Kupiansk offensive

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Kupiansk offensive
Part of the Luhansk Oblast campaign of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Kupiansk front of the Russo-Ukrainian war.svg
Kupiansk frontline as of 26 November 2025
Date28 November 2024 — present
(1 year and 6 days)
Location
Around Kupiansk and the Oskil river, Kharkiv Oblast
Status Ongoing
Territorial
changes
  • Russian forces establish bridgeheads across the Oskil river, and capture Dvorichna
  • Russian forces have entered the city of Kupiansk
Belligerents
Russia Ukraine
Commanders and leaders
Serhii Storozhenko [1] Andrii Besedin [2]
Units involved
Order of battle Order of battle
Strength
10,000+ [3] Several 2,000-person brigades (February 2025) [3]

The Kupiansk offensive refers to a series of military engagements taking place around the city of Kupiansk, as well as along the Oskil river between Kupiansk through Dvorichna to the border settlement of Topoli in Kharkiv Oblast, with the goal of capturing Kupiansk and territory along the Oskil river. Offensive operations restarted in the direction after Russian forces attacked Kupiansk in late November 2024, and intensified after Russian forces established several bridgeheads across the western bank of the Oskil river in early 2025. [3] [4] [5]

Contents

Background

In September 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a major counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast, forcing Russian forces to withdraw from a majority of Kharkiv Oblast and onto the eastern bank of the Oskil river. During the counteroffensive, Kupiansk city was liberated. [6]

In late 2024, amidst Russian offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces began attacking and advancing in eastern Kharkiv Oblast, particularly in the direction of Kupiansk, the administrative centre of Kupiansk Raion. On November 13, Russian forces directly attacked Kupiansk city from the north, using two armoured columns. [7] However, by late November, Russian forces had mostly withdrawn from Kupiansk city after successful Ukrainian counterattacks.

At the end of January 2025, the Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russian forces are attempting to use their bridgeheads across the Oskil river to support their advances and encircle Kupiansk from the northwest, as well as set the ground for future advances and offensives into Kharkiv Oblast. [8]

Offensive

First bridgeheads established and capture of Dvorichna (November 2024 — January 2025)

On 26 November, Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had used boats to cross the Oskil River and had entered the town of Dvorichna. [9] The next day, Russian sources claimed that Russian forces were also attempting to cross the Oskil near the village of Novomlynsk, [10] and that fighting was ongoing on the outskirts of Dvorichna. [11] The following day, Ukrainian officials acknowledged that a small group of Russian forces had crossed to the west bank of the Oskil. [12] [13] [14] According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian forces had crossed the river near a suspension bridge south of Novomlynsk  [ uk ], and the Russian contigent on the west bank of the Oskil was no larger than a company-sized force. [15]

By 1 December, Russian forces had also crossed the Oskil River south of Dvorichna, establishing a second company-sized bridgehead in the area of Masiutivka and Zapadne, according to Mashovets and Russian sources. [16] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced into a forested area west of the village of Masiutivka. [17]

On 3 December, it was reported that the 8th Battalion of Ukraine's 10th Mountain Assault Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Tank Brigade had cleared Russian forces from Novomlynsk and the surrounding area. [18] [19] Geolocated footage indicated that Ukrainian forces were in control of the village. [20] The Ukrainian military claimed that the Russians were forced into a chaotic retreat across the river. [18] Mashovets said the next day that the Russian bridgehead at Novomlynsk had been eliminated and that the bridgehead at Masiutivka-Zapadne had been "significantly reduced" by Ukrainian forces. [21]

However, in mid-December, Mashovets said that the latter Russian bridgehead had "significantly expanded" [22] and that Ukrainian forces had seemingly retreated to the Dvorichna-Kupiansk highway. [23] By late December, Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had advanced to the highway [24] and in early January, Mashovets said that Russian forces were using the highway to advance towards Zapadne. [25]

Russian forces advanced in the southern and southeastern parts of the town of Dvorichna in mid-December. [26] [27] By mid-January, Mashovets claimed that half of the town was held by Russia's 69th Motor Rifle Division. [28]

At the same time, Ukraine's General Staff admitted that Russian forces launched attacks on the west bank near Fyholivka, Holubivka, and Kindrashivka . [29] The fighting continued into December 2024, [30] when Ukrainian troops reported that Russian forces were attempting to cross the Oskil river a few kilometres north of Kupiansk city.

