2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Last updated

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Part of the Russo-Ukrainian War (outline)
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.svg
Military situation as of 6 March 2023
   Controlled by Ukraine     Controlled by Russia
(Detailed map)
Date24 February 2022 – present
(1 year, 1 week and 4 days)
Location
Ukraine, also Russia [lower-alpha 1]
Status Ongoing (list of engagements · territorial control · timeline of events)
Belligerents
Supported by:
Flag of Belarus.svg  Belarus [lower-alpha 3]
Flag of Ukraine.svg  Ukraine [lower-alpha 4]
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Order of battle Order of battle
Strength
Pre-invasion at border:
169,000–190,000 [lower-alpha 5] [5] [6]
Pre-invasion total strength:
900,000 military [7]
554,000 paramilitary [7]
In September 2022:
+ 300,000 mobilized [8]
+ 50,000 mercenaries (including Wagner Group) [8]
In February 2023:
+ 200,000 newly mobilized soldiers [9]
Pre-invasion total strength:
196,600 military [10]
102,000 paramilitary [10]
July 2022 total strength:
up to 700,000 [11]
Casualties and losses
Reports vary widely, see § Casualties for details.

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. The invasion has caused tens of thousands of deaths on both sides and instigated Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. About 8 million Ukrainians were displaced within their country by June, and more than 8 million fled the country by February 2023.

Contents

After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and Russian-backed paramilitaries seized the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine's Donbas region, sparking a regional war. In March 2021, Russia began a military build-up, amassing up to 190,000 soldiers at Ukraine's borders. Russian government officials denied plans to attack Ukraine until the day before the invasion. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed breakaway quasi-states in the Donbas. The next day, the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force and Russian soldiers entered both territories.

The invasion began the morning of 24 February 2022 upon Russian president Vladimir Putin's announcement of a "special military operation" seeking the "demilitarisation" and "denazification" of Ukraine. In his address, Putin espoused irredentist views, challenged Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely claimed that Ukraine was governed by neo-Nazis who persecuted the ethnic Russian minority. Minutes later, Russian air strikes and a ground invasion were launched along a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Donetsk and Luhansk. In response, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted martial law and a general mobilisation.

Russian troops retreated from the northern front by April. On the southern and south-eastern fronts, Russia captured Kherson in March and then Mariupol in May after a siege. On 18 April, Russia launched a renewed battle of Donbas. Russian forces continued to bomb both military and civilian targets far from the front line, including electrical and water systems. In late 2022, Ukraine launched counteroffensives in the south and in the east. Soon after, Russia announced the illegal annexation of four partly occupied oblasts. [12] [13] In November, Ukraine retook Kherson.

The invasion has been met with widespread international condemnation. [14] The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution ES-11/1 condemning the invasion and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed sanctions on Russia, and on its ally Belarus, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Protests occurred around the world; those in Russia were met with mass arrests and increased media censorship. Over 1,000 companies left Russia and Belarus in response to the invasion. The International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into possible crimes in Ukraine since 2013, including possible crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide during the invasion. [15] [16]

Background

Protesters in Kyiv during Euromaidan, November 2013 Euromaidan 01.JPG
Protesters in Kyiv during Euromaidan, November 2013

After the Soviet Union (USSR) dissolved in 1991, the newly independent republics of Ukraine and Russia maintained ties. Ukraine agreed in 1994 to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and dismantle the nuclear weapons in Ukraine left by the USSR. [17] In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed in the Budapest Memorandum to uphold the territorial integrity of Ukraine. [18] [19] In 1999, Russia signed the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirm[ed] the inherent right of each and every participating state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance". [20] After the Soviet Union collapsed, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly due to regional security threats such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). [21] Russian leaders claimed Western powers had pledged that NATO would not expand eastward, although this is disputed. [22] [23] At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. [24] The response among existing members was divided, with Western European countries concerned about antagonising Russia. [25] NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia membership but also issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Vladimir Putin voiced strong opposition to the NATO membership bids, [26] and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia would do everything it could to prevent their admittance. [27]

Ukraine, with the annexed Crimea in the south and two Russia-backed separatist republics in Donbas in the east Map of Ukraine with Cities.png
Ukraine, with the annexed Crimea in the south and two Russia-backed separatist republics in Donbas in the east

In November 2013, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union (EU), overruling the Verkhovna Rada and instead choosing closer ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to reject the agreement. [28] This triggered a wave of pro-EU protests known as Euromaidan, culminating in the removal of Yanukovych in February 2014 and subsequent pro-Russian unrest in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. Russian soldiers without insignia took control of strategic positions and infrastructure in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and seized the Crimean Parliament. In March, Russia organized a controversial referendum and annexed Crimea. This was followed by the outbreak of the war in Donbas, which began in April 2014 with the formation of two Russia-backed separatist quasi-states: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. [29] [30] Russian troops were involved in the conflict. [31] [32] [33] The Minsk agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 were a bid to stop the fighting, but ceasefires repeatedly failed. [34] A dispute emerged over the role of Russia: Normandy Format members France, Germany, and Ukraine saw Minsk as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, whereas Russia insisted Ukraine should negotiate directly with the two separatist republics. [35] [36]

In 2021, Putin refused offers from Zelenskyy to hold high-level talks, and the Russian government endorsed an article by former president Dmitry Medvedev arguing that it was pointless to deal with Ukraine while it remained a "vassal" of the United States. [37] The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with much of the Russian neo-imperial movement aspiring to annex more Ukrainian land, including the unrecognized Novorossiya. [38] Analyst Vladimir Socor argued that Putin's 2014 speech after the annexation of Crimea was a de facto "manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". [39] In July 2021, Putin published an essay titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", reaffirming that Russians and Ukrainians were "one people". [40] American historian Timothy Snyder described Putin's ideas as imperialism. [41] British journalist Edward Lucas described it as historical revisionism. [42] Other observers have noted that the Russian leadership holds a distorted view of modern Ukraine, as well as its history. [43] [44] [45]

Prelude to the invasion

Russian military build-up around Ukraine as of 3 December 2021 Russian forces near Ukraine, 2021-12-03 (crop).jpg
Russian military build-up around Ukraine as of 3 December 2021
US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment departing Aviano Air Base in Italy for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up. 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade depart Aviano Air Base, Italy, Feb. 24, 2022.jpg
US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment departing Aviano Air Base in Italy for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up.

In March and April 2021, Russia began a major military build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border. A second build-up followed from October 2021 to February 2022, in both Russia and Belarus. [48] Members of the Russian government repeatedly denied having plans to invade or attack Ukraine; [49] [50] including government spokesman Dmitry Peskov on 28 November 2021, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on 19 January 2022, [51] Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov on 20 February 2022, [49] and Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Alexander Zmeevsky on 23 February 2022. [52] [53]

Putin's chief national security adviser, Nikolai Patrushev, [54] believed that the West had been in an undeclared war with Russia for years. [55] Russia's updated national security strategy, published in May 2021, said that Russia may use "forceful methods" to "thwart or avert unfriendly actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation". [56] [57] Sources say the decision to invade Ukraine was made by Putin and a small group of war hawks in Putin's inner circle, including Patrushev and minister of defence Sergei Shoigu. [58]

During the second build-up, Russia demanded that the US and NATO enter into a legally binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and remove multinational forces from NATO's Eastern European member states. [59] Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an "aggressive line". [60] These demands were widely seen as non-viable; new NATO members in Central Europe had joined the alliance because they preferred the safety and economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their governments sought protection from Russian irredentism. [61] A formal treaty to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO would contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, despite NATO's unenthusiastic response to Ukrainian requests to join. [62] Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz made respective efforts to prevent the war in February. Macron met with Putin but failed to convince him not to go forward with the attack. Scholz warned Putin about heavy sanctions that would be imposed should he invade Ukraine. Scholz, in trying to negotiate a settlement, also told Zelenskyy to renounce aspirations to join NATO and declare neutrality; however, Zelenskyy said Putin could not be trusted to uphold such an agreement. [63]

Putin's announcement of a "special military operation"

Putin's address to the nation on 24 February 2022. Minutes after Putin's announcement, the invasion began.

On 24 February, before 5:00 a.m. Kyiv time, [64] Putin announced a "special military operation" in the country and "effectively declared war on Ukraine." [65] [66] In his speech, Putin said he had no plans to occupy Ukrainian territory and that he supported the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination. [67] He said the purpose of the "operation" was to "protect the people" in the predominantly Russian-speaking region of Donbas who he falsely claimed that "for eight years now, [had] been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime". [68] Putin said that Russia sought the "demilitarisation and denazification" of Ukraine. [69] Within minutes of Putin's announcement, explosions were reported in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and the Donbas region. [70] Later an alleged report from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) was leaked, claiming that the intelligence agency had not been aware of Putin's plan to invade Ukraine. [71] Russian troops entered Ukraine from the north in Belarus (towards Kyiv); from the north-east in Russia (towards Kharkiv); from the east in the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic; and from the south in Crimea. [72] Russian equipment and vehicles were marked with a white Z military symbol (a non-Cyrillic letter), believed to be a measure to prevent friendly fire. [48]

Immediately following the attack, Zelenskyy declared martial law in Ukraine. [73] The same evening, he ordered a general mobilisation of all Ukrainian males between 18 and 60 years old, [74] prohibiting them from leaving the country. [75]

Invasion and resistance

Military control around Kyiv on 2 April 2022 Battle of Kyiv (2022).svg
Military control around Kyiv on 2 April 2022

The invasion began at the dawn of 24 February, [65] with infantry divisions and armoured and air support in Eastern Ukraine, and dozens of missile attacks across both Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine. [76] [77] The first fighting took place in Luhansk Oblast near Milove village on the border with Russia at 3:40 a.m. Kyiv time. [78] The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearhead incursions, creating a northern front launched towards Kyiv, a southern front originating in Crimea, a south-eastern front launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas, and an eastern front. [79] [80]

Dozens of missile strikes across Ukraine reached as far west as Lviv. [81] [82] Wagner Group mercenaries and Chechen forces reportedly made several attempts to assassinate Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian government said these efforts were thwarted by anti-war officials in Russia's FSB, who shared intelligence of the plans. [83] The Russian invasion was unexpectedly met by fierce Ukrainian resistance. [84] In Kyiv, Russia failed to take the city as its attacks were repulsed at the suburbs during the battles of Irpin, Hostomel and Bucha. The Russian army tried to encircle the capital, but Ukrainian forces managed to hold ground. Ukraine utilized Western arms to great effectiveness, including the Javelin anti-tank missile and the Stinger anti-aircraft missile, thinning Russian supply lines and stalling the offensive. [85] The defense of the Ukrainian capital was under the command of General Oleksandr Syrskyi. [86]

On 9 March, a column of Russian tanks and armoured vehicles was ambushed in Brovary, suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat. [87] The Russian army adopted siege tactics on the Western front around the key cities of Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv, but failed to capture them due to stiff resistance and logistical setbacks. [88] On the southern front, Russian forces captured the major city of Kherson on 2 March. In Mykolaiv Oblast, they advanced as far as Voznesensk but were repelled south of Mykolaiv. On 25 March, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the first stage of the "military operation" in Ukraine was "generally complete", that the Ukrainian military forces had suffered serious losses, and that the Russian military would now concentrate on the "liberation of Donbas". [89] [90] The "first stage" of the invasion was conducted on four fronts [91] [92] including one towards western Kyiv from Belarus by the Russian Eastern Military District, comprising the 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies. A second axis, deployed towards eastern Kyiv from Russia by the Central Military District (north-eastern front), comprised the 41st Combined Arms Army and the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. [93]

A third axis was deployed towards Kharkiv by the Western Military District (eastern front), with the 1st Guards Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army. A fourth, southern front originating in occupied Crimea and Russia's Rostov oblast with an eastern axis towards Odesa and a western area of operations toward Mariupol was opened by the Southern Military District, including the 58th, 49th, and 8th Combined Arms Army, the latter also commanding the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian separatist forces in Donbas. [93] By 7 April, Russian troops deployed to the northern front by the Russian Eastern Military District pulled back from the Kyiv offensive, apparently to resupply and redeploy to the Donbas region to reinforce the renewed invasion of south-eastern Ukraine. The north-eastern front, including the Central Military District, was similarly withdrawn for resupply and redeployment to south-eastern Ukraine. [93] [94] By 8 April, General Alexander Dvornikov was placed in charge of military operations during the invasion. [95] On 18 April, retired Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the former US ambassador to NATO, reported in a PBS NewsHour interview that Russia had repositioned its troops to initiate a new assault on Eastern Ukraine which would be limited to Russia's original deployment of 150,000 to 190,000 troops for the invasion, though the troops were being well supplied from adequate weapon stockpiles in Russia. For Lute, this contrasted sharply with the vast size of the Ukrainian conscription of all-male Ukrainian citizens between 16 and 60 years of age, but without adequate weapons in Ukraine's highly limited stockpiles of weapons. [96] On 26 April, delegates of the US and 40 allied nations met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to discuss forming a coalition to provide economic support and military supplies and refitting to Ukraine. [97] Following Putin's Victory Day speech in early May, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said no short term resolution to the invasion should be expected. [98]

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with members of the Ukrainian Army on 18 June 2022 Robocha poyizdka Prezidenta Ukrayini na Mikolayivshchinu ta Odeshchinu 50.jpg
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy with members of the Ukrainian Army on 18 June 2022

Russian forces improved their focus on the protection of supply lines by advancing slowly and methodically. They also benefited from centralising command under General Dvornikov. [99] Ukraine's reliance on Western-supplied equipment constrained operational effectiveness, as supplying countries feared that Ukraine would use Western-made materiel to strike targets in Russia. [100] Military experts disagreed on the future of the conflict; some suggested that Ukraine should trade territory for peace, [101] while others believed that Ukraine could maintain its resistance thanks to the Russian losses. [102] On 26 May 2022, the Conflict Intelligence Team, citing reports from Russian soldiers, reported that Colonel General Gennady Zhidko had been put in charge of Russian forces during the invasion, replacing Army General Dvornikov. [103] [104] [lower-alpha 6]

