国务院新闻办公室 | |||||||
Headquarters | |||||||
Information office overview | |||||||
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Formed | April 8, 1980 | ||||||
Jurisdiction | Government of China | ||||||
Status |
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Headquarters | Beijing Telegraph Building, 11 West Chang’an Avenue, Xicheng District, Beijing 39°55′53″N116°25′37″E / 39.931293°N 116.426952°E | ||||||
Director responsible | |||||||
Child Information office | |||||||
Website | english | ||||||
Chinese name | |||||||
Simplified Chinese | 国务院新闻办公室 | ||||||
Traditional Chinese | 國務院新聞辦公室 | ||||||
Literal meaning | State Council News Office | ||||||
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Chinaportal |
The State Council Information Office (SCIO) is the chief information office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and an external name of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.
Historically, SCIO was the external name of the Office of External Propaganda (OEP) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under an arrangement termed "one institution with two names." In 2014, OEP was absorbed into the Central Propaganda Department, turning SCIO into an external nameplate.
The SCIO was formed in 1991 when the CCP Central Committee decided that the External Propaganda Leading Group (中央对外宣传小组) of the CCP Central Committee should have the name of State Council Information Office externally. [1] [2] [3] The External Propaganda Leading Group was transformed into the Office of External Propaganda (OEP, 中央对外宣传办公室), officially called in English as the International Communications Office. [4] The office was created with the goal of improving the Chinese government's international image following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. [2] According to scholar Anne-Marie Brady, the SCIO became a separate unit from the CCP Central Propaganda Department but still connected to it and was the "public face of this new direction in foreign propaganda work." [2]
In May 2014, the OEP was formally abolished, with its functions absorbed into the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. The SCIO turned into an external nameplate for the Propaganda Department, used primarily for activities of one of its bureaus. [4] In September 2018, the Press Conference Hall of the SCIO from 225 Chaoyangmennei Street, Dongcheng District to the Beijing Telegraph Building in 11 West Chang’an Avenue, Xicheng District. [5]
Before its absorption to the Propaganda Department, the OEP had nine functional bureaus, with corresponding ones in the SCIO, as well as supervised organs. It oversaw the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, while its seventh bureau oversaw the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS), a front group established in 1993 dealing with human rights-related narratives towards China. [4]
The SCIO oversees the China Internet Information Center. [6] The SCIO formerly had responsibility for internet censorship in China, with its Internet Affairs Bureau overseeing internet censorship and the suppression of "disruptive" activity on the web in mainland China. [7] [8] In May 2011, the SCIO transferred the offices, namely its fifth and ninth bureaus, which regulated the internet to a new subordinate agency, the State Internet Information Office (SIIO). [9] In May 2014, with the abolishment of the OEP, the SIIO (renamed in English as the Cyberspace Administration of China) was absorbed into the newly established Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization. [4]
Since the 2014 merger SCIO's nine bureaus are now controlled by the Central Propaganda Department, sometimes used by the department's bureaus as external nameplates. [4]
Every SCIO director except Zhao Qizheng have also served as deputy heads of the Central Propaganda Department. [4]
Name | Chinese name | Took office | Left office | Ref. |
---|---|---|---|---|
Zhu Muzhi | 朱穆之 | 1991 | November 1992 | |
Zeng Jianhui | 曾建徽 | November 1992 | April 1998 | |
Zhao Qizheng | 趙啟正 | April 1998 | 6 August 2005 | |
Cai Wu | 蔡武 | 6 August 2005 | 30 March 2008 | |
Wang Chen | 王晨 | 30 March 2008 | 26 April 2013 | |
Cai Mingzhao | 蔡名照 | 26 April 2013 | 9 January 2015 | |
Jiang Jianguo | 蒋建国 | 9 January 2015 | 25 July 2018 | |
Xu Lin | 徐麟 | 21 August 2018 | 9 June 2022 | |
Sun Yeli | 孙业礼 | 17 January 2023 | 11 April 2024 | [10] |
Mo Gaoyi | 莫高义 | 11 April 2024 | Incumbent | [11] |
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