At the end of December, Russian military bloggers reported that Russian forces had withdrawn from the northeastern outskirts of Kupiansk to fortified positions near Petropavlivka some time ago, as Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles disrupted Russian ground supply lines. [31] In early January 2025, Russian forces increased pressure on the western bank of the river and began attacking Ukrainian positions across the Oskil river near the settlement of Dvorichna, making several attempts to cross the river and gain a foothold within the settlement. [32] The following day, The Moscow Times reported that Russian forces had successfully established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil river on the southeastern outskirts of Dvorichna, 10 kilometres north of Kupiansk city. During this time, Russian forces claimed to have captured Novomlynsk, which had fallen between Russian and Ukrainian control frequently over the past month. [33]

Throughout January, Russian forces made small advances on their bridgehead around Dvorichna, both inside and outside the settlement, and reported to have captured the abandoned village of Kalynove, [34] but they faced heavy resistance and counterattacks from Ukrainian forces in the area, which hindered their advance. [35] On 19 January, the Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged recent claims that Russian forces were attacking near Stroivka. [36] After struggling to secure Dvorichna, Russian troops advanced westward along the P-79 highway, claimed to have captured the village of Zapadne on 22 January. [37] On January 29, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces had expanded their bridgehead and captured Dvorichna. [38] However, this claim was denied by the Governor of Kharkiv Oblast. [39]

Continued advances (29 January — 29 March)

After claiming to have captured Dvorichna, Russian forces continued to advance north, west, and southwest of the settlement, advancing towards the settlement of Fyholivka, north of Dvorichna. In early February, Ukrainian media and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces had successfully established a second bridgehead near Topoli. [40] [41] [42] On February 5, Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces had captured Zapadne. [43] The following day, Russian forces captured Fyholivka. [42] Following this, advances in the bridgehead began to stall, however Russian forces continued to attack the village of Krasne Pershe from across the Oskil river, as well as attempting to advance north from the bridgehead.

Footage released on February 22 showed Russian troops advancing toward the center of Topoli. [44] Two days later, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces captured the border settlement of Topoli. [4] Despite this claim, fighting continued in the settlement throughout February and March, until Russian forces finally secured control over the settlement on March 23. [45]

Continuing through March, Ukrainian forces managed to launch small counterattacks in the direction of Zapadne and recaptured part of the settlement. [46] Simultaneously, Russian forces began expanding their positions north of Dvorichna towards the settlement of Krasne Pershe, claiming to have established a third bridgehead north of the settlement, however there was no confirmation of any presence of Russian troops on the western river bank in the area. On March 29, Russian forces claimed to have captured Krasne Pershe. [47]

Fighting for Kamyanka (29 March — 28 April)

Towards the end of March, Russian forces began advancing in the southern part of the Dvorichna bridgehead towards Kupiansk's northern outskirts, and started heading towards the strategically located settlement of Kindrashivka. [46] Fighting around the settlement continued into April, when Russian forces claimed to have advanced into the northern and eastern parts of the settlement. During these advances, fighting was also reported on the northwestern outskirts of Petropavlivka. [48]

In early April, Russian forces started attacking the village of Kamyanka from across the Oskil river and claimed to have established a bridgehead directly northeast of the village, however Russian troop presence couldn't be confirmed at the time. [48] Fighting continued throughout the week, and on April 8, Russian forces were confirmed to be active on the western bank of the Oskil river on the outskirts of Kamyanka, with troops entering the village through the south the next day. [5] Russian attacks in and around Kamyanka continued through the week, with Russian forces claiming to have advanced in and northeast of the village on April 16. [49] Russian forces continued to expand their bridgehead the next day, with footage showing Russian troops advancing directly east of Kamyanka, whilst in the Dvorichna direction, Russian forces claimed to have advanced to the west of Zapadne. [50] On April 18, Russian forces advanced south of Zapadne and east of Kindrashivka towards the settlement of Mala Shapkivka, and claimed to have entered it from the southeastern outskirts the following day, with claims from a Russian milblogger that central Mala Shapkivka had become a grey zone. [51]

