Politics of China

This article is about the politics of the People's Republic of China. For other uses, see Politics of China (disambiguation).

Politics of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国的政治
National Emblem of the People's Republic of China
System	Communist state under the system of people's congress
Constitution	Constitution of the People's Republic of China
Formation	1 October 1949
Leading force of state and society
Party	Chinese Communist Party
General Secretary	Xi Jinping
Supreme organ	National Congress
Highest organ	Central Committee
Political organ	Politburo
Executive organ	Secretariat
Military organ	Central Military Commission
Supervisory organ	Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Highest organ of state power
Full Convocation
Name	National People's Congress
Type	Unicameral
Presiding body	Presidium
Meeting place	Great Hall of the People, Beijing
Standing Body
Standing body	Standing Committee
Chair	Zhao Leji
Secretary-General	Liu Qi
Executive organ
Name	State Council
Head of Government
Title	Premier
Currently	Li Qiang
Appointer	President
Current term	14th State Council
Headquarters	Zhongnanhai
Ministries	26
Military organ
Name	Central Military Commission
Chairman	Xi Jinping
Vice Chairman	Zhang Youxia and He Weidong
Supervisory organ
Name	National Supervisory Commission
Director	Liu Jinguo
Vice Director	Xiao Pei, Yu Hongqiu, Fu Kui, Sun Xinyang, Liu Xuexin and Zhang Fuhai
Judicial organ
Name	Supreme People's Court
Chief judge	Zhang Jun (President)
Seat	Beijing
Procuratorial organ
Name	Supreme People's Procuratorate
Head	Ying Yong (Prosecutor-General)
Seat	Beijing

In China, politics functions within a communist state framework based on the system of people's congress under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the National People's Congress (NPC) functioning as the highest organ of state power and only branch of government per the principle of unified power. The CCP leads state activities by holding two-thirds of the seats in the NPC, and these party members are, in accordance with democratic centralism, responsible for implementing the policies adopted by the CCP Central Committee and the National Congress. The NPC has unlimited state power bar the limitations it sets on itself. By controlling the NPC, the CCP has complete state power. China's two special administrative regions (SARs), Hong Kong and Macau, are nominally autonomous from this system.

The Chinese political system is considered authoritarian. ^{[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]} There are no freely elected national leaders, political opposition is suppressed, all religious activity is controlled by the CCP, dissent is not permitted, and civil rights are curtailed. ^{[7] [8]} Direct elections occur only at the local level, not the national level, with all candidate nominations controlled by the CCP. ^{[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]}

The nature of the elections is highly constrained by the CCP's monopoly on power in China, censorship, and party control over elections. ^{[15] [16]} According to academic Rory Truex of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, "the CCP tightly controls the nomination and election processes at every level in the people's congress system... the tiered, indirect electoral mechanism in the People's Congress system ensures that deputies at the highest levels face no semblance of electoral accountability to the Chinese citizenry." ^[17]

Overview

See also: Paramount leader, List of national leaders of the People's Republic of China, Political position ranking of PRC, Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, and Generations of Chinese leadership

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government in Beijing officially asserts to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, which it defines as including mainland China and Taiwan. This has been disputed by the Republic of China (ROC) government since the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taipei in 1949. The Republic of China has since undergone significant political reforms.

China's population, geographical vastness, and social diversity frustrate attempts to rule from Beijing. Economic reform during the 1980s and the devolution of much central government decision making, combined with the strong interest of local CCP officials in enriching themselves, has made it increasingly difficult for the central government to assert its authority. ^[18]

The president of China is the head of state, serving as the ceremonial figurehead under the National People's Congress. ^{[note 1]} In March 2018, the NPC removed the term limits for the presidency. ^{[20] [21]} As a one-party state, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party holds ultimate power and authority over state and government. ^{[note 2]} The offices of president, general secretary, and chairman of the Central Military Commission have been held simultaneously by one individual since 1993, granting the individual de jure and de facto power over the country. ^{[note 3]} The position of CCP General Secretary is the highest authority leading China's National People's Congress, State Council, Political Consultative Conference, Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate.

