Politics of North Korea

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Politics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

조선민주주의인민공화국의 정치 (Korean)
Emblem of North Korea.svg
Polity type Unitary one-party socialist republic under a totalitarian hereditary dictatorship
Constitution Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Legislative branch
Name Supreme People's Assembly
Type Unicameral
Meeting place Mansudae Assembly Hall
Presiding officer Pak Thae-song, Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly
Executive branch
Supreme leader
Title General Secretary
Currently Kim Jong Un
Appointer Central Committee
Head of State
Title President of the State Affairs
Currently Kim Jong Un
Appointer Appointed by the Supreme People's Assembly
Head of Government
Title Premier
Currently Kim Tok-hun
Appointer Appointed by the Supreme People's Assembly
Cabinet
Name Cabinet
Leader Pak Jong-gun
Deputy leader Vice Premier
AppointerPremier
Ministries43
Judicial branch
Name Judiciary of North Korea
Central Court
Chief judge Kang Yun-sok

The politics of North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) takes place within the framework of the official state philosophy, Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. Juche , which is a part of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, is the belief that only through self-reliance and a strong independent state, can true socialism be achieved. [1] [2]

Contents

North Korea's political system is built upon the principle of centralization. The constitution defines North Korea as "a dictatorship of people's democracy" [3] under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which is given legal supremacy over other political parties. WPK General Secretary is typically the supreme leader, who controls the WPK Presidium, the WPK Politburo, the WPK Secretariat and the WPK Central Military Commission, making the officeholder the most powerful person in North Korea.

The WPK is the ruling party of North Korea. It has been in power since its creation in 1948. Other minor political parties also exist, but are legally bound to accept the ruling role of the WPK. [4] Elections occur only in single-candidate races where the candidate is effectively selected beforehand by the WPK. [5] In addition to the parties, there are over 100 mass organizations controlled by the WPK. [6] [7] Those who are not WPK members are required to join one of these organizations. [8] Of these, the most important ones are the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, Socialist Women's Union of Korea, General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, and Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea. [6]

Outside observers generally view North Korea as a totalitarian dictatorship [9] [10] [11] [12] particularly noting the elaborate cult of personality around Kim Il-sung and his family. The WPK, led by a member of the ruling family, [13] holds power in the state. [14] The government has formally replaced all references to Marxism–Leninism in its constitution with the locally developed concept of Juche , or self-reliance. Kim Jong Il placed emphasis on the Songun or "military-first" philosophy, and all references to communism were removed from the North Korean constitution in 2009. [15] Under Kim Jong Un, terminology such as communism and the socialist economy is again in common use. [16] He additionally made Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism the main ideology of the country.

History

Kim Il Sung ruled the country from 1948 until his death in July 1994, holding the offices of General Secretary of the WPK from 1949 to 1994 (titled as chairman from 1949 to 1972), Premier of North Korea from 1948 to 1972 and President from 1972 to 1994. He was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il. While the younger Kim had been his father's designated successor since the 1980s, it took him three years to consolidate his power. He was named to his father's old post of general secretary in 1997, and in 1998 became chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC), which gave him command of the armed forces. The constitution was amended to make the NDC chairmanship "the highest post in the state." [17] At the same time, the presidential post was written out of the constitution, and Kim Il Sung was designated "Eternal leader of Juche Korea" in order to honor his memory forever. Most analysts believe the title to be a product of the cult of personality he cultivated during his life.

Political parties and elections

According to the Constitution of North Korea, the country is a democratic republic and the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) and Provincial People's Assemblies (PPA,도 인민회의) are elected by direct universal suffrage and secret ballot. Suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens aged 17 and over. [18] In reality, these elections are for show and feature single-candidate races only. [19] Those who want to vote against the sole candidate on the ballot must go to a special booth—in the presence of an electoral official—to cross out the candidate's name before dropping it into the ballot box—an act which, according to many North Korean defectors, is far too risky to even contemplate. [20]

All elected candidates are members of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea (DFRK), a popular front dominated by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).[ needs update ] The two minor parties are the Chondoist Chongu Party and the Korean Social Democratic Party, who also have a few elected officials. The WPK exercises direct control over the candidates selected for election by members of the other two parties. [5] In the past, elections were contested by other minor parties as well, including the Korea Buddhist Federation, Democratic Independent Party, Dongro People's Party, Gonmin People's Alliance, and People's Republic Party. [21]

Political ideology

The Juche Tower symbolizes the official state philosophy of Juche. Dprk pyongyang chuche monument 05.jpg
The Juche Tower symbolizes the official state philosophy of Juche .

