][76] After the sacking of Glubb Pasha, British prime minister Anthony Eden became consumed with an obsessional hatred for Nasser, and from March 1956 onwards, was in private committed to the overthrow of Nasser.[77] As one British politician recalled:
For Eden ... this was the last straw.... This reverse, he insisted was Nasser's doing.... Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East and he would not rest until he destroyed all our friends and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence.... Nasser must therefore be ... destroyed.[78]
The American historian Donald Neff wrote that Eden's often hysterical and overwrought views towards Nasser reflected the influence of the amphetamines to which Eden had become addicted following a botched operation in 1953 together with the related effects of sustained sleep deprivation (Eden slept on average about 5 hours per night in early 1956).[79]
On 16 May 1956, Nasser officially recognised the People's Republic of China, which angered the US and Secretary Dulles[75] This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July.[75] The Eisenhower administration believed that if Nasser were able to secure Soviet economic support for the high dam, that would be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to support, and in turn would strain Soviet–Egyptian relations.
Nasser announces the nationalisation of the canal (Universal Newsreel, 30 July 1956).Port Said, at the entrance to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean.
On 26 July 1956, in a speech in Alexandria, Nasser announced the nationalization of the canal. During his speech he used the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, as a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal. Egypt closed the canal (and the Straits of Tiran) to Israeli shipping. They also blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, which was in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this was also a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.
The Egyptian historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan notes Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal without political consultation as an example of his predilection for solitary decision-making.[80]
British response
The nationalisation surprised Britain and its Commonwealth. There had been no discussion of the canal at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in late June and early July.[81]:7–8 Egypt's action threatened British economic and military interests in the region.
Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement in 1938. Since the US government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to keep the oil supply flowing[82] and avoid the complete collapse of British influence in the region.[83]
Eden was hosting a dinner for King Feisal II of Iraq and his prime minister. Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed.[84] Eden believed that Parliament would support him; Gaitskell spoke for the Labour Party when he called the nationalisation a "high-handed and totally unjustifiable step".[85] When Eden made a ministerial broadcast on the nationalisation, Labour declined its right to reply.[86]
However, Gaitskell's support became more cautious as time went on. In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August 1956, Gaitskell condemned Nasser but warned that he would not support any action that violated the United Nations Charter, including an armed attack.[87][88]
Two dozen Labour MPs issued a statement on 8 August stating that forcing Nasser to denationalise the canal against Egypt's wishes would violate the UN charter. Former Labour Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison hinted that he would support unilateral action by the government.[85]Jo Grimond, who became Leader of the Liberal Party that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.[82]
The nationalisation was perceived as a direct threat to British interests. In a letter to the British Ambassador on 10 September 1956, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office wrote:
If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to us for a year or two, our gold reserves will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the sterling area disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a force in Germany, or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.[89]
Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations.[citation needed] As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.[citation needed]
French response
The French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, outraged by Nasser's move, determined that Nasser would not get his way.[90][91] French public opinion very much supported Mollet, and apart from the French Communist Party, all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.[90]
1956 newsreels about Western reactions to the nationalisation. Pictured: John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at conference in London.
On 29 July 1956, the French Cabinet decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel. Britain was informed, and invited to co-operate if interested.[91] At the same time, Mollet felt very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalisation.[92] This was especially the case because France had remained loyal to NATO even after the USSR had offered the French a deal earlier that year in which Paris would remain in NATO but become "semi-neutralist" in the Cold War if Moscow ended its support of the FLN in Algeria.[92] In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support proved not forthcoming, he became even more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would act.[92][additional citation(s) needed]
Commonwealth response
By 1956 the Panama Canal was much more important than the Suez to Australia and New Zealand.[citation needed] However, many still called the Suez Canal their "lifeline" to Britain or "jugular vein".[citation needed] Australian prime minister Robert Menzies and New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland both supported Britain in the early weeks following the seizure. Menzies travelled to London from the United States after hearing of the nationalisation and became an informal member of the British Cabinet discussing the issue.[85]:13–16,56–58,84[93][94]
The "non-white Dominions" saw Egypt's seizing of the canal as an admirable act of anti-imperialism, and Nasser's Arab nationalism as similar to Asian nationalism. As India was a major user of the canal, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru remained publicly neutral other than warning that any use of force, or threats, could be "disastrous". Pakistan was also cautious about supporting Egypt given their rivalry as leading Islamic nations, but its government did state that Nasser had the right to nationalise.[85]:18–24,79
Diplomatic solutions
Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Suez Canal. The mission was a failure.
Almost immediately after the nationalisation, Eisenhower suggested to Eden a conference of maritime nations that used the canal. The British preferred to invite the most important countries, but the Americans believed that inviting as many as possible amid maximum publicity would affect world opinion. The eight surviving signatories of the Constantinople Convention and the 16 other largest users of the canal were invited: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All except Egypt—which sent an observer, and used India and the Soviet Union to represent its interests—and Greece accepted the invitation, and the 22 nations' representatives met in London from 16 to 23 August.[95][96][85]:81–89
Fifteen of the nations supported the American-British-French position of international operation of the canal. Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union supported India's competing proposal—which Nasser had preapproved—of international supervision only. India criticised Egypt's seizure of the canal, but insisted that its ownership and operation remain in Egyptian hands. The majority of 18 chose five nations to negotiate with Nasser in Cairo led by Menzies, while their proposal for international operation of the canal would go to the Security Council.[85]:81–89[97][96]
Menzies' argued for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the canal in a 7 September official communique to Nasser, and called for a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser rejected Menzies' proposals.[97] Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but the US openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.[98]
The United States proposed an association of canal users that would set rules for its operation. Fourteen of the other nations, not including Pakistan, agreed. Britain believed that violation of the association rules would result in military force, but the United States opposed military action.[85]:89–92 Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion, and the international community, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted.[99][100] The Americans refused to support any move that could be seen as imperialism or colonialism, seeing the US as the champion of decolonisation.
