Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party

"Central Propaganda Department" redirects here. For the Vietnamese department, see Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

中国共产党中央委员会宣传部
Former office in Hankou
Abbreviation	Zhongxuanbu (中宣部)
Formation	May 1924;100 years ago (1924-05)
Type	Department directly reporting to the Central Committee Ministerial level agency
Headquarters	5 Chang'an Avenue, Xicheng District, Beijing
Coordinates	39°55′26″N116°23′55″E / 39.92389°N 116.39861°E / 39.92389; 116.39861
Head	Li Shulei
Executive deputy head	Hu Heping
Deputy heads	Shen Haixiong*, Zhuang Rongwen*, Cao Shumin*, Sun Yeli*, Zhang Jianchun, Wang Gang
Parent organization	Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Subsidiaries	National Radio and Television Administration China International Communications Group
*Maintains full minister-level rank

CCP Central Publicity Department (common abbreviation)
Simplified Chinese	中共中央宣传部
Traditional Chinese	中共中央宣傳部
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù

The Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, also known as the Propaganda Department or Central Propaganda Department, is an internal division of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge of spreading its ideology, media regulation, as well as creation and dissemination of propaganda. ^{[1] [2] [3]} The department is also one of the main entities that enforces media censorship and control in the People's Republic of China. ^{[2] [4]} The department is a key organ in the CCP's propaganda system, and its inner operations are highly secretive. ^{[1] [5]}

History

The department was founded in May 1924, and was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, until it was restored in October 1977. ^[1]

During World War II, the department was assigned leadership and censorship tasks in the areas of theory, opinion, education, and culture as part of the war effort. ^{[6] : 136}

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the department had an increased role in activities related to mass organizations like trade unions, artists' associations, and party branches. ^{[6] : 136} It became an important mechanism for mass line politics. ^{[6] : 136}

The department organized networks of cultural workers' associations which were headed by the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. ^{[6] : 136} The state incorporated existing cultural enterprises into the state apparatus, which provided stable income and working environments for artists. ^{[6] : 136}

In 2018, the newly created National Radio and Television Administration was put under its control. ^{[4] [7]}

Name

The CCPPD has several Chinese names with various different English translations. Officially it is the Zhōngguó Gòngchăndǎng Zhōngyāng Wěiyuánhuì Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Publicity Department" or Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Publicity Department" or "Central Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China", colloquially abbreviated as the Zhōnggòng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Publicity Department" or "Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China", or simply Zhōng xuānbù (中宣部). ^[3]

The term xuanchuan (宣传 "propaganda; publicity") has a neutral connotation. Some xuanchuan collocations can be translated as "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn宣传战 "propaganda war"), others as "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán宣传员 "propagandist; publicist"). ^[8]

The Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù changed its official English name from "Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China" to "Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China". ^{[9] [3]} As China's involvement in world affairs grew in the 1990s, the CCP became sensitive to the negative connotations of the English translation propaganda for xuanchuan. ^[10] Official replacement translations include publicity, information, and political communication ^{[1] : 73} When Ding Guangen traveled abroad on official visits, he was known as the Minister of Information. ^[11]

External names

Under the "one institution with two names" system, the Central Propaganda Department has several external names it uses when dealing with a particular manner (i.e., a public government statement). These names include:

• State Council Information Office (SCIO, absorbed in 2014) ^[12]
• National Press and Publication Administration (NPPA, 国家新闻出版署)
• National Copyright Administration (NCA, 国家版权局)
• China Film Administration (CFA, 国家电影局)

The Central Propaganda Department owns and runs the following organizations:

• China International Communications Group
• People's Press
• China Film Archive
• China Daily
• Museum of the Chinese Communist Party
• China Human Rights Foundation ^[13]

The department also owns and controls the following state-owned enterprises:

• China Film Group Corporation
• China Publishing Group ^[14]
• China International Communication Center ^[15]
• China Intercontinental Press ^[16]
• China Intercontinental Communication Center ^[16]
• Global Tone Communication Technology (GTCOM) ^{[17] [18]}

Function

Further information: Propaganda in China, Censorship in China, Internet censorship in China, and Chinese information operations and information warfare