By 30 May, disparities between Russian and Ukrainian artillery were apparent with Ukrainian artillery being vastly outgunned by range and number. [106] In response to US President Joe Biden's indication that enhanced artillery would be provided to Ukraine, Putin indicated that Russia would expand its invasion front to include new cities in Ukraine and in apparent retribution ordered a missile strike against Kyiv on 6 June after not directly attacking the city for several weeks. [107] On 10 June 2022, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine's military intelligence, stated during the Severodonetsk campaign that the frontlines were where the future of the invasion would be decided: "This is an artillery war now, and we are losing in terms of artillery. Everything now depends on what [the west] gives us. Ukraine has one artillery piece to 10 to 15 Russian artillery pieces. Our western partners have given us about 10% of what they have." [108] On 29 June, Reuters reported that Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, updating U.S. intelligence assessment of the Russian invasion, said that U.S. intelligence agencies agree that the invasion will continue "for an extended period of time ... In short, the picture remains pretty grim and Russia's attitude toward the West is hardening." [109] On 5 July, BBC reported that extensive destruction by the Russian invasion would cause immense financial damage to Ukraine's reconstruction economy stating: "Ukraine needs $750bn for a recovery plan and Russian oligarchs should contribute to the cost, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal has told a reconstruction conference in Switzerland." [110]

On 8 October, the Russian Defence Ministry named Air Force General Sergei Surovikin as the overall commander of Russian forces fighting in Ukraine without naming who Surovikin was replacing. [111] By 11 January 2023, another change in high command put Valery Gerasimov, author of the Gerasimov doctrine, as the general in charge of the Ukrainian invasion by Russia. [112] On 20 February, Biden visited Kyiv in person on a diplomatic mission to assure Zelenskyy and his government of sustaining US financial and military supplies support on the eve of the end of the first year of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. [113]

First phase: Invasion of Ukraine (24 February – 7 April)

Animated map of phase 1 of the Russian invasion from 24 February to 7 April 2022 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine Phase 1 animated.gif
Animated map of phase 1 of the Russian invasion from 24 February to 7 April 2022

The invasion began on 24 February, launched out of Belarus to target Kyiv, and from the northeast against the city of Kharkiv. The southeastern front was conducted as two separate spearheads, from Crimea and the southeast against Luhansk and Donetsk. [79] [80]

Kyiv and northern front

The Antonov An-225 Mriya, the largest aircraft ever built, was destroyed during the Battle of Antonov Airport. 50 dniv aktivnogo sprotivu okupantu 02.jpg
The Antonov An-225 Mriya, the largest aircraft ever built, was destroyed during the Battle of Antonov Airport.

Russian efforts to capture Kyiv included a probative spearhead on 24 February, from Belarus south along the west bank of the Dnipro River, apparently to encircle the city from the west, supported by two separate axes of attack from Russia along the east bank of the Dnipro: the western at Chernihiv, and the eastern at Sumy. These were likely intended to encircle Kyiv from the north-east and east. [77] [76]

“The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.”

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, allegedly 25 February 2022,Associated Press

Russia apparently tried to rapidly seize Kyiv, with Spetsnaz infiltrating into the city supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north, but was unsuccessful. [114] [115] [116] [117] Around this time, the United States contacted President Zelenskyy and offered assistance with helping him flee the country, should the Russian Army attempt to kidnap or kill him upon the planned seizure of Kyiv. Zelenskyy reportedly said in response to the request to evacuate: “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride,” according to a senior American intelligence official with direct knowledge of the conversation. [118] The Washington Post, who described the quote as "one of the most-cited lines of the Russian invasion", was not entirely sure of the comment's accuracy. Reporter Glenn Kessler said it came from "a single source, but on the surface it appears to be a good one". [119] Russian forces advancing on Kyiv from Belarus gained control of the ghost towns of Chernobyl and Pripyat. [120] [121] Russian Airborne Forces attempted to seize two key airfields near Kyiv, launching an airborne assault on Antonov Airport, [122] [123] and a similar landing at Vasylkiv, near Vasylkiv Air Base, on 26 February. [124] [125]

By early March, Russian advances along the west side of the Dnipro were limited by Ukrainian defences. [77] [76] As of 5 March, a large Russian convoy, reportedly 64 kilometres (40 mi) long, had made little progress toward Kyiv. [126] The London-based think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) assessed Russian advances from the north and east as "stalled". [127] Advances from Chernihiv largely halted as a siege began there. Russian forces continued to advance on Kyiv from the northwest, capturing Bucha, Hostomel, and Vorzel by 5 March, [128] [129] though Irpin remained contested as of 9 March. [130] By 11 March, the lengthy convoy had largely dispersed and taken cover. [131] On 16 March, Ukrainian forces began a counter-offensive to repel Russian forces. [132] Unable to achieve a quick victory in Kyiv, Russian forces switched their strategy to indiscriminate bombing and siege warfare. [133] [134]

On 25 March, a Ukrainian counter-offensive retook several towns to the east and west of Kyiv, including Makariv. [135] [136] Russian troops in the Bucha area retreated north at the end of March. Ukrainian forces entered the city on 1 April. [137] Ukraine said it had recaptured the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel, and uncovered evidence of war crimes in Bucha. [138] On 6 April, NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said that the Russian "retraction, resupply, and redeployment" of their troops from the Kyiv area should be interpreted as an expansion of Putin's plans for Ukraine, by redeploying and concentrating his forces on Eastern Ukraine. [94] Kyiv was generally left free from attack apart from isolated missile strikes. One did occur while UN Secretary-General António Guterres was visiting Kyiv on 28 April to discuss with Zelenskyy the survivors of the siege of Mariupol. [139]

North-eastern front

Russian forces advanced into Chernihiv Oblast on 24 February and besieged its administrative capital. The next day Russian forces attacked and captured Konotop. [140] [141] A separate advance into Sumy Oblast the same day attacked the city of Sumy, just 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russo-Ukrainian border. The advance bogged down in urban fighting, and Ukrainian forces successfully held the city, claiming more than 100 Russian armoured vehicles were destroyed and dozens of soldiers were captured. [142] Russian forces also attacked Okhtyrka, deploying thermobaric weapons. [143]

On 4 March, Frederick Kagan wrote that the Sumy axis was then "the most successful and dangerous Russian avenue of advance on Kyiv", and commented that the geography favoured mechanised advances as the terrain "is flat and sparsely populated, offering few good defensive positions". [76] Travelling along highways, Russian forces reached Brovary, an eastern suburb of Kyiv, on 4 March. [77] [76] The Pentagon confirmed on 6 April that the Russian army had left Chernihiv Oblast, but Sumy Oblast remained contested. [144] On 7 April, the governor of Sumy Oblast said that Russian troops were gone, but left behind rigged explosives and other hazards. [145]

Southern front

A destroyed Russian BMP-3 near Mariupol, 7 March 2022 Destruction of Russian tanks by Ukrainian troops in Mariupol (4).jpg
A destroyed Russian BMP-3 near Mariupol, 7 March 2022

On 24 February, Russian forces took control of the North Crimean Canal. Troops used explosives to destroy the dam that was blocking the river, allowing Crimea to obtain water from the Dnieper which had been cut off since 2014. [146] On 26 February, the siege of Mariupol began as the attack moved east linking to separatist-held Donbas. [143] [147] En route, Russian forces entered Berdiansk and captured it. [148] On 1 March, Russian forces attacked Melitopol and nearby cities. [149] [150] On 25 February, Russian units from the DPR moves on Mariupol and were defeated near Pavlopil. [151] [152] [153] By evening, the Russian Navy reportedly began an amphibious assault on the coast of the Sea of Azov 70 kilometres (43 mi) west of Mariupol. A US defence official said that Russian forces might be deploying thousands of marines from this beachhead. [154] [155] [156]

The Russian 22nd Army Corps approached the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on 26 February [157] [158] and besieged Enerhodar in order to assume control. [159] A fire began, [160] but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that essential equipment was undamaged. [161] Despite the fires, the plant recorded no radiation leaks. [162] A third Russian attack group from Crimea moved northwest and captured bridges over the Dnieper. [163] On 2 March, Russian troops won a battle at Kherson; this was the first major city to fall to Russian forces in the invasion. [164] Russian troops moved on Mykolaiv, attacking it two days later. They were repelled by Ukrainian forces. [165] On 2 March, Ukrainian forces initiated a counter-offensive on Horlivka, [166] controlled by the DPR since 2014. [167]

After renewed missile attacks on 14 March in Mariupol, the Ukrainian government said more than 2,500 had died. [168] By 18 March, Mariupol was completely encircled and fighting reached the city centre, hampering efforts to evacuate civilians. [169] On 20 March, an art school sheltering around 400 people, was destroyed by Russian bombs. [170] The Russians demanded surrender, and the Ukrainians refused. [79] [80] On 24 March, Russian forces entered central Mariupol. [171] On 27 March, Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna said that "(m)ore than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed." [172]

Putin told Emmanuel Macron in a phone call on 29 March that the bombardment of Mariupol would only end when the Ukrainians surrendered. [173] On 1 April Russian troops refused safe passage into Mariupol to 50 buses sent by the United Nations to evacuate civilians, as peace talks continued in Istanbul. [174] On 3 April, following the retreat of Russian forces from Kyiv, Russia expanded its attack on Southern Ukraine further west, with bombardment and strikes against Odesa, Mykolaiv, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. [175] [176]

Eastern front

Russian bombardment on the outskirts of Kharkiv, 1 March Russian bombardment on the outskirts of Kharkiv.jpg
Russian bombardment on the outskirts of Kharkiv, 1 March

In the east, Russian troops attempted to capture Kharkiv, less than 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Russian border, [177] [178] and met strong Ukrainian resistance. On 25 February, the Millerovo air base was attacked by Ukrainian military forces with OTR-21 Tochka missiles, which according to Ukrainian officials, destroyed several Russian Air Force planes and started a fire. [81] [82] On 28 February, missile attacks killed several people in Kharkiv. [179] On 1 March, Denis Pushilin, head of the DPR, announced that DPR forces had almost completely surrounded the city of Volnovakha. [180] On 2 March, Russian forces were repelled from Sievierodonetsk during an attack against the city. [181] Izium was reportedly captured by Russian forces on 17 March, [182] although fighting continued. [183]

On 25 March, the Russian defence ministry said it would seek to occupy major cities in Eastern Ukraine. [184] On 31 March, the Ukrainian military confirmed Izium was under Russian control, [185] [186] and PBS News reported renewed shelling and missile attacks in Kharkiv, as bad or worse than before, as peace talks with Russia were to resume in Istanbul. [187]

Amid the heightened Russian shelling of Kharkiv on 31 March, Russia reported a helicopter strike against an oil supply depot approximately 35 kilometres (22 mi) north of the border in Belgorod, and accused Ukraine of the attack. [188] Ukraine denied responsibility. [189] By 7 April, the renewed massing of Russian invasion troops and tank divisions around the towns of Izium, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk prompted Ukrainian government officials to advise the remaining residents near the eastern border of Ukraine to evacuate to western Ukraine within 2–3 days, given the absence of arms and munitions previously promised to Ukraine by then. [190]

Second phase: South-Eastern front (8 April – 5 September)

Animated map of phase 2 of the Russian invasion from 7 April to 5 September 2022 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine Phase 2 animated.gif
Animated map of phase 2 of the Russian invasion from 7 April to 5 September 2022

By 17 April, Russian progress on the south-eastern front appeared to be impeded by opposing Ukrainian forces in the large, heavily fortified Azovstal steel mill and surrounding area in Mariupol. [191]

On 19 April, The New York Times confirmed that Russia had launched a renewed invasion front referred to as an "eastern assault" across a 480-kilometre (300 mi) front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk, with simultaneous missile attacks again directed at Kyiv in the north and Lviv in Western Ukraine. [192] As of 30 April, a NATO official described Russian advances as "uneven" and "minor". [193] An anonymous US Defence Official called the Russian offensive: "very tepid", "minimal at best", and "anaemic". [194] In June 2022 the chief spokesman for the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation Igor Konashenkov revealed that Russian troops are divided between the Army Groups "Center" commanded by Colonel General Aleksander Lapin and "South" commanded by Army General Sergey Surovikin. [195] On 20 July, Lavrov announced that Russia would respond to the increased military aid being received by Ukraine from abroad as justifying the expansion of its special military operation to include objectives in both the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. [196]

Russian Ground Forces started recruiting volunteer battalions from the regions in June 2022 to create a new 3rd Army Corps within the Western Military District, with a planned strength estimated at 15,500–60,000 personnel. [197] [198] Its units were deployed to the front around the time of Ukraine's 9 September Kharkiv oblast counteroffensive, in time to join the Russian retreat, leaving behind tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and personnel carriers: the 3AC "melted away" according to Forbes , having little or no impact on the battlefield along with other irregular forces. [199] [200]

Fall of Mariupol

On 13 April, Russian forces intensified their attack on the Azovstal iron and steel works in Mariupol, and the Ukrainian defence forces that remained there. [201] By 17 April, Russian forces had surrounded the factory. Ukrainian prime minister Denys Shmyhal said that the Ukrainian soldiers had vowed to ignore the renewed ultimatum to surrender and to fight to the last soul. [202] On 20 April, Putin said that the siege of Mariupol could be considered tactically complete, since the 500 Ukrainian troops entrenched in bunkers within the Azovstal iron works and estimated 1,000 Ukrainian civilians were completely sealed off from any type of relief in their siege. [203]

