Mass line

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According to Steiner, the mass line is closely related to the CCP's propaganda apparatus. [1] Despite the vast output from the CCP's propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a "principal weakness of the Party's propaganda" a failure to effectively give "systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations". [1]

The directive said that "One of the inborn duties of a Communist lies in the incessant effort to carry out propaganda among the people so as to educate them, to wage relentless war against all reactionary and mistaken conceptions and principles, and to promote as well as raise the political consciousness of the masses." [1]

The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs". [1] Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time". [1]

Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. CCP members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses". [1]

Mass organizations

During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through its united front system. The most significant of the mass organizations encompassed large numbers of people from major social groups, including workers through trade unions, students, youth, and women. Their purpose was to "penetrate society, to bring vast sections of the population further into the party's net," Frederick Teiwes writes. [17] The effort was skewed, however, and coverage was far more extensive in urban areas, with peasant associations existing only sporadically.

Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party

Mass line
Traditional Chinese 群眾路線
Simplified Chinese 群众路线

The largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the US, the Revolutionary Communist Party, which proclaims itself adopted the concept of "mass line" during the 1970s. [18]

See also

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References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Steiner, H. Arthur (June 1951). "Current "Mass Line" Tactics in Communist China". American Political Science Review . 45 (2): 422–436. doi:10.2307/1951469. ISSN   0003-0554. JSTOR   1951469. S2CID   145666761.
  2. ↑ Lin, Chun (2019). "Mass Line". In Sorace, Christian; Franceschini, Ivan; Loubere, Nicholas (eds.). Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi. Canberra: ANU Press. p. 122. ISBN   9781788734769. JSTOR   j.ctvk3gng9.23 . OCLC   1107512484.
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  5. 1 2 Marquis, Christopher; Qiao, Kunyuan (2022). Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise. New Haven: Yale University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k. ISBN   978-0-300-26883-6. JSTOR   j.ctv3006z6k. OCLC   1348572572. S2CID   253067190.
  6. 1 2 Mao, Zedong (1977). A Critique of Soviet Economics. Monthly Review Press. ISBN   978-0-85345-412-0.
  7. 1 2 3 "Xi demands implementation of 'mass line' campaign". People's Daily . 10 December 2013.
  8. ↑ ""China's "Mass Line" Campaign"". The Diplomat . 9 September 2013.
  9. ↑ "CPC's "mass line" campaign not a short-term movement - People's Daily Online". People's Daily . Archived from the original on 26 August 2013. Retrieved 9 August 2022.
  10. ↑ Dickson, Bruce J. (2016). The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival. Oxford University Press. p. 150. ISBN   9780190228576 . Retrieved 23 June 2018.
  11. ↑ Tsang, Steve; Cheung, Olivia (2024). The Political Thought of Xi Jinping. Oxford University Press. ISBN   9780197689363.
  12. ↑ "People's Daily editorial stresses stronger ties with masses - People's Daily Online". People's Daily . Archived from the original on 18 August 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2022.
  13. ↑ "Xinhua Insight: Secretive government receptions defy China's central authority". Xinhua . Archived from the original on 28 January 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2022.
  14. ↑ "Masses of meetings". The Economist . 13 July 2013. ISSN   0013-0613 . Retrieved 2022-11-12.
  15. ↑ Tiezzi, Shannon (December 27, 2013). "The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century". The Diplomat . Retrieved 26 May 2020. Xinhua says that almost 20,000 Party officials have been punished this year ...
  16. ↑ A., Korolev (14 July 2017). "De-ideologized Mass Line, Regime Responsiveness, and State-Society Relations". China Review . 17 (2): 7–36.
  17. ↑ Teiwes, Frederick C. (2000). "The Chinese State During the Maoist Era". In Shambaugh, David (ed.). The Modern Chinese State . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.  105–160. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511528194. ISBN   9780521776035.
  18. ↑ Elbaum, Max (2018-04-10). Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che. Verso Books. ISBN   978-1-78663-458-0. OCLC   1031091411.
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