Authoritarianism

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Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. [1] Political scientists have created many typologies describing variations of authoritarian forms of government. [1] Authoritarian regimes may be either autocratic or oligarchic in nature, and may be based upon the rule of a party or the military. [2] [3]

Contents

In an influential 1964 work, [4] the political scientist Juan Linz defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:

  1. Limited political pluralism, realized with constraints on the legislature, political parties, and interest groups;
  2. Political legitimacy based upon appeals to emotion, and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment, and insurgency";
  3. Minimal political mobilization and suppression of anti-regime activities;
  4. Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, which extends the power of the executive. [5] [6]

Minimally defined, an authoritarian government lacks free and competitive direct elections to legislatures, free and competitive direct or indirect elections for executives, or both. [7] Broadly defined, authoritarian states include countries that lack the civil liberties such as freedom of religion, or countries in which the government and the opposition do not alternate in power at least once following free elections. [8] Authoritarian states might contain nominally democratic institutions, such as political parties, legislatures and elections, which are managed to entrench authoritarian rule; thus, a dictatorship can feature fraudulent, non-competitive elections. [9] Since 1946, the share of authoritarian states in the international political system increased until the mid-1970s, but declined from then until the year 2000. [10]

Characteristics

In general

Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime. [11] Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity". [12] Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition. [11] A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society, while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination. [11] Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a one-party state) or other authority. [11] The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization. [11]

Systemic weakness and resilience

Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms....Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions". [13] Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands, and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse. [11] One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors: (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large". [13]

Institutions

Within authoritarian systems, there may be nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures and elections, but the are managed in a way so as to entrench authoritarian regimes. Within democracies, parties serve to coordinate the pursuit of interests for like-minded citizens, whereas in authoritarian systems, they are a way for authoritarian leaders to find capable elites for the regime. In a democracy, a legislature is intended to represent the diversity of interests among citizens, whereas authoritarians use legislatures to signal their own restraint towards other elites, as well as to monitor other elites who pose a challenge to the regime. Fraudulent elections may serve the role of signaling the strength of the regime, as well as force other elites to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, whereas in democracies, free and fair elections are used to select representatives who represent the will of the citizens. [9]

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes

Authoritarian regimes often adopt "the institutional trappings" of democracies, such as constitutions. [14] Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function); "billboard" (signal of regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice). [15] Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes. [16] For example, an authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting re coordination on a different set of arrangements." [17] Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior. [18]

The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet. [19] Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power). [19] He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritarian dominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permits "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections," without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail—and by a substantial margin"; (4) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (5) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." [19] Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalism state, and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes. [19]

Violence

Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses. [20]

Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as "coup-proofing" – structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another. [21] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring. [22] [23] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness, [24] [25] [26] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract. [27] A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts. [28] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting. [28] According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region. [29] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories. [30] A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders. [31] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler." [32]

According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship. [33]

Manipulation of information

According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy. [34]

Interactions with other elites and the masses

The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts. [20] [35]

Economy

Scholars such as Seymour Lipset, [36] Carles Boix, Susan Stokes, [37] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens [38] argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy). [39] Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances, the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances. [40] Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term. [41]

Typologies

Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others. [42] Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:

Subtypes of authoritarian regime identified by Linz are: corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian. [42]

Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist. [42] Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules". [42] Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups". [42] Examples include Argentina under Perón, [42] Egypt under Nasser [42] and Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro. [44] [45]

A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories: machine (oligarchic party dictatorships); bossism (autocratic party dictatorships); juntas (oligarchic military dictatorships); and strongman (autocratic military dictatorships). [3] Lai and Slater argue that single‐party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g., mass mobilization, patronage networks, coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control, as compared to single‐party regimes. [3] [2]

John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism. [46] Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities. [47]

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism

Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support. [48] Totalitarianism is an extreme version of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart: [49]

TotalitarianismAuthoritarianism
Charisma HighLow
Role conceptionLeader as functionLeader as individual
Ends of powerPublicPrivate
Corruption LowHigh
Official ideology YesNo
Limited pluralism NoYes
LegitimacyYesNo

Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in "key dichotomies":

(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.

(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.