Central government leaders must, in practice, build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the population at large. ^[36] However, control is often maintained over the larger group through control of information. The Chinese Communist Party considers China to be in the initial stages of socialism.^{[ citation needed ]} China's vast social, cultural and economic diversity has led to heterogeneity in the policies applied at the local and regional level. ^{[37] [ better source needed ]}

Even as there have been some moves in the direction of democratization as far as the electoral system at least, in that openly contested People's Congress elections are now held at the village and town levels, ^[38] and that legislatures have shown some assertiveness from time to time, the CCP retains effective control over governmental appointments. This is because the CCP wins by default in most electorates. ^{[39] [ needs update ]}

The social, cultural, and political as well as economic consequences of market reform have created tensions in Chinese society. ^{[40] [41]}

Self-description

The Chinese constitution describes China's system of government as a people's democratic dictatorship. ^[42] The CCP has also used other terms to officially describe China's system of government including "socialist consultative democracy", and whole-process people's democracy. ^[43] According to the CCP theoretical journal Qiushi , "[c]onsultative democracy was created by the CPC and the Chinese people as a form of socialist democracy. ... Not only representing a commitment to socialism, it carries forward China's political and cultural traditions. Not only representing a commitment to the organizational principles and leadership mode of democratic centralism, it also affirms the role of the general public in a democracy. Not only representing a commitment to the leadership of the CPC, it also gives play to the role of all political parties and organizations as well as people of all ethnic groups and all sectors of society". ^[44] The semi-official journal China Today stated the CCP's view: "Consultative democracy guarantees widespread and effective participation in politics through consultations carried out by political parties, peoples congresses, government departments, CPPCC committees, peoples organizations, communities, and social organizations". ^[45] On the other hand, according to the V-Dem Democracy indices China was 2023 the second least electoral democratic country in Asia. ^[46]

Communist Party

Main article: Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominates the Chinese political landscape. Constitutionally, the party's highest body is the Party Congress, which meets every five years. Meetings were irregular before the Cultural Revolution but have been periodic since then. The National Congress elects the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); the Central Committee in turn elects bodies such as:

• The General Secretary, which is the highest-ranking official within the Party and usually the Chinese Paramount leader.
• The Politburo, consisting of 22 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee);
• The Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful decision-making body in China, which as of June 2020 consists of seven members; ^[47]
• The Secretariat, the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the General Secretary;
• The Central Military Commission

In relative liberalization periods, the influence of people and groups outside the formal party structure has increased, particularly in the economic realm. Nevertheless, in all governmental institutions in the PRC, the party committees at all levels maintain a powerful and pivotal role in the administration. ^[48] According to scholar Rush Doshi, "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state." ^[49] Central party control is tightest in central government offices and urban economic, industrial, and cultural settings; it is considerably looser over the government and party establishments in rural areas, where the majority of mainland Chinese people live. The CCP's most important responsibility comes in the selection and promotion of personnel. They also see that party and state policy guidance is followed and that non-party members do not create autonomous organizations that could challenge party rule. Significant are the leading small groups which coordinate activities of different agencies. State-owned enterprises, private companies and foreign-owned businesses are also required to have internal CCP committees. ^[50]

Intra-party factions

Chinese politics have long been defined by the competition between intra-party factions' ability to place key members and allies in positions of power within the CCP and Chinese government. ^{[51] [52] [53]}

Under general secretaries Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the two main factions were thought to be the Tuanpai and the Shanghai Clique. ^[52] The Tuanpai were thought to be cadres and officials that originated from the Communist Youth League of China, while the Shanghai Clique were thought to be officials that rose to prominence under Jiang Zemin when he was first mayor, and then CCP committee secretary, of Shanghai. ^[53]

Xi Jinping, who became general secretary in 2012, has significantly centralized power, removing the influence of the old factions and promoting his allies, sometimes called the "Xi Jinping faction". Due to this, the old factions, including the Tuanpai, are considered extinct, ^[54] especially since the 20th CCP National Congress, in which Xi's allies dominated the new Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. ^[55]

