Propaganda in China

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Propaganda in China
Spectators in front of a large sign on Nixon's motorcade route in China. - NARA - 194413.tif
A large sign featuring a propaganda slogan in 1972: "Long Live the Great, Glorious, and Correct Communist Party of China!"

Mechanics

Propaganda and censorship in China are centrally directed by CCP's Central Propaganda Department (CPD). [101] David Shambaugh, American professor and sinologist, wrote in 2007 that the CCP's propaganda system extends itself as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information. [2] Shambaugh noted that according to the CCP publication Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian. [2] [102] numerous public places, such as media and news organizations, educational institutions, literature and art centers, and cultural exhibitions come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believed that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the CPD. [2] Shambaugh stated that the writ of the CPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, although the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution. [2]

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were "local"), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses, [2] [103] in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview. [104]

According to Brady, propaganda work by the CCP has been historically divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or duinei) and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or duiwai) as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social. [1] The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and, the closely linked bureaucracy, The Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda. [1]

Shambaugh stated that the propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, are highly secret and does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages. [1] [2] The Office of External Propaganda (OEP) itself is more commonly known as 'State Council Information Office' (SCIO), under the one institution with two names system, according to Brady. [1]

The Central Propaganda Department has direct control over the National Radio and Television Administration. [105] It additionally manages the China Media Group, which controls several of China's largest news agencies. In 2014, the OEP was absorbed into the larger Central Propaganda Department, turning the SCIO into an external nameplate of the department. [106]

Control of media

Media operations and content are tightly controlled, [101] [105] and the CCP, primarily through its Central Propaganda Department, determines what appears in news reports. Controlling media content allows the CCP to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies, censor controversial news stories, and have reports published criticizing political adversaries of the CCP. [105] [107] In 2005, Reporters Without Borders published a report about China's official news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, calling it "the world's biggest propaganda agency", and said that it was "at the heart of censorship and disinformation put in place" by the government. [108]

The CPD weekly sends censorship guidelines to prominent editors and media providers and Chinese state media generally employ their own monitors for censorship. [101] While in the past the Central Propaganda Department and its local branches sent faxes to all media throughout the country with instructions indicating subjects that the media should stress or avoid entirely, directives are now imparted to ranking media managers or editors during phone conversations—a move designed to reduce the paper trail. [107] Media in China faces few restrictions on content that is not deemed to be politically damaging. [107]

Wu Xuecan, a former editor of the People's Daily overseas edition, [109] reports that through control of the "ideological domain, material means and living necessities," editors and reporters are conditioned to keep news and reports aligned with the interests of the CCP. [109] Wu further reports that, political study sessions ensures that editors first practice self-censorship. [109] He Qinglian writes that long years of media control have bred in Chinese journalists a habit of "self-discipline," and that most Chinese journalists resign themselves to playing the role of "Party mouthpieces." [110] Control is also directed at sources of information, as ordinary people are restricted from providing news to Chinese media, and more so to foreign media. [110]

Thought reform

Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform", ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological opponents, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated. [15]

The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era CCP leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of 4 June 1989. [15]

Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note the presence of such techniques in Maoist political campaigns, such as daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to find and correct deficiencies in personal conducts. In the military, political leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political conviction, thus exploiting social pressures and personal anxieties to build a sense of conformity. [111]

In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP's rule, and has become a basic feature of citizens' daily life, according to Victor Shaw. [112] To an extent, the "freedom of silence" cherished by some older Chinese scholars was not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda. [112]

According to Shaw, the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs. Ideological tensions result in mass movements, and the resulting spiritual control legitimizes the political establishment. [112] "Political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behaviour, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps." [112]

Kurlantzick and Link stated that the CCP uses the technique of "thoughtwork" (sixiang gongzuo) to maintain popular obedience, dating back to the Mao Zedong era. [4] They noted that while Mao-era campaigns are aimed at transforming the Chinese society and people's natures, the modern approach to thoughtwork are more subtle and only focuses on issues important to the CCP's rule. According to Kurlantzick and Link, it consists largely of cultivating pro-government views in the media and other influential people in Chinese society, and as such complaints against the government becomes distracted with pro-government propaganda. The government also attempts to distance itself from local issues by blaming them on corrupt local officials, says Kurlantzick and Link.

