Assadism

Not to be confused with Neo-Ba'athism.

Hafez al-Assad giving a speech.

The Assad family, c. 1993.

Assadism is a far-left ^[1] variant of the neo-Ba'athist ideology based on the policies and thinking of the Assad family, which governed Syria as a totalitarian hereditary dictatorship from 1971 to 2024. ^{[2] [3]} This period spanned the successive regimes of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad. The Assads rose to power as a result of the 1970 Syrian coup d'état, leading to the consolidation of Alawite minority dominance within the military and security forces. Their governance was largely characterized by nepotism, sectarianism, and ethnic favoritism. ^[4] The ideology enshrines the Assad family's leadership role in Syrian politics and presented the Assad regime in a very personalist fashion, creating a government based upon and revolving around its leader. Under this system, the Syrian Ba'ath Party portrayed the wisdom of Assad as "beyond the comprehension of the average citizen." ^[5] Syrian state propaganda cast Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era. ^[6]

The Assad family cultivated extensive patronage networks, securing loyalty while monopolizing vast portions of the Syrian economy and fostering widespread corruption. ^[7] The Syrian Ba'ath party used its control over Syria's political, social, economic, cultural, educational and religious spheres to enforce its neo-Ba'athist ideology in the wider society and preserve the Assad family's grip on power. Hafez al-Assad's goal upon coming to power was to consolidate the socialist state with the Ba'ath party as its vanguard by establishing a "coup-proof" system that eliminated factional rivalries. As soon as he seized power, the armed forces, secret police, security forces, and bureaucracy were purged, subjugating them to party command by installing Alawite elites loyal to Assad. ^{[8] [9]} To maintain control, although Assadism initially attempted to solve problems within the country through political maneuvering in 1970s, by the early 1980s the regime had shifted toward the use of brute force and relentless oppression, exemplified by the Hama massacre in 1982 and the several sectarian massacres over the course of the Syrian civil war since 2011. ^[10] Following the fall of the Assad regime in 2024 due to a renewed Syrian opposition offensive amid the civil war, Assadists loyal to the former regime have engaged in a violent insurgency across Alawite strongholds in western Syria. ^[11]

Jamal al-Atassi, co-founder of Zaki al-Arsuzi's early Arab Ba'ath Party and later Syrian dissident, stated that "Assadism is a false nationalism. It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and the mukhabarat ... And despite its socialist slogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—a nouvelle bourgeoisie parasitaire." ^[12] The Assad family aligned itself with Iran and its Axis of Resistance for much of its rule, contributing to an inter-Ba'athist rivalry with the Sunni-dominated Saddamist Ba'ath Party in Iraq. ^[13]

History

Pre-1970

Prior to Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in 1970, the neo-Ba'athist movement in Syria had been dominated by strongman Salah Jadid, who came to power after a successful coup in 1966. Tensions between Jadid and Assad increased following the Six-Day War in 1967 and invasion of Jordan in 1970. Hafez al-Assad took advantage of his control over the military to dismantle Jadid's support network, before carrying out a coup and imprisoning Jadid and then Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi. ^[14]

After 1970

Assad visiting a military camp near Damascus, 1978.

After Assad seized power, the ideology of neo-Ba'athism transformed into Assadism, with even greater nationalism, militarism and the now established cult of personality of the Assad family. Assadism is very different from the ideas propagated by the original leaders of the Ba'athist movement, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, which caused them great dissatisfaction with such an ideological transformation. ^{[15] [16]}

Hafez al-Assad's reign was marked by the virtual abandonment of Pan-Arab ideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructing socialist society within Syria. ^[17] Political participation was limited to the National Progressive Front, the ruling coalition of Syrian Baath and Marxist–Leninist parties; entrenching itself firmly within the Soviet Bloc. The Party also began building a personality cult around Assad and brought the elite of the armed forces under Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed with Alawite loyalists, further alienating the Sunni majority from the party. ^[18]

Syrian female students learn how to assemble and disassemble weapons, 1973.

The Ba'athists initially pursued a very militaristic policy aimed at some kind of "mobilization of the nation to fight against the Israeli enemy." But under Assad, militarism reached new heights. Following the Syrian loss during the Six-Day War with Israel, Hafez initiated a huge expansion of the military to achieve military parity with Israel. Assad gave a high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union. ^[19] The Syrian Arab Army, which was mainly a conscripted force, increased from 50,000 personnel in 1967 to 225,000 in 1973, and to over 350,000 by the 1990s.

