Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party

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Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
中国共产党中央委员会宣传部
AbbreviationZhongxuanbu (中宣部)
FormationMay 1924;101 years ago (1924-05)
TypeDepartment directly reporting to the Central Committee
Ministerial level agency
Headquarters5 Chang'an Avenue, Xicheng District, Beijing
Coordinates 39°55′26″N116°23′55″E / 39.92389°N 116.39861°E / 39.92389; 116.39861
Li Shulei
Executive deputy head
 Hu Heping
Deputy heads
 Shen Haixiong*, Zhuang Rongwen*, Cao Shumin*, Sun Yeli*, Zhang Jianchun, Wang Gang
Parent organization
 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Subsidiaries National Radio and Television Administration
China International Communications Group
National Office for the Fight Against Pornography and Illegal Publications
Website www.wenming.cn OOjs UI icon edit-ltr-progressive.svg
*Maintains full minister-level rank
CCP Central Publicity Department
(common abbreviation)
Simplified Chinese 中共中央宣传部
Traditional Chinese 中共中央宣傳部
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyin Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù

The Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, also known as the Propaganda Department or Central Propaganda Department, is an internal division of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge of ideology, propaganda, and media regulation.

Contents

The department was established by the CCP in May 1924, structured using its counterpart in the Soviet Union as a model. In 1941, the department was put in charge of leading and reviewing newspapers and magazines. It became responsible for implementing CCP policies in literary and artistic work and news work in 1943. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the department had an increased role in activities related to mass organizations like trade unions, artists' associations, and party branches. The department was abolished shortly after the Cultural Revolution, with its powers transferred to the Cultural Revolution Group. In October 1977, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the department was re-established. In 2018, the powers of the department was expanded, with the newly created National Radio and Television Administration put under its control as part of the "deepening the reform of the Party and state institutions."

The department exercises direct leadership over the media control system, and is one of the main entities that enforces media censorship and control in the People's Republic of China. The department also engages in propaganda work for both domestic and foreign audiences designed to increase support for the CCP, and is also responsible for researching, devising, and disseminating the ideology of the CCP. Additionally, the department monitors and researches public opinion about public support for CCP policies. Its inner operations are highly secretive.

History

Former site in Hankou Yi Kou Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Xuan Chuan Bu Jiu Zhi .jpg
Former site in Hankou

Following the 1st Party National Congress in 1921, the CCP Central Committee decided to establish the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP. [1] [2] [3] [ better source needed ] The department was founded in May 1924. At its 1924 establishment, the department was structured using its counterpart in the Soviet Union as a model. [4] : 136  The Resolution on Propaganda Work of the 4th Party National Congress in 1925 stipulated that "in order to make propaganda work perfect and systematic, the Central Committee should have a strong propaganda department to be responsible for all matters and to guide the local propaganda departments to have a close and systematic relationship with it." [5] [6] [ better source needed ]

In October 1928, the CCP Central Committee required the establishment and improvement of the organization of the Central Propaganda Department, mandating provincial committees, the county and district committees set up local propaganda departments and that the party branches have propaganda officers to be responsible for propaganda work. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [ excessive citations ] In 1938, Mao Zedong stated that the department's focus should be publishing text books for soldiers and instructional material for cadres. [12] : 134  During World War II, the department was assigned leadership and censorship tasks in the areas of theory, opinion, education, and culture as part of the war effort. [4] : 136 

On May 25, 1941, the Central Committee's Instructions on Unifying External Propaganda in Various Base Areas stipulated that "all external propaganda leadership should be unified under the Propaganda Department" [13] [14] and established a system for the Propaganda Department to lead and review newspapers and magazines. [15] [16] On June 20, 1941, the "Outline of the Central Propaganda Department on the Party’s Propaganda and Mobilization Work" pointed out that “all theories, propositions, education, culture, literature and art, etc., belong to the scope of propaganda and mobilization activities” and “printing, radio and film are powerful tools for propaganda and mobilization." After 1943, the Central Propaganda Department was responsible for implementing the Party's policies in literary and artistic work and news work. [17] In 1946, the Central Propaganda Department put forward requirements for positive propaganda in the Notice on the Propaganda Policy of Broadcasting and Newspapers. [18]