(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy. [49]

Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it". [50] Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature". [50] Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies. [50]

Competitive authoritarian regimes

Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents." [51] [52] The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War. [51] [53] Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment, and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power." [51] However, competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies: free elections (i.e., elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e., the freedom of speech, press, and association), and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media, and legal recourse). [54]

Authoritarianism and democracy

Authoritarianism and democracy are not fundamentally opposed to one another, as it is possible for democracies to possess authoritarian elements. [55] An illiberal democracy (or procedural democracy) is distinguished from liberal democracy (or substantive democracy) in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups and an independent judiciary. [56]

A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars. [57] [58]

Some commentators, such as Seymour Martin Lipset, believed that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies, helping authoritarian regimes generate development. [59] Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) counter this belief, arguing that the evidence has shown that there is no "authoritarian advantage" and that there is a "democratic advantage" instead. [59] Halperin et al. argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism. They point out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable. [59] Halperin point out that the vast majority of refugee crises and financial catastrophes occur in authoritarian regimes. [59]

Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality. [60] Prominent economist Amartya Sen has theorized that no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine. [61]

Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies. [62] Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption. [63] A study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least amount of terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism." [64]

Examples

There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted, including Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report.

Current

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which are currently (or frequently) characterized as authoritarian:

Historical

Examples of states which were historically authoritarian include the following:

StateTime periodRuling group or personNotes
Flag of Algeria.svg  Algeria [135] 1999–2019 Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Flag of Argentina.svg  Argentina [136] [137] 1966–1973Military government Argentine Revolution period of military rule
1973–1974 Justicialista rule of Juan Perón Ideology is populist authoritarianism
1976–1983 Free trade and deregulatory rule of Jorge Rafael Videla National Reorganization Process period of military rule
Flag of Brazil (1889-1960).svg Brazil [138] 1937–1945 Getúlio Vargas Estado Novo period
1964–1985 Military government
Flag of Myanmar (1974-2010).svg Burma [139] 19622011 Military government and Socialist Programme Party
Flag of Chile.svg  Chile [140] 1973–1990 Augusto Pinochet
Flag of Croatia.svg  Croatia [141] [142] 1990–1999 Franjo Tuđman
Flag of the Czech Republic.svg  Czechoslovakia 1938–1939 Party of National Unity
Flag of Egypt.svg  Egypt [143] 1952–2011 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak
Flag of Hungary (1915-1918, 1919-1946).svg  Hungary [144] 1920–1944 Miklós Horthy, Unity Party
Flag of Indonesia.svg  Indonesia 1967–1998 Suharto New Order
Flag of Libya (1977-2011).svg Libya [145] 1969–2011 Muammar Gaddafi
Flag of Lithuania.svg  Lithuania [146] 1926–1940 Antanas Smetona
Flag of North Macedonia.svg  FYR Macedonia [147] [148] 2006–2016 Nikola Gruevski
Flag of Portugal.svg  Portugal [149] 1926–1933Military government National Dictatorship
1933–1974 António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano Under the Estado Novo regime
Flag of Spain (1945 - 1977).svg Spain [150] 1936–1975 Francisco Franco
Flag of South Africa (1928-1994).svg South Africa [151] [152] 1948–1994 National Party Regime ended with the end of apartheid
Flag of South Korea.svg  South Korea [153] [154] 1948–1960 Syngman Rhee
1962–1987 Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan
Flag of Sudan.svg  Sudan [78] 1989–2019 Omar al-Bashir
Flag of the Republic of China.svg  Taiwan [155] 1948–1986 Kuomintang
Flag of Turkey.svg  Turkey [156] [157] 1925–1945 Republican People's Party
Flag of Yugoslavia (1946-1992).svg  Yugoslavia [158] [159] 1944–1980 Josip Broz Tito
Flag of Serbia and Montenegro (1992-2006).svg  FR Yugoslavia [160] [161] 1991–2000 Slobodan Milošević
Flag of Zimbabwe.svg  Zimbabwe [162] 1980–2017 Robert Mugabe

Anti-authoritarianism

Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.

