The offensive separated itself from the Pokrovsk offensive to the south on 11 August 2025 after a major Russian ground assault was launched northeast of Rodynske. The first day saw Russian forces capture a 15km (9.3mi) strip of land around 6km (3.7mi) wide including three villages, which additionally severed the highway connecting Dobropillia to the city of Kramatorsk. Russian forces' tactics including small units of Russian forces penetrating the frontline before larger assaults, Russian numerical advantages, and Ukrainian infantry shortages at this part of the frontline have been credited with making the Russian offensive initially successful. The deployment of Ukrainian elite groups such as the 1st Azov Corps and other Ukrainian reserves, however, saw Russian forces be pushed back from a number of their initially captured positions. Diplomatically, a number of media outlets have stated the offensive was likely launched to place Russia at a better position in peace negotiations for the then-upcoming 2025 Russia–United States Summit.
Since 2024, the Russian army had been carrying out a year-long operation to capture the strategic city of Pokrovsk.[12][13] By July 2025, the offensive gained some momentum when Russian forces were able to advance on the eastern and northern flanks, in an effort to fully encircle the city.[14][15][16] This offensive separated itself from the northern flank of the Pokrovsk offensive following a major assault northeast of Rodynske.
Offensive
Starting on 11 August, the Russian Armed Forces launched a major ground assault from their salient northeast of Rodynske and Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillia.[17] The initial breakthrough was caused by small units of Russian soldiers, originating from a base in Selydove, penetrating the Ukrainian defenses after around two weeks of walking before uniting into a larger unit of between 200–300 soldiers past the frontline.[9] This tactic had been used by Russia before during their offensive around Pokrovsk.[18] At first it was unclear whether these groups were able to consolidate their positions. Russian units were reportedly operating in Kucheriv Yar[uk], Vesele[uk] and in the vicinity of Zolotyi Kolodiaz[uk].[19][20][21] Russian assault squads additionally advanced close to the Dobropillia – Kramatorsk highway.[20][17] Despite these reports, the Strategic Group Dnipro stated that these infiltrations were "not taking control of the territory".[19][22] The OSINT map DeepStateMap.Live updated their map to show a 15km (9.3mi) strip of land around 6km (3.7mi) wide had been taken since earlier advances north of Pokrovsk on 7 August.[23] The Ukrainian military denied reports of a breakthrough to the north of Pokrovsk and into the direction of Dobropillia.[24][25]
The next day, it was confirmed that Russian forces were able to breach the main Ukrainian defense line in the area with an advance up to 10km (six miles) towards Dobropillia.[26][27] During the advance Russian assault groups reportedly entered at least nine settlements.[28][29] Analysts noted that this was Russia’s biggest advance in one day since May 2024.[30][31] A local Ukrainian commander told CNN that small Russian units infiltrate the Ukrainian defense line looking for weak spots. He also added that some of Ukraine’s defense positions consist of two-man positions, which solely rely on resupply by drones.[32] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported that additional assets and personnel had been sent to the area to combat the offensive.[10] In addition, the 1st Azov Corps was being deployed in the direction of the Dobropillia – Kramatorsk highway, reliving the overstretched Pokrovsk Tactical Group on this area of the frontline.[8][33] Due to the swift Russian push, many of the remaining residents in Dobropillia started to flee the city.[34] The Ukrainian authorities announced a mandatory evacuation of families with children in the Bilozerske community on 13 August.[35] On the same day, the Russian Defence Ministry announced the control over the villages of Nykanorivka and Zatyshok, both located to the southeast of Dobropillia.[36][37] By the end of 13 August, the ISW assessed that Russian forces continued to operate in a dozen of settlements to the east and northeast of Dobropillia. However, they emphasized that the Russian presence in the area does not denote full control of the territory.[38]
The Ukrainian General Staff said on 14 August that their forces halted the Russian advance in the direction of Dobropillia city.[39][40] During the counter combat operations the 1st Azov Corps claimed to have killed 151 Russian soldiers over the past two days.[41][42] The Governor of Donetsk Oblast, Vadym Filashkin, stated that the situation near Dobropillia stabilised.[43] He also announced the mandatory evacuations of families from the city of Druzhkivka.[44][45] Following the deployment of significant reserves in the area, the Ukrainian army managed to stem further Russian advances.[9] On top of that, Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack on the Russian salient east of Dobropillia and restored control over the settlements along the Dobropillia – Kramatorsk highway as well as the villages of Hruzke, Rubizhne, Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodiaz by 17 August.[46][47] One day later, geolocated footage showed Russian units advancing northeast of Kucheriv Yar, indicating Russian control over the village.[48]
In the second week of the offensive, Russian forces started advancing from Poltavka to the northwest, in an attempt to flank Shakhove and Volodymyrivka from the east.[49] The Russian military said its forces had captured Pankivka, located southwest of Shakhove, on 20 August.[50][51] On the other hand, the Ukrainian military claimed to have surrounded a Russian unit near Dobropillia.[52][53] In early September, Russian forces advanced into southern Volodymyrivka.[54] Ukrainian troops were able to push the Russians out of the settlement by 8 September.[55][56]
Analysis
With this development of events, if it does not change, we may encounter a situation where Dobropillia falls faster than Pokrovsk.