Politburo Standing Committee

Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
^[56]

Rank	Portrait	Name	Hanzi	19th PSC	Birth	PM	Birthplace	Academic attainment	No. of offices	Ref.
1		Xi Jinping	习近平	Old	1953	1974	Beijing	Graduate Doctoral degree in Marxist legal studies Undergraduate degree in chemical engineering	Eleven Party offices General Secretary, Central Committee Chairman, National Security Commission of the Central Committee Chairman, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Network Security and Information Technology of the Central Committee Military offices Chairman, Central Military Commission Commander-in-chief, Joint Operations Command Center of the Central Military Commission of the People's Liberation Army Head, Leading Group for National Defence and Military Reform of the Central Military Commission Head, Office of the Central Integrated Military-Civilian Development Committee State offices President of the People's Republic of China	[57]
2		Li Qiang	李强	New	1959	1983	Zhejiang	Graduate Master's degree in business administration Graduate programme in world economics Graduate programme in engineering management Undergraduate degree in agricultural mechanisation	Eight Party offices Director, Central Institutional Organisation Commission Deputy director, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission Deputy director, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission Deputy director, Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission Deputy director, Central Foreign Affairs Commission Leader, Central Leading Group for Climate Change and Emissions Reduction Leader, State Council Leading Party Members Group State offices Premier, State Council of the People's Republic of China	[58]
3		Zhao Leji	赵乐际	Old	1957	1975	Qinghai	Graduate Graduate programme in currency and banking Undergraduate degree in philosophy	One State office Chairman, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress	[59]
4		Wang Huning	王沪宁	Old	1955	1984	Shanghai	Graduate Master's degree in Marxist legal studies Graduate programme in international politics Undergraduate degree in French	One Organisational office Chairman, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	[60]
5		Cai Qi	蔡奇	New	1955	1975	Fujian	Graduate Doctoral degree in political economy Post-graduate degree in economic law Undergraduate degree in political education	Three Party offices First Secretary, Secretariat of the Central Committee Director, General Office of the Central Committee Director, Office of the General Secretary of the Central Committee	[61]
6		Ding Xuexiang	丁薛祥	New	1962	1984	Jiangsu	Graduate Master's degree in science and management Bachelor's degree in engineering	One State offices First-Ranked Vice Premier of the State Council	[62]
7		Li Xi	李希	New	1956	1982	Gansu	Graduate Master's degree in economics and management Undergraduate degree in literature	Two Party offices Secretary, Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Director, Central Leading Group for Inspection Work	[63]

Full Politburo members

Members of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
^[64]

