Elections in South Korea are held on a national level to select the President and the National Assembly. Local elections are held every four years to elect governors, metropolitan mayors, municipal mayors, and provincial and municipal legislatures.
The president is directly elected for a single five-year term by plurality vote. The National Assembly has 300 members elected for a four-year term, 253 in single-seat constituencies and 47 members by proportional representation. Each individual party willing to represent its policies in the National Assembly is qualified on the legislative (general) election if: i) the national party-vote reaches over 3% on proportional contest or ii) more than 5 members of the party are elected from each of their first-past-the-post election constituencies.[1]
Voting
Eligibility
All citizens over the age of 18 have the right to vote. According to Article 34 of the 'Immigration Control Act,' a non-Korean citizen registered in the relevant local constituency and who has had a resident visa for at least three years has the right to vote in local elections.[2]
Polling places are usually located in schools. During the absentee or early voting period, voters can vote at any place in the country. On election day, voters may only vote at polling places in their registered constituency. Korean voters mark paper ballots with a rubber stamp using red ink. There is one race per ballot paper; if there are multiple offices up for election, ballot papers are colour-coded and voters are issued one ballot per race.[5]
Polling booth, used in 2025 Presidential Election.
Korea uses a central count model. After the polls close, ballot boxes are sealed and transported to the constituency's counting centre. Traditionally ballots were hand-counted, and optical scanners have been adopted since 3rd local elections held on 13 June 2002. The scanners resemble cash sorter machines, sorting the ballots into stacks by how they are voted. Stacks are then counted using machines resembling currency counting machines.[6]
Korean elections have been praised as a model of best practice.[5] However, the legality of the introduction of optical scan technology has been challenged and there have been allegations of rigged counting.[6]
Electoral Apportionment and Constitutional Mandates
Principles of Constitutional Duties and Equality
Article 11 of the Constitution stipulates that all citizens are equal before the law, and Article 41 (1) stipulates ordinary, equal, direct, and secret elections in the election of members of the National Assembly, requiring not only opportunities for voting but also substantial equality in voting values.[7]
The Constitutional Court has interpreted the principle of equality of voting value in electoral delimitation as requiring that the degree to which all voters' rights contribute to the election results be substantially equal.[8] Constitutional rulings establish that the minimization of population variation between constituencies is a primary criterion.[9]
The implementation of this principle of equality is considered a Constitutional Mandate that limits the discretion of the National Assembly, which must set the boundaries and population standards of the National Assembly's regional constituencies by law through the Public Official Election Act (election district legalism).[10] However, the Constitutional Court believes that absolute population consensus is not necessary because it must consider various realistic factors at the same time, including population density, geographic factors, and administrative district integration, so the Court has judicialized the maximum permissible deviation criterion to consider realistic factors.[11]
The role of the Constitutional Court and the establishment of a 2:1 standard
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea has established judicial standards for the principle of equality of voting value in redistricting.[12] While recognizing legislative discretion, the Constitutional Court ruled that this discretion is strictly limited by the constitutional requirement of equal elections.[13] The evolution of this standard has developed in different ways in the constituencies of the National Assembly and local constituencies.
Strengthen the criteria for population deviation in the National Assembly constituency (3:1 to 2:1)
1) 2001: Establishment of the first 3:1 standard On October 25, 2001, the Constitutional Court first proposed the acceptable standard for population deviation between the constituencies of the National Assembly.[14] In this ruling, the Constitutional Court decided that the allowable limit of population deviation should not exceed 50% above and below the average population, that is, the ratio of the population of the most populous and the least populous constituencies should not exceed 3:1.[15] The Court issued a ruling of unconstitutionality with grace period for the provisions defining overpopulated electoral districts in the Public Official Election Act, requiring the legislature to revise the law by December 31, 2003.[16]
2) 2014: Breakthrough 2:1 standard established On October 30, 2014, the Constitutional Court made a drastic change in the Constitutional Court's judgment on the local constituency ticket of the National Assembly, ruling that the past 3:1 standard could no longer be maintained.[17] The Constitutional Court clearly suggested that the new population deviation allowance standard should not exceed 33% of the upper and lower ⅓ based on the average population, that is, a maximum ratio of 2:1.[18]
For the following reasons, the Constitutional Court mandated this stricter standard.[19]:
1. Supremacy of Equality Values: The Court ruled that the 3:1 ratio resulted in excessive inequality in vote value, which was unacceptable and required that the equality principle must prevail over regional representation.