Originally a close ally of Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, North Korea has increasingly emphasized Juche , an adoption of socialist self-reliance, which roots from Marxism–Leninism, its adoption of a certain ideological form of Marxism–Leninism is specific to the conditions of North Korea. [22] Juche was enshrined as the official ideology when the country adopted a new constitution in 1972. [23] [24] In 2009, the constitution was amended again, quietly removing the brief references to communism (Korean : 공산주의). [25] However, North Korea continues to see itself as part of a worldwide leftist movement. The Workers' Party maintains a relationship with other leftist parties, sending a delegation to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. [26] North Korea has a strong relationship with Cuba; [27] in 2016, the North Korean government declared three days of mourning after Fidel Castro's death. [28]

Political developments

Portraits of the Eternal President, Kim Il Sung (left), and the Eternal General Secretary of the Workers' Party, Kim Jong Il (right). Mangyongdae Children's Palace 09.JPG
Portraits of the Eternal President, Kim Il Sung (left), and the Eternal General Secretary of the Workers' Party, Kim Jong Il (right).

For much of its history, North Korean politics have been dominated by its adversarial relationship with South Korea. During the Cold War, North Korea aligned with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The North Korean government invested heavily in its military, hoping to develop the capability to reunify Korea by force if possible and also preparing to repel any attack by South Korea or the United States. Following the doctrine of Juche, North Korea aimed for a high degree of economic independence and the mobilization of all the resources of the nation to defend Korean sovereignty against foreign powers.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the loss of Soviet aid, North Korea faced a long period of economic crisis, including severe agricultural and industrial shortages. North Korea's main political issue has been to find a way to sustain its economy without compromising the internal stability of its government or its ability to respond to perceived external threats. Recently, North Korean efforts to improve relations with South Korea to increase trade and to receive development assistance have been mildly successful. North Korea has tried to improve its relations with South Korea by participating in the Pyeongchang Olympics, when Kim Jong Un sent his band and a few officials to visit South Korea. But North Korea's determination to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has prevented stable relations with both South Korea and the United States. North Korea has also experimented with market economics in some sectors of its economy, but these have had limited impact.

Although there are occasional reports of signs of opposition to the government, these appear to be isolated, and there is no evidence of major internal threats to the current government. Some foreign analysts[ who? ] have pointed to widespread starvation, increased emigration through North Korea-China border, and new sources of information about the outside world for ordinary North Koreans as factors pointing to an imminent collapse of the regime.[ citation needed ] However, North Korea has remained stable in spite of more than a decade of such predictions. The Workers' Party of Korea maintains a monopoly on political power and Kim Jong Il remained the leader of the country until 2011, ever since he first gained power following the death of his father.

After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, his son, Kim Jong Il became the new leader, which marked the closure of one chapter of North Korean politics. Combined with external shocks and the less charismatic personality of Kim Jong Il, the transition of the leadership moved North Korea toward less centralized control. There are three key institutions: the Korean People's Army (KPA), the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and the cabinet. Rather than dominate a unified system as his father had, each party has their own enduring goals, therefore providing checks and balances to the government. No one party could claim victory and power over the other ones. With changing internal situation, combined with external pressure, the cabinet started to endorse policies it had rejected for years. [29] North Korea politics is gradually becoming more open and negotiable with foreign countries.

Under Kim Jong Il the status of the military was enhanced, and appeared to occupy the center of the North Korean political system; all the social sectors were forced to follow the military spirit and adopt military methods. Kim Jong Il's public activity focused heavily on "on-the-spot guidance" of places and events related to the military. The enhanced status of the military and military-centered political system was confirmed in 1998 at the first session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) by the promotion of NDC members into the official power hierarchy. All ten NDC members were ranked within the top twenty on 5 September, and all but one occupied the top twenty at the fiftieth anniversary of the Day of the Foundation of the Republic on 9 September.[ citation needed ] Under Kim Jong Un there has been an increased emphasis on economic matters, with major defence spending needing support from an economic standpoint. [16] [30]

While the commonly accepted view is that no dissent can be expressed in North Korea, the notionally academic economic journal Kyo'ngje Yo'ngu and the philosophical and economic journals of Kim Il Sung University permit the presentation and discussion of the different views of various parts of the government. [16]

Protests

In 2005, a riot began at Kim Il-sung Stadium during a World Cup qualification match, after a dispute between a Korean player and a Syrian referee and the subsequent disqualification of the player. [31] [32]