Name	Hanzi	19th POL	Birth	PM	Birthplace	Education	No. of offices	Ref.
Cai Qi	蔡奇	Old	1955	1975	Fujian	Graduate	Three Party offices First Secretary, Secretariat of the Central Committee Director, General Office of the Central Committee Director, Office of the General Secretary of the Central Committee	[61]
Chen Jining	陈吉宁	New	1964	1984	Liaoning	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee	[65]
Chen Min'er	陈敏尔	Old	1960	1982	Zhejiang	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Tianjin Municipal Party Committee	[66]
Chen Wenqing	陈文清	New	1960	1983	Sichuan	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission	[67]
Ding Xuexiang	丁薛祥	Old	1962	1984	Jiangsu	Graduate	One State office First-Ranked Vice Premier of the State Council	[62]
He Lifeng	何立峰	New	1955	1981	Guangdong	Graduate	Two Party office Director, Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission State office Second-Ranked Vice Premier of the State Council	[68]
He Weidong	何卫东	New	1957	1978	Fujian	Undergraduate	Two Party office Second Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission State office Second Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	[69]
Huang Kunming	黄坤明	Old	1956	1976	Fujian	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Guangdong Provincial Party Committee	[70]
Li Ganjie	李干杰	New	1964	1984	Hunan	Graduate	One Party office Head, Organization Department of the Central Committee	[71]
Li Hongzhong	李鸿忠	Old	1956	1976	Shenyang	Graduate	One State office First Vice Chairman, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress	[72]
Li Qiang	李强	Old	1959	1983	Zhejiang	Graduate	Eight Party offices Director, Central Institutional Organisation Commission Deputy Director, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission Deputy Director, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission Deputy Director, Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission Deputy Director, Central Foreign Affairs Commission Leader, Central Leading Group for Climate Change and Emissions Reduction Leader, State Council Leading Party Members Group State offices Premier, State Council of the People's Republic of China	[58]
Li Shulei	李书磊	New	1964	1986	Henan	Graduate	One Party office Head, Publicity Department of the Central Committee	[73]
Li Xi	李希	Old	1956	1982	Gansu	Graduate	Two Party office Secretary, Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Director, Central Leading Group for Inspection Work	[63]
Liu Guozhong	刘国中	New	1962	1986	Heilongjiang	Graduate	One State office Fourth-Ranked Vice Premier of the State Council	[74]
Ma Xingrui	马兴瑞	New	1959	1988	Heilongjiang	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Xinjiang Provincial Party Committee	[75]
Shi Taifeng	石泰峰	New	1956	1982	Shanxi	Graduate	Two Party office Head, United Front Work Department of the Central Committee Organisational office Vice Chairman, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	[76]
Wang Huning	王沪宁	Old	1955	1984	Shanghai	Graduate	One Organisational office Chairman, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	[60]
Wang Yi	王毅	New	1953	1981	Beijing	Graduate	Two Party office Director, Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission State office Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China	[77]
Xi Jinping	习近平	Old	1953	1974	Beijing	Graduate	Eleven Party offices General Secretary, Central Committee Chairman, National Security Commission of the Central Committee Chairman, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Work of the Central Committee Head, Central Leading Group for Network Security and Information Technology of the Central Committee Military offices Chairman, Central Military Commission Commander-in-chief, Joint Operations Command Center of the Central Military Commission of the People's Liberation Army Head, Leading Group for National Defence and Military Reform of the Central Military Commission Head, Office of the Central Integrated Military-Civilian Development Committee State offices President of the People's Republic of China	[57]
Yin Li	尹力	New	1962	1980	Shandong	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Beijing City Party Committee	[78]
Yuan Jiajun	袁家军	New	1962	1992	Jilin	Graduate	One Party office Secretary, Chongqing Municipal Party Committee	[79]
Zhang Guoqing	张国清	New	1964	1984	Henan	Graduate	One State office Third-Ranked Vice Premier of the State Council	[80]
Zhang Youxia	张又侠	Old	1950	1969	Beijing	Graduate	Two Party office First Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission State office First Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	[81]
Zhao Leji	赵乐际	Old	1957	1975	Shandong	Graduate	One State office Chairman, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress	[59]

National People's Congress

Political Consultative Conference

Constitutionally the supreme state authority and legislature of China is the National People's Congress (NPC). It meets annually for about two weeks to review and approve major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. The NPC elects and appoints important state positions such as the president, the vice president, the chairman and other members of the Central Military Commission, the premier and rest of the State Council, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and procurator general of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.^{[ citation needed ]}

The NPC also elects a Standing Committee (NPCSC), its permanent body which meets regularly between NPC sessions. Most national legislation in China is adopted by the NPCSC. Most initiatives are presented to the NPCSC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.^{[ citation needed ]}

Members of the State Council include the Premier, a variable number of vice premiers (now four), five state councilors (protocol equal of vice premiers but with narrower portfolios), and 29 ministers and heads of State Council commissions. During the 1980s there was an attempt made to separate CCP and state functions, with the former deciding general policy and the latter carrying it out. ^[82] The attempt was abandoned in the 1990s with the result that the political leadership within the state are also the leaders of the CCP. ^[82]