"The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations."[101] The British disregarded Eisenhower's argument that the American people would not accept a military solution, and doubted that Eisenhower had a determination to avoid war.[102][103] Eden and other leading British officials believed that Nasser's engagement with communist states, support for Palestinian fedayeen, and attempts to destabilise pro-Western Arab regimes, would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli.[citation needed]
Military preparations
Anglo-French planning
Anthony Eden began planning for an invasion in July 1956.[104] Eden's plan called for the Cyprus-based 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to seize the canal zone.[105] The Prime Minister's plan was rejected by Templer and the other service chiefs, who suggested the sea-power based Contingency Plan, which called for the Royal Marines to take Port Said, which would then be used as a base for three British divisions to overrun the canal zone.[104]
In early August, the plan was modified by including a strategic bombing campaign that was intended to destroy Egypt's economy and thereby hopefully bring about Nasser's overthrow, as well as achieve air superiority.[104][106] In addition, a role was allocated to the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade, which would lead the assault on Port Said in conjunction with the Royal Marine landing.[107]
This operation (eventually named Musketeer) would require thousands of troops, leading the British to seek out France as an ally.[106] In place of Port Said, Musketeer called for the capture of Alexandria.[106] Once that city had been taken in assault from the sea, British armoured divisions would engage in a decisive battle of annihilation somewhere south of Alexandria and north of Cairo.[106] To destroy the 300,000-strong Egyptian Army in his planned battle of annihilation, Stockwell estimated that he needed 80,000 troops, while at most the British Army could spare was 50,000 troops; the French could supply the necessary 30,000 troops to make up the shortfall.[106]
On 11 August 1956, General Charles Keightley was appointed commander of Musketeer with French Admiral Pierre Barjot as his deputy commander.[106]André Beaufre would command the French forces. Most of the officers of the Anglo-French Task Force expressed regret that it was Beaufre who was Stockwell's deputy rather the other way around.[108]
A major problem both politically and militarily was the one-week interval between sending troops to the eastern Mediterranean and the beginning of the invasion.[109] In late August 1956, Admiral Barjot suggested that Port Said once again be made the main target, which lessened the number of troops needed and thus reduced the interval between sending forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the invasion.[110] Beaufre warned that merely capturing the canal zone made for a dangerously ambiguous goal.[110]
Additionally, the coming of winter weather to the Mediterranean in late November would render the invasion impossible.[109] An additional problem was Eden, who constantly interfered with the planning and was so obsessed with secrecy that he refused to tell Keightley whether he wanted to retake the Suez Canal or topple Nasser, or both.[111]
In early September, Keightley embraced Barjot's idea of seizing Port Said, and presented Revise.[110] On 8 September 1956 Revise was approved by the British and French cabinets.[110]
Both Stockwell and Beaufre were opposed to Revise as an open-ended plan with no clear goal beyond seizing the canal zone, but was embraced by Eden and Mollet as offering greater political flexibility and the prospect of lesser Egyptian civilian casualties.[110]
Franco-Israeli planning
Israeli M4A4 Shermans were also used in the Sinai campaign.
In late September 1956, Guy Mollet had decided to attack Egypt with Britain, and if the British backed out (as Mollet believed that they might), with Israel.[112] On 7 August, the French asked Ben Gurion if Israel would attack Egypt together with France; Israel agreed and joint planning began.[113][114] On 30 September 1956 secret Franco-Israeli talks started in Paris, based on Britain's non-involvement.[115] The French wanted to use British airfields in Cyprus to bomb Egypt, but wanted to use Israeli airfields if the ones in Cyprus were not available.[116] Only on 5 October were the British informed of the secret Franco-Israeli alliance.[117]
In July 1956, IDF chief of staff General Moshe Dayan advised Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that Israel should attack Egypt at the first chance, but Ben-Gurion stated he preferred to attack Egypt with the aid of France.[118]
After the capture of these four objectives, Israel hope that entire Egyptian Army would fall back into Egypt proper, and British and French forces would then be able to push the Egyptian Army against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.[120]
France, Israel and the United Kingdom reached a secret agreement regarding political and military cooperation to overthrow Nasser and de-nationalise the Canal during discussions held between 22 and 24 October 1956 in Sèvres, France. Under the terms of the Protocol, Israel would attack Egypt on 29 October. The British and French governments would issue a joint appeal for both Egypt and Israel to cease firing and withdraw 10 miles from the canal. If both forces rejected this demand (a guarantee, since Israel was already aware of it), the French and British militaries would attack on 31 October.
Forces
British
Universal Newsreel from 6 August about the departure of British and French ships for Egypt
The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, which was intended to be the main British strike force against Egypt, had neglected paratroop training in favour of counter-insurgency operations.[121] The Royal Navy could project formidable power through the guns of its warships and aircraft flown from its carriers, but lacked amphibious capability.[122]
French paratroopers of the elite Regiment de Parachutistes Coloniaux (RPC) were extremely experienced soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in the fighting in Indochina and in Algeria.[124] They followed a "shoot first, ask questions later" policy towards civilians, which led to the killing of Egyptian civilians.[124]
The main French (and Israeli) tank, the AMX-13, was lightly armoured but agile: designed for mobile, flanking operations.[124] The French Navy had a powerful carrier force but, like its British counterpart, suffered from a lack of landing craft.[124]
Israeli
An Israeli AMX-13, shown here from the rear and side
American military historian Derek Varble called the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the "best" military force in the Middle East while at the same time suffering from "deficiencies" such as "immature doctrine, faulty logistics, and technical inadequacies".[125] The IDF's Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, encouraged aggression, initiative, and ingenuity among the Israeli officer corps while ignoring logistics and armoured operations.[125] Dayan preferred infantry at the expense of armour.[125]
The IDF had a disorganised logistics arm, which was put under severe strain when the IDF invaded the Sinai.[125] The main IDF tank was the AMX-13 and the main aircraft were the Dassault Mystère IVA and the Ouragan.[126] Superior pilot training gave the Israeli Air Force an edge over their Egyptian opponents.[125] The Israeli Navy consisted of two destroyers, seven frigates, eight minesweepers, several landing craft, and fourteen torpedo boats.[citation needed]
Egyptian
In the Egyptian Armed Forces, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion.[127] The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was a heavy drinker who was close friends with Nasser and who would prove incompetent as a general during the Crisis.[127] In 1956, the Egyptian military was well equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union such as T-34 and IS-3 tanks, MiG-15 fighters, Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, SU-100 self-propelled guns and assault rifles.[127]
Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them.[128] Egyptian troops were excellent in defensive operations, but had little capacity for offensive operations, owing to the lack of "rapport and effective small-unit leadership".[128]
Anglo-French para drops on the Suez Canal and Israeli conquest of Sinai
The fighting began on 29 October 1956.[129] At about 3:00pm, Israeli Air Force Mustangs launched a series of attacks on Egyptian positions all over the Sinai.[130] Egyptian commander Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer at first treated the reports of an Israeli incursion into the Sinai as a large raid instead of an invasion, and did not order a general alert.[130] By the time that Amer realised his mistake, the Israelis had made significant advances into the Sinai.[130]
Because Israeli intelligence expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side, the Israel Border Police militarised the Israel-Jordan border, including the Green Line with the West Bank.[131]Israeli-Arab villages along the Jordanian border were placed under curfew. This resulted in the killings of 48 civilians in the Arab village of Kafr Qasim in an event known as the Kafr Qasim massacre.
