Mass line

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According to Steiner, the mass line is closely related to the CCP's propaganda apparatus. [5] Despite the vast output from the CCP's propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a "principal weakness of the Party's propaganda" a failure to effectively give "systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations". [5]

The directive said that "One of the inborn duties of a Communist lies in the incessant effort to carry out propaganda among the people so as to educate them, to wage relentless war against all reactionary and mistaken conceptions and principles, and to promote as well as raise the political consciousness of the masses." [5]

The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs". [5] Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time". [5]

Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. CCP members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses". [5]

Mass organizations

During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through its united front system. The most significant of the mass organizations encompassed large numbers of people from major social groups, including workers through trade unions, students, youth, and women. Their purpose was to "penetrate society, to bring vast sections of the population further into the party's net," Frederick Teiwes writes. [35]

Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party

Mass line
Traditional Chinese 群眾路線
Simplified Chinese 群众路线
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyin qúnzhòng lùxiàn
Wade–Giles ch'ün-chung lu-hsien
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutping kwan4 zung3 lou6 sin3
Southern Min
Hokkien POJ kûn-chiòng lō͘-sòaⁿ

The largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the US, the Revolutionary Communist Party, which proclaims itself adopted the concept of "mass line" during the 1970s. [15]

See also

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References

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