Minor parties

Main article: List of political parties in China

No legal political opposition groups exist in China. There are eight minor political parties in the country under the CCP's united front system. They participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) but have to support the "leading role" of the CCP for their continued existence, ^[83] and their leadership is appointed by the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP. ^[84] Their original function was to create the impression that the PRC was being ruled by a diverse national front, not a one-party dictatorship. The major role of these parties is to attract and subsequently muzzle niches in society that have political tendencies, such as academia. ^[85]

Coordination between the eight minor parties and the CCP is done through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which meets annually in Beijing in March at about the same time that the National People's Congress meets. In addition, there are banned political parties that are actively suppressed by the government, such as the Maoist Communist Party of China, China Democracy Party and China New Democracy Party, which have their headquarters outside of the mainland China. ^[86]

State Council

The Premier of China is the head of government, presiding over the State Council composed of four vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions.

Local-level politics

Each local Bureau or office is under the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level. People's Congress members at the county level are elected by voters. These county-level People's Congresses have the responsibility of oversight of local government and elect members to the Provincial (or Municipal in the case of independent municipalities) People's Congress. The Provincial People's Congress, in turn, elects members to the National People's Congress that meets each year in March in Beijing. ^[87] The ruling CCP committee at each level plays a large role in the selection of appropriate candidates for election to the local congress and to the higher levels.^{[ citation needed ]}

Administrative divisions

See also: Administrative divisions of China

Click any region for more info. For a larger version of this map, see here.

Armed forces

Main articles: People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police, and Militia (China)

See also: List of wars involving the People's Republic of China

The CCP created and leads the People's Liberation Army. After the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA also became a state military. The state military system inherited and upholds the principle of the CCP's absolute leadership over the people's armed forces, often referred to under Mao's maxim that "the Party commands the gun." The CCP and the state jointly established the Central Military Commission that carries out the task of supreme military leadership over the armed forces. ^[88]

Legal system

Main article: Law of the People's Republic of China

A trial by the Guizhou High People's Court

Nationality and ethnicity law

See also: Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China and Regional ethnic autonomy system of China

Nationality is granted at birth to children with at least one Chinese-national parent, with some exceptions. In general, naturalization or the obtainment of the People's Republic of China nationality is difficult. The Nationality Law prescribes only three conditions for the obtainment of PRC nationality (marriage to a PRC national is one, permanent residence is another). PRC nationals who acquire a foreign nationality automatically lose Chinese nationality. ^{[89] [ non-primary source needed ]} State functionaries and military personnel on active service are not permitted renounce their Chinese nationality. If a citizen wishes to resume PRC nationality, foreign nationality is no longer recognized. ^{[90] [ non-primary source needed ]}

Policies toward Uyghurs

Main article: Persecution of Uyghurs in China

Further information: Xinjiang internment camps

In 2020, widespread public reporting detailed the Chinese government's pattern of human rights violations in its continuing maltreatment of Uyghurs. ^{[91] [92] [93] [94]} These abuses include forced labor, arbitrary detainment, forced political indoctrination, destruction of cultural heritage, and forced abortions and sterilization. ^{[95] [96] [97]} Critics of the policy have described it as the sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide, with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide. ^{[98] [99] [100] [101] [102]} The Chinese government denies it is committing human rights violations in Xinjiang. ^{[103] [104]}

Foreign relations

Main article: Foreign relations of China

Chinese leader Hu Jintao and US president George W. Bush, with first ladies Liu Yongqing and Laura Bush, wave from the White House. The relationship between the world's sole superpower United States and the emerging superpower status of the PRC is closely watched by international observers.

The Karakoram Highway connecting China and Pakistan is an example of China's international development involvements.

The PRC maintains diplomatic relations with most countries in the world. In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China, commonly known as "Taiwan" since the 1970s, as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. ^[105] China had been represented by the Republic of China at the time of the UN's founding in 1945. (See also China and the United Nations.)