Israeli paratrooper near the Mitla Pass
The Israeli 9th Infantry Brigade captured Ras al-Naqb, an important staging ground for the later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh, during the night of 29-30 October.[132] Also that night, the 4th Infantry Brigade stormed al-Qusaymah, a jumping off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.[132][133]
Israeli paratroopers dig in near the Parker Memorial
A portion of the paratroopers under Ariel Sharon's advanced to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted Themed in a dawn attack, and was able to storm the town with his armour.[134] Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan.[134] The Egyptians were defeated and forced to retreat. A total of 260 Egyptian and 38 Israeli soldiers were killed in the battle.[135] Although the battle was an Israeli victory, the casualties sustained would surround Sharon with controversy.[136]
The village of Abu Uwayulah served as the road centre for the entire Sinai, and thus was a key Israeli target.[135] To the east of Abu Uwayulah were several ridges that formed a natural defensive zone known to the Israelis as the "Hedgehog".[135] Holding the "Hedgehog" were 3,000 Egyptians of the 17th and 18th battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Sami Yassa.[135] Over the course of 30 October-1 November, the Israeli military repeatedly assaulted the position. Eventually, the lack of ammunition and water caused the Egyptians to retreat.[137][138]
Air operations
In air combat, Israeli aircraft shot down between seven and nine Egyptian jets[139] with the loss of one plane.[139][140] On 1 November, President Nasser ordered his pilots to disengage and fly their planes to bases in southern Egypt.
On 3 November, Israeli Dassault Mystère fighter jets attacked a British warship, the Black Swan class sloopHMS Crane as it was patrolling the approaches to the Gulf of Aqaba after it had been mistaken for an Egyptian Navy warship. Three crewmen were wounded in the attack. The ship put up heavy anti-aircraft fire, and there are conflicting accounts as to whether or not it shot down one of the attacking jets.[141][142][143][144][145][146]
The Egyptian Navy's Ibrahim el Awal, an ex-British Hunt-classdestroyer, was damaged by the Israeli Navy and captured on 31 October after shelling Haifa.[147] Also on 31 October, the Egyptian frigate Domiat was destroyed by a British light cruiser.[147][148] On 4 November, a squadron of Egyptian motor torpedo boats attacked a British destroyer off the northeast coast of the Nile Delta. Three torpedo boats were sunk and the rest retreated.[147]
Gaza Strip operations
U.S. newsreel on the Sinai and Gaza invasions
The city of Rafah was strategically important to Israel.[149] Dayan ordered the IDF forces to focus on breaking through rather than reducing every Egyptian strongpoint.[149] French warships led by the cruiser Georges Leygues provided fire support.[150] In the morning of 1 November, Israeli tanks had encircled the city.[151] At that point, the commander of the Egyptian forces, General al-Abd, ordered his forces to abandon their posts outside of Rafah and retreat into the city.[152]
With Rafah more or less cut off and Israeli forces controlling the northern and eastern roads leading into the city, the 27th Armored Brigade to went west to take al-Arish.[152] By this point, Nasser had ordered his forces to fall back towards the Suez Canal, so at first Bar-Lev and his men met little resistance as they advanced across the northern Sinai.[152]
Hearing of the order to withdraw, General al-Abd and his men left Rafah on the morning of 1 November through a gap in the Israeli lines.[152] Three hours later, the Israelis took Rafah.[152] After taking Rafah, Israeli troops killed 111 people, including 103 refugees, in Rafah's Palestinian refugee camp. The circumstances of the killings are disputed.[153][154] On 2 November, Bar-Lev's forces took al-Arish.[155] The city itself fell without a fight after its defenders retreated.
Meanwhile, the IDF attacked the Egyptian defences outside of Gaza City late on 1 November.[155] Joined by infantry, the armour attacked the al-Muntar fortress outside of Gaza City, killing or capturing 3,500 Egyptian National Guard troops.[155] By noon of 2 November, there was no more Egyptian opposition in the Gaza City area.[155] By noon of 3 November, the Israelis had control of almost the entire Gaza Strip save for a few isolated strong points, which were soon attacked and taken.[156]
The UN estimated that in total 447 to 550 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli troops during the first weeks of Israeli occupation of the strip. The manner in which these people were killed is disputed.[157]A number of Palestinians were killed after the town of Khan Yunis was taken on 3 November.[155][156] Israel maintains that the Palestinians were killed in street-fighting, while the Palestinians claimed that they were unarmed civilians executed by Israeli troops.[158] The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency later reported that 275 people were killed.[159][160]
In both Gaza City and Khan Yunis, street-fighting led to the deaths of "dozens, perhaps hundreds, of non-combatants".[161] Food and medicine distribution for refugees in need of assistance was complicated when some Palestinians ransacked the warehouses belonging to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.[161] This was compounded by a widespread view in Israel that the responsibility for the care of the Palestinian refugees rested with the UNRWA, not Israel, which led the Israelis to be slow with providing aid.[162]
Sharm el-Sheikh operations
By 3 November, Sharm el-Sheikh was the last Israeli objective.[156] The Egyptian forces at Sharm el-Sheikh had the advantage of holding one of the most strongly fortified positions in the entire Sinai, but had been subjected to heavy Israeli air attacks from the beginning of the war.[163] The main difficulty faced by Colonel Abraham Yoffe's 9th Infantry Brigade was logistical.[156] There were no good roads linking Ras an-Naqb to Sharm el-Sheikh.[156]
After numerous skirmishes on the outskirts of Sharm el-Sheikh, Yoffe ordered an attack on the port around midnight on 4 November.[164] After four hours of heavy fighting, Yoffe ordered his men to retreat.[164] On the morning of 5 November, Israeli forces launched a massive artillery barrage and napalm strikes against Egyptian forces defending Sharm el-Sheikh.[164] At 9:30am on 5 November, the Egyptian commander, Colonel Raouf Mahfouz Zaki, surrendered Sharm el-Sheikh.[164] The Israelis had lost 10 killed and 32 wounded, while the Egyptians had lost about 100 killed and 31 wounded. Another 864 Egyptian soldiers were taken prisoner.[147]
Casualties
The Israeli losses were 172 dead and 817 wounded. The number of Egyptians killed was "never reliably established".[165] Egyptian casualties to the Israeli invasion were estimated at 1,000–3,000 dead and 4,000 wounded, while losses to the Anglo-French operation were estimated at 650 dead and 900 wounded.[5][166] 1,000 Egyptian civilians are estimated to have died.
