Sinicization

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hui people</span> Ethnoreligious group of China

The Hui people are an East Asian ethnoreligious group predominantly composed of Chinese-speaking adherents of Islam. They are distributed throughout China, mainly in the northwestern provinces and in the Zhongyuan region. According to the 2010 census, China is home to approximately 10.5 million Hui people. Outside China, the 170,000 Dungan people of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Panthays in Myanmar, Hui Chin Haws in Thailand are also considered part of the Hui ethnicity.

Ethnic minorities in China are the non-Han population in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chinese nationalism</span>

Chinese nationalism is a form of nationalism in which asserts that the Chinese people are a nation and promotes the cultural and national unity of all Chinese people. According to Sun Yat-sen's philosophy in the Three Principles of the People, Chinese nationalism is evaluated as multi-ethnic nationalism, which should be distinguished from Han nationalism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hui pan-nationalism</span>

Hui pan-nationalism refers to the common identity among diverse communities of Chinese-speaking Muslims. Hui pan-nationalism should be distinguished from nationalist sentiments by minority groups who are also Muslim such as those of the Uyghurs. These sentiments are grounded upon the Hui "zealously preserving and protecting their identity as enclaves ensconced in the dominant Han society." In exchange for support during the Cultural Revolution, the Hui were granted high political participation. Hui pan-nationalism was one of the first sources of modern Chinese nationalism, influenced by Western, Japanese and Soviet influences.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Han nationalism</span> Ethnicity-exclusive form of Chinese nationalism

Han nationalism is a form of ethnic nationalism asserting ethnically Han people as the exclusive constituents of the Chinese nation. It is often in dialogue with other conceptions of Chinese nationalism, often mutually-exclusive or otherwise contradictory ones. Han people are the dominant ethnic group in both states claiming to represent the Chinese nation: the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islam in China</span>

Islam has been practiced in China since the 7th century CE. Muslims are a minority group in China, representing 1 to 1.5 percent of the total population according to various estimates. Though Hui Muslims are the most numerous group, the greatest concentration of Muslims are in Xinjiang, which contains a significant Uyghur population. Lesser yet significant populations reside in the regions of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai. Of China's 55 officially recognized minority peoples, ten of these groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ajall Shams al-Din Omar</span>

Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar al-Bukhari was Yunnan's first provincial governor, appointed by the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty of China.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of Xinjiang</span> Aspect of Chinese history

Xinjiang is historically consisted of two main geographically, historically, and ethnically distinct regions with different historical names: Dzungaria north of the Tianshan Mountains; and the Tarim Basin south of the Tianshan Mountains, currently mainly inhabited by the Uyghurs. They were conquered by the Qing dynasty in the 18th century, and after the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) the Qing reconquered both regions and integrated them into one province named Xinjiang in 1884.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of Islam in China</span> Overview of the history of Islam in China

The history of Islam in China dates back to 1,300 years ago. Currently, Chinese Muslims are a minority group in China, representing between 0.45% to 1.8% of the total population according to the latest estimates. Although Hui Muslims are the most numerous group, the greatest concentration of Chinese Muslims are located in Northwestern China, mostly in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, which holds a significant Uyghur population. Lesser but significant Chinese Muslim populations reside in the regions of Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai. Of China's 55 officially recognized minority peoples, ten groups are predominantly Sunnī Muslim.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islam during the Yuan dynasty</span> Islam and Muslims in Yuan dynasty China

During the Yuan dynasty in the 13th century, there was a significant increase in the population of Muslims in China. Under the Mongol Empire, east–west communication and cross-cultural transmission were largely promoted. As a result, foreigners in China were given an elevated status in the hierarchy of the new regime. The impact on China by its Muslims at this time, including the advancement of Chinese science and the designing of Dadu, is vast and largely unknown. It is estimated that the population of the Hui minority grew from 50,000 in the 9th century to 4,000,000 in the 14th century, becoming the largest non-Han ethnic group.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islam during the Qing dynasty</span> Overview of the role of Islam and Muslims in Qing dynasty China

During the Manchu-led Qing dynasty (1636–1912), Islam was a significant religion in Northwestern China and Yunnan. There were five major Muslim rebellions during the Qing period. The first and last rebellions were caused by sectarian infighting between rival Sufi Muslim orders.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Semu</span>