On April 22, Russian forces and milbloggers claimed several advances across the Kupiansk frontline and claimed to have captured the entire western bank of the Oskil river north of Kupiansk. Russian forces claimed to have advanced northeast of Topoli along the international border with Russia and Ukraine, southwest of Kamyanka and northeast of Krasne Pershe along the Oskil river, northwest of Zapadne towards the outskirts of Doroshivka and southwest towards Mala Shapkivka, north of Kupiansk, and northwest and northeast along Petropavlivka's outskirts. Fighting continued in and around the settlements of Kamyanka, Mala Shapkivka, Kindrashivka, and Petropavlivka. [52] Following these advances, fighting stalled for a few days until April 26, when Russian forces claimed to have advanced southeast of Kupiansk, near the village of Stepova Novoselivka. [53] The following day, Russian forces claimed to have reached Doroshivka. [54] On April 28, the Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces captured Kamyanka, however only control over the southern half of the settlement could be confirmed. [55] [56]

Continued advances west of the Oskil river (28 April — present)

Following Russia's claim of capturing Kamyanka, Russian forces began to push further west into Kharkiv Oblast to further support their encirclement of Kupiansk. On April 29, the Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces captured Doroshivka. [57] Russian forces also claimed to have advanced further west of Doroshivka, taking up positions in nearby fields east of the town of Monachynivka and the settlement of Vasylivka, and claimed to have advanced into central Mala Shapkivka. [58] Following these advances, the frontline saw a short operational pause. On May 1, Russian Forces advanced northwest of Zapadne after repelling an attempted Ukrainian counterattack. [59] Two days later, Russian forces advanced into the fields west of Kyslivka, southeast of Kupiansk; however, this advance likely occurred in late March or early April. [60]

On May 8, during the three-day "Victory Day ceasefire", Russian forces marginally advanced in the northeastern outskirts of Dvorichna. [61]

On July 6, Russian forces claimed the seizure of Sobolivka, a settlement located 3 kilometers west of Kupiansk. [62]

On August 5, according to Russian military expert Andrey Marochko, who spoke with TASS, a large Russian state-owned news agency, Russian forces had begun fighting street battles in Kupiansk. [63]

On August 6, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had seized the settlement of Sobolivka. [64]

On September 18, the BBC reported that a new push into Kupiansk is led by former Ukrainian officer Serhii Storozhenko who is currently leading the 6th Combined Arms Army, the next day, Russian forces attempted to infiltrate the city using underground pipes. [65]

On 28 September, the head of the Kupiansk City Military Administration, Andrii Besedin, announced the city's closure to civilians. [66]

Analysis

The Kupiansk offensive is part of a renewed effort to advance into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and retake positions up to, and across, the Oskil river in order to cut off Ukrainian logistics on the eastern bank. [67] The Institute for the Study of War has assessed that recapturing territory up to the Oskil river would allow Russian forces to encircle northern Donetsk Oblast and directly attack Ukrainian logistics centres there, such as Lyman, as part of Russia’s broader main effort in eastern Ukraine. [68]

