Fourteenth five-year plan

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The plan aims to increase China's scientific and technical capabilities. [19] China aims to make "major breakthroughs in core technologies" [15] and to prioritize technological self-sufficiency. [11] : 218 

The plan aims to increase R&D spending every year by 7%, [15] [19] with the proportion of that going to basic research increasing from 6% to more than 8%. [19] and aid the development of real-world applications by fostering closer links between business, industry, and academia – historically such links have been weak. [19] Businesses will be encouraged to invest in R&D through tax incentives. [15] [19]

The plan aims to boost quantum information and computing, [20] : 95  brain science, semiconductors, seed industry, genetic research, regenerative medicine, biotechnology, clinical medicine and health, and deep space, deep sea and polar exploration. The plan prioritizes development towards an integrated communications system, including earth observation and navigation satellites. [21] : 81 

The plan set the goal of building four comprehensive national science centers, to be located in Huairou, Zhangjiang, the Greater Bay Area, and Hefei. [22] : 123 

China still is unable to independently develop advanced semiconductors that match the performance of those made in Taiwan or South Korea. [23] Acknowledging the challenges that lay ahead, influential officials, entrepreneurs, and academics have evoked the "patriotic spirit of scientists" and called on Chinese students and entrepreneurs to "gnaw on the hard bones" to help China build an independent, controllable semiconductor supply chain.

China has more than 7,200 licensed seed companies but few have the capability for innovation. Tang Renjian, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, said the ministry is studying a plan to help its animal and plant breeding sector close the gap with foreign countries. [24]

About a trillion dollars of government funding have been set aside under the technology initiative, part of which will be used by central and local governments to jointly invest in a series of third-generation chip projects, according to people with knowledge of the matter. [25]

“For our country, technology and innovation is not just a matter of growth," Liu He told a three-story auditorium packed with China's top scientists in a separate meeting in May 2021. "It's also a matter of survival." [26]

Urbanization

The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan sets a target urbanization rate of 65%, as measured by permanent population living in cities (i.e., as opposed to hukou status). [22] : 206 

The plan directs the development of more centralized cities and avoiding urban sprawl. [21] : 114–115  The plan calls for acceleration of urban renewal to develop "human-centric cities." [21] : 115  The plan's related Climate Change Special Plan emphasizes ecologically oriented urban planning, including through means like urban green rings, public transportation, and bicycle lanes and walking paths. [21] : 114 

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References

  1. ↑ Hale, Thomas; Liu, Xinning; Yang, Yuan (17 April 2020). "China's economy shrinks for first time in four decades". Financial Times. Retrieved 30 November 2020.
  2. 1 2 Roach, Stephen S. (2022). Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN   978-0-300-26901-7. OCLC   1347023475.
  3. ↑ Liu, Zongyuan Zoe (2023). Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances its Global Ambitions. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. doi:10.2307/jj.2915805. ISBN   9780674271913. JSTOR   jj.2915805. S2CID   259402050.
  4. ↑ "李克强主持召开研究部署"十四五"规划编制专题会议" [Li Keqiang presided over a special meeting to study and deploy the preparation of the "14th Five-Year Plan"]. State Council of the People's Republic of China . 26 November 2019. Retrieved 26 September 2023.
  5. ↑ "习近平总书记担任规划《建议》起草组组长，亲自领导《建议》的制定" [General Secretary Xi Jinping served as the leader of the drafting group of the planning "Recommendations" and personally led the formulation of the "Recommendations"]. Xinhua News Agency . 30 October 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2023.
  6. ↑ Tiezzi, Shannon (29 October 2020). "China's Fifth Plenum: What You Need to Know". The Diplomat. Retrieved 30 November 2020.
  7. ↑ Wang, Orange; Zheng, William; Mai, Jun; Xie, Echo (30 October 2020). "Five-year plan: China moves to technology self-sufficiency". South China Morning Post . Retrieved 30 November 2020.
  8. ↑ Sukri, Azhar (30 October 2020). "Five questions about China's latest five-year plan". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  9. ↑ "China's 14th Five-Year Plan: A First Look". Congressional Research Service. 12 November 2020. Retrieved 30 December 2020.
  10. ↑ Kevin Yao (15 September 2020). "What we know about China's 'dual circulation' economic strategy". Reuters. Retrieved 30 December 2020.
  11. 1 2 Jin, Keyu (2023). The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism. New York: Viking. ISBN   978-1-9848-7828-1.
  12. ↑ Myers, Steven Lee (25 September 2020). "China's Pledge to Be Carbon Neutral by 2060: What It Means". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  13. ↑ "The 14th Five Year Plan: what ideas are on the table?". China Dialogue. 7 August 2019. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  14. ↑ "China's 14th Five-Year Plan: A First Look". Congressional Research Service . January 5, 2021. Archived from the original on September 24, 2023. Retrieved October 6, 2023.
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 Cooper, Benjamin (1 April 2021). "China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) Report". Hill+Knowlton Strategies. Archived from the original on 11 April 2021. Retrieved 27 May 2021.
  16. 1 2 3 4 5 "Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People's Republic of China_ News_ 福建省人民政府门户网站". www.fujian.gov.cn. Retrieved 2021-08-19.
  17. ↑ "China eyes 60 GW of hydropower on Tibet's Brahmaputra river – state media". Reuters. 30 November 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2020.
  18. ↑ "China to add over 30 civil transport airports by 2025 – China.org.cn". www.china.org.cn. Retrieved 2021-08-19.
  19. 1 2 3 4 5 Mallapaty, Smriti (11 March 2021). "China's five-year plan focuses on scientific self-reliance". Nature. 591 (7850): 353–354. Bibcode:2021Natur.591..353M. doi: 10.1038/d41586-021-00638-3 . PMID   33707693. S2CID   232208744.
  20. ↑ Bachulska, Alicja; Leonard, Mark; Oertel, Janka (2 July 2024). The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People (EPUB). Berlin, Germany: European Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN   978-1-916682-42-9. Archived from the original on 17 July 2024. Retrieved 22 July 2024.
  21. 1 2 3 4 Curtis, Simon; Klaus, Ian (2024). The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. doi:10.2307/jj.11589102. ISBN   9780300266900. JSTOR   jj.11589102.
  22. 1 2 Hu, Richard (2023). Reinventing the Chinese City. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN   978-0-231-21101-7.
  23. ↑ Thomas, Christopher A. (2021-01-07). "Lagging but motivated: The state of China's semiconductor industry". Brookings. Retrieved 2022-05-10.
  24. ↑ "China seed industry seeks better laws to support innovation". CNA.
  25. ↑ "Xi Jinping Picks Top Lieutenant to Lead China's Chip Battle Against U.S." Bloomberg. 17 June 2021.
  26. ↑ "China Is Still Searching for a Chipmaking Advance That Changes the Game". www.bloomberg.com. 27 July 2021. Retrieved 2021-08-19.
14th Five-Year Plan
Simplified Chinese 十四五规划
Traditional Chinese 十四五規劃
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyin Shísìwǔ Guīhuà
Preceded by
13th Plan
2016 – 2020
 14th Five-Year Plan
2021–2025		Succeeded by
Current
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