The Anglo-French military action had two phases: Operation Musketeer and Operation Telescope.
Operation Musketeer Revise (often referred to as Operation Revise) was in two phases:
Phase I: Anglo-French air forces to gain air supremacy over Egypt's skies.[167]
Phase II: Anglo-French air forces were to launch a 10-day "aero-psychological" campaign that would destroy the Egyptian economy.[167]
To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by Britain and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft.
Operation Telescope consisted of air- and sea-borne landings to capture the Canal Zone.
In the morning of 30 October Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel. Eden and Mollet ordered Phase I of Operation Revise to begin 13 hours after the Anglo-French ultimatum with a bombing campaign.[168][169]
Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered Egyptian troops in the Sinai to stay put, as Amer confidently assured Nasser that the Egyptians could defeat the Israelis in the Sinai and then defeat the Anglo-French forces once they came ashore in the canal zone.[170] Amer also advised Nasser to send more troops into the Sinai to inflict his promised defeat on Israel.[170] Not until late on 31 October did Nasser disregard Amer's rosy assessment and ordered his forces to disengage in the Sinai and to retreat back to the canal zone to face the expected Anglo-French invasion.[170]
A Hawker Sea Hawk of 899 Naval Air Squadron, armed with rockets, about to be launched from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle for a strike on an Egyptian airfield
British night bombing proved ineffective.[168]Starting on the morning of 1 November, carrier-based planes began a series of daytime strikes on Egypt.[168] By the night of 1 November the Egyptian Air Force had lost 200 planes.[168]
With the destruction of Egypt's air force, Keightley ordered the beginning of Revise Phase II, a wide-ranging interdiction campaign.[171][172] By 3 November, Beaufre convinced Keightley and Stockwell to seize the canal zone with airborne landings instead of waiting the planned ten days for Revise II, and gained the approval for Operation Telescope, as Beaufre had code-named the airborne assault on the canal zone.[173][174]
Paratroop attack on Port Said
Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, 5 November 1956.
The British forces moved up towards Port Said with air support before digging in at 13:00 to hold until the beach assault.[176] Overall, the British paratroopers had managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Egyptians for the loss of 4 dead and 32 wounded.[177]
The French paratroopers swiftly secured the western bridge. With close-air-support, the French paratroopers stormed and took Port Said's waterworks that morning.[176] Chateau-Jobert followed up this success by beginning an attack on Port Fuad, which became a rout.[178] During the fighting in the canal zone, the French paratroopers often executed Egyptian POWs.[179]
The Egyptian commander at Port Said, General Salahedin Moguy then proposed a truce.[178] Moguy had no interest in surrendering and had only made the truce offer to buy time for his men to dig in.[180] As the paratroopers alone were not enough to take the city, Beaufre and British Admiral Manley Laurence Power urged that the sea-borne landings be accelerated and that Allied forces land the very next day.[85]:173[180]
Royal Marines come ashore at Port Said
Troops of the Parachute Regiment escort a captured Egyptian soldier at Port Said
At first light on 6 November, Royal Marines of No. 42 and 40 Commando stormed the beaches[181] The battle group standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.[181]
The men of 42 Commando as much as possible chose to by-pass Egyptian positions and focused on trying to break through inland.[181]Upon entering downtown Port Said, the Marines became engaged in fierce urban combat.[182]
In the afternoon, 522 additional French paratroopers were dropped near Port Fuad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale. The French were aided by AMX-13 light tanks.[183]
British Royal Marines of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft also mistakenly hit 45 Commando and HQ. One Marine was killed and 15 wounded when a carrier-based Wyvern mistakenly fired into a concentration of Marines.[184][185] This was the first time helicopters were used by British forces to lift men directly into a combat zone.[186]
Nasser proclaimed the Suez War to be a "people's war".[187] As such, Egyptian troops were ordered to don civilian clothes while guns were freely handed out to Egyptian civilians.[188] From Nasser's point of view, this presented the British and French with an unsolvable dilemma: cause deaths of innocent civilians and bring world sympathy to his cause while weakening morale in Britain and France, or fall prey to snipers attacking "with near impunity by hiding among crowds of apparent non-combatants".[189]
These tactics worked especially well against the British.[189] British leaders, especially Eden and the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Louis Mountbatten, sincerely attempted to limit Egyptian civilian deaths.[189] Despite Eden's best efforts, British bombing still killed hundreds of Egyptian civilians during Revise II, though these deaths were due more to imprecise aiming rather than a deliberate policy of "area bombing" such as that employed against Germany in World War II.[190] At Port Said, the heavy fighting in the streets and the resulting fires destroyed much of the city, killing many civilians.
Most Egyptian soldiers wore civilian clothing and operated in small groups, but remained organized. Civilians who took up arms as guerrillas were organized into eight groups with five additional groups joining them from outside the city. The Egyptians were gradually pushed back as the British took key objectives.[191] Egyptian sniper attacks and the need to clear every building led 3 Para to be slowed in their attempts to link up with the Royal Marines.[192] The link-up of British and French forces occurred close to the offices of the Suez Canal Company.
