Chinaportal |
The succession of power in China since 1949 takes place in the context of a one-party state under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [1] Despite the guarantee of universal franchise in the constitution, the appointment of the Paramount leader lies largely in the hands of his predecessor and the powerful factions that control the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The appointment of the leader occurred after two five year terms in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China from 1982 to 2018. [2] This was changed to unlimited terms during the first plenary session of the 13th National People's Congress in March 2018.
In October 2022, Xi Jinping was re-elected as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for a precedent-breaking third term of paramount leader after Mao Zedong's death. [3]
The paramount leader (supreme leader) of China holds these three official titles:
In the past it was possible for the Paramount leader to wield absolute power without holding any of the highest offices. This was the case with Deng Xiaoping who was the undisputed leader from 1978 to 1989 without holding any of the highest offices of party and state. Since his retirement, power has become more structured with the leader holding all three of the previously mentioned offices.
The concept of Paramount leader was instituted during the era of Mao Zedong who was Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party for life. The position was further established under Deng Xiaoping, however the term Paramount leader has not been officially attributed to any other leaders. Since the retirement of Deng Xiaoping by resigning from Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party in 1989, political power in China has been held collectively by the members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The General Secretary may be best described as primus inter pares, first among equals. Because the proceedings of this body are considered a state secret, the inner workings of Politburo are not made public. It is clear, however, that decision making has become consensus driven and that no single figure can any longer act unilaterally as in the days of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. [4]
Constitutional power in the People's Republic of China is held by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCPC). Although this group of approximately 300 members does not have power in the same way as a traditional legislative body, the most important and senior officials of the Chinese government are all members.
Within the CCCPC is the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. This body is a group of 25 individuals (currently 24 men and one woman) who govern the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Theoretically, the Politburo is elected by the CCCPC; however, in practice any new member of the Politburo is chosen by the current members. Politburo members hold positions in China's national government and regional positions of power simultaneously thereby consolidating the CCP's power.
In the case of key policy decisions, topics are addressed in the Politburo which then determines actions to be taken by the national and local government. The policy direction for the entire country rests in the hands of these 25 individuals who meet together once a month. Admission into the Politburo is extremely difficult. Tight control over the body is exercised by current members who vet potential members carefully to maintain the balance of power. Good political relationships within the Politburo are essential for admittance into the group. All members of the Politburo are elected for five year terms. [5]
Power within the Politburo is further concentrated in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This group of seven members meets together weekly and is led by the General Secretary. [5]
Executive leadership in the PRC is elected through a process that can best be described as an indirect election. In this system, only one candidate stands for the election of any given position. Although other candidates cannot run formally, write-in candidates are permitted. In 2013, when the 12th National People's Congress elected CCP general secretary Xi Jinping as president, 2952 members voted in favour and one against, with three abstentions. Similarly, in the 2008 election, Hu Jintao, then-General Secretary, President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, were re-elected by a landslide. Of the 2985 members of the 11th National People's Congress, only 3 voted against Hu Jintao, with another 5 abstaining.
In practical terms, the National Congress provides a rubber stamp on a decision that is made by the Politburo and the Standing Committee.[ citation needed ] The transition of leadership can take several months. For instance, when Hu Jintao took over power from Jiang Zemin, the transition of power stretched out almost two years. Listed below are the dates on which Hu was appointed to each office:
Usually the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission is the last office handed over by the previous leader, in order to secure political influence and ensure political continuity.[ citation needed ]
Appointments to key offices are the best predictor of whom the next leader will be. The office of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) is seen by many as the last stop before becoming the top leader of China. Appointment to Vice Chairman position is so crucial that when Xi Jinping, the current CCP General Secretary, failed to achieve that office at the 4th Plenum in 2009, many analysts suggested that he had fallen from favor and would not be the next Chinese leader. His ultimate appointment to Vice Chairman of the CMC was seen as evidence that he had begun to consolidate his power and would ultimately succeed Hu Jintao when his term expired in 2012 at the 18th Party Congress. [32]
Absent a transparent electoral process, the appointment to key positions is the only way to predict future leadership in China. Note in the table below, the path that Xi Jinping followed from a low-level party official at the age of 30 to his current position of the leader of the most populous country in the world.