The straight-line offensive was reported by Ukrainian Armed Forces officer Andriy Tkachuk as likely an attempt to split Ukrainian forces at this part of the frontline in half, further reporting the situation as "very difficult".[57] The Institute for the Study of War reported while there were tactical gains, an "operational-level breakthrough" had yet to occur.[20] Conversely, RBC-Ukraine reported the assault had worsened for Ukrainian forces due officers on this area of the front reporting the assault was "under control" or otherwise "not grasp[ing] the full scale of the problem".[19] DeepState reported the "situation remains chaotic" with "Russian forces quickly establish[ing] positions [to] accumulate troops for further advances".[23] Left unchecked, DeepState further reported the assault placed Dobropillia in "immediate danger", places the city of Pokrovsk in threat of encirclement, and threatens Kostiantynivka from a new direction.[23] Despite both DeepStateMap.Live and Ukrainian National News reporting that Russian forces were suffering heavy casualties in their advance,[22] Russian numerical advantages and Ukrainian infantry shortages at this part of the frontline allows the assault to still remain successful, and further makes it unlikely for Ukrainians to cut off and encircle the advancing Russian units.[23]
We see that the Russian army is not preparing to end the war. On the contrary, they are making movements that indicate preparations for new offensive operations
Diplomatically; Time Magazine,[58] RBC-Ukraine,[17] and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated the timing of the major assault was likely arranged to precede the upcoming 2025 Russia–United States Summit between Russian President Putin and US President Trump on 15 August to place Russia at a better position in peace negotiations.[59]
Territorial control
Below is a list of populated areas affected by the offensive, and their control status as of the date listed on the far right of the table. If not described in more detail in earlier sections, information used in the table is sourced from DeepStateMap.Live and Institute for the Study of War.[60] A Ukrainian source claimed on August 15 that Ukrainian forces liberated Rubizhne, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodiaz. ISW has not observed any visual evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlements.[61]
↑ Harward, Christina; Sobieski, Jessica; Evans, Angelica; Olmsted, Jennie; Hird, Karolina; Trotter, Nate (22 July 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 15 August 2025.
↑ Gibson, Olivia; Harward, Christina; Olmsted, Jennie; Mappes, Grace; Young, Justin; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Barros, George; Trotter, Nate (11 August 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 12 August 2025.
↑ Harward, Christina; Novikov, Daria; Gibson, Olivia; Young, Justin; Barros, George; Trotter, Nate (12 August 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 14 August 2025.
↑ Harward, Christina; Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Young, Justin; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate (13 August 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 14 August 2025. Retrieved 14 August 2025.
↑ Mappes, Grace; Novikov, Daria; Gibson, Olivia; Olmsted, Jennie; Harvey, Anna; Kagan, Frederick W. (16 August 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 17 August 2025. Retrieved 17 August 2025.
↑ Harvey, Anna; Mappes, Grace; Novikov, Daria; Sobieski, Jessica; Young, Justin; Barros, George; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate (19 August 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 23 August 2025.
↑ Harvey, Anna; Harward, Christina; Evans, Angelica; Young, Justin; Gibson, Olivia; Kagan, Frederick W. (2 September 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 12 September 2025.
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