The Central Propaganda Department has a "direct leadership (Chinese :领导; pinyin :lingdao)" role in the media control system, working with other organizations like the National Radio and Television Administration. ^{[1] : 17} According to Bill Schiller of the Toronto Star , its scope is to control licensing of media outlets, and to give instructions to the media on what is and what is not to be said, especially about certain issues, like Taiwan, Tibet, etc., that can affect state security, or the rule of the CCP. ^[19] He says its central offices are located in an unmarked building near the Zhongnanhai at 5 West Chang'an Avenue, although the department has offices throughout the country at the provincial, municipal, and county level. ^[19]

Schiller says the editors-in-chief of China's major media outlets must attend the department's central office weekly to receive instructions on which stories should be emphasized, downplayed, or not reported at all. ^[19] These instructions are not normally known to the public, but are communicated to media workers at the weekly meeting or via secret bulletins. ^[19] However, since the rise of social networking tools, Propaganda Department instructions have been leaked to the internet. Examples presented by Schiller include "All websites need to use bright red color to promote a celebratory atmosphere [of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic]" and "negative reports... not exceed 30 per cent". ^[19]

Propaganda Department directives are enforced by disciplines within the CCP, as all media in China are required to be loyal to the CCP, and are to serve as propaganda organs for the CCP in principle. ^{[1] [20]} Operational and reporting freedom increased in the Chinese media in the early 2000s. ^[21] However, open defiance against the Propaganda Department directives is rare, as dissenting media organizations risk severe punishment, including restructuring or closure. ^[21] In 2000, a system of warnings was introduced for individual journalists, whereby repeat offenses can lead to dismissal. ^[19] One Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, was sentenced to prison after giving Propaganda Department instructions to a pro-democracy website; according to an American organization, the Dui Hua Foundation, the case was related to "illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities". ^[22]

One important way the Propaganda Department has ensured that the media system remains well controlled is by ensuring that the boundaries of acceptable reporting are kept "deliberately fuzzy" in an effort to ensure that "news workers self-censor to a critical degree." ^[21]

Credentialing and monitoring media personnel

According to a report from Freedom House, the Central Propaganda Department is the most important institution for monitoring media personnel and controlling the content of print and visual media. ^[23]

The report says that the Central Propaganda Department plays a key role in monitoring editors and journalists through a national registration system. It also says that in 2003, the CPD, along with the General Administration of Press and Publication and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, required Chinese journalists to attend nearly 50 hours of training on Marxism, the role of CCP leadership in the media, copyright law, libel law, national security law, regulations governing news content, and journalistic ethics prior to renewing press identification passes in 2003. ^[23] The report states that media personnel are required to participate in "ideological training sessions", where they are evaluated for their "loyalty to the party." Further "political indoctrination" courses are said to occur at meetings and training retreats to study party political ideology, and the role of the media in "thought work" (sīxiǎng gōngzuò思想工作). ^[23]

As of 2009 ^[update] , 90 percent of China's newspapers consisted of light stories regarding sport and entertainment, which are rarely regulated. ^{[19] [ needs update ]}

In 2019, the Media Oversight Office (传媒监管局) of the Central Propaganda Department announced that training and testing of news professionals nationwide would be handled through the "Study Xi, Strong Nation" mobile app. ^{[24] [25]}

According to Radio Free Asia, in December 2022, the department issued a directive stating that in order to obtain credentials as a professional journalist, they must pass a national exam and "...must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, conscientiously study, publicize and implement Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the party’s theory, line, principles and policies, and adhere to the correct political direction and public opinion guidance." ^[26]

Structure

At its 1924 establishment, the department was structured using its counterpart in the Soviet Union as a model. ^{[6] : 136}

A 1977 directive on the re-establishment of the Central Propaganda Department reveals the structure and organization of the "extremely secretive" body, according to Anne-Marie Brady. ^[1] The directive states that the department will be set up with one Director and several deputies, and the organizational structure will be set up with one office and five bureaus. The office is in charge of political, secretarial and administrative work, and the five bureaus are: the Bureau of Theory, Bureau of Propaganda and Education, Bureau of Arts and Culture, Bureau of News, and Bureau of Publishing. The directive states that the staff will be fixed at around 200 personnel, selected from propaganda personnel across the country in consultation with the Central Organization Department. ^[1]

The leadership of the Propaganda Department is selected with guidance from the CCP General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the media, while local committees of the Propaganda Department work with lower levels of the party-state hierarchy to transmit content priorities to the media. ^[23]