Spin doctors

According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid-1990s. China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realised that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars. [15]

Brady writes that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the Blair government's spin doctoring during the mad cow disease crisis of 2000–2001, and the Bush government's use of the U.S. media after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005. [15] According to Brady, trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises; these spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda, externally named the State Council Information Office. [15]

Instead of attempting a media blackout as with the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the CCP has adopted a series of more advanced techniques to influence the information leaving China. The day after violence in Ürümqi, the State Council Information Office set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Ürümqi to assist foreign reporters. It invited foreign media to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and look at the aftermath themselves. Journalists were also given CDs with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," according to Professor Xiao Qiang, quoted by Newsweek. [113]

Propaganda on the internet

Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski. [114] In later years the internet played a key role in the spread of propaganda to Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites remain a leading source of Chinese-language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady. [115]

Brady cites an example of the role of the internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese, its usage by the state against a perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of 2008 Tibetan unrest and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay. [115] Brady noted that these protests were genuine and popular, demonstrating the effectiveness of China's efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese overseas diaspora, but the demonstrations nevertheless received official support both symbolically and in practice. [115] While there was no compulsion for overseas Chinese to attend the rallies, those who did were given free T-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and accommodation, donated by local embassy officials and China-based donors. [115]

50 Cent Party

The Chinese government regularly uses fake social media accounts and posts to attempt to shape online dialogue and steer discussions away from sensitive topics. [116] This is done by specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums, or wikis, to shift the debate in favor of the CCP and influence public opinion. [114] They are sometime called the "50-cent party" – named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make, [117] though some speculate that they are probably not paid anything for the posts, instead being required to do so as a part of their official party duties. [116]

An internal government document released by the BBC outlines the requirements for those employed as online posters, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc. [117]

It is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands; [117] David Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280,000 [114] while The Guardian puts the estimate as 300,000. [118] According to The Guardian, the growth in popularity of such astroturfing owes to the ease with which web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube can be employed to sway public opinion. The BBC reports that special centres have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'. [117] Data analysis of social media activity and leaked government emails by a team led by Gary King at Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Science showed that the Chinese government generates over 440 million posts every year through such accounts. [119] [116]

Wikipedia

On 13 September 2021, the Wikimedia Foundation banned seven Wikipedia users and removed administrator privileges from twelve users that were part of Wikimedians of Mainland China (WMC). [120] Maggie Dennis, the foundation's vice present of community resilience and sustainability, said that there had been an yearlong investigation into infiltration concerns. Dennis observed that the infiltrators had tried to promote "the aims of China, as interpreted through whatever filters they may bring to bear". [121] Dennis said, “we needed to act based on credible information that some members (not all) of that group [WMC] have harassed, intimidated, and threatened other members of our community, including in some cases physically harming others, in order to secure their own power and subvert the collaborative nature of our projects”. [120]

Domestic propaganda

Within the doctrine of China's peaceful rise resorting to Peace Journalism has been analyzed as a growing trend in China's strategy for domestic propaganda, in particular in covering news from Xinjiang. [122] After Zbigniew Brzezinski's having termed Central Asia the "Global Balkans" [123] Idriss Aberkane has argued the resorting to unilateral, state-endorsed Peace Journalism could be a way for China to "de-balkanize" Xinjiang. This he has called "coercive Peace Journalism".

Peace journalism does not sell well because it typically proscribes the coverage of a conflict by news eliciting strong emotional reactions. Man becomes easily addicted to strong emotions and this has played a central role in peace journalism's failure at being adopted by mainstream media. On the other hand, mainstream media badly need (and compete with each other) to provide the strongest emotional value to their audience and this has become a vital part of their business model. Yet in China the media industry is not driven by returns on financial investments but by returns on political interests. Thus paradoxically promoting Peace Journalism is much easier for the PRC than say for countries of the European Union as in promoting a political agenda the former can afford to broadcast news with low emotional weight, especially in a non-competitive environment for its media industry. [122]