Xi Jinping's Corresponding Political and Military Postings, 1983–2007
Years | Political Position | Military Position |
---|---|---|
1983-85 | First secretary, Zhengding County, Hebei Province party committee | First political commissar and first secretary of the Party committee of People's Armed Forces Department of Zhengding County, Hebei Province |
1988-90 | Secretary of the CCP Ningde Prefectural Committee, Fujian Province | First secretary of the Party committee of Ningde Sub-Military Area Command |
1990-93 | Secretary of the CCP Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command |
1995-96 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CCP Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command |
1996-99 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee | First political commissar of the anti-aircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
1999-2000 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee and acting governor of Fujian Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
2000-02 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee and governor of Fujian Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
2002 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang provincial commission for national defense mobilization |
2002-03 | Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province | First secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang provincial commission for national defense mobilization |
2003-07 | Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command |
2007 | Secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee | First secretary of the Party committee of Shanghai Garrison |
As long as the Chinese government remains secretive about the inner workings of the CCP Politburo, past behavior will continue to be the most effective tool for predicting future appointments. In this context, the appointment of a candidate to key offices is still the best indicator of their future role. For example, the appointment of Xi Jinping as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party signposted with a reasonable amount of confidence that he would be the next top leader of the People's Republic of China.
The sixth generation of leaders had been expected to come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. However, following Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at the 19th Party Congress, the future of the "sixth generation" was cast into doubt as clear successor figures failed to be named to senior leadership posts, particularly the Politburo Standing Committee.[ citation needed ] Xi Jinping was re-elected as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022.
In preceding years, Hu Chunhua (a Vice-Premier from 2018 to 2023) was seen[ by whom? ] as a possible core figure.[ citation needed ] Hu and Sun Zhengcai were the only Politburo members named at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 who were born after 1960, making their further advancement seem like a certainty, but Sun was purged before the 19th Party Congress and Hu was dropped from the Politburo at the 20th.[ citation needed ] U.S.-based newspaper Duo Wei Times also listed four figures who have since fallen from grace, former Fujian Governor Su Shulin, former President of the Supreme People's Court Zhou Qiang, former Heilongjiang Party Secretary Zhang Qingwei, and former Minister of Natural Resources Lu Hao, as other potential figures in this generation of leadership. Others in this rough age group ascending in the ranks include Zhang Guoqing (now a Vice-Premier) and Chen Min'er (party secretary of Chongqing and then Tianjin). [34]
Ding Xuexiang is the only person from this age bracket to have reached the Standing Committee, but the 20th Politburo includes eight other members born between 1960 and 1964.[ citation needed ]Xi Jinping has not named his successor as paramount leader of the CCP which broke from the precedent previously established of naming the successor at the start of the second term of the paramount leader. [35] This is seen as an attempt by Xi to further consolidate power as the leader of China and maintain a strong hold on his position of power. [36] Xi's lack of a named successor reversed the previously perceived notion of intraparty democracy in the naming system of leadership succession in the CCP. [37]
In China, politics functions within a communist state framework based on the system of people's congress under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the National People's Congress (NPC) functioning as the highest organ of state power and only branch of government per the principle of unified power. The CCP leads state activities by holding two-thirds of the seats in the NPC, and these party members are, in accordance with democratic centralism, responsible for implementing the policies adopted by the CCP Central Committee and the National Congress. The NPC has unlimited state power bar the limitations it sets on itself. By controlling the NPC, the CCP has complete state power. China's two special administrative regions (SARs), Hong Kong and Macau, are nominally autonomous from this system.