Between 2006–2007, "market riots" erupted in the countryside when the government "unsuccessfully tried to restart" the Public Distribution System. [31] Andrei Lankov goes on to say that the "outbreak of public discontent usually happens at the markets when vendors believe that their right to make money is being unfairly infringed by some decision of the authorities". [31]

In June 2011, it was reported that the government had ordered universities to cancel most classes until April 2012, sending students to work on construction projects, presumably for fear of similar developments as in North Africa. In the previous months, the regime had ordered riot gear from China. [33] However, "as soon as universities were reopened, graffiti appeared again. Perhaps the succession is not the real reason, but greater awareness among North Koreans could lead to changes." [34]

Transition of power to Kim Jong Un

Political power

After the death of Kim Jong Il on December 17, 2011, his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, inherited the political leadership of the DPRK. The succession of power was immediate: Kim Jong Un became Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army on December 30, 2011, was appointed first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on April 11, 2012, and was entitled first chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) two days later. To gain complete political power, he became the military rank of Marshal of the KPA. [30]

Differences from the Kim Jong Il regime

Up until his death, Kim Jong Il maintained a strong national military-first political system that equated stability with military power. Kim Jong Un continues to carry on the militarized political style of his father, but with less commitment to complete military rule. Since he took power, Kim Jong Un has attempted to move political power away from the KPA and has divided it among the WPK and the cabinet. Because of his political lobbying, the WPK's Central Committee has vastly shifted power in April 2012: out of 17 members and 15 alternates of the Committee, only five members and six alternates derive from military and security sectors. Ever since, the economic power of the WPK, the cabinet, and the KPA has been in a tense balance. The KPA has lost a significant amount of economic influence because of the current regime, which continually shifts from what Kim Jong Il built his regime on, and may cause later internal issues. [30]

Foreign relations

The foreign relations of North Korea have been shaped by its conflict with South Korea and its historical ties with world communism. Both the government of North Korea and the government of South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea) claim to be the sole legitimate government of the whole of Korea. The Korean War in the 1950s failed to resolve the issue, leaving North Korea locked in a military confrontation with South Korea and the United States Forces Korea across the Demilitarized Zone.

At the start of the Cold War, North Korea only had diplomatic recognition by communist countries. Over the following decades, it established relations with developing countries and joined the Non-Aligned Movement. When the Eastern Bloc collapsed in the years 1989–1992, North Korea made efforts to improve its diplomatic relations with developed capitalist countries. At the same time, there were international efforts to resolve the confrontation on the Korean peninsula (known as the Korean conflict). At the same time, North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, adding to the concerns of the international community. [35]

See also

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The Korean People's Army encompasses the combined military forces of North Korea and the armed wing of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). The KPA consists of five branches: the Ground Force, the Naval Force, the Air Force, Strategic Force, and the Special Operation Force. It is commanded by the WPK Central Military Commission, which is chaired by the WPK general secretary, and the president of the State Affairs; both posts are currently headed by Kim Jong Un.

<i>Juche</i> State ideology of North Korea

Juche, officially the Juche idea, is the state ideology of North Korea and the official ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea. North Korean sources attribute its conceptualization to Kim Il Sung, the country's founder and first leader. Juche was originally regarded as a variant of Marxism–Leninism until Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son and successor, declared it a distinct ideology in the 1970s. Kim Jong Il further developed Juche in the 1980s and 1990s by making ideological breaks from Marxism–Leninism and increasing the importance of his father's ideas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Constitution of North Korea</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Government of North Korea</span> National government of North Korea

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kim Jong Un</span> Supreme Leader of North Korea since 2011

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea</span> Ideology of the ruling party of North Korea

Officially, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) – the ruling party of North Korea – is a communist party guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, a synthesis of the ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The party is committed to Juche, an ideology attributed to Kim Il Sung which promotes national independence and development through the efforts of the popular masses. Although Juche was originally presented as the Korean interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, the party now presents it as a freestanding philosophy. The WPK recognizes the ruling Kim family as the ultimate source of its political thought. The fourth party conference, held in 2012, amended the party rules to state that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism was "the only guiding idea of the party". Under Kim Jong Il, who governed as chairman of the National Defence Commission, communism was steadily removed from party and state documents in favour of Songun, or military-first politics. The military, rather than the working class, was established as the base of political power. However, his successor Kim Jong Un reversed this position in 2021, replacing Songun with "people-first politics" as the party's political method and reasserting the party's commitment to communism.

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Further reading