THAAD deployment by South Korea

Last updated

On 7 February 2016, South Korea announced consultations over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which was officially announced to be implemented on 8 July 2016. The deployment was strongly opposed by China and Russia. South Korea argued that this military deployment was only a defensive measure to deal with North Korea, while China believed that the deployment of the THAAD system would affect its national security and took a number of countermeasures against South Korea, including implementing a Hallyu ban. These measures also led to a rapid deterioration of relations between China and South Korea.

Contents

On 6 March 2017, the system's launchers arrived in South Korea, and the South Korean side said that the system would be in service as early as April. On April 26, two launchers were deployed in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang Province, and on September 12, the temporary deployment of the remaining four launchers was completed. All six launchers were confirmed to have normal fire control radar and were in operational status. On November 22, China and South Korea reached a consensus, and the South Korean side stated that it "will not consider adding THAAD system, will not join the US anti-missile system, will not develop the trilateral military alliance of South Korea, the United States and Japan, and has no intention of harming China's security interests". Since then, relations between the two countries have gradually warmed up.

Background

In late 2016, the United States and South Korea jointly announced the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), in response to nuclear and missile threats by North Korea. [1] The move drew opposition from China and Russia. [2] [3] The U.S. states that the deployment of the THAAD is “purely a defensive measure… only aimed at North Korea” and has no intention to threaten China's security interests. China has continuously expressed its opposition over South Korea and U.S.’s decision because of its concern that the deployment of THAAD might be a measure by the U.S. to contain China. [4] [5]

Reactions from China

Stating that the THAAD will undermine China's own nuclear deterrent capability, China’s Ambassador Qiu Guohong warned that the deployment of THAAD could “destroy” the China–South Korea ties in an instant, whereas the spokesperson of the president of South Korea warned China that deploying the THAAD is a “matter we will decide upon according to our own security and national interests." [6] In February 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that having THAAD in South Korea would "shatter the regional strategic balance" and that the system exceeded South Korea's need. [7] In 2017, a Chinese military official said that the deployment had a negative influence on "bilateral military ties and mutual trust" with the United States. [8]

Unit sales and year-on-year rate in China. From March 2017, unit sales plummeted in retaliation for the installation of THAAD. Hyundai Motor Sales in China.svg
Unit sales and year-on-year rate in China. From March 2017, unit sales plummeted in retaliation for the installation of THAAD.

With South Korea's decision in 2017 to accept the deployment of THAAD in the country, although China's government shied away from formal sanctions and measures, it has urged its citizens through official media to express their displeasure and ill will at South Korea over the move. [9] Chinese citizens were allowed to gather to protest. The news media has reported of citizen boycotts of South Korean products like Hyundai cars, of South Korean goods being removed from supermarket shelves, and tourists and travel companies canceling trips to South Korea. [10]

South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group became a particular focus. Lotte had agreed to an exchange of land, a golf course in Seongju, with the South Korean government that will be used for the THAAD deployment. In addition to a consumer boycott of Lotte stores in China, municipal authorities suddenly discovered that Lotte stores and factories to be in contravention of fire safety regulations and other local ordinances which has resulted in the closure of 75 out of 99 Lotte supermarkets. [10] [11] [12]

March sales of Hyundai and its sister brand Kia Motors in China plunged 52 per cent from a year earlier to 72,000 vehicles, the lowest level since 2014. [10] Chinese tourism also dropped 39.4% (compared to March 2016) in March. [13] Opinion polls conducted in South Korea found less favorable perceptions of China. [14]

Korean culture, singers, actors and dancers are popular with Chinese youth because of the development of the internet and export of Korean cultural content. [15] After the 2017 THAAD deployment, a Hallyu ban was placed. In China, Hallyu cultural events were canceled, Korean actors had to quit from their works and limited Korean media could be exported to China. The ban was lifted soon after, and relations cooled. [16]

Aftermath

To relieve the economic strain the informal Chinese sanctions placed on South Korea, president Moon promised “three No-s,” saying that he would not participate in the US missile defense system, that he was not considering the additional deployment of THAAD, and that Japan-US-Korea security cooperation would not develop into a military alliance. [17]