After consecutive meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy, UN Secretary-General Guterres on 28 April said he would attempt to organise an emergency evacuation of survivors from Azovstal in accordance with assurances he had received from Putin on his visit to the Kremlin. [204] On 30 April, Russian troops allowed civilians to leave under UN protection. [205] By 3 May, after allowing approximately 100 Ukrainian civilians to depart from the Azovstal steel factory, Russian troops renewed non-stop bombardment of the steel factory. [206] On 6 May, The Telegraph reported that Russia had used thermobaric bombs against the remaining Ukrainian soldiers, who had lost contact with the Kyiv government; in his last communications, Zelenskyy had authorised the commander of the besieged steel factory to surrender as necessary under the pressure of increased Russian attacks. [207] On 7 May, the Associated Press reported that all civilians were evacuated from the Azovstal steel works at the end of the three-day ceasefire. [208]

A children's hospital in Mariupol after a Russian airstrike Naslidki obstrilu ditiachoyi likarni ta pologovogo budinku v Mariupoli, 9 bereznia 2022 roku.jpg
A children's hospital in Mariupol after a Russian airstrike

After the last civilians evacuated from the Azovstal bunkers, nearly two thousand Ukrainian soldiers remained barricaded there, with 700 injured; they were able to communicate a plea for a military corridor to evacuate, as they expected summary execution if they surrendered to the Russians. [209] Reports of dissent within the Ukrainian troops at Azovstal were reported by Ukrainskaya Pravda on 8 May indicating that the commander of the Ukrainian Marines assigned to defend the Azovstal bunkers made an unauthorised acquisition of tanks, munitions, and personnel, broke out from the position there and fled. The remaining soldiers spoke of a weakened defensive position in Azovstal as a result, which allowed progress to advancing Russian lines of attack. [210] Ilia Somolienko, deputy commander of the remaining Ukrainian troops barricaded at Azovstal, said: "We are basically here dead men. Most of us know this and it's why we fight so fearlessly." [211]

On 16 May, the Ukrainian General staff announced that the Mariupol garrison had "fulfilled its combat mission" and that final evacuations from the Azovstal steel factory had begun. The military said that 264 service members were evacuated to Olenivka under Russian control, while 53 of them who were "seriously injured" had been taken to a hospital in Novoazovsk also controlled by Russian forces. [212] [213] Following the evacuation of Ukrainian personnel from Azovstal, Russian and DPR forces fully controlled all areas of Mariupol. The end of the battle also brought an end to the Siege of Mariupol. Russia press secretary Dmitry Peskov said Russian President Vladimir Putin had guaranteed that the fighters who surrendered would be treated "in accordance with international standards" while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an address that "the work of bringing the boys home continues, and this work needs delicacy — and time". Some prominent Russian lawmakers called on the government to deny prisoner exchanges for members of the Azov Regiment. [214]

Fall of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk

Military control around Donbas as of 6 March 2023 Map of the war in Donbass.svg
Military control around Donbas as of 6 March 2023

A Russian missile attack on Kramatorsk railway station in the city of Kramatorsk took place on 8 April, reportedly killing at least 52 [215] and injuring 87 to 300. [216] On 11 April, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine expected a major new Russian offensive in the east. [217] American officials said that Russia had withdrawn or been repulsed elsewhere in Ukraine, and therefore was preparing a retraction, resupply, and redeployment of infantry and tank divisions to the south-eastern Ukraine front. [218] [219] Military satellites photographed extensive Russian convoys of infantry and mechanised units deploying south from Kharkiv to Izium on 11 April, apparently part of the planned Russian redeployment of its north-eastern troops to the south-eastern front of the invasion. [220]

On 18 April, with Mariupol almost entirely overtaken by Russian forces, the Ukrainian government announced that the second phase of the reinforced invasion of the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions had intensified with expanded invasion forces occupying of the Donbas. [221]

On 22 May, the BBC reported that after the fall of Mariupol, Russia had intensified offensives in Luhansk and Donetsk while concentrating missile attacks and intense artillery fire on Sievierodonetsk, the largest city under Ukrainian control in Luhansk province. [222]

On 23 May, Russian forces were reported entering the city of Lyman, fully capturing the city by 26 May. [223] [224] Ukrainian forces were reported leaving Sviatohirsk. [225] By 24 May, Russian forces captured the city of Svitlodarsk. [226] On 30 May, Reuters reported that Russian troops had breached the outskirts of Sievierodonetsk. [227] By 2 June, The Washington Post reported that Sievierodonetsk was on the brink of capitulation to Russian occupation with over 80 per cent of the city in the hands of Russian troops. [228] On 3 June, Ukrainian forces reportedly began a counter-attack in Sievierodonetsk. By 4 June, Ukrainian government sources claimed 20% or more of the city had been recaptured. [229]

On 12 June it was reported that possibly as many as 800 Ukrainian civilians (as per Ukrainian estimates) and 300–400 soldiers (as per Russian sources) were besieged at the Azot chemical factory in Severodonetsk. [230] [231] With the Ukrainian defences of Severodonetsk faltering, Russian invasion troops began intensifying their attack upon the neighbouring city of Lysychansk as their next target city in the invasion. [232] On 20 June it was reported that Russian troops continued to tighten their grip on Severodonetsk by capturing surrounding villages and hamlets surrounding the city, most recently the village of Metelkine. [233]

On 24 June, CNN reported that, amid continuing scorched-earth tactics being applied by advancing Russian troops, Ukraine's armed forces were ordered to evacuate the Severodonetsk; several hundred civilians taking refuge in the Azot chemical plant were left behind in the withdrawal, with some comparing their plight to that of the civilians at the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol in May. [234] On 3 July, CBS announced that the Russian defense ministry claimed that the city of Lysychansk had been captured and occupied by Russian forces. [235] On 4 July, The Guardian reported that after the fall of the Luhansk oblast, that Russian invasion troops would continue their invasion into the adjacent Donetsk Oblast to attack the cities of Sloviansk and Bakhmut. [236]

Kharkiv front

Saltivka residential area after battle of Kharkiv on 19 May 2022 Northern Saltivka after battle for Kharkiv (2022-05-19) 01.jpg
Saltivka residential area after battle of Kharkiv on 19 May 2022

On 14 April, Ukrainian troops reportedly blew up a bridge between Kharkiv and Izium used by Russian forces to redeploy troops to Izium, impeding the Russian convoy. [237]

On 5 May, David Axe writing for Forbes stated that the Ukrainian army had concentrated its 4th and 17th Tank Brigades and the 95th Air Assault Brigade around Izium for possible rearguard action against the deployed Russian troops in the area; Axe added that the other major concentration of Ukraine's forces around Kharkiv included the 92nd and 93rd Mechanized Brigades which could similarly be deployed for rearguard action against Russian troops around Kharkiv or link up with Ukrainian troops contemporaneously being deployed around Izium. [238]

On 13 May, BBC reported that Russian troops in Kharkiv were being retracted and redeployed to other fronts in Ukraine following the advances of Ukrainian troops into surrounding cities and Kharkiv itself, which included the destruction of strategic pontoon bridges built by Russian troops to cross over the Seversky Donets river and previously used for rapid tank deployment in the region. [239]

Kherson-Mykolaiv front

Missile attacks and bombardment of the key cities of Mykolaiv and Odesa continued as the second phase of the invasion began. [192] On 22 April, Russia's Brigadier General Rustam Minnekayev in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolayiv–Odesa front after the siege of Mariupol further west to include the breakaway region of Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova. [240] [241] The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine described this intention as imperialism, saying that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine and that the statement was an admission that "the goal of the 'second phase' of the war is not victory over the mythical Nazis, but simply the occupation of eastern and southern Ukraine". [240] Georgi Gotev, writing for Reuters on 22 April, noted that occupying Ukraine from Odesa to Transnistria would transform it into a landlocked nation without any practical access to the Black Sea. [242] On 24 April, Russia resumed its missile strikes on Odesa, destroying military facilities and causing two dozen civilian casualties. [243]

On 27 April, Ukrainian sources indicated that explosions had destroyed two Russian broadcast towers in Transnistria, primarily used to rebroadcast Russian television programming. [244] At the end of April, Russia renewed missile attacks on runways in Odesa, destroying some of them. [245] During the week of 10 May, Ukrainian troops began to take military action to dislodge Russian forces installing themselves on Snake Island in the Black Sea approximately 200 kilometres (120 mi) from Odesa. [246] On 30 June 2022, Russia announced that it had withdrawn troops from the island after objectives were completed. [247] [248]

On 23 July, CNBC reported a Russian missile strike on Ukrainian port Odesa stating that the action was swiftly condemned by world leaders, a dramatic revelation amid a recently U.N. and Turkish-brokered deal that secured a sea corridor for grains and other foodstuff exports. [249] [250] On 31 July, CNN reported significant intensification of the rocket attacks and bombing of Mykolaiv by Russians also killing Ukrainian grain tycoon Oleksiy Vadaturskyi in the city during the bombing. [251]

Zaporizhzhia front

The Russian missile attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk was called a "war crime" by French president Emmanuel Macron on 28 June 2022. Shopping center in Kremenchuk after Russian shelling, 2022-06-27 (1) frame 0246.jpg
The Russian missile attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk was called a "war crime" by French president Emmanuel Macron on 28 June 2022.

Russian forces continued to fire missiles and drop bombs on the key cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. [192] On 10 April, Russian missiles destroyed the Dnipro International Airport. [252] [253] On 2 May the UN reportedly evacuated about 100 survivors from the siege at Mariupol with the cooperation of Russian troops, to the village of Bezimenne near Donetsk, from whence they were to move to Zaporizhzhia. [254] On 28 June, Reuters reported that a Russian missile attack was launched upon the city of Kremenchuk north-west or Zaporizhzhia detonating in a public mall and causing at least 18 deaths while drawing condemnation from France's Emmanuel Macron, among other world leaders, who spoke of it as being a "war crime". [255] 2022 July Dnipro missile strike killed four.

On 7 July, it was reported that after the Russians captured the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia earlier in the invasion, they installed heavy artillery and mobile missile launchers between the separate reactor walls of the nuclear installation, using it as a shield against possible Ukrainian counterattack. A counterattack against the installed Russian artillery sites would not be possible without the risk of radiation fallout in case of near misses. [256] On 19 August, Russia agreed to allow IAEA inspectors access to the Zaporizhzhia plant from Ukrainian-held territory, after a phone call between the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, and Russian president, Vladimir Putin. A temporary ceasefire around the plant still needed to be agreed for the inspection. [257] [258]

Russia reported that 12 attacks with over 50 artillery shells explosions had been recorded at the plant and the staff town of Energodar, by 18 August. [259] Also on 19 August, Tobias Ellwood, chair of the UK's Defence Select Committee, said that any deliberate damage to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant that could cause radiation leaks would be a breach of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an attack on a member state of NATO is an attack on all of them. The next day, United States congressman Adam Kinzinger said that any radiation leak would kill people in NATO countries, which would be an automatic activation of Article 5. [260] [261]

Shelling hit coal ash dumps at the neighbouring coal-fired power station on 23 August, and ash was on fire by 25 August. The 750 kV transmission line to the Dniprovska substation, which was the only one of the four 750 kV transmission lines that had not yet been damaged and cut by military action, passes over the ash dumps. At 12:12 p.m. on 25 August the line cut off due to the fire below, disconnecting the plant and its two operating reactors from the national grid for the first time since it started operating in 1985. In response, reactor 5's back-up generators and coolant pumps started up, and reactor 6 reduced generation. [262]

Incoming power was still available via the 330 kV line to the substation at the coal-fired station, so the diesel generators were not essential for cooling reactor cores and spent fuel pools. The 750 kV line and reactor 6 resumed operation at 12:29 p.m., but the line was cut by fire again two hours later. The line, but not the reactors, resumed operation again later that day. [262] On 26 August, one reactor restarted in the afternoon and another in the evening, resuming electricity supplies to the grid. [263] On 29 August 2022, an IAEA team led by Rafael Grossi went to investigate the plant. [264] Lydie Evrard and Massimo Aparo were also in the leadership team. No leaks had been reported at the plant before their arrival but shelling had occurred days before. [265]

Third phase: Russian annexations and Ukrainian counterattacks (6 September present)

Animated map of phase 3 of the Russian invasion from 5 September to 23 February (every third day) 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine Phase 3 animated (cropped).gif
Animated map of phase 3 of the Russian invasion from 5 September to 23 February (every third day)

On 6 September 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region, [266] beginning near Balakliia. [267] This counteroffensive was led by General Syrskyi. [268] By 12 September, an emboldened Kyiv launched a counteroffensive in the area surrounding Kharkiv with sufficient success for Russia to publicly admit to losing key positions in the area. The New York Times reported on 12 September that the success of the counteroffensive dented the image of a "Mighty Putin", and led to encouraging the government in Kyiv to seek more arms from the West to sustain its counteroffensive in Kharkiv and surrounding areas. [269] [270] On 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization. [271] [272] He also said that his country will use "all means" to "defend itself". Later that day, minister of defence Sergei Shoigu stated that 300,000 reservists would be called on a compulsory basis. [273] [271] Mykhailo Podolyak, the adviser to the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said that the decision was predictable, and was an attempt to justify "Russia's failures". [274] British Foreign Office Minister Gillian Keegan called the situation an "escalation", [275] while former Mongolian president Tsakhia Elbegdorj accused Russia of using Russian Mongols as "cannon fodder". [276] [277]

On 8 October 2022, the Crimean Bridge partially collapsed due to an explosion. [278] Russia later blamed Ukraine for the blast, and launched retaliatory missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian areas. [279] Since mid-October, Russia has carried out waves of strikes on Ukrainian electrical and water systems. [280] On 15 November 2022, Russia fired 85 missiles at the Ukrainian Power Grid, causing major power outages in Kyiv and neighboring regions. A missile, initially reported to be Russian and later claimed to be "Russian-made", crossed into Poland, killing two people in Przewodów, which led to the top leaders of Poland holding an emergency meeting. [281] The next day, US president Joe Biden stated that the missile that struck Polish territory was 'unlikely' to have been fired from Russia. [282] On 31 December, Putin ordered an extensive and large missile and drone attack upon Kyiv accompanied by his declaration that he intends to increase the diplomatic ante and military ante of his special military operation against Ukraine for all Russians to now be a "sacred duty to our ancestors and descendants". [283] By 11 January 2023, another change in high command put Valery Gerasimov as the general in charge of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. [112] On 7 February, The New York Times reported that Russians had mobilized nearly 200,000 newly mobilized soldiers to participate in the offensive towards Nevske, against Ukraine troops already wearied by previous fighting. [284] On 20 February, Biden visited Kyiv to assure Zelenskyy of sustaining US financial and military supplies support to Ukraine on the eve of the end of the first year of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. [113]