New departments and offices were set up in 2004 to deal with the growing demands of information control.^{[ needs update ]} One, the Bureau of Public Opinion, is in charge of commissioning public opinion surveys and other relevant research. ^[1]

Leaders

Heads of the department

• Li Da (1921–1922) as first propaganda chief of the CCP
• Cai Hesen (1922–1923) as propaganda chief of the 2nd Central Executive Committee
• Luo Zhanglong (May 1924 – January 1925) as propaganda chief of the 3rd Central Executive Committee
• Peng Shuzhi (February 1925 - March 1927) as director of propaganda
• Cai Hesen (April 1927 – October 1927) as acting propaganda chief of the 5th Politburo
• Luo Qiyuan (November 1927 – June 1928)
• Cai Hesen (July 1928 – October 1928)
• Li Lisan (November 1928 – December 1930), as first head of the Central Propaganda Department
• Shen Zemin (January 1931 – April 1931)
• Zhang Wentian (April 1931 – December 1934)
• Wu Liangping (January 1935 – July 1937)
• Zhang Wentian (July 1937 – December 1942)
• Lu Dingyi (January 1943 – December 1952), as head of the "Central Propaganda Commission" from 1943 to 1945
• Xi Zhongxun (January 1953 – July 1954)
• Lu Dingyi (July 1954 – May 1966)
• Tao Zhu (May 1966 – January 1967)
• Wang Li (January 1967 – January 1968)
• Interregnum: The Propaganda Department was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution and it was replaced by units under the Cultural Revolution Group, the Gang of Four and Kang Sheng.
• Kang Sheng (November 1970 – December 1975), as head of the Central Organization and Propaganda Leading Group
• Yao Wenyuan (January 1976 – October 1976)
• Geng Biao (October 1976 – October 1977) as head of the Central Propaganda Group
• Zhang Pinghua (October 1977 – December 1978)
• Hu Yaobang (December 25, 1978 – March 12, 1980)
• Wang Renzhong (March 12, 1980 – April 1982)
• Deng Liqun (April 1982 – August 1985)
• Zhu Houze (August 1985 – February 1987)
• Wang Renzhi (February 1987 – December 1992)
• Ding Guangen (December 1992 – October 2002)
• Liu Yunshan (October 2002 – November 2012)
• Liu Qibao (November 2012 – October 2017)
• Huang Kunming (October 2017 – October 2022)
• Li Shulei (October 2022 – present)

Executive deputy heads

• Hu Qiaomu (March 1950–December 1954)
• Zhang Jichun (December 1954–November 1956)
• Zhang Ziyi (November 1956–May 1966)
• Xiong Fu (June 1966–December 1966)
• Yu Wen (1982–October 1989)
• Xu Weicheng (October 1989–September 1992)
• Zheng Bijian (September 1992–November 1992)
• Liu Yunshan (April 1993–October 2002)
• Gong Xinhan (1993–2006)
• Ji Bingxuan (April 2003–April 2008)
• Luo Shugang (June 2008–December 2014)
• Huang Kunming (December 2014–October 2017)
• Wang Xiaohui (January 2018–April 2022)
• Li Shulei (April 2022–October 2022)
• Hu Heping (March 2023–present)

Composition as of the 20th Central Committee

• Head
  • Li Shulei, member of the Politburo
• Executive deputy head
  • Hu Heping, minister of Culture and Tourism, member of the Central Committee
• Deputy heads
  • Shen Haixiong, ministerial-level, head of the China Media Group, member of the CCP Central Committee
  • Zhuang Rongwen, ministerial-level, director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, member of the Central Committee
  • Cao Shumin, ministerial-level, director of the National Radio and Television Administration, alternate member of the Central Committee
  • Sun Yeli, ministerial-level, director of the State Council Information Office
  • Zhang Jianchun
  • Wang Gang

Further reading

• Brady, Anne-Marie (2006-02-01). "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era". Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 3 (1). University of Westminster Press: 58–77. doi: 10.16997/wpcc.15 .