The Chinese government has used its public evaluations of historical, public figures as a means of communicating to the Chinese public the traits and political goals that it considers desirable and undesirable. The Chinese government has historically tended towards evaluating public figures either as villains or heroes, leaving little room for interpretation and making it clear whether the traits and goals of individual figures should be emulated or despised. The public image of some figures, including Peng Dehuai, have undergone radical reverses throughout the history of the PRC, as required by CCP propagandists: Peng was portrayed as a subhuman villain during the Cultural Revolution; but, since 1978, has been evaluated as a nearly perfect Marxist, general, and public official. [124]

By examining the qualities associated with public figures whose images have been manipulated to make those figures either exaggeratedly positive or exaggeratedly negative symbols, scholars have developed a number of assumptions about the traits and political goals generally desired by various PRC governments. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them positive symbols will be portrayed as: coming from proletarian or semi-proletarian backgrounds; being courageous, fair, straightforward, and honest in their treatment of subordinates and superiors; leading a simple and frugal life; demonstrating great concern for the "masses"; achieving outstanding professional success; and, being impeccably loyal to the CCP and to the communist cause. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them negative symbols will be portrayed as: coming from backgrounds which have exposed them to "bourgeoise" thoughts and attitudes; adhering to all or most historical attempts to oppose political figures in the PRC who later became powerful, which are also vilified; being professionally inept, only succeeding temporarily or appearing to succeed through trickery or deception; participating in "conspiracies" against the correct leadership of the CCP; cooperating with "foreign countries" (historically either the Soviet Union or the United States, depending on which is more threatening at the time); and, having numerous negative traits, such as opportunism or corruption. Usually, public figures will provide considerable examples of either positive or negative qualities, but will be made to fit either a positive or negative stereotype through exaggerating qualities which support the interpretation desired by the CCP, and by omitting from the historical narrative qualities which contradict the CCP's intended interpretation. [124]

As part of the "Propaganda Teaching Team" (xuan jiang tuan), tens of thousands of CCP cadre routinely travel from China's urban areas to rural China to engage in xuanchuan activities at the grassroots level. [9] : 30 

External propaganda

The Chinese state refers to all media work abroad as wai xuan, or "external propaganda." [27] Through its external propaganda operations, frequently directed by the CCP's United Front Work Department, China seeks to shape international perception of the Chinese government and its policies to "allay concerns about China's economic rise, military build-up and increasing political and diplomatic influence." [125] Specifically by:

  1. Reducing fears that China is a threat to neighboring countries. China seeks to change its image within the region from that of a growing threat and aggressor to that of a benefactor and potential partner. [126] : 5  Beijing is working to "diminish fears of China's future military power, or concerns that China's massive economic growth would divert trade and foreign investment from other nations." [126] : 40 
  2. Securing access to resources and energy. As China's economy continues to grow at a rapid pace, the need for resources and energy has become more pressing. To protect its access to these resources, China is working to gain the trust of foreign states that possess oil, gas, and other materials. [126] : 41 
  3. Building alliances and weaken Taiwan's relationship with the international community. In 1994, China announced that it would "use all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan." [127] : 114  Through propaganda as well as economic incentives, China seeks to convince any nation that still recognizes Taiwan to switch their loyalty to Beijing and formally declare that Taiwan is part of China. [126] : 42 
  4. Promoting a multipolar world and constrain U.S. global power. [127] : 111  China seeks to slowly diminish the United States' influence in Asia, and create its own sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. [126] : 43 

In a 2008 report, the U.S. State Department's International Security Advisory Board declared that China was in the midst of a "comprehensive strategic deception campaign," which was said to include "Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of 'legal regimes' to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him)." [128] On its official Chinese Web site, CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," and lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," referring to new foreign-language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda." [27]

CCP propaganda themes

Former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leadership to "hide your capabilities, and bide your time." [129] Most modern Chinese foreign propaganda seeks to pursue China's strategic goals while adhering to this advice. The following themes were stated by Zheng Bijian to be characteristic of China's foreign propaganda prior to Xi Jinping:

External propaganda efforts have since shifted to denigrating liberal democracy and stoking anti-American sentiment. [131]