Annexations

In late September 2022, Russian-installed officials in Ukraine organized referendums on annexation of occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic in Russian occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, as well as the Russian-appointed military administrations of Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Denounced by Ukraine's government and its allies as sham elections, the official results showed overwhelming majorities in favor of annexation. [285]

On 30 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced the annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament. Ukraine, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations all denounced the annexation as illegal. [286]

Kherson counteroffensive

On 29 August, Zelenskyy advisedly vowed the start of a full-scale counteroffensive in the southeast. He first announced a counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in the south concentrating on the Kherson-Mykolaiv region, a claim that was corroborated by the Ukrainian parliament as well as Operational Command South. [287] [288] [289] [290] [291]

On 4 September, Zelenskyy announced the liberation of two unnamed villages in Kherson Oblast and one in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian authorities released a photo showing the raising of the Ukrainian flag in Vysokopillia by Ukrainian forces. [292] [293]

On 6 September, Ukraine started a second offensive in the Kharkiv area, where it achieved a rapid breakthrough. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks also continued along the southern frontline, though reports about territorial changes were largely unverifiable. [294] On 12 September, Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian forces had retaken a total of 6,000 square kilometres (2,300 sq mi) from Russia, in both the south and the east. The BBC stated that it could not verify these claims. [295]

In October, Ukrainian forces pushed further south towards the city of Kherson, taking control of 1,170 square kilometres (450 sq mi) of territory, with fighting extending to Dudchany. [296] [297]

On 9 November, defence minister Shoigu ordered Russian forces to leave part of Kherson Oblast, including the city of Kherson, and move to the eastern bank of the Dnieper. [298] On 11 November, Ukrainian troops entered Kherson, as Russia completed its withdrawal. This meant that Russian forces no longer had a foothold on the west (right) bank of the Dnieper. [299]

Kharkiv counteroffensive

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.svg
   Controlled by Ukraine
   Occupied by Russia
Map of the Kharkiv counteroffensive as of 6 March 2023

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces launched another surprise counteroffensive on 6 September in the Kharkiv region, [266] beginning near Balakliia. [267] By 7 September, Ukrainian forces had advanced some 20 kilometres (12 mi) into Russian occupied territory and claimed to have recaptured approximately 400 square kilometres (150 sq mi). Russian commentators said this was likely due to the relocation of Russian forces to Kherson in response to the Ukrainian offensive there. [300] On 8 September, Ukrainian forces captured Balakliia and advanced to within 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) of Kupiansk. [301] Military analysts said Ukrainian forces appeared to be moving towards Kupiansk, a major railway hub, with the aim of cutting off the Russian forces at Izium from the north. [302]

On 9 September, the Russian occupation administration of Kharkiv Oblast announced it would "evacuate" the civilian populations of Izium, Kupiansk and Velykyi Burluk. The Institute for the Study of War said it believed Kupiansk would likely fall in the next 72 hours, [303] while Russian reserve units were sent to the area by both road and helicopter. [304] On the morning of 10 September, photos emerged claiming to depict Ukrainian troops raising the Ukrainian flag in the centre of Kupiansk, [305] and the Institute for the Study of War said Ukrainian forces had captured approximately 2,500 square kilometres (970 sq mi) by effectively exploiting their breakthrough. [306]

Later in the day, Reuters reported that Russian positions in northeast Ukraine had "collapsed" in the face of the Ukrainian assault, with Russian forces forced to withdraw from their base at Izium after being cut off by the capture of Kupiansk. [307] By 15 September, an assessment by UK's Ministry of Defence confirmed that Russia had either lost or withdrawn from almost all of their positions west of Oskil river. The retreating units had also abandoned various high-value military assets. [308] The offensive continued pushing east and by 2 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces had liberated another key city in the Second Battle of Lyman. [309]

By 28 January 2023, Russian forces launched renewed attacks near Chervonopopivka (6 km north of Kreminna) in the direction of Nevsky (18 km north-west of Kreminna) and Makievka (22 km north-west of Kreminna). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled an attack by Russian infantry near Bilohorivka (12 km south of Kreminna across the Donets River). On 28 January, Ukrainian troops responded to the Russian counteroffensive with missile strikes from the HIMARS system on a hospital in the city of Novoaidar (55 km from Kreminna), killing 14 military patients and staff. [310] On 7 February, The New York Times reported that Russians had mobilized nearly 200,000 newly mobilized soldiers to participate in the offensive towards Nevske, against Ukraine troops already wearied by previous fighting. [284]

Zaporizhzhia front

Damage to a residential building in Zaporizhzhia following the airstrike of 9 October 2022. Putin has been labeled a war criminal by international experts. Zaporizhzhia after Russian shelling, 2022-10-09 (41).jpg
Damage to a residential building in Zaporizhzhia following the airstrike of 9 October 2022. Putin has been labeled a war criminal by international experts.

On 3 September 2022, an IAEA delegation visited the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia and on 6 September a report was published documenting damages and threats to the plant security caused by external shelling and presence of occupational troops in the plant. [312] [313] On 11 September, at 3:14 a.m., the sixth and final reactor was disconnected from the grid, "completely stopping" the plant. The statement from Energoatom said that "Preparations are underway for its cooling and transfer to a cold state". [314] On 24 January 2023, The Wall Street Journal reported an intensification of fighting in the Zaporizhzhia region with both sides suffering heavy casualties. [315]

Donetsk front

Following defeat in Kherson and Kharkiv, Russian and Wagner forces have focused on taking the city of Bakhmut and breaking the half year long stalemate that has prevailed there since the start of the war. Russian forces have sought to encircle the city, attacking from the north via Soledar and after taking heavy casualties during the battle Russian and Wagner forces took control of the settlement on 16 January 2023. [316] [317] Attacking from the south, the Russian defence ministry and Wagner forces claimed to have captured Klishchiivka, a village located 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) southwest of Bakhmut in Donetsk on 20 January, however, this has yet to be independently verified. [318] [319] [320] This would mean that Bakhmut is facing attacks from North, South and East, with the sole line of supplies coming from the west via Chasiv Yar to fend off renewed Russian assaults. [321] [322] [323]

Events in Crimea

Ukrainian oblasts annexed by Russia since 2014 (Crimea) and 2022 (others). The 2022 annexation creates the equivalent of a strategic land bridge between Crimea and Russia. Ukraine disputed regions.svg
Ukrainian oblasts annexed by Russia since 2014 (Crimea) and 2022 (others). The 2022 annexation creates the equivalent of a strategic land bridge between Crimea and Russia.

On 31 July 2022, Russian Navy Day commemorations were cancelled after a drone attack reportedly wounded several people at the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol. [324] On 9 August 2022, there were large explosions reported at Saky Air Base in western Crimea. Satellite imagery showed that at least eight aircraft were damaged or destroyed. The cause of the explosions is unknown, but may have been long-range missiles, sabotage by special forces or an accident; [325] Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, a major Ukrainian commander during the war, [326] claimed on 7 September that it had been a Ukrainian missile attack. [327]

The base is located near the town of Novofedorivka, which is popular with tourists. Queues to leave the area formed at the Crimean Bridge after the explosions. [328] A week later there were explosions and a fire at an arms depot near Dzhankoi in northeastern Crimea, which Russia blamed on "sabotage". A railway line and power station were also damaged. According to the Russian regional head, Sergei Aksyonov, 2,000 people were evacuated from the area. [329] On 18 August, explosions were reported at Belbek Air Base, north of Sevastopol. [330]

On the morning of 8 October, the Kerch Bridge, which links occupied Crimea with Russia, was hit by a large explosion which collapsed part of the roadway and caused damage to the railway line. [331]

Missile attacks and aerial warfare

A street in Kyiv following Russian missile strikes on 10 October 2022 Kyiv after Russian shelling, 2022-10-10 (073).webp
A street in Kyiv following Russian missile strikes on 10 October 2022

Aerial warfare began on the first day of the invasion. By September, the Ukrainian air force was still at 80% of its prewar strength and had shot down about 55 Russian warplanes. [332] [333] By late December, 173 Ukrainian aircraft and UAVs were confirmed to have been shot down, whereas Russia had lost 171 aircraft. With the beginning of the invasion, dozens of missile attacks were recorded across both Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine. [76] [77] Dozens of missile strikes across Ukraine also reached as far west as Lviv. [81] [82] Starting in mid-October, Russian forces launched massive missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, intending to knock out energy facilities throughout the country. [334] By late November, hundreds of civilians had been killed and wounded by the attacks, [335] and millions of civilians had been left without power due to rolling blackouts. [336]

On 16 October, the Washington Post reported that Iran was planning to supply Russia with both drones and missiles. [337] On 21 November, the Ukrainian defense ministry said that according to reports in the Israeli press, Israel might respond by transferring short-range and medium-range missiles to Ukraine. [338] On 18 October 2022 the U.S. State Department accused Iran of violating UN Resolution 2231 by selling Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones to Russia, [339] [340] agreeing with similar assessments by France and the United Kingdom. Iran denied sending arms for use in the Ukraine war. [341] [342] On 22 October France, Britain and Germany formally called for an investigation by the UN team responsible for UNSCR 2231. [343] On 1 November, CNN reported that Iran was preparing to send ballistic missiles and other weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine. [344] On 21 November, CNN reported that an intelligence assessment had concluded that Iran planned to help Russia begin production of Iran-designed drones in Russia. The country making the intelligence assessment was not named. [345]

By 29 December, the Biden administration stated through diplomatic entreaties that Iran would need to curtail its supply of drones to Russia being used in its invasion of Ukraine, under the alternative that the United States would be compelled to redouble its supply of anti-drone missile intercept technology to Ukraine in order to nullify Iranian drone weaponry currently being deployed against Ukraine. [346]

In December several attacks on Dyagilevo and Engels air bases in Western Russia were allegedly carried out by drones launched from Ukraine causing 10 casualties in addition to heavily damaging 2 Tu-95 aircraft. [347] [348]

The Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva was sunk on 14 April 2022, reportedly after being hit by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles. Russian cruiser Moskva.jpg
The Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva was sunk on 14 April 2022, reportedly after being hit by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles.

Ukraine lies on the Black Sea, which has ocean access only through the Turkish-held Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. On 28 February, Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention and sealed off the straits to Russian warships not registered to Black Sea home bases and not returning to their ports of origin. This prevented the passage of four Russian naval vessels through the Turkish Straits in late February. [349] [350] [351] On 24 February, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced that an attack on Snake Island by Russian Navy ships had begun. [352] [353] The guided missile cruiser Moskva and patrol boat Vasily Bykov bombarded the island with their deck guns. [354] When the Russian warship identified itself and instructed the Ukrainian soldiers stationed on the island to surrender, their response was "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!" [355] [356] After the bombardment, a detachment of Russian soldiers landed and took control of Snake Island. [357]

Russia stated on 26 February that US drones supplied intelligence to the Ukrainian navy to help target Russian warships in the Black Sea, which the US denied. [358] By 3 March, the Ukrainian frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, the flagship of the Ukrainian navy, was scuttled in Mykolaiv to prevent its capture by Russian forces. [359] [360] [361] [362] On 14 March, the Russian source RT reported that the Russian Armed Forces had captured about a dozen Ukrainian ships in Berdiansk, including the Polnocny-class landing ship Yuri Olefirenko. [363] On 24 March, Ukrainian officials said that a Russian landing ship docked in Berdiansk – initially reported to be the Orsk and then its sister ship, the Saratov – was destroyed by a Ukrainian rocket attack. [364] [136] [148] In March 2022, the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) sought to create a safe sea corridor for commercial vessels to leave Ukrainian ports. [365] On 27 March, Russia established a sea corridor 80 miles (130 km) long and 3 miles (4.8 km) wide through its Maritime Exclusion Zone, for the transit of merchant vessels from the edge of Ukrainian territorial waters south-east of Odesa. [366] [367] Ukraine closed its ports at MARSEC level 3, with sea mines laid in port approaches, until the end to hostilities. [368]

The Russian cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, was, according to Ukrainian sources and a US senior official, [369] hit on 13 April by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles, setting the ship on fire. The Russian Defence Ministry confirmed the warship had suffered serious damage due to a munition explosion caused by a fire, and said that its entire crew had been evacuated. [370] The Pentagon spokesman John Kirby reported on 14 April that satellite images showed that the Russian warship had suffered a sizeable explosion onboard but was heading to the east for expected repairs and refitting in Sevastopol. [371] Later on the same day, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that Moskva had sunk while under tow in rough weather. [372] On 15 April, Reuters reported that Russia launched an apparent retaliatory missile strike against the missile factory Luch Design Bureau in Kyiv where the Neptune missiles used in the Moskva attack were manufactured and designed. [373] On 5 May, a US official confirmed that the US gave "a range of intelligence" (including real-time battlefield targeting intelligence) [374] to assist in the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva . [375]

In early May, Ukrainian forces launched counterattacks on Snake Island. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have repelled these counterattacks. Ukraine released footage of a Russian Serna-class landing craft located in the Black Sea being destroyed near Snake Island by a Ukrainian drone. [376] [377] The same day, a pair of Ukrainian Su-27 conducted a high-speed, low level bombing run on Russian-occupied Snake Island; the attack was captured on film by a Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drone. [378] On 1 June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserted that Ukraine's policy of mining its own harbours to impede Russia maritime aggression had contributed to the food export crisis, stating that: "If Kyiv solves the problem of demining ports, the Russian Navy will ensure the unimpeded passage of ships with grain to the Mediterranean Sea." [379] On 30 June 2022, Russia announced that it had withdrawn troops from the island in a "gesture of goodwill". [247] The withdrawal was later officially confirmed by Ukraine. [380]