Under the One-China policy, the PRC has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to all of China, including Taiwan, and severs any official ties with the Republic of China (ROC) government. The government actively opposes foreign government meetings with the 14th Dalai Lama in a political capacity, as the spokesperson for a separatist movement in Tibet.^{[ citation needed ]}

The PRC has been playing a leading role in calling for free trade areas and security pacts amongst its Asia-Pacific neighbours. In 2004, the PRC proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues that pointedly excluded the United States. ^[106] The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005. China is also a founder and member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), alongside Russia and the Central Asian republics.^{[ citation needed ]}

Much of the current^{[ when? ]} foreign policy is based on the concept of "China's peaceful development".^{[ needs update ]} Nonetheless, crises in relations with foreign countries have occurred at various times in its recent history, particularly with the United States; e.g., the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict in May 1999 and the Hainan Island incident in April 2001. China's foreign relations with many Western nations suffered for a time following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. A much troubled foreign relationship is that between China and Japan, which has been strained at times by Japan's refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of the PRC, such as revisionistic comments made by prominent Japanese officials, and insufficient details given to the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities committed during World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Another point of conflict between the two countries is the frequent visits by Japanese government officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors not only Japanese World War II dead but also many convicted World War II war criminals, including 14 Class A convictions.^{[ citation needed ]}

Foreign aid

Main articles: Chinese foreign aid and Belt and Road Initiative

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China under the CCP in 1949, China joined the international community in providing foreign aid. In the past few decades, the international community has seen an increase in Chinese foreign aid. Specifically, a recent example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure project that was launched in 2013 by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. ^[107] The stated goal of the program is to expand maritime routes and land infrastructure networks connecting China with Asia, Africa, and Europe, boosting trade and economic growth. ^[108] It involves a massive development of trade routes that will create a large expansion of land transportation infrastructure and new ports in the Pacific and Indian oceans to facilitate regional and intercontinental trade flow and increase oil and gas supply. ^[109]

International territorial disputes

Main article: Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China

The PRC is in a number of international territorial disputes, several of which involved the Sino-Russian border. Although the great majority of them are now resolved,^{[ citation needed ]} China's territorial disputes have led to several localized wars in the last 50 years, including the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979. In 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, ^{[110] [ better source needed ]} which ended the conflict. Other territorial disputes include islands in the East and South China Seas, and undefined or disputed borders with India, Bhutan and North Korea.^{[ citation needed ]}

International organizations

On 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 to transfer the seat from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). ^[111]

United Nations

Main article: China and the United Nations

Today, not only is China a part of many UN organizations, it is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. A memo done by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified Chinese nationals serving in leadership position within international organizations signifies China's increasing involvement in the international arena. ^[112] For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and so on are all organizations that Chinese nationals are currently in position of (The memo is updated on a semi-annual basis). ^[112]

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

See also: List of non-governmental organizations in China

Although NGO development in China is relatively slow compared to other countries, a Harvard University academic study reveals that China had NGOs as early as during the Dynasties. Specifically in the forms of American missionaries, which assisted in rural reconstruction programs and ideological reforms locally. ^[113] After the establishment of The People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao banned any NGOs that were related to counter revolutionary goals. During the reform era under Deng beginning the 1970s, NGOs although not completely banned, three laws were implemented to keep relatively tight control over them––the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Foundations, and the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China. ^[114] The latter two were implemented after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, and the general tone of all the regulations emphasized government control. For instance, the regulations require a two-tiered management system, in which before being legally registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a government agency must sponsor the organization; thus, two governmental agencies must be monitoring the day-to-day operations of the NGO. ^[114] However, in the 1990s, NGOs began to regain momentum despite restrictions in place. ^[114] Today, the number of registered organizations in China has grown to over 700,000, "... including many professional and friendship associations, foundations working in the fields of education, science, and culture, and a large number of nonprofits engaged in poverty alleviation, social work with people with disabilities, children, and the elderly. The number of nonprofits and environmental education and climate action groups has also significantly grown". ^[115]

In 2017, a policy called "Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland China Law" (FNGO Law) was enacted, which creates registration barriers that, for instance, require a Chinese partner organization to sign on. The reaction from the West has widely been that the space for NGOs to conduct work in may be shrinking. ^[116]