Both Stockwell and Beaufre spent the day in Port Said, and were thus cut off from the news.[183] Only late in the day did Beaufre and Stockwell learn of the acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire.[183] The British forces were at al-Cap, a small village four miles north of al-Qantarah at 2:00am, when the ceasefire came into effect.[193][194]
Total Royal Marine casualties in the Port Said landings were 9 killed and 60 wounded.[185]
Newsreel from 12 November 1956 about the end of the invasion
Eden's obsession with secrecy meant that the government did nothing in the months running up to the attack to explain to the British people or the reservists called up for their National Service in the summer and fall of 1956 why the war was necessary.[195][196] Only one British soldier, however, refused to fight.[197]
According to some historians, the majority of British people were on Eden's side.[198][199][200] According to public opinion polls at the time, 37% of the British people supported the war while 44% were opposed.[201][202] On 10 and 11 November an opinion poll found 53% supported the war, with 32% opposed.[203]
Although the public believed the British government's justification of the invasion as a separation of Israeli and Egyptian forces,[197] protests against the war occurred in Britain after it began. Stormy and violent debates in the House of Commons on 1 November 1956 almost degenerated into fist-fights after several Labour MPs compared Eden to Hitler.[204] The British government pressured the BBC to support the war,[205] and seriously considered taking over the network.[197]
The majority of Conservative constituency associations passed resolutions of support to "Sir Anthony".[206] The majority of letters written to MPs from their constituents were against the Suez attack.[207] Significantly, many of the letters came from voters who identified as Conservatives.[208]
The Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress organised nation-wide anti-war protests, starting on 1 November.[201] On 4 November, at an anti-war rally in Trafalgar Square attended by 30,000 people (making it easily the biggest rally in London since 1945), the Labour MP Aneurin Bevan accused the government of "a policy of bankruptcy and despair".[209] Inspired by Bevan's speech, the crowd at Trafalgar Square then marched on 10 Downing Street chanting "Eden Must Go!", and attempted to storm the Prime Minister's residence.[210] The ensuing clashes between the police and the demonstrators which were captured by television cameras had a huge demoralising effect on the Eden cabinet,[211] which was meeting there.[210]
The conflict exposed the division within the Labour Party between its middle-class internationalist intelligentsia who opposed the conflict, and working-class voters who supported it.[212][213][214][f] The Labour MP Richard Crossman said that "when the Labour Party leadership tried to organise demonstrations in the Provinces of the kind they'd held in Trafalgar Square, there was great reluctance among the working classes, because we were at war. It was Munich in reverse." Another Labour MP, Barbara Castle, recalled that Labour's protest against the conflict was "drowned in a wave of public jingoism".[216] The Suez Crisis played a key role in the reconciliation of the Gaitskellite and Bevanite factions of the Labour Party, which both condemned the invasion, after the 1955 leadership election.[217]
International responses
Responses by Western governments
Eisenhower press conference about the crisis, 9 August
Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Hungarian revolution. Vice-President Richard Nixon later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser".[218] Eisenhower also believed that if the United States supported the attack on Egypt, that the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union.[219]
The United States put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain's oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States.
In addition, Eisenhower ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, to prepare to sell part of the US government's sterling bond holdings.[220] Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, told Eden that Britain's foreign exchange reserves could not sustain the devaluation of the pound that would come after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to import sufficient food and energy supplies. However, there were suspicions in the Cabinet that Macmillan had deliberately overstated the financial situation in order to force Eden out. What Treasury officials had told Macmillan was far less serious than what he told the Cabinet.[221]
Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many countries were concerned with the growing rift between Western allied nations.
When Israel refused to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, Eisenhower sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. The Democratic Party-controlled Senate would not co-operate with Eisenhower's position on Israel.[222]
A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from West Germany. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.[223][224] Adenauer feared that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests.[225] Because of this, Adenauer strengthened his relationship with Mollet and France.[226]
Responses in the Muslim world
The attack on Egypt greatly offended many in the Muslim world. In Pakistan, 300,000 people took part in a rally in Lahore to show solidarity with Egypt, and a violent mob in Karachi chanting anti-British slogans burned down the British High Commission.[227] In Syria, the government blew up the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers in the Mediterranean, to punish Iraq for supporting the invasion and to cut Britain off from one of its main routes for taking delivery of Iraqi oil.[228] In concert with US actions, Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The US refused to fill the gap until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. Other NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or France.[229][230]
UN General Assembly Resolution 997
Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960
On 30 October, the Security Council submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected.[231] On 31 October, as planned, France and the UK launched their attacks against targets in Egypt. Later that day, the Security Council passed Resolution 119, calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time, in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.[231]
Universal Newsreel from 4 December about Dag Hammarskjöld's meeting with Nasser
The emergency special session was convened on 1 November. The same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the US, without requesting the same from the Soviet Union.[232]
In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997. It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked.[231] The vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.[233]
On 7 November, David Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset and declared a great victory, saying that the 1949 armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. Under no circumstances would Israel agree to the stationing of UN forces on its territory or in any area it occupied.[235][236]:104–117 He also made an oblique reference to his intention to annex the Sinai Peninsula.[235] Isaac Alteras writes that Ben-Gurion "was carried away by the resounding victory against Egypt" and while "a statesman well known for his sober realism, [he] took flight in dreams of grandeur".
The speech marked the beginning of a four-month-long diplomatic struggle, culminating in withdrawal from all territory, under conditions far less palatable than those envisioned in the speech, but with conditions for sea access to Eilat and a UNEF presence on Egyptian soil.[235] The speech immediately drew increased international pressure on Israel to withdraw.[236] That day in New York, the emergency session passed Resolution 1002, again calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops to behind the armistice lines, and for the immediate withdrawal of British and French troops from Egyptian territory.[231] After a long Israeli cabinet meeting late on 8 November, Ben-Gurion informed Eisenhower that Israel declared its willingness to accept withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, "when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the canal zone".[235]
Soviet response
Premier Nikolai Bulganin threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side, and to launch rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel.[237][238] It was later learned that the Soviets did not have the ICBMs necessary to launch this attack, but the West did not know this at the time.[239][240]
The Soviet threat to send troops to Egypt to fight the Allies led Eisenhower to fear that this might be the beginning of World War III.[241][242][243] Eisenhower immediately ordered Lockheed U-2 flights over Syria and Israel to search for any Soviet air forces on Syrian bases. The Americans excluded Israel from the guarantee against Soviet attack, however, alarming the Israeli government.[235] The U-2 showed that Soviet aircraft were not in Syria despite the threats.[244]
Ceasefire
Israelis protesting against the UN order to evacuate Gaza and Sinai, 14 February 1957
Anthony Eden announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on operational manoeuvres. Port Said had been overrun, and the military assessment was that the Suez Canal could have been completely taken within 24 hours.[245]
Eisenhower was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops until the US ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. pushed for it. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.[246]
The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli-controlled territory and withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in the Sinai peninsula such as roads, railways and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of Abu Ageila and El Quseima.[247] Israeli troops confiscated Egyptian National Railways equipment for use by Israel Railways.[248][249]
The UNEF was formed by forces from countries that were not part of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Canadian Armed Forces troops participated in later years, since Canada had spearheaded the idea of a neutral force. By 24 April 1957, the canal was fully reopened to shipping.[250][251]
Aftermath
1957 newsreels about the aftermath of the crisis
The conflict resulted in a military victory for the Coalition,[252][253][254] but a political victory for Egypt.[252] Egypt maintained control of the canal.[255]
Israel
In the context of the massive armament of Egypt via Czechoslovakia, Israel had been expecting an Egyptian invasion in either March or April 1957, as well as a Soviet invasion of Syria, neither of which occurred after this war.[256] The fight over the canal also laid the groundwork for the Six-Day War in 1967 due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war and rising of tensions between Egypt and Israel.[257]
An Israeli soldier stands next to an Egyptian gun that had blocked the Tiran Straits.
The Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt since 1950,[259] were re-opened to Israeli shipping. The Israelis also secured the presence of UN Peacekeepers in Sinai. Operation Kadesh bought Israel an eleven-year lull on its southern border with Egypt.[260]
In addition, its refusal to withdraw without guarantees, even in defiance of the United States and United Nations, ended all Western efforts, mainly American and British ones, to impose a political settlement in the Middle East without taking Israel's security needs into consideration.[261]
In October 1965 Eisenhower told Jewish fundraiser and Republican party supporter Max M. Fisher that he greatly regretted forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula.[261]
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union made major gains with regards to influence in the Middle East.[262]Nikita Khrushchev's much publicised threat expressed through letters written by Nikolai Bulganin to begin rocket attacks on 5 November on Britain, France, and Israel if they did not withdraw from Egypt was widely believed at the time to have forced a ceasefire.[262][263] Accordingly, it enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the Arab world, and the Third World, who believed the USSR was prepared to launch a nuclear attack on Britain, France, and Israel for the sake of Egypt. Though Nasser in private admitted that it was American economic pressure that had saved him, it was Khrushchev, not Eisenhower, whom Nasser publicly thanked as Egypt's saviour and special friend.
Shortly after it reopened, the canal was traversed by the first Soviet Navy warships since World War I. The Soviets' burgeoning influence in the Middle East, although it was not to last, included acquiring Mediterranean bases, and supporting the budding Palestinian liberation movement.[264][unreliable source?]
Statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps, a Frenchman who was lead developer in the construction of the Suez Canal, being removed following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956.
Khrushchev took the view that the Suez crisis had been a great triumph for Soviet nuclear brinkmanship, arguing publicly and privately that his threat to use nuclear weapons was what had saved Egypt.[267][268] Therefore, a long period of crises began, starting with the Berlin crisis, beginning later in November 1958, and culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[269]
The Soviet Union was able to avoid most repercussions from its concurrent violent suppression of the rebellion in Hungary, and were able to present an image at the United Nations as a defender of small powers against imperialism.[270]
United States
The crisis may also have hastened decolonisation, as many of the remaining British and French colonies gained independence over the next few years. Some argued that the imposed ending to the Crisis led to over-hasty decolonisation in Africa, increasing the chance of civil wars and military dictatorships in newly independent countries.[271]
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived a power vacuum in the Middle East, and he thought the United States should fill it. AIn order to prevent further Soviet expansion in the region, Eisenhower asked Congress on 5 January 1957 for authorisation to use military force if requested by any Middle Eastern nation to check aggression and, secondly, to set aside $200million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the United States. Congress granted both requests and this policy became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.[257]
Nasser saw the Eisenhower Doctrine as a heavy-handed American attempt to dominate the Middle East and led him to ally Egypt with the Soviet Union as an effective counter-weight. It was only with the abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine in mid-1958 that Nasser started pulling away from the Soviet Union to resume his preferred role as an opportunist who tried to use both superpowers to his advantage.[272]
The American historian Arthur L. Herman said that the episode ruined the usefulness of the United Nations to support American geopolitical aims.[273]
Europe
The Bulganin letters showcased Europe's dependence upon the United States for security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as had been advertised.[274][neutrality is disputed]
As a result, the French became determined to acquire their own nuclear weapons rather than rely upon the Americans, while Germany became even more interested in the idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War. This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community, which was intended to be the foundation of the European "Third Force".[274]
Egypt
Presidents Shukri al-Quwatli (left) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) clasp hands in front of jubilant crowds in Damascus days after the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic, 1958
Egypt kept control of the Suez Canal.[275] The British historian D. R. Thorpe wrote that the outcome gave Nasser "an inflated view of his own power",[276] thinking he had overcome the combined forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, failing to attribute their withdrawal to pressure from the superpowers.[276][277]
American historian Derek Varble commented, "Although Egyptian forces fought with mediocre skill during the conflict, many Arabs saw Nasser as the conqueror of European colonialism and Zionism, simply because Britain, France and Israel left the Sinai and the northern Canal Zone."[277] The fighting at Port Said became a symbol of Egyptian victory, linked to a global anti-colonial struggle.[278]
In October 1956, Nasser brought in a set of sweeping regulations abolishing civil liberties and allowing the state to stage mass arrests without charge and strip away Egyptian citizenship from any group it desired; these measures were mostly directed against the Jews of Egypt. As part of its new policy, 1,000 Jews were arrested and 500 Jewish businesses were seized by the government.[279]
A statement branding the Jews as "Zionists and enemies of the state" was read out in the mosques of Cairo and Alexandria. Jewish bank accounts were confiscated and many Jews lost their jobs. Lawyers, engineers, doctors and teachers were not allowed to work in their professions. Thousands of Jews were ordered to leave the country.[280]
They were allowed to take only one suitcase and a small sum of cash, and forced to sign declarations "donating" their property to the Egyptian government. Some 25,000 Jews, almost half of the Jewish community, left Egypt, mainly for Israel, Europe, the United States and South America. By 1957, the Jewish population of Egypt had fallen to 15,000.[281]
The political and psychological impact of the crisis had a fundamental impact on British politics. Anthony Eden was accused of misleading parliament and resigned from office on 9 January 1957.[282]
Though British influence continued in the Middle East, Suez was a blow to British prestige in the Near East from which the country never recovered.[283] Britain evacuated all positions East of Suez by 1971, though this was due mainly to economic factors.
Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, accelerated the process of decolonisation and sought to restore Britain's special relationship with the United States.[284][pageneeded] Benefiting from his personal popularity and a healthy economy, Macmillan's government increased its Parliamentary majority in the 1959 general election.[283]
During the 1960s there was much speculation that Prime Minister Harold Wilson's refusals to send British troops to the Vietnam War, were partially due to the Americans not supporting Britain during the Suez Crisis.[citation needed] In 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath refused the US permission to use any of the UK's air bases to resupply during the Yom Kippur War,[285] or to allow the Americans to gather intelligence from British bases in Cyprus.[286]
However, the British relationship with the United States did not suffer lasting consequences from the crisis.[287] One example came with Britain's first hydrogen bomb test Operation Grapple which led to the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement.[288] Six years after the crisis, the Americans sold Britain state-of-the-art missile technology at a moderate cost, which became the UK Polaris programme.[289]
Risse-Kappen argued that Franco-American ties never recovered from the Suez crisis. Previously there had already been strains in the Franco-American relationship triggered by what Paris considered US betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina in 1954.[291] From the point of view of General Charles de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated to France that it could not rely on its allies. The British had initiated a ceasefire in the midst of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had opposed Paris politically. The damage to the ties between Paris and Washington, D.C., "culminated in President de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from the military integration of NATO".[292]
Much of the French Army officer corps felt that they had been "betrayed" by politicians in Paris when they were on the verge of victory, just as they believed they had been "betrayed" in Vietnam in 1954, and accordingly became more determined to win the war in Algeria, even if it meant overthrowing the Fourth Republic to do so. The Suez crisis thus helped to set the stage for the military disillusionment with the Fourth Republic, which was to lead to the collapse of the republic in 1958.[293]
The military lesson that was reinforced by the Suez War was the extent that the desert favoured highly fluid, mobile operations and the power of aerial interdiction. To operate in the open desert without air supremacy proved to be suicidal for the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The Royal Marine helicopter assault at Port Said "showed promise as a technique for transporting troops into small landing zones".[296] Egyptian urban warfare tactics at Port Said proved to be effective at slowing down the Allied advance.
↑ Other names include the Suez Canal Crisis, Suez War, 1956 War, Suez–Sinai war, 1956 Arab–Israeli war, Suez Campaign, and Sinai Campaign.
↑ From an Intelligence perspective and according to CIA original operative, Miles Copeland, CIA's internal and external disagreements (with its British counterparts) of the impending Suez Crisis rendered it to be one of indecision by the western powers; Copeland described the discoordination with the British Intelligence at the time as "Our British counterparts were apparently in ignorance of what my CIA team had been doing in Cairo during the previous two years". And the only political move of Nasser that the CIA did not acknowledge preemptively (against Frank Wisner's insistences): "Secretary Dulles failed to understand rule number one: 'you can hardly win a game if you don't even know you're in one.' But a winning strategy can come to a sad end if it fails to take into account radical changes in the gameboard itself. Nasser used to say, 'I don't act; I only react.' That made it easy for us—what the hell, let's not mince words: made it easy for me. (one can be too self-effacing, you know.) Oh, yes, there was one move of Nasser's which Kim and I both failed to predict. When Secretary Dulles announced that we weren't going to help Nasser with his Aswan Dam, we were called to a meeting at the State Department to help figure out how he would react. There were many suggestions, but only Frank Wisner, our beloved boss, mentioned the possibility of Nasser's nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Kim and I both kicked him under the table (we loved Frank, and didn't want him to make a fool of himself), but he persisted as one or another of the State Department people sitting around the table explained to him, patronizingly, why such an action was unlikely. Well, as everybody now knows, Nasser did eventually nationalize the canal company (not the canal itself, as has been erroneously reported, but the company), and Frank called us to his office to crow. 'When you come', he said, 'would you please bring your notes on the State Department meeting.' Frank was in high I-told-you-so spirits—until he looked through the notes seeking a reference to his prediction. He couldn't find it! 'Don't you remember?' he said, his voice rising. 'I said two or three times how I thought Nasser might nationalize the canal company.' Kim looked at me; I looked at Kim. 'Frank, I don't remember you saying anything like that. Do you, Miles?' 'I didn't hear him,' I said to Kim, then to Frank, 'Are you sure you didn't just think about suggesting it? After all, it would have been a very prescient suggestion, but ...' 'You know I said it!' Frank kept insisting, but Kim and I, with bewildered looks on our faces, kept saying that we didn't remember. It was a dirty trick, and we've had guilty thoughts about it often, especially after Frank died of his own hand less than a year later after seeing his pet operation, the revolution in Hungary, go sour. I would like to go on record as saying that Frank Wisner unknown to most Americans, was a truly great man and a perfect boss. Stewart Alsop said that he 'died as much a victim of war as any soldier killed in battle', and his friends and underlings were 100 per cent in agreement."
"When nationalization of the Canal Company was announced, the British immediately took and held the initiatives. We played along with them despite our awareness that British intelligence, for all its superior competence throughout the rest of the Middle East, was grossly uninformed on all that had been going on inside the Nasser government and on the general situation in Egypt. In one of the what-to-do-about-Nasser meetings some of my CIA colleagues and I had with SIS officers a month or so before the Anglo—French—Israeli attack on Egypt, an officer showed me a highly secret document purporting to be a chart showing the organization of the Mukhabarat, the Egyptian intelligence service. I thought he was pulling my leg! It was the chart my BA&H colleagues and I had drawn up, translated from the Arabic into what we Americans liked to call 'Anglicized English'. The interesting part was the list of the section heads, all friends of mine, some of them misspelled, some without first names, and some entirely wrong due to faulty interpretation of footnotes. Our British counterparts were apparently in ignorance of what my CIA team had been doing in Cairo during the previous two years. What bothered us most, however, was the fact that the British weren't reacting at all like seasoned, cold-blooded gameplayers. Everything our colleagues in SIS and the Foreign Office said to us showed that they had no information that made any sense at all on which Egyptian officers or civilians might constitute a new government if Nasser were to be eliminated, or on the general situation inside Egypt. They were only guessing and making assumptions. And they didn't seem to care. They thought they should just get rid of Nasser, hang the practical consequences, just to show the world that an upstart like him couldn't get away with so ostentatiously twisting the lion's tail. It was as though a chess Grand Master, embarrassed at having been outmaneuvered by an opponent whom he considered an inferior player, wanted to kick over the table."[13]
↑ "As late as 1956 it was the middle class, not the working class, who opposed the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt".[215]
References
↑ A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. 2006. p.251. McGregor 2006, p.251
↑ Isacoff, Jonathan B. (2006). Writing the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Pragmatism and Historical Inquiry. Lexington Books. pp.79ff. ISBN978-0-7391-1273-1.
↑ Caplan, Neil (1983). Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956. Psychology Press. pp.15. ISBN978-0-7146-4757-9.
↑ Copeland, Miles (1989). The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's Original Political Operative. Aurum Press. pp.170–171, 201.