Nuclear threats

Four days into the invasion, President Putin placed Russia's nuclear forces on high alert, raising fears that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, or a wider escalation of the conflict could occur. During April, Putin and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov made a number of threats alluding to the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and the countries supporting Ukraine. [381] [382] On 14 April, CIA director William Burns said that "potential desperation" in the face of defeat could encourage President Putin to use tactical nuclear weapons. [383] In response to Russia's disregard of safety precautions during its occupation of the disabled former nuclear power plant at Chernobyl and its firing of missiles in the vicinity of the active nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia, on 26 April President Zelenskyy called for an international discussion on regulating Russia's use of nuclear resources, stating: "no one in the world can feel safe knowing how many nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons and related technologies the Russian state has ... If Russia has forgotten what Chernobyl is, it means that global control over Russia's nuclear facilities, and nuclear technology is needed." [384] In August, shelling around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant developed into a crisis, prompting an emergency inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ukraine has described the crisis as an act of nuclear terrorism by Russia. [385] On 19 September, CNBC reported that Biden's response to Russian uncertainties about its lack of combat success in its invasion stating: "President Joe Biden warned of a 'consequential' response from the U.S. if Russian President Vladimir Putin were to use nuclear or other non-conventional weapons... Asked what he would say to Putin if he was considering such action, Biden replied, 'Don't. Don't. Don't.'" [386] Following his statement made on 19 September, Biden appeared before the United Nations on 21 September and continued his criticism of Putin's nuclear sabre-rattling, stating that Putin was "overt, reckless and irresponsible... A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." [387] In January 2023, Graham Allison, writing for Time , presented a seven-point summary of Putin's hypothetical intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. [388]

Ukrainian resistance

Civilians in Kyiv preparing Molotov cocktails, 26 February 2022 Reporter's Notebook - Thriving Kyiv Becomes Battle Zone, Almost Overnight 03 (cropped).jpg
Civilians in Kyiv preparing Molotov cocktails, 26 February 2022

Ukrainian civilians resisted the Russian invasion, volunteering for territorial defence units, making Molotov cocktails, donating food, building barriers such as Czech hedgehogs, [389] and helping to transport refugees. [390] Responding to a call from Ukraine's transportation agency, Ukravtodor, civilians dismantled or altered road signs, constructed makeshift barriers, and blocked roadways. Social media reports showed spontaneous street protests against Russian forces in occupied settlements, often evolving into verbal altercations and physical standoffs with Russian troops. [391] By the beginning of April, Ukrainian civilians began to organise as guerrillas, mostly in the wooded north and east of the country. The Ukrainian military announced plans to launch a large-scale guerrilla campaign to complement its conventional defence against the Russian invasion. [392]

People physically blocked Russian military vehicles, sometimes forcing them to retreat. [391] [393] [394] The Russian soldiers' response to unarmed civilian resistance varied from reluctance to engage the protesters [391] to firing into the air or directly into crowds. [395] There have been mass detentions of Ukrainian protesters, and Ukrainian media has reported forced disappearances, mock executions, hostage-taking, extrajudicial killings, and sexual violence perpetrated by the Russian military. [396] To facilitate Ukrainian attacks, civilians reported Russian military positions via a Telegram chatbot and Diia, a Ukrainian government app previously used by citizens to upload official identity and medical documents. In response, Russian forces began destroying mobile phone network equipment, searching door-to-door for smartphones and computers, and in at least one case killing a civilian found with pictures of Russian tanks. [397]

As of 21 May, Zelenskyy indicated that Ukraine had 700,000 servicemembers on active duty combating the Russian invasion. [398] Throughout 2022, Ukraine withdrew soldiers and military equipment deployed to United Nations peacekeeping missions, such as MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, back to Ukraine. [399]

Reactions

UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 vote on 2 March 2022 condemning the invasion of Ukraine and demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian troops

In favour
Against
Abstained
Absent
Non-member United Nations General Assembly resolution ES-11 L.1 vote.svg
UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 vote on 2 March 2022 condemning the invasion of Ukraine and demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian troops
  In favour
  Against
  Abstained
  Absent
  Non-member

The invasion received widespread international condemnation from governments and intergovernmental organisations. On 2 March 2022 and on 23 February 2023, 141 member states of the UN General Assembly voted for Russia to immediately withdraw, while only five and seven member states, respectively, including Russia, voted against the resolutions. [400] Political reactions to the invasion included new sanctions imposed on Russia, which triggered widespread economic effects on the Russian and world economies. [401] The European Union and other Western governments financed and delivered humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. The bloc also implemented various economic sanctions, including a ban on Russian aircraft using EU airspace, [402] a ban on certain Russian banks from using the SWIFT international payments system, and a ban on certain Russian media outlets. [403] Reactions to the invasion have varied considerably across a broad spectrum of concerns including public response, media responses, peace efforts, and the examination of the legal implications of the invasion.

The invasion received widespread public condemnation internationally, while in some countries, certain sectors expressed sympathy or outright support for Russia due in part to distrust of US foreign policy. [404] Protests and demonstrations were held worldwide, including some in Russia and parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia. [405] Calls for a boycott of Russian goods spread on social media platforms, [406] while hackers attacked Russian websites, particularly those operated by the Russian government. [407] Anti-Russian sentiment against Russians living abroad surged after the invasion. [408] [409]

Foreign involvement

World maps of countries sending military aid to Ukraine
and imposing sanctions against Russia and Belarus
Countries supplying military equipment to Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion.svg
  Countries sending lethal military equipment
  Countries sending non-lethal military aid
  •   Russia
  •   Ukraine
Sanctions against Russia and Belarus 2022.svg
  Countries that imposed sanctions
[410] [411]
  Countries that imposed single restrictions
  Countries blocking sanctions circumvention

Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO and does not have any military alliance with the United States or with any NATO nation, [26] the Kiel Institute has tracked $84.2 billion from the 40 countries and the European Union in financial, humanitarian, and military aid to Ukraine from 24 January to 3 August 2022. [412] NATO is coordinating and assisting member states in providing billions of dollars in military equipment and financial aid to Ukraine. [413] The United States has provided the most military assistance, having committed over $29.3 billion from 24 February 2022 to 3 February 2023. [414] [lower-alpha 7] Many NATO allies, including Germany, have reversed past policies against providing offensive military aid in order to support Ukraine. The European Union for the first time in its history supplied lethal arms and has provided €3.1 billion to Ukraine. [417] Bulgaria, a major manufacturer of Soviet-pattern weapons, has covertly supplied more than €2 billion worth of arms and ammunition to Ukraine, including a third of the ammunition needed by the Ukrainian military in the critical early phase of the invasion; Bulgaria also provides fuel supplies and has, at times, covered 40% of the fuel needs of the Ukrainian armed forces. [418]

Foreign involvement in the invasion has been world-wide and extensive, ranging from foreign military sales and aid, foreign military involvement, foreign sanctions and ramifications, and including foreign condemnation and protest. [419] [420] Although NATO and the EU have publicly taken a strict policy of "no boots on the ground" in Ukraine, [421] the United States has significantly increased the secret involvement of special operations military and CIA operatives in support of Ukrainian forces since the beginning of the invasion. [422] Western countries and others imposed limited sanctions on Russia when it recognised Donbas as an independent nation. When the attack began, many other countries applied sanctions intended to cripple the Russian economy. [423] The sanctions targeted individuals, banks, businesses, monetary exchanges, bank transfers, exports, and imports. [419] [420] The invasion received widespread international condemnation and protests occurred around the world. On 2 March 2022, the United Nations General Assembly passed UNGA resolution ES-11/1 condemning the invasion and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces. [424]

Casualties

Field casualties and injuries

Combat deaths can be inferred from a variety of sources, including satellite photos and videos of military action. [425] Both Russian and Ukrainian sources are widely believed to inflate casualty numbers in opposing forces, while downplaying their own losses for the sake of morale. Russian news outlets have largely stopped reporting the Russian death toll. [426] [427] [428] [429] Russia and Ukraine admitted suffering "significant" and "considerable" losses, respectively. [428] [429] BBC News reported in April 2022 that Ukrainian claims of Russian deaths included the living injured. [430] [431] Agence France-Presse and independent conflict monitors could not verify Russian and Ukrainian claims of enemy losses and suspected that they were inflated. [432]

The number of civilian and military deaths is impossible to determine precisely in the fog of war. [433] [425] On 12 October 2022, the independent Russian media project iStories reported that more than 90,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, been seriously wounded, or gone missing in Ukraine, citing sources close to the Kremlin. [434] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of civilian casualties to be considerably higher than the figure the United Nations has been able to certify. [435] On 16 June, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense told CNN that he believed that tens of thousands of Ukrainians had died, adding that he hoped that the true death toll was below 100,000. [436] In the destroyed city of Mariupol alone, Ukrainian officials believe at least 25,000 have been killed; [437] but investigations of morgue records indicate many more, [438] and some bodies remain uncollected. [439]

Confirmed casualties
BreakdownNumbersTime periodSource
Civilians8,101 killed, 13,479 wounded [lower-alpha 8]
(622 killed, 2,202 wounded
in DPR/LPR areas)
24 February 2022 – 26 February 2023United Nations [440]
Ukrainian forces
(ZSU, NGU, SBGS, PSMOP)
10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded24 February – 3 June 2022Ukrainian government [441] [442]
Ukrainian forces (ZSU)13,000+ killed24 February – 2 December 2022Ukrainian government [443]
Russian forces
(VSRF, Rosgvardiya, FSB, FSO,
PMCs Wagner & Redut)
16,071 killed (confirmed
by names)
24 February 2022 – 3 March 2023 BBC News Russian & Mediazona [444]
Russian forces (VSRF)5,937 killed24 February – 21 September 2022Russian government [445]
Donetsk People's Republic forces 4,163 killed, 17,329 wounded26 February – 22 December 2022Donetsk People's Republic [lower-alpha 9]
5,400+ killed24 February 2022 – 3 March 2023BBC News Russian & Mediazona [444]
Luhansk People's Republic forces 1,700+ killed24 February 2022 – 3 March 2023BBC News Russian & Mediazona [444]
Estimated and claimed casualties
BreakdownNumbersTime periodSource
Civilians9,000 [448] –16,502 [449] killed [lower-alpha 10] 24 February 2022 – 17 January 2023Ukrainian government
1,252 killed, 3,982 wounded17 February – 28 December 2022DPR [lower-alpha 11] and LPR [451]
40,000 killed and wounded24 February – 9 November 2022US estimate [452] [453] [454]
Ukrainian forces
(ZSU, NGU, SBGS)
61,207 killed and 49,368 wounded24 February – 21 September 2022Russian government [455] [456] [457]
100,000+ killed and wounded24 February – 9 November 2022US [458] [459] [460] [461] and EC estimate [462]
100,000+ killed and wounded24 February 2022 – 22 January 2023 Norwegian Chief of Defence [463]
Russian and other forces
(VSRF, Rosgvardiya, FSB,
PMC Wagner, DPR & LPR)
180,000 killed and wounded24 February 2022 – 22 January 2023Norwegian Chief of Defence [463]
200,000 killed and wounded24 February 2022 – 16 February 2023US estimate [464]
175,000–200,000 casualties
(40,000–60,000 killed)
24 February 2022 – 17 February 2023UK Ministry of Defense [465]
151,370 killed24 February 2022 – 3 March 2023Ukrainian government [466] [467]
Russian and other forces
(VSRF, Rosgvardiya, FSB, FSO,
PMCs Wagner & Redut)
32,000 killed, 112,500 wounded24 February 2022 – 3 March 2023BBC News Russian & Mediazona [444]

Prisoners of war

Official statistics and estimates of prisoners of war (POW) have varied. [468] In the initial stages of the invasion, on 24 February, Oksana Markarova, Ukraine's ambassador to the US, said that a platoon of the 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kemerovo Oblast surrendered, saying they were unaware that they had been brought to Ukraine and tasked with killing Ukrainians. [469] Russia claimed to have captured 572 Ukrainian soldiers by 2 March 2022, [470] while Ukraine claimed 562 Russian soldiers were being held as prisoners as of 20 March, [471] with 10 previously reported released in a prisoner exchange for five Ukrainian soldiers and the mayor of Melitopol. [472] [473]

A report by The Independent on 9 June cited an intelligence report estimating that more than 5,600 Ukrainian soldiers had been captured, while the number of Russian servicemen being held as prisoners had fallen to 550, from 900 in April, following several prisoner exchanges. In contrast, Ukrayinska Pravda claimed 1,000 Russian soldiers were being held as prisoners as of 20 June. [474]

The first large prisoner exchange took place on 24 March, when 10 Russian and 10 Ukrainian soldiers, as well as 11 Russian and 19 Ukrainian civilian sailors, were exchanged. [475] [476] On 1 April 86 Ukrainian servicemen were exchanged [477] for an unknown number of Russian troops. [478]

On 25 August, research conducted by the Humanitarian Research Lab of the Yale School of Public Health and the Conflict Observatory was published which reported the identification of some 21 filtration camps in and around Russian-controlled Donetsk oblast, run by Russian and Russian allied forces and used for Ukrainian "civilians, POWs, and other personnel". These camps were allegedly used for four main purposes: as registration points; as camps and other holding facilities for those awaiting registration; as interrogation centers; and as "correctional colonies" (i.e., prisons). At Olenivka prison, one of the identified camps, the disturbed earth seen in imagery was said by researchers to be consistent with graves. Kaveh Khoshnood, a professor at the Yale School of Public Health, said: "Incommunicado detention of civilians is more than a violation of international humanitarian law — it represents a threat to the public health of those currently in the custody of Russia and its proxies. The conditions of confinement documented in this report allegedly include insufficient sanitation, shortages of food and water, cramped conditions, and reported acts consistent with torture." [479]

Humanitarian impact

The humanitarian impact of the invasion has been extensive and has included negative impacts on international food supplies and the 2022 food crises. [480] The invasion has also had a negative impact upon the cultural heritage of Ukraine, [481] with over 500 Ukrainian cultural heritage sites, including cultural centers, theatres, museums, and churches, having been impacted by "Russian aggression", and Ukraine's Minister of Culture calling it cultural genocide. [482] The deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites in this way is considered a war crime. [483] [484]

Refugee crisis

Ukrainian refugees in Krakow protesting against the war, 6 March 2022 02022 1199 Refugees from Ukraine in Krakow.jpg
Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protesting against the war, 6 March 2022
Ukrainian refugees in Helsinki protesting against the war, 26 February 2022. The sign reads "Russia, get out." We Stand with Ukraine 2022 Helsinki - Finland (51906158420).jpg
Ukrainian refugees in Helsinki protesting against the war, 26 February 2022. The sign reads "Russia, get out."