After 1949

Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Central Propaganda Department managed cultural and educational work. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the department had an increased role in activities related to mass organizations like trade unions, artists' associations, and party branches. [4] : 136  It became an important mechanism for mass line politics. [4] : 136  Under the leadership of the Central Propaganda Department, it organized the Central Broadcasting Administration, the Central Publishing Committee, the Central Film Administration and other institutions. In December 1949, the Central Propaganda Department issued an instruction that party newspapers at all levels should not publicly promote themselves as official newspapers of the CCP, nor should they say that they are official newspapers of the government; they should simply say that they are newspapers of a certain place. [18]

In the autumn of 1962, the Central Propaganda Department began to abolish the Party Committee system of literary and art units. Xu Guangxiao implemented this system in the Ministry of Culture. Many units abolished the Party Committee system. In 1962, Yao Wenyuan 's article criticizing "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" was resisted by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee headed by Peng Zhen and the Central Propaganda Department headed by Lu Dingyi. In 1966, Mao Zedong pointed out that the Central Propaganda Department was "the palace of the King of Hell" and that "the King of Hell should be overthrown and the little devils should be liberated." He criticized Peng Zhen, the Central Propaganda Department and the Beijing Municipal Committee for protecting bad people, suppressing leftists and not allowing revolution. He also said that if bad people were to be protected again, the Central Propaganda Department would be dissolved, the Beijing Municipal Committee would be dissolved, and the "Five-Person Group" would be dissolved. [19]

Shortly after the Cultural Revolution, the Central Propaganda Department was abolished. According to the May 16th Notice of the Central Committee in May 1966, its powers were concurrently held by the Cultural Revolution Group. The appendix to the May 16th Notice stated: "The Central Propaganda Department is the palace of the King of Hell", "the King of Hell should be overthrown and the little devils should be liberated", and "the Central Propaganda Department should be dissolved". Lu Dingyi was labeled a "counter-revolutionary." Nine deputy ministers of the Propaganda Department were labeled "traitors," "spies," and "Kuomintang members," respectively. The Minister, deputy ministers, and secretary-general of the Propaganda Department were the first to be implicated, referred to as the "Kings of Hell." An enlarged meeting of the Politburo made a "Decision on the Suspension and Removal of Comrades Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shangkun from Their Posts," and issued an "Explanation on the Errors of Comrades Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun". Tao Zhu was transferred to serve as the Executive Secretary of the Secretariat, concurrently holding the position of Minister of the Propaganda Department. Deputy Ministers Xu Liqun, Yao Zhen, and Lin Mohan, and Secretary-General Tong Dalin were suspended from their duties for self-reflection. [20]

On June 23, the Cultural Revolution Group of the Propaganda Department, headed by Tao Zhu, was established. In 1967, the department established the Office for the Translation of Chairman Mao's works. [21] : 86  At a meeting of all staff members of the Propaganda Department, Tao Zhu announced the "Decision of the Central Committee on Reorganizing the Leadership of the Propaganda Department," and announced the abolition of the original departments and offices, replacing them with four departments and one office: the Department of Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda, the Department of Party Member and Cadre Education, the Department of Cadre Management, the Secretariat, and the Investigation and Research Office. On July 27, 1968, the Central Committee decided to impose military control on the former Central Propaganda Department, and appointed Li Xiao as the head of the military control group and Wang Shaoping as the deputy head. After the Central Propaganda Department was first smashed as a "palace of the King of Hell", propaganda, publishing and cultural departments at all levels of the Party and government were also "smashed" and then "militarily controlled". [22]

In October 1977, the 11th CCP National Congress approved the "Report on the Establishment of the Central Propaganda Department", reorganized the department, restoring its original functions and powers, and appointed Zhang Pinghua as its head. [23] The directive on the re-establishment of the Central Propaganda Department reveals the structure and organization of the "extremely secretive" body, according to Anne-Marie Brady. [24] The directive states that the department will be set up with one Director and several deputies, and the organizational structure will be set up with one office and five bureaus. The office is in charge of political, secretarial and administrative work, and the five bureaus are: the Bureau of Theory, Bureau of Propaganda and Education, Bureau of Arts and Culture, Bureau of News, and Bureau of Publishing. The directive states that the staff will be fixed at around 200 personnel, selected from propaganda personnel across the country in consultation with the Central Organization Department. [24]