World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers — Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan — had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, for example, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government (at least not at first). [163]

Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers. [164] Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s, [165] the hippies in the 1960s [166] and punks in the 1970s. [167]

In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990. [168]

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated. [169] The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed", [170] became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man . [170] According to Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving toward democracy in the early 1990s," as where the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans. [171]

In late 2010, the "Arab Spring" arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia [172] [173] and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and partially in Yemen, and other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies. [174]

Authoritarian revival

From 2005 to 2015 observers noted what some called a "democratic recession" [170] [175] (although some — Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way — have disputed this theory). [175] In 2018 Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018, "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement." [176]

Writing in 2018, U.S. political journalist David Frum stated:

The hopeful world of the very late 20th century—the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela—now looks battered and delusive." [177]

Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment", [170] and Fukuyama himself expressed concern. [169] By 2018 only one Arab Spring uprising — in Tunisia — resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance, [174] and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region [178] was dubbed the "Arab Winter". [179] [180] [181] [182] [183]

Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism, including the downside of globalization, [184] and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China. [185] In at least one country, (the U.S.) factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the Financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth; [186] and social media's elimination of "gatekeepers" of knowledge, so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts” – everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination. [187]

See also

Notes

  1. 1 2 Furio Cerutti (2017). Conceptualizing Politics: An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Routledge. p. 17. Political scientists have outlined elaborated typologies of authoritarianism, from which it is not easy to draw a generally accepted definition; it seems that its main features are the non-acceptance of conflict and plurality as normal elements of politics, the will to preserve the status quo and prevent change by keeping all political dynamics under close control by a strong central power, and lastly, the erosion of the rule of law, the division of powers, and democratic voting procedures.
  2. 1 2 Natasha M. Ezrow & Erica Frantz (2011). Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. Continuum. p. 17.
  3. 1 2 3 Brian Lai & Dan Slater (2006). "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992". American Journal of Political Science. 50 (1): 113–126. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x. JSTOR   3694260.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
  4. Richard Shorten, Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 256 (note 67): "For a long time the authoritative definition of authoritarianism was that of Juan J. Linz."
  5. Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society), pp. 291-342. Reprinted in Erik Allardt & Stine Rokkan, eds., Mas Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp.251-83, 374-81.
  6. Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), pp. 40–50 (citing Linz 1964).
  7. Milan W. Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 22–23. I follow Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) in defining a dictatorship as an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems. Throughout this book, I use the terms dictatorship and authoritarian regime interchangeably and refer to the heads of these regimes' governments as simply dictators or authoritarian leaders, regardless of their formal title.
  8. Milan W. Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. p. 20. More demanding criteria may require that governments respect certain civil liberties such as the freedom of religion (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Zakaria 1997) or that the incumbent government and the opposition alternate in power at least once after the first seemingly free election (Huntington 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibib et al. 2010).
  9. 1 2 Milan W. Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 8, 12, 22, 25, 88, 117.
  10. Milan W. Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. p. 25.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Theodore M. Vesta, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State . Greenwood, 1999, p. 17.
  12. Przeworski, Adam (1991-07-26). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America . Cambridge University Press. p.  58. ISBN   9780521423359.
  13. 1 2 Andrew J. Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience", Journal of Democracy, 14.1 (2003), pp. 6–17.
  14. Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, "The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions," in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80.
  15. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 3-10.
  16. Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 54.
  17. Davis S. Law & Mila Versteeg, "Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism" in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 173.
  18. Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 54, 80.
  19. 1 2 3 4 Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 100, Issue 2 (January 2015).
  20. 1 2 Milan W. Svolik (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 2, 15, 23.
  21. Quinlivan, James T. (1999). "Coup-Proofing". RAND Corporation.
  22. Powell, Jonathan (1 December 2012). "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 56 (6): 1017–1040. doi:10.1177/0022002712445732. ISSN   0022-0027.
  23. Braithwaite, Jessica Maves; Sudduth, Jun Koga (1 January 2016). "Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict". Research & Politics. 3 (1): 2053168016630730. doi:10.1177/2053168016630730. ISSN   2053-1680.
  24. Narang, Vipin; Talmadge, Caitlin (31 January 2017). "Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (7): 1379–1405. doi:10.1177/0022002716684627.
  25. Brown, Cameron S.; Fariss, Christopher J.; McMahon, R. Blake (1 January 2016). "Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution". International Interactions. 42 (1): 1–30. doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598. ISSN   0305-0629.(subscription required)
  26. Bausch, Andrew W. (3 February 2017). "Coup-proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment". International Interactions. 0 (ja): 1–32. doi:10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938. ISSN   0305-0629.
  27. Leon, Gabriel (1 April 2014). "Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military's role in politics". Oxford Economic Papers. 66 (2): 533–556. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.1000.7058 . doi:10.1093/oep/gpt024. ISSN   0030-7653.
  28. 1 2 Frantz, Erica; Stein, Elizabeth A. (4 July 2016). "Countering Coups Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships". Comparative Political Studies. 50 (7): 935–962. doi:10.1177/0010414016655538. ISSN   0010-4140.
  29. Curtis Bell & Jonathan Powell (30 July 2016). "Will Turkey's coup attempt prompt others nearby?". Washington Post.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
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Works cited