The war caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s; [485] [486] the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War II. [487] As Russia built up military forces along the Ukrainian border, many neighbouring governments and aid organisations prepared for a mass displacement event in the weeks before the invasion. In December 2021, the Ukrainian defence minister estimated that an invasion could force three to five million people to flee their homes. [488]

In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently rose to over eight million by 31 January 2023. [489] [490] On 20 May, NPR reported that, following a significant influx of foreign military equipment into Ukraine, a significant number of refugees are seeking to return to regions of Ukraine which are relatively isolated from the invasion front in south-eastern Ukraine. [491] However, by 3 May, another 8 million people were displaced inside Ukraine. [492]

Most refugees were women, children, the elderly, or people with disabilities. [493] [494] Most male Ukrainian nationals aged 18 to 60 were denied exit from Ukraine as part of mandatory conscription, [495] [496] unless they were responsible for the financial support of three or more children, single fathers, or were the parent/guardian of children with disabilities. [497] Many Ukrainian men, including teenagers, opted to remain in Ukraine voluntarily in order to join the resistance. [498] [499]

Regarding destinations, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees, as of 13 May, there were 3,315,711 refugees in Poland, 901,696 in Romania, 594,664 in Hungary, 461,742 in Moldova, 415,402 in Slovakia, and 27,308 in Belarus, while Russia reported it had received over 800,104 refugees. [500] As of 23 March, over 300,000 refugees had arrived in the Czech Republic. [501] Turkey has been another significant destination, registering more than 58,000 Ukrainian refugees as of 22 March, and more than 58,000 as of 25 April. [502] [503] The EU invoked the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history, granting Ukrainian refugees the right to live and work in the EU for up to three years. [504] Britain has accepted 146,379 refugees, as well as extending the ability to remain in the UK for 3 years with broadly similar entitlements as the EU, three years residency and access to state welfare and services. [505]

According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia has engaged in "massive deportation" of over 1.3 million Ukrainian civilians, potentially constituting crimes against humanity. [506] [507] The OSCE and Ukraine have accused Russia of forcibly moving civilians to filtration camps in Russian-held territory, and then into Russia. Ukrainian sources have compared this policy to Soviet-era population transfers and Russian actions in the Chechen War of Independence. [508] [509] For instance, as of 8 April, Russia claimed to have evacuated about 121,000 Mariupol residents to Russia. [509] Also, on 19 October, Russia announced the forced deportation of 60,000 civilians from areas around the line of contact in Kherson oblast. [510] RIA Novosti and Ukrainian officials said that thousands were dispatched to various centers in cities in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, [511] from which people were sent to economically depressed regions of Russia. [512] In April, Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council secretary Oleksiy Danilov said Russia planned to build "concentration camps" for Ukrainians in western Siberia, and that it likely planned to force prisoners to build new cities in Siberia. [513] [514] [lower-alpha 12]

Protest of Russians living in the Czech Republic against the war in Ukraine. People fleeing Russia are mostly young and educated. Protest of Russians in the Czech Republic against the war in Ukraine.png
Protest of Russians living in the Czech Republic against the war in Ukraine. People fleeing Russia are mostly young and educated.

A second refugee crisis created by the invasion and by the Russian government's suppression of human rights has been the flight of more than 300,000 Russian political refugees and economic migrants, the largest exodus from Russia since the October Revolution of 1917, [517] [518] to countries such as the Baltic states, Finland, Georgia, Turkey, and Central Asia. [519] [520] By 22 March, it was estimated that between 50,000 and 70,000 high-tech workers had left the country, and that 70,000 to 100,000 more might follow. Fears arose in Russia over the effect of this flight of talent on economic development. [521] Some Russian refugees sought to oppose Putin and help Ukraine from outside their country, [522] and some faced discrimination for being Russian. [523] [524] There has also been an exodus of millionaires. [525] On 6 May, The Moscow Times , citing data from the FSB, reported that almost four million Russians had left the country, although this figure included travellers for business or tourism. [526] Russia's partial mobilization of 300,000 men in September prompted an initial 200,000 more Russians to flee the country, [527] rising to 400,000 by early October, double the number of those conscripted. [528] To facilitate conscription and militarization, on 17 January 2023, Russian authorities re-imposed the Soviet-era Moscow and Leningrad military districts. [529]

Peace efforts

As of January 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin cited recognition of Russia's sovereignty over the annexed territories (pictured) as a condition for peace talks with Ukraine. Annexation of Southern and Eastern Ukraine.svg
As of January 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin cited recognition of Russia's sovereignty over the annexed territories (pictured) as a condition for peace talks with Ukraine.

Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place on 28 February, [531] 3 March, [532] and 7 March 2022, [533] in an undisclosed location in the Gomel Region on the Belarus–Ukraine border, [534] with further talks held on 10 March in Turkey prior to a fourth round of negotiations which began on 14 March. The Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on 13 July that peace talks are frozen for the time being. [535] On 19 July, former Russian President and current Deputy head of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, said: "Russia will achieve all its goals. There will be peace – on our terms." [536]

Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that any peace plan can only proceed from Ukraine's recognition of Russia's sovereignty over the regions it annexed from Ukraine in September 2022. [537] [538] By 29 December, following the Russian declared annexation of multiple Ukrainian oblasts, hopes for Ukrainian peace talks with Russia dimmed significantly with Russia taking a hardline position that the full Russian occupation of the four oblasts would be non-negotiable under any circumstances. [539] In addition, Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine would not hold peace talks with Russia while Putin was president and signed a decree to ban such talks. [540] [541] In January 2023, Putin's spokesperson Peskov said that "there is currently no prospect for diplomatic means of settling the situation around Ukraine." [542]

See also

Notes

  1. Additionally the Polish border village of Przewodów, the Moldovan localities of Briceni, Larga and Naslavcea and the Belarusian village of Harbacha.
  2. 1 2 The Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic were Russian-controlled puppet states that declared their independence in May 2014. They received international recognition from each other, Russia, Syria and North Korea, and some other partially recognised states. On 30 September 2022, after a referendum, Russia declared it had formally annexed both entities.
  3. Russian forces were permitted to stage part of the invasion from Belarusian territory. [1] [2] Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko also stated that Belarusian troops could take part in the invasion if needed, [3] and Belarusian territory has been used to launch missiles into Ukraine. [4] See also: Belarusian involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
  4. See § Foreign involvement for more details.
  5. Including military, paramilitary, and 34,000 separatist militias.
  6. A report of 5 June placed Dvornikov still in command. [105]
  7. By early September 2022 the US had given 126 M777 howitzer cannons and over 800,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition for them. [415] By January 2023 the US had donated 250,000 more 155 mm shells to Ukraine. The US is producing 14,000 155 mm shells monthly and plans to increase production to 90,000 shells per month by 2025. [416]
  8. Confirmed figure by source, not final (confirmations ongoing), estimates are higher.
  9. The DPR stated 4,176 of its servicemen were killed and 17,379 wounded between 1 January and 22 December 2022, [446] of which 13 died and 50 were wounded between 1 January and 25 February 2022, [447] leaving a total of 4,163 killed and 17,329 wounded in the period of the Russian invasion.
  10. See table here for a detailed breakdown of civilian deaths by oblast, according to Ukrainian authorities.
  11. The DPR stated 1,091 of its civilians were killed and 3,533 wounded between 1 January and 28 December 2022, [450] of which 8 died and 23 were wounded between 1 January and 25 February 2022, [447] leaving a total of 1,083 killed and 3,510 wounded in the period of the Russian invasion.
  12. Most likely, new cities meant new industrial cities in Siberia, the construction plans of which were announced by Shoigu in the fall of 2021. [515]

Related Research Articles

Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War included six deaths during the 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, 14,200–14,400 military and civilian deaths during the War in Donbas (2014–2022), and hundreds of thousands of deaths during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Events in the year 2022 in Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Kharkiv (2022)</span> A 2022 battle of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Battle of Kharkiv was a military engagement that took place from February to May 2022 in and around the city of Kharkiv in Ukraine, as part of the northeastern Ukraine offensive and eastern Ukraine offensive during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Kharkiv, located just 30 kilometres (19 mi) south of the Russia–Ukraine border and a predominately Russian-speaking city, is the second-largest city in Ukraine and was considered a major target for the Russian military early in the invasion.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Southern Ukraine campaign</span> Theater of conflict in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

The southern Ukraine campaign is an ongoing theatre of operation in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February. From their base in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Russian Armed Forces attacked Kherson Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast in southern Ukraine, battling the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kyiv offensive (2022)</span> Russian offensive in Ukraine

The Kyiv offensive was a theater in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It involved attacks by Russia across the Russo-Ukrainian and Belarusian–Ukrainian borders, beginning on 24 February 2022, for control of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and the surrounding areas of Kyiv Oblast and parts of Zhytomyr Oblast. Kyiv is the site of the Ukrainian government and the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Territorial control during the Russo-Ukrainian War</span>

This page provides information on the most recently known control of localities in Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War, which started in 2014 and escalated with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It includes all larger localities across the country, and additionally some smaller localities close to current or recent lines of contact.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Kyiv (2022)</span> Battle in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

The Battle of Kyiv was part of the Kyiv offensive in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for control of Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, and surrounding districts. The combatants were elements of the Russian Armed Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces. The battle lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022 and ended with the withdrawal of Russian forces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War crimes in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine</span> Violations of the laws of war during the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War

Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities and armed forces have committed multiple war crimes in the form of deliberate attacks against civilian targets, massacres of civilians, torture and rape of women and children, and indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Siege of Mariupol</span> Siege in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

The siege of Mariupol began on 24 February 2022 and lasted until 20 May, as part of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It saw fighting between the Russian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Armed Forces for control over Mariupol. Lasting for almost three months, the siege ended in a victory for Russia and the Donetsk People's Republic, as Ukraine lost control of the city amidst Russia's eastern Ukraine offensive and southern Ukraine offensive; all Ukrainian troops remaining in the city surrendered at the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works on 20 May 2022, after they were ordered to cease fighting.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eastern Ukraine campaign</span> Ongoing military offensive in Ukraine

The eastern Ukraine campaign is a theatre of operation in the ongoing 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that affects three oblasts in eastern Ukraine: Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast and Kharkiv Oblast. The invasion is an escalation or intensification of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which had been waged between Ukraine and Russian proxies since 2014.

Hero City of Ukraine is a Ukrainian honorary title awarded for outstanding heroism during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It was awarded to ten cities in March 2022, in addition to four already-named Hero Cities of the Soviet Union. This symbolic distinction for a city corresponds to the distinction of Hero of Ukraine awarded to individuals.

There have been several rounds of peace talks to halt Russia's 2022 invasion in Ukraine and end the Russo-Ukrainian War in an armistice. The first meeting was held four days after the start of the invasion, on 28 February 2022, in Belarus. It concluded without result, with delegations from both sides returning to their capitals for consultations. A second and third round of talks took place on 3 and 7 March 2022, on the Belarus–Ukraine border, in an undisclosed location in the Gomel region of Belarus. A fourth and fifth round of talks were respectively held on 10 and 14 March in Istanbul, Turkey.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Northeastern Ukraine campaign</span> 2022 military offensive in northeastern Ukraine

The northeastern Ukraine campaign was a theatre of operation from 24 February to 8 April 2022 in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for control of two provinces (oblasts) in Ukraine — Chernihiv Oblast and Sumy Oblast. On 4 April 2022, Ukrainian authorities said that Russian troops had mostly withdrawn from Sumy Oblast and no longer occupied any towns or villages in the area. Later that evening Ukrainian authorities claimed that Russian forces had withdrawn from Chernihiv Oblast, which was confirmed by the Pentagon by 6 April. In addition, it took place from February 24 to May 14 in Kharkiv Oblast. On 14 May, the ISW reported that: “Ukraine thus appears to have won the battle of Kharkiv.” The Mayor of Kharkiv said to the BBC: "There was no shelling in the city for the last five days. There was only one attempt from Russians to hit the city with a missile rocket near Kharkiv airport, but the missile was eliminated by Ukrainian Air Defence."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Izium (2022)</span> Battle of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

The Battle of Izium was a military engagement between Russia and Ukraine that occurred as part of the Eastern Ukraine offensive during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The battle started in March 2022 for control of the town of Izium due to the town's importance as a transportation node. The Russian military wanted to capture Izium so its forces in the Kharkiv Oblast could link up with their troops in the Donbas region.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Attacks on civilians in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine</span>

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities and armed forces have committed war crimes by carrying out deliberate attacks against civilian targets and indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas. The Russian military exposed the civilian population to unnecessary and disproportionate harm by using cluster munitions and by firing other explosive weapons with wide-area effects such as bombs, missiles, heavy artillery shells and multiple launch rockets.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive</span> Battle in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine

The 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive was a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory of the Kharkiv Oblast which was launched on 6 September 2022. Following the launch of the Kherson counteroffensive in Southern Ukraine in late August, Ukrainian forces began a second counteroffensive in early September in Kharkiv Oblast, in Eastern Ukraine.