In 1973, Syria, together with Egypt, launched an almost successful war against Israel: despite facing stiffer resistance than their Egyptian allies, the Syrian army was able to break through the Israeli defenses. ^[20] However, due to the lack of coordination and the Egyptian operational pause from October 7 to 14, Syria faced the full fury of the Israeli forces (who learned of Egypt's modest strategy) and were forced to retreat. ^{[21] [22]} Israel again invaded Syrian territory, the Bashan region, hoping to reach Damascus. However, Syria was able to stop its advance and a war of attrition began, which lasted until May 1974, when Syria signed a disengagement agreement. Although Syria did not liberate the Golan Heights, its army was not defeated, which earned Assad respect inside Syria and abroad. ^[23]

Bitterness towards the Assadist regime and the Alawite elite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of an Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders of Muslim Brotherhood like Issam al-Attar were imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunni ulema , Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries and Islamist activists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad through Jihad and establishing an Islamic state. In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in its war with Iraq and controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups into Lebanon and Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledged Islamist rebellion in 1982; led by the Islamic Front. The regime responded by slaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hama and Aleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and the Muslim Brotherhood armed movement was demolished. ^[24] After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, repealing liberalization introduced when Assad came to power. ^[25]

Ideology's tenets

Syrian women students in military uniform marching, 1973.

The Assadist regime was characterized by a very large-scale militarization of the entire Syrian society (both men and women, as can be seen from the military parades held in Syria) and a highly militaristic propaganda in the media and education system, mixed with the personality cult of Hafez al-Assad (and later Bashar). Even if a person has not yet served in the army and is a student, he will eventually receive some military training, such as assembling weapons, in a schools, run by Assadist youth organizations (such as the Revolutionary Youth Union), membership in which was mandatory. ^{[26] [27]} Organizations like the RYU also carried out intensive ideological training and spread of Assadist ideas in schools, helping to create "ideologically correct" youth. School students also were taught Ba'athism and Assadism through a course known as "Political Arab Sociology". ^[28] The degree of Assadist's militarism of was indecently high: Syria's air force and tank fleets were not much smaller (if not larger) than those of large European countries. In 1979, Syria was one of the four largest arms importers in the world (between 1961 and 1979, it imported weapons worth $7.4 billion, one of the highest figures). ^[29] According to the Constitution of Syria of 1973, Chapter 3: Educational and Cultural Principles, Article 21, it is written:

Syrian female students in military uniform during a military ceremony of the RYU, 1980s.

The educational and cultural system aims at creating a socialist nationalist Arab generation which is scientifically minded and attached to its history and land, proud of its heritage, and filled with the spirit of struggle to achieve its nation's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism, and to serve humanity and its progress. ^[30]

Assadist propaganda outside of schools was also very strong and all-encompassing. In fact, the personality cult and ideas of Hafez al-Assad were everywhere: in society, in schools, in the media, in public places and most other places in Syria. Describing Assadism as a quasi-religion fostered by the Ba'athist state for mobilising the fealty and adulation of Syrian citizens, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Bonn International Centre Dr. Esther Meininghaus wrote:

"by drawing on religion, the Assad regime successfully sought to promote a value system ultimately rooted in the Baʿthist vision for Syrian society .... To this, we can indeed add the cult surrounding Presidents Hafez and Bashar al-Asad, whose pictures are displayed not only in public buildings and schools but taxis and shops, or ceremonies such as mass parades and/or the playing of the national anthem during official celebrations. Also, official rhetoric has become increasingly infused with transcendental and metaphysical elements, in particular with regard to the President's personality cult. For instance, the President is addressed as the 'Eternal Leader' who will guide his people to becoming the 'true' Arab nation. The recent slogan of 'Bashar, Allah, Suriyya wa-bas' (Bashar, God, and Syria – that's it) possibly best epitomises how close the regime has come to creating a Syrian public religion in its own right. Whether the outward performance of 'regime rituals' was actually fully internalised or secretly mocked, it had to be practised and obeyed." ^[31]

References

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   • I. Dawisha, Adeed (1980). "3: External and Internal Setting". Syria and the Lebanese Crisis. London, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 45. ISBN   978-1-349-05373-5. The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
   • The Israel Economist. Vol. 26–27. University of Minnesota: Kollek & Son, Limited. 1970. p. 61. The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
   • Abadi, Jacob (2004). Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy. London, UK: Frank Class Publishers. p. 22. ISBN   0-7146-5576-7. radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
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   • Hopwood, Derek (2013). Syria 1945–1986: Politics and Society. Routledge. pp. 45–46, 73–75, 90. doi:10.4324/9781315818955. ISBN   9781317818427. The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis ... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
   • Phillips, Christopher (2020). The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East. London, UK: Yale University Press. p. 11. ISBN   978-0-300-21717-9. In 1963 ... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
   • Mikhaĭlovich Vasil'ev, Alekseĭ (1993). Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. University of Michigan, USA: Ithaca Press. pp. 63, 76. ISBN   978-0863721687. Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy ... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union ... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
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Sources

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