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Dictatorship form of autocratic government led by a single individual

A dictatorship is an authoritarian form of government, characterized by a single leader or group of leaders and little or no toleration for political pluralism or independent programs or media. According to other definitions, democracies are regimes in which "those who govern are selected through contested elections"; therefore dictatorships are "not democracies". With the advent of the 19th and 20th centuries, dictatorships and constitutional democracies emerged as the world's two major forms of government, gradually eliminating monarchies, one of the traditional widespread forms of government of the time. Typically, in a dictatorial regime, the leader of the country is identified with the title of dictator, although their formal title may more closely resemble something similar to "leader". A common aspect that characterized dictatorship is taking advantage of their strong personality, usually by suppressing freedom of thought and speech of the masses, in order to maintain complete political and social supremacy and stability. Dictatorships and totalitarian societies generally employ political propaganda to decrease the influence of proponents of alternative governing systems.

An autocracy is a system of government in which a single person or party possesses supreme and absolute power. The decisions of this autocrat are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control. Absolute monarchies and dictatorships are the main modern-day forms of autocracy.

The Kirkpatrick Doctrine was the doctrine expounded by United States Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick in the early 1980s based on her 1979 essay, "Dictatorships and Double Standards". The doctrine was used to justify the U.S. foreign policy of supporting Third World anti-communist dictatorships during the Cold War.

A military junta is a government led committee of military leaders. The term junta means "meeting" or "committee" and originated in the national and local junta organized by the Spanish resistance to Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808. The term is now used to refer to an authoritarian form of government characterized by oligarchic military dictatorship, as distinguished from other categories of authoritarian rule, specifically strongman ; machine ; and bossism.

Democratization is the transition to a more democratic political regime, including substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction. It may be the transition from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, a transition from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy or transition from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system.

An illiberal democracy, also called a partial democracy, low intensity democracy, empty democracy, hybrid regime or guided democracy, is a governing system in which although elections take place, citizens are cut off from knowledge about the activities of those who exercise real power because of the lack of civil liberties; thus it is not an "open society". There are many countries "that are categorized as neither 'free' nor 'not free', but as 'probably free', falling somewhere between democratic and nondemocratic regimes". This may be because a constitution limiting government powers exists, but those in power ignore its liberties, or because an adequate legal constitutional framework of liberties does not exist.

Military dictatorship in Brazil 1964-1985 military regime in Brazil

The Brazilian military government, also known in Brazil as the Fifth Brazilian Republic, was the authoritarian military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1 April 1964 to 15 March 1985. It began with the 1964 coup d'état led by the Armed Forces against the administration of President João Goulart—who, having been vice-president, had assumed the office of president upon the resignation of the democratically elected president Jânio Quadros—and ended when José Sarney took office on 15 March 1985 as President. The military revolt was fomented by Magalhães Pinto, Adhemar de Barros, and Carlos Lacerda, then governors of the states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Guanabara, respectively. The coup was planned and executed by the most forefront commanders of the Brazilian Army and received the support of almost all high-ranking members of the military, along with conservative elements in society, like the Catholic Church and anti-communists civil movements among the Brazilian middle and upper classes. Internationally, it was supported by the State Department of the United States through its embassy in Brasilia.

Democracy in China was introduced in the late 19th century. The debate over its definition and application was one of the major ideological battlegrounds in Chinese politics for over a century.

National Democratic Party (Egypt) former political party in Egypt

The National Democratic Party, often simply called in Arabic: الحزب الوطني‎ Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭaniy – the "National Party", was an Centrist political party in Egypt. It was founded by President Anwar El Sadat in 1978.

A strongman is a type of authoritarian political leader. Political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater identify strongman rule as a form of authoritarian rule characterized by autocratic military dictatorships, as distinct from three other categories of authoritarian rule, specifically machine ; bossism, and juntas.