This timeline of the first phase of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine, to 7 April 2022 when fighting focused away from the northeast and Kyiv and towards the south and east of Ukraine.

This timeline of the second phase of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 8 April 2022, when the area of heavy fighting shifted to the south and east of Ukraine, to 11 September 2022, just before Ukrainian counteroffensives made ground in the south and the east.

This timeline of the third phase of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine covers the period from 12 September 2022, when Ukrainian forces retook substantial ground during counteroffensives in the south and east, to 9 November 2022 when Ukrainian troops retook Kherson. Starting in October, Russia began a campaign of massive strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Outline of the Russo-Ukrainian War</span> Outline of the war between Russia and Ukraine since 2014

Below is a topical outline of articles significantly or meaningfully related the Russo-Ukrainian War; it is not an outline of articles related generally to Russian–Ukrainian relations. The Related outlines section contains links to other outlines related to the Russo-Ukrainian War. This outline is a topical organization of articles; for a chronological organization, please see the Timelines section below.

References

  1. Lister, Tim; Kesa, Julia (24 February 2022). "Ukraine says it was attacked through Russian, Belarus and Crimea borders". Kyiv: CNN. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  2. Murphy, Palu (24 February 2022). "Troops and military vehicles have entered Ukraine from Belarus". CNN. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  3. Rodionov, Maxim; Balmforth, Tom (25 February 2022). "Belarusian troops could be used in operation against Ukraine if needed, Lukashenko says". Reuters. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  4. "Missiles launched into Ukraine from Belarus". BBC News . 27 February 2022. Archived from the original on 2 March 2022. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  5. Bengali, Shashank (18 February 2022). "The U.S. says Russia's troop buildup could be as high as 190,000 in and near Ukraine" . The New York Times . Archived from the original on 18 February 2022. Retrieved 18 February 2022.
  6. Hackett, James, ed. (February 2021). The Military Balance 2021 (1st ed.). Abingdon, Oxfordshire: International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN   978-1-03-201227-8. OCLC   1292198893. OL   32226712M.
  7. 1 2 The Military Balance 2022. International Institute for Strategic Studies. February 2022. ISBN   9781000620030 via Google Books.
  8. 1 2 "Russia", The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 2023-01-18, retrieved 2023-01-19
  9. Michael Schwirtz. "Outnumbered and Bracing for a Russian Assault." The New York Times. 7 February 2023. Page 1.
  10. 1 2 The Military Balance 2022. International Institute for Strategic Studies. February 2022. ISBN   9781000620030 via Google Books.
  11. "Ukraine", The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 2023-01-18, retrieved 2023-01-19
  12. Berlinger, Joshua; Chernova, Anna; Lister, Tim (30 September 2022). "Putin announces annexation of Ukrainian regions in defiance of international law". CNN . Retrieved 26 January 2023.
  13. Speri, Alice (8 October 2022). "Will Putin Face Prosecution for the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine?". The Intercept . Retrieved 26 January 2023.
  14. Bellinger III, John B. (28 February 2022). "How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Violates International Law". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 26 January 2023.
  15. Allegretti, Aubrey (3 March 2022). "ICC launches war crimes investigation over Russian invasion of Ukraine". The Guardian . ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 11 February 2023.
  16. "Ukraine". International Criminal Court . Retrieved 11 February 2023.
  17. Budjeryn, Mariana. "Issue Brief #3: The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum" (PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars . Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  18. Vasylenko, Volodymyr (15 December 2009). "On assurances without guarantees in a 'shelved document'". The Day. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  19. Harahan, Joseph P. (2014). "With Courage and Persistence: Eliminating and Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction with the Nunn-Luger Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs" (PDF). DTRA History Series. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. ASIN   B01LYEJ56H. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  20. "Istanbul Document 1999". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 19 November 1999. p.  3. Archived from the original on 1 June 2014. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
  21. Hall, Gavin E. L. (14 February 2022). "Ukraine: the history behind Russia's claim that Nato promised not to expand to the east". The Conversation . Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  22. Wiegrefe, Klaus (15 February 2022). "NATO's Eastward Expansion: Is Vladimir Putin Right?". Der Spiegel . ISSN   2195-1349. Archived from the original on 15 February 2022. Retrieved 31 May 2022.
  23. Baker, Peter (9 January 2022). "In Ukraine Conflict, Putin Relies on a Promise That Ultimately Wasn't". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331.
  24. Bevan, Scott (5 April 2008). "Ukraine-Georgia NATO membership a 'direct threat to Russia'". ABC News .
  25. Brown, Colin (3 April 2008). "EU allies unite against Bush over Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine". The Independent . p. 24.
  26. 1 2 Evans, Michael (5 April 2008). "President tells summit he wants security and friendship". The Times . p. 46. President Putin, in a bravura performance before the world's media at the end of the Nato summit, warned President Bush and other alliance leaders that their plan to expand eastwards to Ukraine and Georgia "didn't contribute to trust and predictability in our relations.
  27. Dick, Charles, ed. (11 April 2008). "Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO". Reuters . Moscow.
  28. Dinan, Desmond; Nugent, Neil (eds.). The European Union in Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 3, 274.
  29. Grytsenko, Oksana; Vlasova, Anastasia (12 April 2014). "Armed pro-Russian insurgents in Luhansk say they are ready for police raid". Kyiv Post . Luhansk: Businessgroup LLC. Archived from the original on 12 April 2014. Retrieved 1 February 2022.
  30. Ragozin, Leonid (16 March 2019). "Annexation of Crimea: A masterclass in political manipulation". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 7 November 2020. Retrieved 24 May 2022.
  31. Charap, Samuel; Boston, Scott (21 January 2022). "U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?". RAND Corporation.
  32. Walker, Shaun; Grytsenko, Oksana; Ragozin, Leonid (3 September 2014). "Russian soldier: 'You're better clueless because the truth is horrible'". The Guardian . ISSN   1756-3224. OCLC   60623878. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  33. "Exclusive: Charred tanks in Ukraine point to Russian involvement". Reuters . 23 October 2014. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  34. "Ukraine ceasefire violated more than 100 times within days: OSCE". Al Jazeera. 29 July 2020. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  35. "France says Russia refused to hold ministerial meeting on Ukraine". Reuters . 9 November 2021. Retrieved 26 January 2022.
  36. "Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'". President of Russia . 12 July 2021. Archived from the original on 19 February 2022. Retrieved 26 January 2022. ... the outcome of both Minsk‑1 and Minsk‑2 which give a real chance to peacefully restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine by coming to an agreement directly with the DPR and LPR with Russia, Germany and France as mediators, contradicts the entire logic of the anti-Russia project.
  37. "Russia Shouldn't Negotiate With 'Vassal' Ukraine, Ex-President Medvedev Says". Moscow Times . 11 October 2021. Retrieved 26 January 2022.
  38. Michael, Casey (19 June 2015). "Pew Survey: Irredentism Alive and Well in Russia". The Diplomat.
  39. Socor, Vladimir (24 March 2014). "Putin's Crimea Speech: A Manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". Vol. 11, no. 56. Eurasia Daily Monitor.
  40. Putin, Vladimir (12 July 2021). "Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'". The Kremlin . Government of Russia. Archived from the original on 25 January 2022. Retrieved 1 February 2022.
  41. Snyder, Timothy D. (18 January 2022). "How to think about war in Ukraine". Thinking about... (newsletter). Substack. Archived from the original on 19 January 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2021. Historically speaking, the idea that a dictator in another country decides who is a nation and who is not is known as imperialism.
  42. Lucas, Edward (15 September 2020). "Why Putin's history essay requires a rewrite" . The Times . Archived from the original on 25 January 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2022.
  43. Roth, Andrew (7 December 2021). "Putin's Ukraine rhetoric driven by distorted view of neighbor". The Guardian . Moscow. Archived from the original on 7 December 2021. Retrieved 25 January 2021. But that fear has gone hand-in-hand with chauvinistic bluster that indicates Moscow has a distorted view of modern Ukraine and the goals it wants to achieve there.
  44. Dickinson, Peter; Haring, Melinda; Lubkivsky, Danylo; Motyl, Alexander; Whitmore, Brian; Goncharenko, Oleksiy; Fedchenko, Yevhen; Bonner, Brian; Kuzio, Taras (15 July 2021). "Putin's new Ukraine essay reveals imperial ambitions". Atlantic Council. Archived from the original on 15 July 2021. Retrieved 25 January 2021. Vladimir Putin's inaccurate and distorted claims are neither new nor surprising. They are just the latest example of gaslighting by the Kremlin leader.
  45. Wilson, Andrew (23 December 2021). "Russia and Ukraine: 'One People' as Putin Claims?". Royal United Services Institute. Archived from the original on 24 January 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2022. Putin's key trope is that Ukrainians and Russians are 'one people', and he calls them both 'Russian'. He starts with a myth of common origin: 'Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus', which was the largest state in Europe' from the 9th–13th centuries AD.
  46. Harris, Shane; Sonne, Paul (3 December 2021). "Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops, U.S. intelligence warns". The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 February 2023.
  47. Montgomery, Nancy (24 February 2022). "173rd Airborne Brigade battalion heads to Latvia as Ukraine comes under Russian attack". Stars and Stripes . Vicenza, Italy. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  48. 1 2 Schogol, Jeff (22 February 2022). "Here's what those mysterious white 'Z' markings on Russian military equipment may mean". Task & Purpose . North Equity. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 27 February 2022. [B]ottom line is the 'Z' markings (and others like it) are a deconfliction measure to help prevent friendly fire incidents.
  49. 1 2 Taylor, Adam (24 February 2022). "Russia's attack on Ukraine came after months of denials it would attack" . The Washington Post . Photograph by Evgeniy Maloletka (Associated Press). Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022. On Sunday ... "There is no invasion. There is no such plans," Antonov said.
  50. "Putin attacked Ukraine after insisting for months there was no plan to do so. Now he says there's no plan to take over". Kharkiv: CBS News (published 22 February 2022). 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  51. Farley, Robert; Kiely, Eugene (24 February 2022). "Russian Rhetoric Ahead of Attack Against Ukraine: Deny, Deflect, Mislead". FactCheck.org . Photograph by Aris Messinis (Agence-France Presse). Annenberg Public Policy Center. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022. Nov. 28 – ... 'Russia has never hatched, is not hatching and will never hatch any plans to attack anyone,' Peskov said. ... 19 Jan – ... Ryabkov ... 'We do not want and will not take any action of aggressive character. We will not attack, strike, invade, quote unquote, whatever Ukraine.'
  52. Fořtová, Klára (8 March 2022). "Velvyslanec Ukrajiny v Česku denně promlouvá, ruský mlčí a je 'neviditelný'" [Ukraine's ambassador to the Czech Republic speaks daily, the Russian is silent and 'invisible']. Mladá fronta DNES (in Czech). Archived from the original on 8 March 2022. Retrieved 10 March 2022. Zmejevský ... 'Důrazně jsme odmítli jako nepodložená obvinění Ruska z přípravy, agrese vůči Ukrajině a fámy o vstupu ruských jednotek na ukrajinské území,' stojí v něm.[Zmeevsky ... 'We emphatically dismissed Russia's allegations of preparation, aggression against Ukraine and rumors of Russian troops entering Ukrainian territory,' he said.]
  53. Levchenko, Grigory (22 April 2021). "'A path towards destroying relations' Czech Republic to limit Russian Embassy staff in Prague amid escalating diplomatic tensions". Meduza .
  54. Troianovski, Anton (30 January 2022). "The Hard-Line Russian Advisers Who Have Putin's Ear" . The New York Times . Archived from the original on 1 February 2022. Retrieved 28 May 2022.
  55. Galeotti, Mark (5 July 2021). "New National Security Strategy Is a Paranoid's Charter". Moscow Times . Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  56. "Russia's security strategy envisages 'forceful methods'". ABC News. 31 May 2021. Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  57. Sherwin, Emily (11 March 2022). Paulick, Jane (ed.). "Putin's inner circle: Who has the Russian president's ear on the war in Ukraine?". Deutsche Welle . Retrieved 28 March 2022.
  58. "Kremlin Insiders Alarmed Over Growing Toll of Putin's War in Ukraine". Bloomberg News . 20 March 2022.
  59. Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle; Balmforth, Tom (17 December 2021). "Russia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine". Reuters . Archived from the original on 22 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  60. MacKinnon, Mark (21 December 2021). "Putin warns of unspecified military response if U.S. and NATO continue 'aggressive line'". The Globe and Mail . Archived from the original on 15 January 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  61. Szayna, Thomas S. (29 October 1997). "The Enlargement of NATO and Central European Politics". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars . Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  62. Coyer, Cassandre (25 February 2022). "Why is Ukraine not in NATO and is it too late to join? Here's what experts, NATO say". The Miami Herald . Archived from the original on 29 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  63. Gordon, Michael R.; Pancevski, Bojan; Bisserbe, Noemie; Walker, Marcus (1 April 2022). "Vladimir Putin's 20-Year March to War in Ukraine—and How the West Mishandled It" . The Wall Street Journal . Retrieved 18 June 2022.
  64. The Kyiv Independent news desk (24 February 2022). "Putin declares war on Ukraine". The Kyiv Independent . Retrieved 24 June 2022.