New departments and offices were set up in 2004 to deal with the growing demands of information control. [24] The Bureau of Public Opinion is in charge of commissioning public opinion surveys and other relevant research. [24] The department organized networks of cultural workers' associations which were headed by the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. [4] : 136  The state incorporated existing cultural enterprises into the state apparatus, which provided stable income and working environments for artists. [4] : 136  In 2018, the newly created National Radio and Television Administration was put under its control as part of the deepening the reform of the Party and state institutions. [25] [26]

Name

The CCPPD has several Chinese names with various different English translations. Officially it is the Zhōngguó Gòngchăndǎng Zhōngyāng Wěiyuánhuì Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Publicity Department" or Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Publicity Department" or "Central Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China", colloquially abbreviated as the Zhōnggòng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Publicity Department" or "Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China", or simply Zhōng xuānbù (中宣部). [27]

The term xuanchuan (宣传 "propaganda; publicity") has a neutral connotation. Some xuanchuan collocations can be translated as "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn宣传战 "propaganda war"), others as "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán宣传员 "propagandist; publicist"). [28]

The Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù changed its official English name from "Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China" to "Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China". [29] [27] As China's involvement in world affairs grew in the 1990s, the CCP became sensitive to the negative connotations of the English translation propaganda for xuanchuan. [30] Official replacement translations include publicity, information, and political communication [24] : 73  When Ding Guangen traveled abroad on official visits, he was known as the Minister of Information. [31]

External names

Under the "one institution with two names" system, the Central Propaganda Department has several external names it uses when dealing with a particular manner (i.e., a public government statement). These names include:

Function

The Central Propaganda Department has a "direct leadership (Chinese :领导; pinyin :lingdao)" role in the media control system, working with other organizations like the National Radio and Television Administration. [24] : 17  The Central Propaganda Department's tasks include managing, guiding, and censoring China's newspaper, publishing, radio, television, and film industries to align with the CCP. [33] Internet censorship is handled by the Cyberspace Administration of China. The department also engages in propaganda work for both domestic and foreign audiences designed to increase support for the CCP, and is also responsible for researching, devising, and disseminating the ideology of the CCP, CCP theory and the Core Socialist Values. Additionally, the department monitors and researches public opinion about public support for CCP policies and to track potential political instability and engages in arts, culture, foreign cultural exchanges, as well as human rights propaganda. [34]

According to Bill Schiller of the Toronto Star , its scope is to control licensing of media outlets, and to give instructions to the media on what is and what is not to be said, especially about certain issues, like Taiwan, Tibet, etc., that can affect state security, or the rule of the CCP. [35] He says its central offices are located in an unmarked building near the Zhongnanhai at 5 West Chang'an Avenue, although the department has offices throughout the country at the provincial, municipal, and county level. [35] Schiller says the editors-in-chief of China's major media outlets must attend the department's central office weekly to receive instructions on which stories should be emphasized, downplayed, or not reported at all. [35] These instructions are not normally known to the public, but are communicated to media workers at the weekly meeting or via secret bulletins. [35] However, since the rise of social networking tools, Propaganda Department instructions have been leaked to the internet. Examples presented by Schiller include "All websites need to use bright red color to promote a celebratory atmosphere [of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic]" and "negative reports... not exceed 30 per cent". [35]

Propaganda Department directives are enforced by disciplines within the CCP, as all media in China are required to be loyal to the CCP, and are to serve as propaganda organs for the CCP in principle. [24] [36] Operational and reporting freedom increased in the Chinese media in the early 2000s. [37] However, open defiance against the Propaganda Department directives is rare, as dissenting media organizations risk severe punishment, including restructuring or closure. [37] In 2000, a system of warnings was introduced for individual journalists, whereby repeat offenses can lead to dismissal. [35] One Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, was sentenced to prison after giving Propaganda Department instructions to a pro-democracy website; according to an American organization, the Dui Hua Foundation, the case was related to "illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities". [38]