For aims of a détente (a relaxation of tension), China and South Korea held a summit in Hangzhou, eastern China, on Sept. 5, 2016 with each party's leaders, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-Hye, to discuss the issue of THAAD. During the summit, Park reemphasized that the THAAD deployment is only to be aimed against North Korea and that there should be no reason for China's security interest to be concerned. However, Xi reiterated China's firm stance against the deployment of THAAD stating that it could “intensify disputes". Yet, the two countries still emphasized the long history of their relationship and agreed that a stable and healthy bilateral relationship will benefit both countries. [18]

References

  1. Sherman, Paul; Haenle, Anne (2016-09-12). "The Real Answer to China's THAAD Dilemma". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2022-04-23. Retrieved 2022-04-29.
  2. "THAAD missile defense system". Thomson Reuters . May 2, 2017. Archived from the original on December 31, 2021. Retrieved March 8, 2022.
  3. Panda, Ankit (June 4, 2017). "Why China and Russia Continue to Oppose THAAD". The Diplomat . Archived from the original on March 8, 2022. Retrieved March 8, 2022.
  4. Rice, Susan (2016-07-26). "Why I'm Here: The Importance of the U.S. — China Relationship". The White House (President Barack Obama) Archives. Archived from the original on 2022-04-04. Retrieved 2022-04-29.
  5. "'No Nukes, No THAAD': South Korean town calls for missile defense..." Reuters. 2018-07-06. Archived from the original on 2019-05-28. Retrieved 2019-05-28.
  6. Tiezzi, Shannon (2016-02-25). "China Warns THAAD Deployment Could Destroy South Korea Ties 'in an Instant'". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2022-04-08. Retrieved 2022-04-29.
  7. Shalal, Andrea; Stewart, Phil (25 February 2016). "China cites concerns on U.S. missile defense system in South Korea". Reuters.
  8. Blanchard, Ben; Martina, Michael (17 August 2017). Perry, Michael; Fernandez, Clarence (eds.). "China military criticizes 'wrong' U.S. moves on Taiwan, South China Sea". Reuters.
  9. McDonell, Stephen (13 March 2017). "China fuels anger over Seoul's missile move". BBC News . Archived from the original on 5 October 2018. Retrieved 21 June 2018.
  10. 1 2 3 "South Korea's Hyundai, Kia sales halve in China amid diplomatic spat over THAAD". South China Morning Post . 5 April 2017. Archived from the original on 2017-04-05.
  11. Mullen, Jethro; Han, Sol (7 March 2017). "One company is bearing the brunt of China's anger over U.S. missile system". CNN Money . Archived from the original on 13 March 2017. Retrieved 14 March 2017.
  12. Hernandez, Javier; Guo, Owen; McMorrow, Ryan (9 March 2017). "South Korean Stores Feel China's Wrath as U.S. Missile System Is Deployed". The New York Times . Archived from the original on 2 August 2017. Retrieved 14 March 2017.
  13. 신. 호. 경. (April 5, 2017). "3월 중국인 관광객 39% 줄어… '사드 보복' 영향" [Chinese tourists decrease by 39% in March ... Impact of 'THAAD Revenge']. Yonhap News . Archived from the original on April 5, 2017. Retrieved April 5, 2017.
  14. "Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China". The Asan Institute for Policy Studies. March 20, 2017. Archived from the original on April 27, 2021. Retrieved April 26, 2021.
  15. Sun, Meicheng; Liew, Kai Khiun (2019-12-01). Written at Singapore. "Analog Hallyu: Historicizing K-pop formations in China". Global Media and China. 4 (4). Nanyang Technological University: 419–436. doi: 10.1177/2059436419881915 . ISSN   2059-4364. S2CID   214314200.
  16. Frater, Patrick (2021-03-03). "China Poised to Give Korean Content a Boost After Three Year Boycott". Variety . Archived from the original on 2021-11-02. Retrieved 2021-11-02.
  17. Stangarone, Troy (October 30, 2019). "Did South Korea's Three Noes Matter? Not So Much". The Diplomat . Archived from the original on March 7, 2021. Retrieved March 11, 2021.
  18. Song, Sang-ho (2016-09-05). "(6th LD) Park, Xi reconfirm differences over THAAD, agree to strengthen communication". Yonhap News Agency . Archived from the original on 2022-04-29. Retrieved 2022-04-29.