2. Maturity of Local Autonomy: The Court found that with the local self-government system well established, the need to significantly relax the equality of suffrage principle for the sake of regional representation was diminished.
3. Reflecting International Trends: The Court noted that the progressive adoption of stricter deviation standards was consistent with global trends in constitutional jurisprudence.
The Constitutional Court ruled that constituencies exceeding the 2:1 standard (e.g., Yongin A/B in Gyeonggi Province, Cheonan A/B in Chungcheongnam-do, Gangnam-gu in Seoul, and Namdong-gu in Incheon) violate the claimants' right to vote and equality, but on December 31, 2015, it made a constitutional inconsistency decision to avoid the indivisibility of constituency tables and invalidity of the law, requiring legislators to apply it temporarily until the law is revised.[20]
Separation and strengthening of population deviation standards in local constituencies
Unlike the criteria for the constituency of the National Assembly, the demarcation of the constituency of city and provincial councilors (wide-area local councilors) was gradually strengthened by applying separate standards in consideration of the characteristics of local autonomy.[21] 1) 2007: Establishment of 4:1 standard for local councilors On March 29, 2007, the Constitutional Court set the standard for allowing population deviations in municipal and provincial constituencies to be 60% above and below the average population, that is, a maximum ratio of 4:1.[22] As the court acknowledged that due to the nature of local councils, more weight should be given to secondary factors such as regional representation and respect for administrative districts, the ruling applied a slightly more relaxed standard than the National Assembly standard (3:1 at the time), and a constitutional inconsistency decision was made on votes in Yongin and Gunsan districts that exceeded this standard.[23] 2) 2018: Strengthen the 3:1 standard for local councilors On June 28, 2018, the Constitutional Court strengthened the standards, believing that the 4:1 standard, which was applied to the regional constituencies of cities and provinces, also caused excessive inequality in voting value.[24] The Constitutional Court acknowledged the peculiarity of local council districts, but decided that it would be reasonable to change the allowable population deviation limit to 50% above and below the average population, or up to 3:1, and thus ruled that it would be a 3:1 standard from the 2022 local council elections.[25]
Independent Redistricting Commission
Enhanced installation background and independence The demarcation committee was first established in the National Assembly at the time of the 15th National Assembly election, but the demarcation proposal submitted by the demarcation committee is often unreasonably revised according to the political interests of the National Assembly, revealing structural problems that delay redistricting every time.[26] The weakness of this system was faced with fundamental demands for reform on October 30, 2014, when the Constitutional Court strictly limited the population deviation of the parliamentary constituency to 2:1.[27] Following this ruling, the Public Official Election Act (Act No. 13334) was amended on 19 June 2015 to dramatically upgrade the status of the demarcation committee, which was later established as an independent body under the Central Election Commission (NEC) and officially launched on 15 July 2015.[28]
Committee composition and independence mechanisms: The National Assembly Member Election Planning Committee consists of nine members commissioned by the Chairman of the National Election Commission (Article 24, Paragraph 3 of the Public Official Election Act).[29] The Committee shall have the status of independence with respect to its duties, and the term of office of the members shall be the duration of the demarcation committee.[30][31] The Committee applies the following strict reasons for disqualification to ensure neutrality.[32] Members of the National Assembly and political parties cannot become members, and those who have been members of political parties for the past year from the date of establishment of the Demarcation Committee are also not eligible for membership (Article 24, Paragraph 7 of the Public Official Election Act).[33] Members are selected after a resolution by the National Assembly's competent committee, including one nominated by the chairman of the Central Election Commission, from among those recommended by academia, legal circles, media, civic groups, and political parties.[34]
Duties and Privileges: The demarcation committee shall have the duty to fairly demarcate constituencies in accordance with the demarcation standards, such as population deviation standards and geographical requirements of the Constitutional Court stipulated in Article 25 (1) of the Public Official Election Act.[35] The most important role is to submit a demarcation plan and report resolved with the approval of more than two-thirds of the registered members to the Speaker of the National Assembly by 13 months before the election date of the National Assembly election due to the expiration of the term of office (Article 24, Paragraph 11 of the Public Official Election Act).[36] In addition, the Redistricting Committee may request data necessary for redistricting to state agencies and local governments, and related agencies must comply without delay (Article 24, Paragraph 9 of the Public Official Election Act).[37]