One important way the Propaganda Department has ensured that the media system remains well controlled is by ensuring that the boundaries of acceptable reporting are kept "deliberately fuzzy" in an effort to ensure that "news workers self-censor to a critical degree." [37]

Credentialing and monitoring media personnel

According to a report from Freedom House, the Central Propaganda Department is the most important institution for monitoring media personnel and controlling the content of print and visual media. [39]

The report says that the Central Propaganda Department plays a key role in monitoring editors and journalists through a national registration system. It also says that in 2003, the CPD, along with the General Administration of Press and Publication and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, required Chinese journalists to attend nearly 50 hours of training on Marxism, the role of CCP leadership in the media, copyright law, libel law, national security law, regulations governing news content, and journalistic ethics prior to renewing press identification passes in 2003. [39] The report states that media personnel are required to participate in "ideological training sessions", where they are evaluated for their "loyalty to the party." Further "political indoctrination" courses are said to occur at meetings and training retreats to study party political ideology, and the role of the media in "thought work" (sīxiǎng gōngzuò思想工作). [39]

As of 2009, 90 percent of China's newspapers consisted of light stories regarding sport and entertainment, which are rarely regulated. [35] [ needs update ]

In 2019, the Media Oversight Office (传媒监管局) of the Central Propaganda Department announced that training and testing of news professionals nationwide would be handled through the Xuexi Qiangguo mobile app. [40] [41]

According to Radio Free Asia, in December 2022, the department issued a directive stating that in order to obtain credentials as a professional journalist, they must pass a national exam and "...must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, conscientiously study, publicize and implement Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the party’s theory, line, principles and policies, and adhere to the correct political direction and public opinion guidance." [42]

Structure

The leadership of the Propaganda Department is selected with guidance from the CCP General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the media, while local committees of the Propaganda Department work with lower levels of the party-state hierarchy to transmit content priorities to the media. [39] The department's inner operations are highly secretive. [43] The department has the following organizations: [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [ excessive citations ]

Internal organization

  • General Office
  • Policy and Regulation Research Office
  • Cadre Bureau
  • Theory Bureau
  • Publicity and Education Bureau
  • Culture and Arts Bureau
  • Public Opinion Information Bureau
  • Government Information Bureau
  • External Information Bureau
  • International Liaison Bureau
  • External Promotion Bureau
  • International Communications Bureau
  • Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Information Bureau
  • Human Rights Affairs Bureau (Human Rights Affairs Bureau of the State Council Information Office)
  • Publishing House
  • Media Regulatory Authority
  • Printing and Distribution Bureau
  • Office for the Fight Against Pornography and Illegal Publications (National Office for the Fight Against Pornography and Illegal Publications)
  • Copyright Administration
  • Import and Export Administration
  • Film Bureau
  • Civilization Creation Bureau
  • Civilization Cultivation Bureau
  • Civilized Practice Bureau
  • Retired Cadres Bureau
  • National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences
  • Office of Cultural System Reform and Development
  • Administration Bureau
  • Party Committee

Public institution managed by the Publicity Department

Directly affiliated institutions

  • Publicity Department Service Center (Information Center)
  • Publicity and Public Opinion Research Center of the Publicity Department
  • People's Publishing House
  • China Press and Publication Research Institute
  • News and Publishing Newspapers
  • China Copyright Protection Center
  • China National Library of Editions (Central Publicity Department Publications Data Center)
  • Central Publicity Department Publication Product Quality Supervision and Inspection Center (Central Publicity Department Publication Review Center)
  • National Publishing Fund Planning and Management Office
  • China Research Institute of Film Science and Technology
  • Film Technology Quality Inspection Institute of the Central Publicity Department
  • China Film Archive (China Film Art Research Center)
  • Film Script Planning and Design Center of the Central Publicity Department
  • Film Digital Program Management Center of the Central Publicity Department
  • Office of the National Film Industry Development Special Fund Management Committee
  • Film Satellite Channel Program Production Center of the Central Publicity Department
  • Human Rights Development and Exchange Center of the Central Publicity Department (Human Rights Development and Exchange Center of the State Council Information Office)
  • National Publicity Cadres College
  • Party Building Magazine
  • Current Affairs Report Magazine
  • China Daily
  • Editorial Department of China Civilization Network
  • Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
  • Ideological and Political Work Research Magazine