Semu is the name of a caste established by the Yuan dynasty. The 31 Semu categories referred to people who came from Central and West Asia. They had come to serve the Yuan dynasty by enfranchising under the dominant Mongol caste. The Semu were not a self-defined and homogeneous ethnic group per se, but one of the four castes of the Yuan dynasty: the Mongols, Semu, the "Han" and the Southerners. Among the Semu were Buddhist Turpan Uyghurs, Tanguts and Tibetans; Nestorian Christian tribes like the Ongud; Alans; Muslim Central Asian Turkic peoples including the Khwarazmians and Karakhanids; West Asian Arab, Jewish, Christians and other minor groups who are from even further west.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islam in China (1912–present)</span>

After the fall of the Qing dynasty following the Xinhai Revolution (1911-1912), Sun Yat-sen, who led the new Republic of China (1912–1949), immediately proclaimed that the country belonged equally to the Han, Hui (Muslim), Meng (Mongol), and Tsang (Tibetan) peoples. When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Chinese Muslims suffered political repression along with all other religious groups in China, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

De-Sinicization is a process of eliminating or reducing Han Chinese cultural elements, identity, or consciousness from a society or nation. In modern contexts, it is often contrasted with the assimilation process of Sinicization.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Xinjiang</span> Autonomous region of China

Xinjiang, officially the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, is an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China (PRC), located in the northwest of the country at the crossroads of Central Asia and East Asia. Being the largest province-level division of China by area and the 8th-largest country subdivision in the world, Xinjiang spans over 1.6 million square kilometres (620,000 sq mi) and has about 25 million inhabitants. Xinjiang borders the countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and India. The rugged Karakoram, Kunlun and Tian Shan mountain ranges occupy much of Xinjiang's borders, as well as its western and southern regions. The Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract regions are administered by China but also claimed by India. Xinjiang also borders the Tibet Autonomous Region and the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai. The most well-known route of the historic Silk Road ran through the territory from the east to its northwestern border.

Nasr al-Din was a provincial governor of Yunnan during the Yuan dynasty, and was the son of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Xinjiang conflict</span> Geopolitical conflict in Central Asia

The Xinjiang conflict, also known as the East Turkistan conflict, Uyghur–Chinese conflict or Sino-East Turkistan conflict, is an ongoing ethnic geopolitical conflict in what is now China's far-northwest autonomous region of Xinjiang, also known as East Turkistan. It is centred around the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group who constitute a plurality of the region's population.

Anti-Mongolianism, also called the Anti-Mongolian sentiment has been prevalent throughout history, often perceiving the Mongols to be barbaric and uncivilized people with a lack of intelligence or civilized culture.

The New Qing History is a historiographical school that gained prominence in the United States in the mid-1990s by offering a wide-ranging revision of history of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty of China. Orthodox historians tend to emphasize the power of the Han people to "sinicize" their conquerors in their thought and institutions. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a handful of American scholars began to learn Manchu and took advantage of archival holdings in this and other non-Chinese languages that had long been held in Taipei and Beijing but had previously attracted little scholarly attention to gain new insight onto the Qing as a state founded by a people who did not originally see themselves as "Chinese" and were widely perceived by Han elites as "barbarian" aliens. This research provided a new, arguably more emic, perspective on Qing rule, which found that the Manchu rulers were savvy in manipulating the image of the dynasty and adjusting their claims to legitimacy differentially according to the expectations of various subject populations. From the 1630s at least through to the early 19th century, emperors developed a sense of Manchu identity and used traditional Han Chinese culture and Confucian models to rule the core parts of the empire, while blending with models from other ethnic groups across the vast realm, including those from northern China, the Eurasian Steppe, and Inner Asia.