Many NGOs in the PRC have been described as government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGOs) that are organized under the CCP's united front system. ^{[117] [118] [119]}

Civil society

Academic debates on whether China has a civil society are ongoing. ^{[120] : 62}

Within China, academic debate regarding theories of the public sphere began in the 1980s. ^{[120] : 62} There is no consensus and academic debates involve disagreements in the applicability of concepts like "civil society," "private sphere," and "state" in the Chinese context. ^{[120] : 62} Among the issues is that the terminology developed by Jürgen Habermas was developed in discourse on German bourgeois society. ^{[120] : 63–64} The major groups in Habermasian theory include merchants, bankers, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs, which is not consistent with Chinese views of the "general public." ^{[120] : 64}

The majority of research on Chinese civil society from the early 1990s to the early 2010s has been to examine "the organizational independence of civic associations from the state". ^[121] Researchers have argued that the western driven definition of "civil society" is too narrowly fixed, which does not allow for a full understanding of Chinese civil society. Taru Salmenkari, an associate professor specializing in contemporary China and issues of democracy and civil society in East Asia at Tallinn University, has argued in her "Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society" that to understand Chinese civil society, one must "...go beyond the question of the degree of autonomy from the state. It must address the nature of horizontal contacts through which civil society is constituted". ^[121]

Advocacy

A 2013 study by Harvard University found that while the censorship exists, the purpose of the censorship is not to silence all comments made about the state or any particular issues, but rather to prevent and reduce the probability of collective action. ^[122] As the study illustrates, allowing social media to flourish also has allowed negative and positive comments about the state and its leaders to exist. ^[122] According to another study, the development of technology and the internet has also allowed certain civil society advocacy, such as the Weiquan movement, to flourish. ^[123]

Protests

Main articles: Protest and dissent in China and Mass incidents in China

The authoritarian government in China suppresses protests that challenge the authority of the government while showing greater tolerance for protests that are rooted in localized economic or social unrest. ^[38] Under Xi Jinping's rule, the government has resorted to greater suppression. ^[38]

Citizen surveys

Surveys have shown a high level of the Chinese public's satisfaction with their government. ^{[124] : 137} These views are generally attributed to the material comforts and security available to large segments of the Chinese populace as well as the government's attentiveness and responsiveness. ^{[124] : 136} A majority of the Chinese middle class are satisfied with the CCP and are among those who tend to credit it for the increase of living standards in China since reform and opening up. ^{[125] : 61}

A 2009 study by academic Tony Sachs found that 95.9% of Chinese citizens were relatively satisfied or extremely satisfied with the central government, with the figure dropping to 61.5% for their local governments. ^[126]

According to the World Values Survey (2017–2020), 95% of Chinese respondents have significant confidence in their government. ^{[124] : 13} Confidence decreased to 91% in the survey's 2022 edition. ^{[124] : 13}

A 2020 survey by Harvard University found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China's government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey's history. ^{[127] : 163} A 2020 survey by Stanford University and the Hoover Institution found that support for the CCP is between 50 and 70 percent, and that support for the government is typically overstated by almost 30 percent in citizen surveys. ^{[128] [129]} The same survey found that Han Chinese are more supportive of the CCP than are ethnic minorities and that minorities tend to conceal their views of the CCP. ^{[129] [130]}

Survey data compiled by academic Bruce Dickson concludes that approximately 70% of China's population supports the Chinese Dream. ^{[131] : 148}

See also

• Politics of Hong Kong
• Politics of Macau

Notes

1. The office of the President is largely powerless, with the powers and functions under the Constitution of 1982 comparable to that of a constitutional monarch or a head of state in a parliamentary republic. ^{[19] [ better source needed ]}
2. Xi Jinping was elected President of the People's Republic of China on 14 March 2013. ^{[22] [23]}
3. Recently, as of April 2020 ^[update] , Xi Jinping, the current general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and paramount leader of China, has been accused of drawing too much power to himself. ^{[24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35]}

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