↑ Pierre, Major Jean-Marc (15 August 2014). 1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations. Tannenberg Publishing. ISBN978-1-7828-9608-1. Still in 1950 Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran barring Israel from the waterway ( Longgood 1958, xii-xiii).
↑ Golani, Motti (1995). "The Historical Place of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, Fall 1955". Middle Eastern Studies. 31 (4): 803–827. doi:10.1080/00263209508701081. ISSN0026-3206. JSTOR4283762. 3. The blockade of the Straits of Eilat (Tiran) had actually been in effect since 1948, but was significantly aggravated on 12 September 1955, when Egypt announced that it was being tightened and extended to the aerial sphere as well. (p. 805)
↑ Abernathy, David (2000). The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980. Yale University Press. p.CXXXIX. ISBN978-0-3000-9314-8.
↑ Owen, Roger (2001). Krieger, Joel (ed.). Suez Crisis. The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World (2nded.). Oxford University Press.[pageneeded]
↑ Christopher, Adam (2010). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives. University of Ottawa Press. p.37. ISBN978-0-7766-0705-4.
1 2 Darwin 1988, p. 207 "Nothing could have been better calculated to lash popular Muslim feeling to new fury ... and to redouble Egyptian hostility to Britain on whose 'betrayal' of the Palestine Arabs the catastrophe could easily be blamed."
1 2 3 Nasr, Kameel B. (1 December 1996). Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936–1993. McFarland. pp.39–40. ISBN978-0-7864-3105-2. Nasser was personally furious; the raid, using sophisticated weapons, had no provocation. Seeing that peace was impossible ... he also allowed Palestinians, who held sizeable demonstrations in Gaza and Cairo after the attack, to organize raids. ... These incursions paved the way for the 1956 Suez War...
↑ Alteras 1993, pp. 169 "Nasser's personal security and that of his government were at stake. Several times during the conversation Nasser mentioned the murder of King Abdullah."
↑ Podeh, Elie; Winckler, Onn (1 December 2004). Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. University Press of Florida. pp.105, 106. ISBN978-0-8130-3137-8. the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a book published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult.... The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader.... His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation. ... The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser's inclination to solitary decision making ... the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness
↑ Eayrs, James (1964). The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey. Oxford University Press.
↑ Morris, Benny (1993) Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War. Oxford University Press, ISBN0-19-827850-0. p. 408. "On 3 November, the day Khan Yunis was conquered, IDF troops shot dead hundreds of Palestinian refugees and local inhabitants in the town. One UN report speaks of 'some 135 local resident' and '140 refugees' killed as IDF troops moved through the town and its refugee camp 'searching for people in possession of arms'. In Rafah, which fell to the IDF on 1–2 November, Israeli troops killed between forty-eight and one hundred refugees and several local residents, and wounded another sixty-one during a massive screening operation on 12 November, in which they sought to identify former Egyptian and Palestinian soldiers and Fedayeen hiding among the local population.... Another sixty-six Palestinians, probably Fedayeen, were executed in a number of other incidents during screening operations in the Gaza Strip between 2 and 20 November.... The United Nations estimated that, all told, Israeli troops killed between 447 and 550 Arab civilians in the first three weeks of the occupation of the Strip."
↑ Neff 1981, p. 414. Quotes UN report: "thousands of wounded and dead bodies all over Sanai (sic)". Neff estimates 4000 Egyptians wounded and 6000 captured or missing in Sinai and a further 900 wounded by the Anglo-French.
↑ Harrison, Brian (2009). Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951–1970. Oxford University Press. pp.105, 112.
↑ Black, Lawrence (Autumn 2001). "'The Bitterest Enemies of Communism': Labour Revisionists, Atlanticism and the Cold War". Contemporary British History. 15 (3): 50–51. doi:10.1080/713999414.
↑ Barnett, Correlli (1972). The Collapse of British Power. London: Eyre Methuen. p.52, n. 2.
↑ Borhi, László (1999). "Containment, Rollback, Liberation or Inaction? The United States and Hungary in the 1950s". Journal of Cold War Studies. 1 (3): 67–108. doi:10.1162/152039799316976814. S2CID57560214.
↑ Divine, Robert (1981). Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.64–66.
↑ Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1995). Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967. Oxford: Berghahn Books. pp.241–242.
↑ Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1995). Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967. Oxford: Berghahn Books. p.242.
↑ Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1995). Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967. Oxford: Berghahn Books. p.244.
↑ Lucas, W. Scott (September 1991). Divided we Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis. Hodder. ISBN978-0-3405-3666-7. Cited in Kyle, Keith (25 February 1993). "Lacking in style". London Review of Books. Vol.15, no.4. ISSN0260-9592. Retrieved 17 March 2023.
↑ Pierre, Major Jean-Marc (15 August 2014). 1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations. Tannenberg Publishing. ISBN978-1-7828-9608-1. Still in 1950 Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran barring Israel from the waterway ( Longgood 1958, xii-xiii).
Barnett, Michael N. (1992). Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN978-0-6910-7883-0.
Bromberger, Merry and Serge Secrets of Suez Sidgwick & Jackson London 1957 (translated from French Les Secrets de l'Expedition d'Egypte by James Cameron)
Burns, William J. (1985). Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN978-0-8739-5868-4.
Butler, L. J. (2002). Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN978-1-8606-4449-8.
Darwin, John (1988). Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat From Empire in the Post-War World. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-3332-9258-7.
Laskier, Michael M. (1995). "Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime, 1956–70". Middle Eastern Studies. 31 (3): 573–619. doi:10.1080/00263209508701070. JSTOR4283743.
Love, Kenneth (1969). Suez The Twice Fought War. McGraw-Hill.
Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN978-0-6714-1010-0.
Pearson, Jonathan. (2002) Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Springer, 2002). online
Thornhill, M. T. (1 September 2004). "Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser's Consolidation of Power, 1952-4". The English Historical Review. 119 (483): 892–921. doi:10.1093/ehr/119.483.892. ISSN0013-8266.
Turner, Barry (2006). Suez 1956 The World's First War for Oil. London: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN978-0-3408-3768-9.
Troen, S. Ilan. "The Protocol of Sèvres: British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956." Israel Studies 1.2 (1996): 122-139 online.
Verbeek, Bertjan (2003). Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing. ISBN978-0-7546-3253-5.
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Suez Crisis.
Blue Vanguard (1957), National Film Board of Canada film for the United Nations about its role in restoring peace after the Suez Crisis (60 min, Ian MacNeill, dir.)
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