References

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  13. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 385. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. certain that Muslims of Central Asian originally played a major role in the Yuan (Mongol) conquest and subsequent rule of south-west China, as a result of which a distinct Muslim community was established in Yunnan by the late 13th century AD. Foremost among these soldier-administrators was Sayyid al-Ajall Shams al-Din Umar al-Bukhari (Ch. Sai-tien-ch'ih shan-ssu-ting). a court official and general of Turkic origin who participated in the Mongol invasion of Szechwan ... And Yunnan in c. 1252, and who became Yuan Governor of the latter province in 1274–79. Shams al-Din—who is widely believed by the Muslims of Yunnan to have introduced Islam to the region—is represented as a wise and benevolent ruler, who successfully "pacified and comforted" the people of Yunnan, and who is credited with building Confucian temples, as well as mosques and schools
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  21. 1 2 Yang, Bin (2008). "Chapter 5 Sinicization and Indigenization: The Emergence of the Yunnanese" (PDF). Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE). Columbia University Press. ISBN   978-0231142540. Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 March 2014. Retrieved 24 April 2014.[ page needed ]
  22. Yang, Bin (2009). Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE). Columbia University Press. p. 157. ISBN   978-0231142540. Archived from the original on 27 September 2023. Retrieved 24 April 2014.
  23. Thant Myint-U (2011). Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. Macmillan. ISBN   978-1-4668-0127-1. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. claimed descent from the emir of Bokhara ... and was appointed as the top administrator in Yunnan in the 1270s. Today the Muslims of Yunnan regard him as the founder of their community, a wise and benevolent ruler who 'pacified and comforted' the peoples of Yunnan. Sayyid Ajall was officially the Director of Political Affairs of the Regional Secretariat of Yunnan ... According to Chinese records, he introduced new agricultural technologies, constructed irrigation systems, and tried to raise living standards. Though a Muslims, he built or rebuilt Confucian temples and created a Confucian education system. His contemporary, He Hongzuo, the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies, wrote that through his efforts 'the orangutans and butcherbirds became unicorns and phonixes and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps' ...[ page needed ]
  24. M. Th Houtsma (1993). First encyclopaedia of Islam: 1913–1936. BRILL. p. 847. ISBN   90-04-09796-1. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. Although Saiyid-i Adjall certainly did much for the propagation of Islam in Yunnan, it is his son Nasir al-Din to whom is ascribed the main credit for its dissemination. He was a minister and at first governed the province of Shansi: he later became governor of Yunnan where he died in 1292 and was succeeded by his brother Husain. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the direction of this movement was from the interior, from the north. The Muhammadan colonies on the coast were hardly affected by it. On the other hand it may safely be assumed that the Muslims of Yunnan remained in constant communication with those of the northern provinces of Shensi and Kansu.
  25. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 174. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. from the Yuan Dynasty, and indicated further Muslim settlement in northeastern and especially southwestern Yunnan. Marco Polo, who travelled through Yunnan "Carajan" at the beginning of the Yuan period, noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population. Similarly, the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that the 'great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims.
  26. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 387. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. when Maroco Polo visited Yunnan in the early Yuan period he noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population while the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that 'the great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims. Rashid al-Din may have been referring to the region around Ta-li in western Yunnan, which was to emerge as the earliest centre of Hui Muslim settlement in the province.
  27. ( )Thant Myint-U (2011). Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. Macmillan. ISBN   978-1-4668-0127-1. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. In this way, Yunnan became known to the Islamic world. When Sayyid Ajall died in 1279 he was succeeded by his son Nasir al-Din who governed for give years and led the invasion of Burma. His younger brother became the Transport Commissioner and the entire family entrenched their influence.[ page needed ]
  28. (Original from the University of Virginia) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986). Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8. The Institute. p. 385. Archived from the original on September 27, 2023. Retrieved December 20, 2011. On his death he was succeeded by his eldest son, Nasir al-Din (Ch. Na-su-la-ting, the "Nescradin" of Marco Polo), who governed Yunnan between 1279 and I284. While Arab and South Asian Muslims, pioneers of the maritime expansion of Islam in the Bay of Bengal, must have visited the
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  32. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242. ISBN   0-8047-4684-2 . Retrieved March 2, 2012. famous Manchu figure of the early Qing who belonged to the Niohuru clan) would have been the unwieldy "Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long" in Chinese. Moreover, the characters used in names were typically chosen to represent the sounds of Manchu, and not to carry any particular meaning in Chinese. For educated Han Chinese accustomed to names composed of a familiar surname and one or two elegang characters drawn from a poem or a passage from the classics, Manchu names looked not just different, but absurd. What was oneo to make of a name like E-bi-long, written in Chinese characters meaning "repress-must flourish," or Duo-er-gun, meaning "numerous-thou-roll"? S.... To them they looked like nonsense.... But they are not nonsense in Manchu: "E-bi-long" is the transcription of ebilun, meaning "a delicate or sickly child," and "Duo-er-gun" is the Chinese transcription of dorgon, the Manchu word for badger.