Instruments

The PRC uses many tactics and techniques to disseminate its propaganda themes abroad. China uses its news and media outlets, which are directly influenced by various state organizations (and ultimately the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP), [132] to relay news stories consistent with these themes to foreign audiences. In 2009, reports emerged that China intends to invest US$6.6 billion to expand its foreign language news service. This includes plans for a 24-hour English-language news network to discuss world affairs from Beijing's point of view. [133] A 2015 investigative report by Reuters found a network of at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries that obscures China Radio International (CRI) as its majority shareholder. A significant portion of the programming on these stations is either produced or provided by CRI, or by media firms CRI controls in the United States, Australia, and Europe. [134]

Soft power initiative

Since 2005, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao has promoted a "soft power initiative" [135] aimed at increasing China's influence overseas through cultural and language programs. These trends have been identified by the American Council of Foreign Relations, which describes that "Beijing is trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan." [135] The article points out that adverse effects of soft power, that "China has the potential to become the 600-pound gorilla in the room," and that "Chinese influence may begin to breed resentment." [135]

The CCP Politburo Standing Committee members Li Changchun and Liu Yunshan have repeatedly stressed that Chinese propaganda should be equally spread both domestically and internationally, and Li Changchun stated that the Confucius Institutes are "an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world", which is "part of China's foreign propaganda strategy". [136]

The Economist noted that Confucius Institutes are used to project China's soft power and win the support of an external audience, and Confucius was specifically chosen to cast an image of peace and harmony. Such centers are partially sponsored by the Chinese government, with a hands-off approach to management, its directors being directly appointed by their attached universities. [137]

In 2009, Chinese state media launched the English-language version of the Global Times, a nationalistic tabloid under the auspices of the People's Daily. It was described as a part of a larger push by the Chinese government to have a greater say in international media, as well as supplanting what it considers to be biased Western media sources. [138]

In early 2011, the Chinese government launched a million dollar advertising campaign, which was aimed to improve the "incomplete understandings" the American public has about China. A 60-second ad was shown at New York's Times Square, which featured Chinese personalities such as scientist Sun Jiadong, singer Liu Huan and news anchor Jing Yidan, ending with the message of "Chinese Friendship". Newsweek noted the ad's great production values, but criticized it as confusing and explaining little about the featured Chinese identities. [139] China scholar David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University, says that "the scale of Beijing’s [propaganda] push is unprecedented" and estimates that "China spends $10bn a year on external propaganda". [140]

Propaganda in the arts

An old propaganda painting in Guangzhou promoting family planning The Friendly Communist.JPG
An old propaganda painting in Guangzhou promoting family planning

As in the Soviet Union, the CCP under Mao Zedong took socialist realism as its basis for art, making clear its goal was the 'education' of the people in CCP ideology. This included, as during the Cultural Revolution, transforming literature and art to serve these ends. Pre-revolutionary songs [141] : 72  and operas [141] : 12  were banned as a poisonous legacy of the past. Middle and high schools were targeted by one campaign because the students circulated romance and love stories among themselves. [141] : 16 

Maoist propaganda art has been remade and modernized for almost two decades, and old Cultural Revolution era propaganda productions have appeared in new formats such as DVDs and karaoke versions. They appear in rock and pop versions of revolutionary songs in praise of Mao, as well as T-shirts, watches, porcelain, and other memorabilia. [19] The works of propaganda from the Cultural Revolution have been selling extremely well in recent years, largely for nostalgia, social, patriotic or entertainment purposes. [19] [20]

Propaganda songs and music, such as guoyue and revolutionary opera, have a long and storied history in the PRC, featuring prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s to the 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including Red Rock and Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley. The latter sold 6–10 million copies in China. [142] Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the People's Liberation Army, the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

In recent times, films and documentaries such as Silent Contest, Amazing China, The Founding of a Party, Republic and Army has become the new staple of Chinese propaganda, known as "main melody" films. [143]

Famous propaganda works

Novel

Red Crag , a famous 1961 Chinese novel featuring underground CCP agents fighting an espionage battle against the Kuomintang.

Sculpture

Rent Collection Courtyard , a 1965 sculpture depicting former landlord Liu Wencai as an evil landlord collecting rent from poor, although this depiction has been disputed by modern accounts.