References

1. Brady, Anne-Marie (2008). Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 13, 20. ISBN   978-0-7425-4057-6. OCLC   968245349. Archived from the original on 2023-03-08. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
2. Xu, Beina; Albert, Eleanor (17 February 2017). "Media Censorship in China". Council on Foreign Relations . Archived from the original on 26 July 2020. Retrieved 20 August 2020.
3. Shambaugh, David (January 2007). "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy". The China Journal . 57 (57): 25–58. doi:10.1086/tcj.57.20066240. ISSN   1324-9347. JSTOR   20066240. S2CID   222814073.
4. Buckley, Chris (2018-03-21). "China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2021-11-12. Retrieved 2021-11-12.
5. Brady, Anne-Marie (2006-02-01). "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era". Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 3 (1). University of Westminster Press: 58–77. doi: 10.16997/wpcc.15 . ISSN   1744-6716.
6. Laikwan, Pang (2024). One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ISBN   9781503638815.
7. "China's Central Propaganda Department Takes Over Regulation of All Media". Radio Free Asia . 3 March 2018. Archived from the original on 12 November 2021. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
8. Translations from John DeFrancis, ed. (2003), ABC Chinese–English Dictionary , University of Hawaii Press, p. 1087.
9. Edney, Kingsley (2014). The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 22, 195. doi:10.1057/9781137382153. ISBN   978-1-349-47990-0. In recent years however the Party State has recognised the negative connotations of the word "propaganda" in English and now official English translations refer to the "Publicity Department" (although xuanchuan continues to the used in Chinese).
10. Mackinnon, Stephen R. (January 1997). "Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period". Modern China . 23 (1): 3–32. doi:10.1177/009770049702300101. ISSN   0097-7004. JSTOR   189462. S2CID   148316475.
11. Chen, Jianfu; Li, Yuwen; Otto, Jan Michiel (2002-05-29). Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 287. ISBN   978-90-411-1834-9. OCLC   49853349. Archived from the original on 2023-03-08. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
12. Lulu, Jichang; Jirouš, Filip; Lee, Rachel (2021-01-25). "Xi's centralisation of external propaganda: SCIO and the Central Propaganda Department" (PDF). Sinopsis. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-11-20. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
13. Bandurski, David; Parete, Dalia (February 16, 2024). "Human Rights Heist at the United Nations". China Media Project. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
14. Hoffman, Samantha (2019). Global Tone Communication Technology Co. Ltd (Report). Australian Strategic Policy Institute. pp. 09–18. JSTOR   resrep23095.8 .
15. Bandurski, David (2023-02-17). "Co-Producing with the CCP". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2023-02-20. Retrieved 2023-02-20.
16. Bandurski, David (2018-10-18). "Documenting China's Influence". Made in China Journal. Archived from the original on 2023-02-20. Retrieved 2023-02-20.
17. Hoffman, Samantha (April 2022). "China's Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy . 33 (2): 76–89. doi:10.1353/jod.2022.0019. ISSN   1086-3214. S2CID   245443824.
18. Hvistendahl, Mara (August 19, 2020). "How China surveils the world". MIT Technology Review . Archived from the original on 2023-12-08. Retrieved 2023-12-11.
19. Schiller, Bill (September 27, 2009). "Beijing's 'aim is to make people docile'". Toronto Star . Archived from the original on June 7, 2019. Retrieved May 9, 2020.
20. Lin, Liza (2021-10-12). "China Targets News Media in Xi Jinping's Campaign to Expand Communist Party Control" . The Wall Street Journal . ISSN   0099-9660. Archived from the original on 2021-10-29. Retrieved 2021-10-29.
21. Hassid, Jonathan (June 2008). "Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business". Asian Survey . 48 (3): 414–430. doi:10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414. ISSN   0004-4687. JSTOR   10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414.
22. Bradsher, Keith (2007-08-15). "China cracks down on 'false news'". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2023-12-11. Retrieved 2023-12-11.
23. Esarey, Ashley (February 2006). "Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China" (PDF). Freedom House. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 3, 2014. Retrieved May 9, 2020.
24. Bandurski, David (August 29, 2019). "News Control, In the Palm of Your Hand". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2021-10-29. Retrieved 2021-10-29.
25. "Chinese journalists to be tested on loyalty to Xi Jinping". The Guardian . 2019-09-20. Archived from the original on 2021-11-03. Retrieved 2021-10-29.
26. "China forces journalists to take exam to demonstrate loyalty, political correctness". Radio Free Asia . 12 January 2023. Archived from the original on 12 January 2023. Retrieved 12 January 2023.

External links

• Official website (in Chinese)