  65. 1 2 "Putin announces formal start of Russia's invasion in eastern Ukraine". Meduza . 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  66. Haltiwager, John (23 February 2022). "Russian President Vladimir Putin announces military assault against Ukraine in surprise speech". MSN. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  67. "Full text: Putin's declaration of war on Ukraine". The Spectator . 24 February 2022.
  68. Hinton, Alexander (25 February 2022). "Putin's claims that Ukraine is committing genocide are baseless, but not unprecedented". The Conversation .
  69. "Ukraine conflict: Russian forces attack after Putin TV declaration". BBC News . 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  70. Sheftalovich, Zoya (24 February 2022). "Putin announces 'special military operation' in Ukraine". Politico . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  71. Ball, Tom (7 March 2022). "This war will be a total failure, FSB whistleblower says". The Times . Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  72. Peltz, Jennifer; Lederer, Edith (23 February 2022). "'It's too late': Russian move roils UN meeting on Ukraine". AP News . Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  73. Lock, Samantha (24 February 2022). "Russia-Ukraine crisis live news: Putin has launched 'full-scale invasion', says Ukrainian foreign minister – latest updates". The Guardian . Archived from the original on 24 February 2022. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  74. "Zelensky signs decree declaring general mobilization". Interfax-Ukraine . 25 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  75. Gilbert, Asha C. (25 February 2022). "Reports: Ukraine bans all male citizens ages 18 to 60 from leaving the country". USA Today . Retrieved 26 March 2022.
  76. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kagan, Frederick; Barros, George; Stepanenko, Kateryna (5 March 2022). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 4". CriticalThreats. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
  77. 1 2 3 4 5 Kagan, Frederick; Barros, George; Stepanenko, Kateryna (4 March 2022). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 4". Institute for the Study of War . Retrieved 5 March 2022.
  78. "Олексій Данілов: Росія розпадеться ще при нашому житті" [Alexei Danilov: Russia will fall apart during our lifetime]. Ukrainska Pravda (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 24 June 2022.
  79. 1 2 3 "Ukraine rejects Russian demand to surrender port city of Mariupol in exchange for safe passage". CBS News. 20 March 2022. Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  80. 1 2 3 "Ukraine refuses to surrender Mariupol as scope of human toll remains unclear". Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 21 March 2022. Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  81. 1 2 3 Dutton, Jack (25 February 2022). "Russian Military Base Blown Up as Ukraine Fights Back". Newsweek . Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  82. 1 2 3 "Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked Millerovo with Tochka-U". Rostov Gazeta . 25 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  83. Rana, Manveen (3 March 2022). "Volodymyr Zelensky survives three assassination attempts in days" . The Times . Retrieved 21 March 2022.
  84. "Russian offensive unexpectedly slowed by fierce Ukrainian resistance". NBC News . 26 February 2022. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  85. "Russia's failure to take down Kyiv was a defeat for the ages". Associated Press News. 7 April 2022. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  86. Sonne, Paul; Khurshudyan, Isabelle (24 August 2022). "Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital". The Washington Post . Retrieved 27 September 2022.
  87. Kramer, Andrew E. (15 March 2022). "How a Line of Russian Tanks Became an Inviting Target for Ukrainians". The New York Times . Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  88. "Russian advance slowed by Ukrainian resistance and logistical setbacks, U.S. defense official says". CBS . 28 February 2022. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  89. "Russian focus on 'liberating' Donbas hints at shift in strategy". Al Jazeera English . 25 March 2022. Retrieved 4 February 2023.
  90. "Russia targets east Ukraine, says first phase over". BBC. 26 March 2022. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  91. Varner, Joe (28 March 2022). "It's been one month since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. Here's where we stand". The Hub. Retrieved 3 April 2022.
  92. "Russian invasion of Ukraine lacks a battlefield commander, U.S. officials say". Yahoo! News. 1 April 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2022.
  93. 1 2 3 Bielieskov, Mykola (21 September 2021). "The Russian and Ukrainian Spring 2021 War Scare". Center for Strategic & International Studies . Retrieved 25 November 2021.
  94. 1 2 Epstein, Jake; Haltiwanger, John (6 April 2022). "NATO chief says Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine, despite repositioning forces to the eastern Donbas region" . Retrieved 7 April 2022.
  95. "Trending news: BBC: Putin replaces military commander in Ukraine – The Moscow Times". Hindustan News Hub. 8 April 2022. Retrieved 9 April 2022.
  96. "Russia's battle for the east has begun, Zelenskyy says". PBS NewsHour . 18 April 2022. Retrieved 20 April 2022.
  97. Vandiver, John; Svan, Jennifer H. (26 April 2022). "US and allies gather at Ramstein to discuss how to help Ukraine defeat Russia's 'unjust invasion'" . Stars and Stripes . Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Archived from the original on 4 May 2022. Retrieved 9 May 2022.
  98. Barnes, Julian E. (10 May 2022). "The U.S. intelligence chief says Putin is preparing for a prolonged conflict" . The New York Times . ISSN   1553-8095. OCLC   1645522. Archived from the original on 10 May 2022. Retrieved 27 May 2022.
  99. "The Russians may be learning from the mistakes of the Ukraine war. But are they adapting fast enough?". ABC. 31 May 2022.
  100. "Biden will not supply Ukraine with long-range rockets that can hit Russia". The Guardian. 31 May 2022.
  101. Champion, Marc; Kudrytski, Aliaksandr (28 May 2022). "Russian Wins in Eastern Ukraine Spark Debate Over Course of War". Bloomberg.
  102. Atlamazoglou, Stavros (30 May 2022). "War in Ukraine, Day 96 Update: Russia's Military Losses are 'Unsustainable'". 19fortyfive.com.
  103. Conflict Intelligence Team [@CITeam_en] (26 May 2022). "Also reportedly, Russia's command in the battle for Donbas has undergone another shakeup — the overall commander is now said to be Colonel General Gennady Zhidko. Like Dvornikov, he once commanded operations in Syria and also headed the Eastern Military District" (Tweet) via Twitter.
  104. "General Dvornikov 'no longer in command' of Russian Army in Ukraine". The New Voice of Ukraine. 3 June 2022.
  105. "Kremlin orders army commander Dvornikov to take Severodonetsk by June 10 — regional governor". Yahoo!. The New Voice of Ukraine. 5 June 2022.
  106. Sabbagh, Dan (31 May 2022). "Biden will not supply Ukraine with long-range rockets that can hit Russia". The Guardian .
  107. CBS News Videos. "Russia bombards Kyiv, vows to strike new targets if U.S. sends long-range missiles to Ukraine". 6 June 2022.
  108. Koshiw, Isobel (10 June 2022). "We're almost out of ammunition and relying on western arms, says Ukraine". The Guardian .
  109. Alper, Alexandra; Freifeld, Karen; Landay, Jonathan (29 June 2022). "Putin still wants most of Ukraine, war outlook grim -U.S. intelligence chief". Reuters . Retrieved 2 July 2022.
  110. Sarah Rainford. "Ukraine war: Putin presses on after Lysychansk capture". BBC. 5 July 2022.
  111. "Russia names air force general to lead its forces in Ukraine". 8 October 2022.
  112. 1 2 NY Times. "Russia Installs New War Leader Amid Dissention in Putin's Circle". By Anatoly Kurmanaev. 12 January 2023. Page 1.
  113. 1 2 Baker, Peter (23 February 2023). "Reassuring Zelensky of US Support". The New York Times . p. 1.Associated
  114. Roblin, Sebastien (27 February 2022). "At Vasylkiv, Ukrainians Repel Russia's Paratroopers and Commandos in Frantic Night Battle". 19FortyFive. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
  115. Sly, Liz; Lamothe, Dan (20 March 2022). "Russia's war for Ukraine could be headed toward stalemate". The Washington Post . ISSN   0190-8286. OCLC   2269358. Archived from the original on 20 March 2022. Retrieved 6 June 2022.
  116. Boot, Max (21 March 2022). "Opinion: Against all odds, Ukrainians are winning. Russia's initial offensive has failed". The Washington Post . Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  117. Kemp, Richard (22 March 2022). "The Russian army has run out of time". The Daily Telegraph . Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  118. "Live updates: Zelenskyy declines US offer to evacuate Kyiv". AP NEWS. 25 February 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  119. "Analysis | Zelensky's famous quote of 'need ammo, not a ride' not easily confirmed". Washington Post. ISSN   0190-8286 . Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  120. "Ukraine loses control of Chernobyl nuclear site, amid battles in Kyiv outskirts". The Times of Israel . 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  121. "Ukrayinsʹki viysʹkovi pid Kyyevom zupynyly kolonu rosiysʹkykh tankiv" Українські військові під Києвом зупинили колону російських танків [The Ukrainian military stopped a column of Russian tanks near Kyiv]. Gazeta (in Ukrainian). 25 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  122. "Battle Underway for Airbase on Kyiv Outskirts". Moscow Times . AFP. 24 February 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  123. "Russia claims to take control of Hostomel airport just outside Kyiv". The Times of Israel . Associated Press. Archived from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  124. "Okupanty namahayutʹsya vysadyty desant u Vasylʹkovi, ydutʹ boyi" Окупанти намагаються висадити десант у Василькові, йдуть бої [The occupiers are trying to land in Vasylkiv, fighting is going on] (in Ukrainian). Ukrinform. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  125. "U Vasylʹkovi zbyly vynyshchuvach ta dva hvyntokryly okupantiv" У Василькові збили винищувач та два гвинтокрили окупантів [A fighter and two helicopters of the occupiers were shot down in Vasylkiv] (in Ukrainian). Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  126. Stern, David L. (5 March 2022). "After temporary cease-fires break down, Putin threatens Ukraine's government". The Washington Post . Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  127. Arnold, Edward (6 March 2022). How is the war in Ukraine going for Russia?. DW News . Interviewed by Rebecca Ritters. Archived from the original on 14 March 2022. Retrieved 18 March 2022 via YouTube.
  128. Lister, Tim; Pennington, Josh; McGee, Luke; Gigova, Radina (7 March 2022). "'A family died ... in front of my eyes': Civilians killed as Russian military strike hits evacuation route in Kyiv suburb". CNN . Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  129. "Bucha, Vorzel, Hostomel under enemy's control, situation remains critical". Ukrinform. 7 March 2022. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  130. Lister, Tim; Voitovych, Olga (8 March 2022). ""Irpin can't be bought, Irpin fights": Mayor refuses Russian demand to surrender". CNN . Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  131. Murphy, Paul (11 March 2022). "Stalled 40-mile-long Russian convoy near Kyiv now largely dispersed, satellite images show". CNN . Retrieved 11 March 2022.
  132. Cullison, Alan; Coles, Isabel; Trofimov, Yaroslav (16 March 2022). "Ukraine Mounts Counteroffensive to Drive Russians Back From Kyiv, Key Cities" . The Wall Street Journal . Archived from the original on 16 March 2022. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  133. Gordon, Michael R.; Leary, Alex (21 March 2022). "The Wall Street Journal News Exclusive | Russia, Failing to Achieve Early Victory in Ukraine, Is Seen Shifting to 'Plan B'". The Wall Street Journal . Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  134. Ali, Idrees; Stewart, Phil (27 February 2022). "Russian forces appear to shift to siege warfare in Ukraine- U.S. official". Reuters . Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  135. "Ukraine war: Ukrainian fightback gains ground west of Kyiv". BBC News . 23 March 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
  136. 1 2 Walters, Joanna; Bartholomew, Jem; Belam, Martin; Lock, Samantha (25 March 2022). "Russia-Ukraine war latest: Ukraine takes back towns east of Kyiv; hopes of Mariupol humanitarian corridor grow – live". The Guardian . Retrieved 25 March 2022.
  137. Rudenko, Olga (2 April 2022). "Hundreds of murdered civilians discovered as Russians withdraw from towns near Kyiv (Graphic Images)". The Kyiv Independent . Archived from the original on 3 April 2022. Retrieved 3 April 2022.
  138. "Ukraine war latest: Ukraine says it has retaken entire Kyiv region". BBC News . Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  139. Tebor, Celina; Miller, Ryan W.; Hayes, Christal; Santucci, Jeanine (30 April 2022). "Ukraine in 'a fight for life' in Donbas region, Zelenskyy says in nightly address; Russian strike kills at least 1 in Kyiv: Live updates". Yahoo News . Retrieved 2 June 2022.
  140. Ward, Alexander (25 February 2022). "'Almost not possible' for Ukraine to win without West's help, Ukraine official says". Politico . Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  141. "Ukraine war news from February 25: Kyiv suburbs breached, Russian forces face resistance, Zelensky warns Russia will 'storm' capital" . Financial Times . 26 February 2022. ISSN   0307-1766. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  142. Недилько, Владимир (28 February 2022). "Boi pod Sumami: artilleriya i "Bayraktary" unichtozhili 100 tankov i 20 "Gradov" okkupantov" Бои под Сумами: артиллерия и "Байрактары" уничтожили 100 танков и 20 "Градов" оккупантов [Battles near Sumy: Artillery and Bayraktars destroyed 100 tanks and 20 "Grad" of invaders]. Апостроф[Apostrophe] (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  143. 1 2 Polyakovskaya, Tanya (26 February 2022). "Rossiyskaya voyennaya tekhnika zanyala territoriyu byvshego aeroporta "Berdyansk" – gorsovet" Российская военная техника заняла территорию бывшего аэропорта "Бердянск" – горсовет [Russian military equipment occupied the territory of the former airport "Berdyansk" – city council] (in Russian). Berdyansk City Council. Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. Archived from the original on 26 February 2022. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
  144. Demirjian, Karoun; Lamthoe, Dan (6 April 2022). "Pentagon: Russia has fully withdrawn from Kyiv, Chernihiv". The Washington Post . Retrieved 7 April 2022.
  145. Kalatur, Anastasiya (8 April 2022). "Sumy region liberated from Russian troops". Ukrayinska Pravda . Retrieved 15 April 2022.
  146. Marrow, Alexander; Ostroukh, Andrey (24 February 2022). "Russian forces unblock water flow for canal to annexed Crimea, Moscow says". Reuters . Archived from the original on 1 March 2022.
  147. NEXTA [@nexta_tv] (26 February 2022). "The tanks of the occupiers have circled #Berdyansk and are heading towards #Mariupol. t.co/jwsIoORzH0" (Tweet). Archived from the original on 27 February 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022 via Twitter.
  148. 1 2 Lister, Tim; Alkhaldi, Celine; Voitovych, Olga; Mezzofiore, Gianluca (24 March 2022). "Ukrainians claim to have destroyed large Russian warship in Berdyansk". CNN . Retrieved 24 March 2022.