Films and plays

The Red Detachment of Women Revolutionary opera.jpg
The Red Detachment of Women

Songs

The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:[ citation needed ]

  • "Nanniwan" (《南泥湾》/《南泥灣》), a 1943 revolutionary song
  • "The East is Red" (《东方红》/《東方紅》), the de facto national anthem of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution
  • "Socialism is Good" (《社会主义好》), a modern rock adaptation of which was performed by Zhang Qu and featured on the 1990s album Red Rock .
  • "Battle Hymn of the Chinese People's Volunteers" (《中国人民志愿军战歌》/《中國人民志願軍戰歌》) – a well-known song from the Korean War period
  • "Red Sun Shining Over the Border" (《红太阳照边疆》/《紅太陽照邊疆》) –a song from the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province
  • "A Wa People Sing New Songs" (阿佤唱新歌曲) –a song attributed to the Wa ethnic minority of Yunnan
  • "Laundry Song" (《洗衣歌》) –a song celebrating the liberation of Tibet
  • "Liuyang River" (《浏阳河》) –a song about a river near Mao Zedong's hometown of Shaoshan in Hunan
  • "Saliha Most Follows the Words of Chairman Mao" (《萨利哈听毛主席的话》/《薩利哈最聽毛主席的話》) –a song attributed to the Kazakh minority of the Xinjiang
  • "The Never-Setting Sun Rises Over the Grassland" (《草原上升起不落的太阳》/草原上升起不落的太陽 – ) from Inner Mongolia
  • "Xinjiang is Good" (新疆好) –attributed to the ethnic Uyghurs of Xinjiang
  • "I Love Beijing Tiananmen" (《我爱北京天安门》/《我愛北京天安門》) –claimed to have been translated into over 50 languages, this song is frequently taught to schoolchildren in the PRC
  • "Zhuang Brocade Dedicated to Chairman Mao" (莊錦獻給毛主席) –a song attributed to the Zhuang ethnic minority of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
  • "Sweet-Scented Osmanthus Blooms With the Arrival of Happiness"(《桂花开放幸福来》) (attributed to the Miao, or Chinese Hmong, ethnic minority group)
  • "Generations Remember Chairman Mao's Kindness"(《世世代代铭记毛主席的恩情》) (a song celebrating the "liberation of the ethnic Xibe people")
  • "Salaam Chairman Mao" (《萨拉姆毛主席》/《薩拉姆毛主席》) –a Xinjiang song praising Mao, composed by Wang Luobin. A modern version was performed by Chinese rock singer Dao Lang.
  • "Song of Mount Erlangshan" (《歌唱二郎山》) –a 1950s song celebrating the development of Tibet, which made Mount Erlangshan in western Sichuan famous
  • "Story of the Spring" (春天的故事) –a song performed by Dong Wenhua, initially at the 1997 CCTV New Year's Gala, days before his death, dedicated to late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
  • "The Cultural Revolution is Just Great" (《无产阶级文化大革命就是好》/《無產階級文化大革命就是好》) –a song praising the Cultural Revolution
  • "On the Golden Mountains of Beijing" (北京的金山上) –a song attributed to the Tibetan people praising Mao as the shining sun
  • "Ode to the Socialist Motherland" (《歌唱社会主义祖国》/《歌唱社會主義祖國》) –the Cultural Revolution-era modification of the well-known patriotic song "Ode to the Motherland" (《歌唱祖国》/《歌唱祖國》).
  • "Where are you going, Uncle Kurban?" (库尔班大叔您上哪儿) –a song attributed to a Uyghur elder named Kurban Tulum (also known as Uncle Kurban) praising People's Liberation Army.

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times".[ citation needed ]

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party</span> Internal division of the CCP for ideology-related work and information dissemination

The Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, also known as the Propaganda Department or Central Propaganda Department, is an internal division of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge of spreading its ideology, media regulation, as well as creation and dissemination of propaganda. The department is also one of the main entities that enforces media censorship and control in the People's Republic of China.

