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Xi Jinping Administration 以习近平同志为核心的党中央 | |
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![]() 5th generation Communist leadership of the People's Republic of China | |
Incumbent | |
![]() Paramount leader Xi Jinping | |
Date formed | 15 November 2012 |
People and organisations | |
Head of state | Xi Jinping |
Head of government | Li Keqiang Li Qiang |
No. of ministers | 31 |
Member party | Chinese Communist Party Eight minor parties |
History | |
Elections | November 2012 October 2017 October 2022 |
Legislature terms | 12th National People's Congress 13th National People's Congress 14th National People's Congress |
Predecessor | Hu Jintao Administration/ Xi–Li Administration |
General secretaryship of Xi Jinping | |||||||||||
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Simplified Chinese | 习近平 体制 | ||||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 習近平體制 | ||||||||||
Literal meaning | Xi Jinping System | ||||||||||
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Alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 以习近平同志为核心的党中央 | ||||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 以習近平同志為核心的黨中央 | ||||||||||
Literal meaning | The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core | ||||||||||
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Second alternative Chinese name | |||||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 以习近平同志为总书记的党中央 | ||||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 以習近平同志為總書記的黨中央 | ||||||||||
Literal meaning | The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary | ||||||||||
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Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's 4th leadership core, following Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. [1] [2] [3] Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term as CCP General Secretary after the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022. [4] [5]
The name Xi Jinping administration is officially called the "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary" (以习近平同志为总书记的党中央) from 2012 to 2016, and "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core" (以习近平同志为核心的党中央) since 2016.
Xi's political ideas and principles, known as Xi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCP Central Committee passed a historical resolution in November 2021.
His rule is often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, while his tenure has included an increase of censorship and mass surveillance, deterioration in human rights, including the internment of a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang (which some observers have described as part of a genocide), a cult of personality developing around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018.
In economic policy, Xi has prioritized poverty alleviation and creating common prosperity to reduce disparities in wealth. Xi's administration seeks to implement common prosperity in part through its education policy, including through drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Xi continues to emphasize the need for global development, including through the Belt and Road Initiative.
In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes the Community of Common Destiny. He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers") like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak."
Xi Jinping has set three overarching goals for China's economy. [6] : 10 First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules. [6] : 10 Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market. [6] : 10 Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor. [6] : 10
During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to use state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased [7] : 138 while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs. [7] : 141 Although China has promoted its national champion companies since the Jiang Zemin administration, [8] : 158 it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector. [9] : 91
Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development. [10] : 135 These industrial plans include Made in China 2025, the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry". [10] : 135 China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development. [10] : 135
During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy of dual circulation. [11] : 170 First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers. [11] : 160 Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology. [11] : 160
By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries. [12] : 228 At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries. [9] : 259 As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010. [11] : 88
China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%. [9] In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion. [9]
Xi has implemented a number of education reforms. [6] : 155 Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours). [6] : 155 Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term. [6] : 155 Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned. [6] : 156
As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children. [6] : 156 In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector. [6] : 156
The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals of common prosperity. [12] : 67 Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor. [13] : 5 Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits. [6] : 156 Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital." [6] : 156 They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays. [6] : 156
Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals. [6] : 57 Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors. [6] : 157
During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant. [6] : 188 Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change. [6] : 188
In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG. [14] : 180 The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters. [14] : 180 Xi introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security." [15] : 3
During the Xi Jinping era, the Community of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation. [15] : 6 In his foreign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreign friends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to the Second Sino-Japanese war. [16] : 42 For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people like Claire Lee Chennault, Norman Bethune, Dawarkanath Kotnis, and Soviet pilots. [16] : 42
Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak". [17] : 103
During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa. [18] : 87
"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party having gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. [6] : 21–26
In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes. [16] : 32 He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook". [16] : 32 Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence". [16] : 32 Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlighting its five thousand years of history. [16] : 33 He often cites the Four Great Inventions as a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity. [16] : 33 In his discourse for foreign audiences regarding China's peaceful rise, Xi quotes the Confucian saying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others." [16] : 64 In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholar Chen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients." [16] : 64
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Upon taking office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-level officials and local civil servants alike. [19] Most of the officials investigated were removed from office and faced accusations of bribery and abuse of power, although the range of alleged abuses varied widely. The campaign 'netted' over 120 high-ranking officials, including about a dozen high-ranking military officers, several senior executives of state-owned companies, and five national leaders. [20] [21] As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials have been prosecuted. [22] : 129 The campaign is part of a much wider drive to clean up malfeasance within party ranks and shore up party unity. It has become an emblematic feature of Xi Jinping's political brand.
We should continue to catch "tigers" as well as "flies" when dealing with cases of leading officials in violation of Party discipline and state laws as well as misconduct and corruption problems that directly affect the people's interests. All are equal before the law and Party discipline; whoever is involved in a corruption case must be thoroughly and impartially investigated.