  33. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242. ISBN   0-8047-4684-2 . Retrieved March 2, 2012. Thus we find names like Nikan (Chinese), Ajige (little), Asiha (young), Haha (nale), Mampi (knot—a reference to the hair?), Kara (black), Fulata (red-eyed), Necin (peaceful), Kirsa (steppe fox), Unahan (colt), Jumara (squirrel), Nimašan (sea eagle), Nomin (lapis lazuli), and Gacuha (toy made out of an animal's anklebone).44 Names such as Jalfungga (long-lived), Fulingga (lucky one), Fulungga (majestic), and Hūturingga (fortunate), were not unknown, either, particularly after the seventeenth century. Although mightily foreign when written as Zha-la-feng-a, Fu-ling-a, Fu-long-a, or Hu-tu-ling-ga
  34. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 243. ISBN   0-8047-4684-2. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. While Chinese names, too, sometimes ended in characters with the sounds "zhu," "bao," and "tai," more often than not, such names in the Qing belonged to Manchus and other bannermen (Chinese bannermen and Mongols sometimes took Manchu-sounding names), even if the attached meaning is not clear (it is not certain that all names in fact had a specific meaning). Giving "numeral names" was another unique Manchu habit. These were names that actually referred to numbers. Sometimes they were given using Manchu numbers—for example, Nadanju (seventy) or Susai (fifty). Other times number names used the Manchu transcriptions of Chinese numbers, as in the name Loišici (= Liushi qi, "sixty-seven"), Bašinu (= bashi wu, "eight-five").45 Such names, unheard of among the Han, were quite common among the Manchus, an appeared from time to time among Chinese bannermen. Popular curiosity about this odd custom in Qing was partly satisfied by the nineteenth-century bannerman-writer Fu-ge, who explained in his book of "jottings" that naming children for their grandparents' ages was a way of wishing longevity to the newly born.46
  35. Yu Hsiao-jung, Manchu Rule over China and the Attrition of the Manchu Language Archived 19 June 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  36. Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928. University of Washington Press, 2000. Pages 52–54. ISBN   0-295-98040-0. Partially available on Google Books Archived 2023-09-27 at the Wayback Machine
  37. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN   9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. At Xiuyan, in eastern Fengtian, the Manchus in the seventh or eighth generation continued as before to give their sons polysyllabic Manchu personal names that were meaningless when transliterated into Chinese, but at the same time they began to also give them Chinese names that were disyllabic and meaningful and that conformed to the generational principle. Thus, in the seventh generation of the Gūwalgiya lineage were sons with two names, one Manchu and one Chinese, such as Duolunbu/Shiman, Delinbu/Shizhu, and Tehengbu/Shizhen. Within the family and the banner, these boys used their Manchu name, but outside they used their Han-style name. Then, from the eighth or ninth generation one, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gūwalgiya at Xiuyan stopped giving polysyllabic Manchu names to their sons, who thereafter used Chinese names exclusively.
  38. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN   9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. and when the ancient and politically prominent Manchu lineage of Niohuru adopted the Han-style surname Lang, he ridiculed them for having "forgotten their roots." (The Niohuru, whose name was derived from niohe, Manchu for wolf," had chosen Lang as their surname because it was a homophone for the Chinese word for "wolf.")
  39. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. ISBN   9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. Manchu men had abandoned their original polysyllabic personal names infavor of Han-style disyllabic names; they had adopted the Han practice of choosing characters with auspicious meanings for the names; and they had assigned names on a generational basis.... Except among some Hanjun such as the two Zhao brothers, bannermen still did not, by and large, use their
  40. Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 57. ISBN   9780295804125. Archived from the original on January 5, 2014. Retrieved March 2, 2012. family name but called themselves only by their personal name—for example, Yikuang, Ronglu, Gangyi, Duanfang, Xiliang, and Tieliang. In this respect, most Manchus remained conspicuously different from Han.
  41. Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 241. ISBN   0-8047-4684-2. Archived from the original on December 31, 2013. Retrieved March 2, 2012. Chinese names consist typically of a single-character surname and a given name of one or two characters, the latter usually chosen for their auspicious meaning. Manchu names were different. For one thing, Manchus did not commonly employ surnames, identifying themselves usually by their banner affiliation rather than by their lineage. Even if they had customarily used both surname and given name, this would not have eliminated the difference with Han names, since Manchu names of any kind were very often longer than two characters—that is, two syllables— in length. Where a Han name (to pick at random two names from the eighteenth century) might read Zhang Tingyu or Dai Zhen, the full name of, say, Ebilun (a
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Sinicization
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese 漢化
Simplified Chinese 汉化
Hanyu Pinyin hànhuà
Literal meaning Han-ization