The history of the People's Republic of China details the history of mainland China since 1 October 1949, when CCP chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) from atop Tiananmen, after a near complete victory (1949) by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War. The PRC is the most recent political entity to govern mainland China, preceded by the Republic of China and thousands of years of monarchical dynasties. The paramount leaders have been Mao Zedong (1949–1976); Hua Guofeng (1976–1978); Deng Xiaoping (1978–1989); Jiang Zemin (1989–2002); Hu Jintao (2002–2012); and Xi Jinping.

Censorship in the People's Republic of China is mandated by the PRC's ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is one of the strictest censorship regimes in the world. The government censors content for mainly political reasons, such as curtailing political opposition, and censoring events unfavorable to the CCP, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, pro-democracy movements in China, the persecution of Uyghurs in China, human rights in Tibet, Falun Gong, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since Xi Jinping became the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, censorship has been "significantly stepped up".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Phoenix Television</span> Chinese state-owned television network

Phoenix Television is a majority state-owned television network that offers Mandarin and Cantonese-language channels that serve mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and other markets with substantial Chinese-language viewers. It is headquartered in Shenzhen and Hong Kong. It is also registered in Cayman Islands.

The history of the Chinese Communist Party began with its establishment in July 1921. A study group led by Peking University professors Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao to discuss Marxism, led to intellectuals officially founding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 1921. In 1923, Sun Yat-sen invited the CCP to form a United Front, and to join his Nationalist Party (GMD) in Canton for training under representatives of the Communist International, the Soviet Union's international organization. The Soviet representatives reorganized both parties into Leninist parties. Rather than the loose organization that characterized the two parties until then, the Leninist party operated on the principle of democratic centralism, in which the collective leadership set standards for membership and an all-powerful Central Committee determined the party line, which all members must follow.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China</span>

The incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China, known in Chinese historiography as the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang, was the takeover of Xinjiang by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the waning days of the Chinese Civil War. At the time, Xinjiang was divided into ten districts. The Republic of China controlled seven districts and governed them as Xinjiang Province, while the other three were governed by the Three Districts Economic Commission which consisted of the former leadership of the Second East Turkestan Republic.

<i>Global Times</i> Chinese Communist Party-owned daily tabloid

The Global Times is a daily tabloid newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party's flagship newspaper, the People's Daily, commenting on international issues from a Chinese nationalistic perspective. The publication is sometimes called "China's Fox News" for its propaganda and the monetization of nationalism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deng Liqun</span>

Deng Liqun was a Chinese politician and theorist who was one of the leading figures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the 1980s, most well known for his involvement with the party's propaganda work. Deng was born in Guidong County, Hunan province, and joined the CCP in 1936. He came from an intellectual family and joined the party out of intellectual commitment. He was often referred to as "Little Deng", to be distinguished from Deng Xiaoping, the "Old Deng".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mao Zedong's cult of personality</span> State-sponsored veneration of Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong's cult of personality was a prominent part of Chairman Mao Zedong's rule over the People's Republic of China from the state's founding in 1949 until his death in 1976. Mass media, propaganda and a series of other techniques were used by the state to elevate Mao Zedong's status to that of an infallible heroic leader, who could stand up against the West, and guide China to become a beacon of communism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Xi Jinping's cult of personality</span>

A cult of personality has been developing around Xi Jinping since he became General Secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and the country's paramount leader in 2012.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Persecution of Uyghurs in China</span> Series of human rights abuses against an ethnic group in Western China

The Chinese government is committing a series of ongoing human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang that is often characterized as persecution or as genocide. Beginning in 2014, the Chinese government, under the administration of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, incarcerated more than an estimated one million Turkic Muslims without any legal process in internment camps. Operations from 2016 to 2021 were led by Xinjiang CCP Secretary Chen Quanguo. It is the largest-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II. The Chinese government began to wind down the camps in 2019. Amnesty International states that detainees have been increasingly transferred to the formal penal system.

<i>The Grayzone</i> US-based fringe news website and blog

The Grayzone is an American fringe, far-left news website and blog, founded and edited by American journalist Max Blumenthal. The website, initially founded as The Grayzone Project, was affiliated with AlterNet before becoming independent in early 2018.

References

Citations

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