See also

References

  1. ↑ "Ex-Ukrainian officer commands Russian offensive on Kupiansk, BBC reports". The Kyiv Independent. 19 September 2025. Retrieved 21 September 2025.
  2. ↑ "City of Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast closed to civilians and left with no power, water or gas". Ukrainska Pravda. Retrieved 29 September 2025.
  3. 1 2 3 "A Russian Tank Army Is Poised To Attack Kupyansk—But First It Needs To Cross The Oskil River". Forbes. 5 February 2025.
  4. 1 2 "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 24 February 2025.
  5. 1 2 "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 9, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 9 April 2025.
  6. ↑ "'Everybody was running away.' Ukrainians in Kharkiv villages describe Russia's retreat". CNN. 12 September 2022.
  7. ↑ "Russian forces breach Kupyansk: calls for Ukrainian Command accountability intensify". UAWire. 13 November 2024.
  8. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 31 January 2025.
  9. ↑ Harward, Christina; Gasparyan, Davit; Wolkov, Nicole; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Runkel, William; Barros, George (26 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces used boats to cross the Oskil River and enter Dvorichna...
  10. ↑ Mappes, Grace; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Wolkov, Nicole; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Evans, Angelica; Runkel, William; Barros, George (27 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continue efforts to advance across the Oskil River near Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk)...
  11. ↑ Mappes, Grace; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Wolkov, Nicole; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Evans, Angelica; Runkel, William; Barros, George (27 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Russian milbloggers claimed that... fighting continues on the outskirts of the settlement.
  12. ↑ Hird, Karolina; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Evans, Angelica; Mappes, Grace; Wolkov, Nicole; Runkel, William; Barros, George (29 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . A Ukrainian official confirmed that a small group of Russian forces has recently crossed to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction amid continued fighting north of Kupyansk on November 28 and 29.
  13. ↑ Hird, Karolina; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Evans, Angelica; Mappes, Grace; Wolkov, Nicole; Runkel, William; Barros, George (29 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on November 28 that a small group of Russian infantry crossed to the west bank and that Ukrainian forces are working to repel the group.
  14. ↑ "Russia could encircle Kupyansk if they secure right bank of Oskil". Espreso TV . 28 November 2024. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  15. ↑ Hird, Karolina; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Evans, Angelica; Mappes, Grace; Wolkov, Nicole; Runkel, William; Barros, George (29 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 29 that Russian forces also crossed the Oskil River near the suspension bridge south of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna) and that the Russian contingent on the west bank is no larger than a company-sized force...
  16. ↑ Mappes, Grace; Gasparyan, Davit; Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Barros, George (1 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 1 that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River south of Dvorichna and created a second company-sized bridgehead in the Masyutivka-Zapadne area. Russian milbloggers made similar claims about a Russian bridgehead in the area...
  17. ↑ Evans, Angelica; Hird, Karolina; Gasparyan, Davit; Wolkov, Nicole; Gibson, Olivia; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Barros, George (2 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Several Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces operating north of Kupyansk crossed the Oskil River and advanced in a forested area west of Masyutivka (southeast of Dvorichna).
  18. 1 2 Ян, Олександр (3 December 2024). "Воїни "Едельвейса" розповіли про втечу окупантів за Оскіл". Мілітарний  [ uk ] (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 4 May 2025.
  19. ↑ Ян, Олександр (3 December 2024). "Бригада "Едельвейс" ліквідувала плацдарм окупантів на правому березі річки Оскіл". Мілітарний  [ uk ] (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 28 November 2025.
  20. ↑ Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Gasparyan, Davit; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Runkel, William; Hird, Karolina (3 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Geolocated footage published on December 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces control Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk and on the western bank of the Oskil River)...
  21. ↑ Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Gasparyan, Davit; Gibson, Olivia; Mappes, Grace; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Stepanenko, Kateryna (4 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 4 that Ukrainian forces eliminated a Russian bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk and northeast of Dvorichna) and significantly reduced another Russian bridgehead on the right bank in the direction of Masyutivka-Zapadne area (southeast of Dvorichna).
  22. ↑ Hird, Karolina; Harward, Christina; Mappes, Grace; Runkel, William; Gasparyan, Davit; Kagan, Frederick W. (16 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on December 16 that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces off the west bank of the Oskil River north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) but that Russian forces significantly expanded their tactical bridgehead along the river south of the settlement.