The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, officially the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, is the highest political body of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), officially the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, is a committee consisting of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Historically it has been composed of five to eleven members, and currently has seven members. Its officially mandated purpose is to conduct policy discussions and make decisions on major issues when the Politburo, a larger decision-making body, is not in session. According to the party's constitution, the General Secretary of the Central Committee must also be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
The general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the sole ruling party of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since 1989, the CCP general secretary has been the paramount leader of the PRC.
The orders of precedence in China is the ranking of political leaders in China for the purposes of event protocol and to arrange the ordering of names in official news bulletins, both written and televised. It is also sometimes used to assess perceived level of political power. Although there is no formally published ranking, there is usually an established convention and protocol, and the relative positions of Chinese political figures can usually be deduced from the order in meetings and especially by the time and order in which figures are covered by the official media. Since 1982, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party has been the highest-ranking official in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Paramount leader is an informal term for the most important political figure in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The paramount leader typically controls the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), often holding the titles of CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The state representative, head of state (president) or head of government (premier) are not necessarily paramount leader—under China's party-state system, CCP roles are politically more important than state titles.
The Shanghai clique, also referred to as the Shanghai gang, Jiang clique, or Jiang faction, refers to an informal group of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials who rose to prominence under former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin while he served as the party chief and mayor of Shanghai.
Generations of Chinese leadership is a term historians use to characterize distinct periods of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, by extension, successive changes in the ideology of the CCP. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by reference to these "generations".
Zhao Leji is a Chinese politician who is the current chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the third-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The 17th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formally the Political Bureau of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected at the 1st plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP on 22 October 2007 in the aftermath of the 17th National Congress. This electoral term was preceded by the 16th Politburo and succeeded by the 18th. Of the 25 members, nine served in the 17th Politburo Standing Committee.
The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held November 8–14, 2012 at the Great Hall of the People. Due to term limits and age restrictions, seven of the nine members of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) retired during the Congress, including Hu Jintao, who was replaced by Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. The Congress elected the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and saw the number of Politburo Standing Committee seats reduced from nine to seven.
The 18th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formally the Political Bureau of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected at the 1st plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP on 15 November 2012 in the aftermath of the 18th National Congress. This electoral term was preceded by the 17th Politburo and succeeded by the 19th. Of the 25 members, seven served in the 18th Politburo Standing Committee.
Li Hongzhong is a Chinese politician, who is currently the first-ranking vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.
The president of China, officially the president of the People's Republic of China, is the state representative of the People's Republic of China. On its own, it is a ceremonial office and has no real power in China's political system. While the office has many of the characteristics of a head of state, the Constitution of China does not define it as such. However, since 1993, the post has been held by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Military Commission, who is China's paramount leader.
The 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formally the Political Bureau of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected at the 1st plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP on 25 October 2017 in the aftermath of the 19th National Congress. This electoral term was preceded by the 18th Politburo and succeeded by the 20th. Seven of the 25 members served in the 19th Politburo Standing Committee.
Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's 4th leadership core, following Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.
The Office of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party often referred to as the General Secretary's Office (总书记办公室) is a bureau whose staff is assigned to work directly under, and closely with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s General Secretary. The Office manages personal affairs of the General Secretary and is a part of the Central Committee, but reports directly to the General Secretary. The director of the Office of the General Secretary and the staff under him are considered to be Mishus, or trusted confidants responsible for maintaining the private information and correspondence of the party's leader.
The 20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), formally the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected at the 1st plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP on 23 October 2022 in the aftermath of the 20th National Congress. This electoral term was preceded by the 19th Politburo. Seven of the 24 members serve in the 20th Politburo Standing Committee.
The 20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, formally the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected by the 1st plenary session of the 20th Central Committee on 23 October 2022, in the aftermath of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was preceded by the 19th Politburo Standing Committee.
The 18th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, formally the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was elected by the 1st plenary session of the 18th Central Committee on 15 November 2012, in the aftermath of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was preceded by the CCP's 17th Politburo Standing Committee and was succeeded by the 19th in 2017.