Democratic consolidation is the process by which a new democracy matures, in a way that means it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock. The notion is contested because it is not clear that there is anything substantive that happens to new democracies that secures their continuation beyond those factors that simply make it 'more likely' that they continue as democracies. Unconsolidated democracies suffer from formalized but intermittent elections and clientelism.

Defective democracies are democracies with certain defects. The concept was proposed by the political scientists Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Aurel S. Croissant at the beginning of the 21st century to subtilize the usual distinction of totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic political systems. It is based on the concept of embedded democracies. There are 4 different forms of defective democracies each varying with specifics of what makes said democracies defective. How each nation reaches the point of being a defective democracy varies on a case by case basis but with many common themes. One recurring theme which has a major impact on the nation’s democracy is the geographical location of the nation. This can have a major impact due to surrounding nations and their influence they can have over other nations in the region. Other causes for defective democracies are: Path of modernization, Level of modernization, Economic trends, Social Capital, Civil Society, Political Institutions, Education.

Coup d├ętat Sudden deposition of a government

A coup d'état, also known simply as a coup, or an overthrow, is the overthrow of an existing government by non-democratic means; typically, it is an illegal, unconstitutional seizure of power by a dictator, the military, or a political faction. A coup d'état is considered successful when the usurpers seize and hold power for at least seven days.

Civic-military dictatorship of Uruguay 1973-1985 military regime in Uruguay

The civic-military dictatorship of Uruguay (1973–85), also known as the Uruguayan Dictatorship, was an authoritarian military dictatorship that ruled Uruguay for 12 years, from June 27, 1973 until February 28, 1985. The dictatorship has been the subject of much controversy due to its violations of human rights, use of torture, and the unexplained disappearances of many Uruguayans. The term "civic-military" refers to the military regime's initial use of a relatively powerless civilian president as the head of state, which distinguished it from dictatorships in other South American countries in which senior military officers immediately seized power and directly served as head of state.

Types of democracy refers to pluralism of governing structures such as governments and other constructs like workplaces, families, community associations, and so forth. Types of democracy can cluster around values. For example, some like direct democracy, electronic democracy, participatory democracy, real democracy, deliberative democracy, and pure democracy strive to allow people to participate equally and directly in protest, discussion, decision-making, or other acts of politics. Different types of democracy - like representative democracy - strive for indirect participation as this procedural approach to collective self-governance is still widely considered the only means for the more or less stable democratic functioning of mass societies. Types of democracy can be found across time, space, and language. In the English language the noun "democracy" has been modified by 2,234 adjectives. These adjectival pairings, like atomic democracy or Zulu democracy, act as signal words that point not only to specific meanings of democracy but to groups, or families, of meaning as well.

Anocracy is a form of government loosely defined as part democracy and part dictatorship, or as a "regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features". Another definition classifies anocracy as "a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition group behavior but that has incomplete development of mechanisms to redress grievances". Scholars have also distinguished anocracies from autocracies and democracies in their capability to maintain authority, political dynamics, and policy agendas. Similarly, these regime types have democratic institutions that allow for nominal amounts of competition.

A hybrid regime is a mixed type of political regime that arises on the basis of an authoritarian as a result of an incomplete democratic transition. Hybrid regimes combine autocratic features with democratic ones, they can simultaneously hold political repressions and regular elections. The term “hybrid regime” arises from a polymorphic view of political regimes that opposes the dichotomy of autocracy or democracy. Hybrid regimes are characteristic of resource countries (petro-states). Such regimes are stable and tenacious.

Embedded democracy

Embedded democracy is a form of government in which democratic governance is secured by democratic partial regimes. The term "embedded democracy" was coined by political scientists Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, and Aurel Croissant, who identified "five interdependent partial regimes" necessary for an embedded democracy: electoral regime, political participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the power of the elected representatives to govern. The five internal regimes work together to check the power of the government, while external regimes also help to secure and stabilize embedded democracies. Together, all the regimes ensure that an embedded democracy is guided by the three fundamental principles of freedom, equality, and control.

In political science, democratic backsliding, also known as democratic erosion or de-democratization, is a gradual decline in the quality of democracy. This decline is caused by the state-led weakening of political institutions that sustain the democratic system. These essential components of democracy can be threatened in different ways. Thus, the concept of democratic backsliding can take various forms.