  23. ↑ Stepanenko, Kateryna; Evans, Angelica; Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Mappes, Grace; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Runkel, William; Kagan, Frederick W. (19 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 19, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces seem to have retreated westward to the P-79 highway in the direction of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).
  24. ↑ Stepanenko, Kateryna; Evans, Angelica; Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Gasparyan, Davit; Gibson, Olivia; Kagan, Fredrick W. (26 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 26, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces... advanced along the R-79 highway between Dvorichna and Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk)...
  25. ↑ Wolkov, Nicole; Evans, Angelica; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Kagan, Frederick W. (8 January 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that... Russian forces advanced along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway towards Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna and northwest of Kupyansk).
  26. ↑ Evans, Angelica; Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Runkel, William; Kagan, Frederick W. (18 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 18, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Geolocated footage published on December 18 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk)...
  27. ↑ Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Mappes, Grace; Runkel, William; Barros, George (22 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 22, 2024". Institute for the Study of War . Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southeastern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).
  28. ↑ Wolkov, Nicole; Evans, Angelica; Gibson, Olivia; Mappes, Grace; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Kagan, Frederick W. (13 January 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2025". Institute for the Study of War . Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD])... hold positions in half of Dvorichna...
  29. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 1 February 2025.
  30. ↑ "Russians build bridgeheads on the Oskil River and the Dnipro. Day 1034 of the war". OSW. 23 December 2024.
  31. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 27, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 2 February 2025.
  32. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 2 February 2025.
  33. ↑ "Russian Forces Establish Bridgehead Across Frontline River in Eastern Ukraine". The Moscow Times. 9 January 2025.
  34. ↑ "Russia says it takes control of two villages in Eastern Ukraine". Reuters. 12 January 2025.
  35. ↑ "Russian forces face major setbacks in attempted Kupyansk offensive". UAWire. 10 February 2025.
  36. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  37. ↑ "Russian Troops Capture Kharkiv Region Village Amid Westward Advance". The Moscow Times. 22 January 2025.
  38. ↑ "Russian military reports capture of new village in eastern Ukraine". Reuters. 30 January 2025.
  39. ↑ "'Pure propaganda' — Kharkiv Oblast governor denies Russian claims of capturing Dvorichna". The Kyiv Independent. 28 January 2025. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  40. ↑ "The occupiers have established another foothold on the Oskil River bank: The enemy advances – DeepState". ТСН.ua. 6 February 2025. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  41. ↑ "Russia establishes new foothold on right bank of Oskil River". global.espreso.tv. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  42. 1 2 "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 6 February 2025.
  43. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  44. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 22 February 2025. Retrieved 21 April 2025.
  45. ↑ "DeepStateMAP". DeepStateMAP. 23 March 2025.
  46. 1 2 "Ukrainian Forces regain ground in Kharkiv region". UAWire. 5 March 2025.
  47. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 29, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 29 March 2025.
  48. 1 2 "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 1 April 2025.
  49. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 16 April 2025.
  50. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 17 April 2025.
  51. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 19 April 2025.
  52. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 22 April 2025.
  53. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 26 April 2025.
  54. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 27 April 2025.
  55. ↑ "Russian Troops Capture Kamianka". Devdiscourse. 28 April 2025.
  56. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 28 April 2025.
  57. ↑ "Russia 'carving buffer zone' in northern Ukraine". The Telegraph. 29 April 2025.
  58. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 29 April 2025.
  59. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 4 May 2025.
  60. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 6 May 2025.
  61. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 8 May 2025.
  62. ↑ "Russian forces gain control of two settlements in Ukraine, Russian military says". Reuters. 6 July 2025.
  63. ↑ "Russia eyes Ukraine's 'fortress belt' after fall of Chasiv Yar". Al Jazeera Media Network. 6 August 2025.
  64. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 6 August 2025.
  65. ↑ "Ex-Ukrainian officer commands Russian offensive on Kupiansk, BBC reports". The Kyiv Independent. 19 September 2025. Retrieved 23 September 2025.
  66. ↑ "City of Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast closed to civilians and left with no power, water or gas". Ukrainska Pravda. Retrieved 29 September 2025.
  67. ↑ "British intelligence analyzes new Russian assault attempts near Kupiansk". RBC-Ukraine. 17 November 2024.
  68. ↑ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 14 April 2025.
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