Directly affiliated enterprises

Responsible social groups

Other

The department publishes a journal called International Communication (Chinese :对外传播). [53] The Central Propaganda Department owns and runs the following organizations:

The department also owns and controls the following state-owned enterprises:

Leaders

Composition as of the 20th Central Committee

Further reading

References

  1. ↑ "中國共產黨第一個綱領". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2019-04-25. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  2. ↑ "中国共产党中央局通告—关于建立与发展党、团、工会组织及宣传工作等". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2020-07-10. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  3. ↑ "新闻宣传异同论". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2020-04-13. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Laikwan, Pang (2024). One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503638822. ISBN   9781503638815.
  5. ↑ "《党内组织及宣传教育问题议决案》". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2019-04-10. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  6. ↑ "對於宣傳工作之議決案". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2020-07-10. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  7. ↑ "中央通告第四号——关于宣传鼓动工作". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2019-05-02. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  8. ↑ "中国共产党民主革命时期宣传工作思想述论" (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2015-09-23. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  9. ↑ "中央特别通告——关于组织兵士暴动问题". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2019-05-02. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  10. ↑ "中央通告第六十号——执行武装保护苏联的实际策略". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2019-05-02. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  11. ↑ "中国共产党第三次修正章程决案第十九条". Xinhua News Agency (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2013-05-23. Retrieved 2012-11-08.
  12. ↑ Li, Ying (2024). Red Ink: A History of Printing and Politics in China. Royal Collins Press. ISBN   9781487812737.
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  14. ↑ "对于组织问题之议决案". Xinhua News Agency . Archived from the original on 2013-03-13. Retrieved 2012-11-08.
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  18. 1 2 "《关于中央人民政府成立后党的文化教育工作问题的指示》". Xinhua News Agency (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2008-08-27. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  19. ↑ "点燃"文化大革命"的三把火". People's Daily (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2011-05-14. Retrieved 2012-10-09.
  20. ↑ 1967年5月18日人民日报《伟大的历史文件》：“我们伟大领袖毛主席正是总结了国际无产阶级专政的历史经验，发动亿万群众，进行这场史无前例的无产阶级文化大革命，这是使我们党和国家永不变色的最可靠的保证。这是毛泽东同志在理论上和实践上对国际无产阶级的最大的贡献。在这个文件中，宣布撤销原来由彭真反革命修正主义集团包办的“文化革命五人小组”，重新设立中央文化革命小组，隶属于中央政治局常委之下。这是进行无产阶级文化大革命的一个重要措施。”
  21. ↑ Xu, Lanjun (2013). "Translation and Internationalism". In Cook, Alexander C. (ed.). Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107298576. ISBN   978-1-107-05722-7.
  22. ↑ 《中国共产党组织史资料: "文化大革命"时期》，第六卷，中共党史出版社，2000
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  30. ↑ Mackinnon, Stephen R. (January 1997). "Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period". Modern China . 23 (1): 3–32. doi:10.1177/009770049702300101. ISSN   0097-7004. JSTOR   189462. S2CID   148316475.
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  38. ↑ Bradsher, Keith (2007-08-15). "China cracks down on 'false news'". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2023-12-11. Retrieved 2023-12-11.
  39. 1 2 3 4 Esarey, Ashley (February 2006). "Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China" (PDF). Freedom House. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 3, 2014. Retrieved May 9, 2020.
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  42. ↑ Hsia, Hsiao-hwa; Man, Jojo (12 January 2023). Foster, Malcolm (ed.). "China forces journalists to take exam to demonstrate loyalty, political correctness". Radio Free Asia . Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Archived from the original on 12 January 2023. Retrieved 12 January 2023.
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