Reform of China's defense and military structure began after Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012. Under Xi's administration, China created the CCP National Security Commission and established an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea in 2013. [24] In 2014, Xi told the CCP Politburo that the PLA should operate by integrating multiple services. [24]
The "deepening national defense and military reform" was announced in November 2015 at a plenary session of the Central Military Commission (CMC)'s Central Leading Group for Military Reform. [25] They were expected to be long and extensive that aimed at turning the PLA into a modern military on par with international standards. [25] Before the reforms were announced, Xi said the CMC should directly control the military and new regional commands be created. [24]
In January 2014, Chinese senior military officers[ who? ] said that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was planning to reduce the number of military regions from seven to five Theater Commands to have joint command with the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This is planned to change their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented defense to mobile and coordinated movements of all services and to enhance offensive air and naval capabilities. The coastal areas would be turned into three military regions, each with a joint operations command (Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou) for projecting power into the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. The four other inland military regions (Shenyang, Beijing, Chengdu and Lanzhou) will be streamlined into two military areas mainly for organizing forces for operations. The change was projected to occur through 2019. [26] [ needs update ]R. | Officeholder | 19th | Birth | PM | Birthplace | Academic feats | Positions | Ref. | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | ![]() | Xi Jinping | 习近平 | Old | 1953 | 1974 | Beijing | Twelve
| [28] | |
2 | ![]() | Li Qiang | 李强 | New | 1959 | 1983 | Zhejiang |
| Fifteen
| [29] |
3 | ![]() | Zhao Leji | 赵乐际 | Old | 1957 | 1975 | Qinghai |
| Four
| [30] |
4 | ![]() | Wang Huning | 王沪宁 | Old | 1955 | 1984 | Shanghai |
| Eight
| [31] |
5 | ![]() | Cai Qi | 蔡奇 | New | 1955 | 1975 | Fujian | Fifteen
| [32] | |
6 | ![]() | Ding Xuexiang | 丁薛祥 | New | 1962 | 1984 | Jiangsu | Thirteen
| [33] | |
7 | ![]() | Li Xi | 李希 | New | 1956 | 1982 | Gansu | Four
| [34] |
Officeholder | 19th | Birth | PM | Birthplace | Education | Offices held | Ref. | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() | Cai Qi | 蔡奇 | Old | 1955 | 1975 | Fujian | Graduate | Three
| [36] |
![]() | Chen Jining | 陈吉宁 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Liaoning | Graduate | One
| [37] |
![]() | Chen Min'er | 陈敏尔 | Old | 1960 | 1982 | Zhejiang | Graduate | One
| [38] |
![]() | Chen Wenqing | 陈文清 | New | 1960 | 1983 | Sichuan | Graduate | One
| [39] |
![]() | Ding Xuexiang | 丁薛祥 | Old | 1962 | 1984 | Jiangsu | Graduate | One
| [40] |
![]() | He Lifeng | 何立峰 | New | 1955 | 1981 | Guangdong | Graduate | Two
| [41] |
![]() | He Weidong | 何卫东 | New | 1957 | 1978 | Fujian | Undergraduate | Two
| [42] |
![]() | Huang Kunming | 黄坤明 | Old | 1956 | 1976 | Fujian | Graduate | One
| [43] |
![]() | Li Ganjie | 李干杰 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Hunan | Graduate | One
| [44] |
![]() | Li Hongzhong | 李鸿忠 | Old | 1956 | 1976 | Shenyang | Graduate | One
| [45] |
![]() | Li Qiang | 李强 | Old | 1959 | 1983 | Zhejiang | Graduate | Eight
| [46] |
![]() | Li Shulei | 李书磊 | New | 1964 | 1986 | Henan | Graduate | One
| [47] |
![]() | Li Xi | 李希 | Old | 1956 | 1982 | Gansu | Graduate | Two
| [48] |
![]() | Liu Guozhong | 刘国中 | New | 1962 | 1986 | Heilongjiang | Graduate | One
| [49] |
![]() | Ma Xingrui | 马兴瑞 | New | 1959 | 1988 | Heilongjiang | Graduate | One
| [50] |
![]() | Shi Taifeng | 石泰峰 | New | 1956 | 1982 | Shanxi | Graduate | Two
| [51] |
![]() | Wang Huning | 王沪宁 | Old | 1955 | 1984 | Shanghai | Graduate | One
| [52] |
![]() | Wang Yi | 王毅 | New | 1953 | 1981 | Beijing | Graduate | Two
| [53] |
![]() | Xi Jinping | 习近平 | Old | 1953 | 1974 | Beijing | Graduate | Eleven
| [54] |
![]() | Yin Li | 尹力 | New | 1962 | 1980 | Shandong | Graduate | One
| [55] |
![]() | Yuan Jiajun | 袁家军 | New | 1962 | 1992 | Jilin | Graduate | One
| [56] |
![]() | Zhang Guoqing | 张国清 | New | 1964 | 1984 | Henan | Graduate | One
| [57] |
![]() | Zhang Youxia | 张又侠 | Old | 1950 | 1969 | Beijing | Graduate | Two
| [58] |
![]() | Zhao Leji | 赵乐际 | Old | 1957 | 1975 | Shandong | Graduate | One
| [59] |