A difference from the District Council on Redistricting: The Redistricting Committee for Local Council Members shall be established separately from the National Assembly Redistricting Committee by the mayor or provincial governor, who is also responsible for appointing its members.[38] This committee is tasked with delineating constituencies for metropolitan and basic local councils within the relevant jurisdiction.[39] Unlike the National Assembly’s single-member constituencies, each local electoral district elects between two and four members, following a small multi-member district system.[40]
Redistricting procedures and legislative results
The redistricting process, established by the 2015 amendment to the Public Official Election Act, integrates the independent committee’s technical proposal with the National Assembly’s final approval to both strengthen the committee’s autonomy and limit the legislature’s discretionary power to alter constituency boundaries.[41]
Step 1: Preparation and submission of demarcation plan The Demarcation Committee shall prepare a demarcation plan that reflects the standards for population deviation and other demarcation standards of the Constitutional Court by 13 months before the election date of the National Assembly election due to the expiration of the term of office.[42] This demarcation plan must be resolved with the approval of at least two-thirds of the registered members, and is submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly along with a report stating the reasons and related matters (Article 24, Paragraph 11 of the Public Official Election Act).[43]
Step 2: National Assembly deliberation and finalization The Speaker of the National Assembly shall refer the redistricting proposal submitted by the Redistricting Committee to the standing committee or special committee under the jurisdiction of the National Assembly, and the National Assembly must comply with the strict deadline for finalizing the redistricting bill by one year before election day.[44] • Standing/Special Committee Review: The National Assembly’s standing or special committee shall adopt the demarcation plan submitted by the Redistricting Committee as a constituency bill without amendment, but if the plan clearly violates the Public Official Election Act, the committee may — with the approval of at least two-thirds of its registered members and only once — request the Redistricting Committee to resubmit a revised plan, which must then be returned to the Speaker of the National Assembly within ten days.[45] • Excluding the Legislative Judicial Committee Examination: The Legislative Judicial Committee excludes the name and district of the National Assembly members from the examination in the process of reviewing the system and self-rescue measures for constituency legislation, and is prohibited from changing the contents.[46] • Resolution of the plenary session: The constituency bill is submitted to the first plenary session after it is proposed, and members of the National Assembly must vote on the bill without amendment.[47]
Political controversy (Gerrymandering): In this final legislative process, the Gerrymandering controversy often arises. Disputes occur because there is still room for political parties to adjust the demarcation plan in a way that artificially divides administrative districts or adjusts the number of populations. Political compromises and controversies have arisen in the process of merging urban and rural complex districts and dividing metropolitan districts, which remains an ongoing point of contention in Korea's election system.[48]
Geographic and administrative constraints
The population deviation (2:1), which is the standard for defining the constituency of the National Assembly, has been established as the judicial standard of the Constitutional Court, but Article 25 of the Public Official Election Act stipulates specific institutional and geographic constraints to meet this constitutional standard.[49]
Key criteria for definition: The constituency of the National Assembly members is defined by comprehensively considering the following factors within the jurisdiction of the city and province (Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act).[50] 1. Population 2. Administrative divisions 3. Geographic conditions 4. Traffic 5. Life and Cultural Zone
By population: The population that is the standard for redistricting shall be the population on the resident registration table under the Resident Registration Act as of the end of the month that falls 15 months prior to the relevant election date.[51]
Administrative zoning prohibition principles and exceptions: One of the most strictly observed standards for redistricting is the principle that part of one autonomous district, city, or county cannot be divided into other congressional districts. This rule is intended to maintain the unity of the local community and is a defense against arbitrary gerrymandering.[52]
Exceptions: Provided, That there are significant exceptions to this principle. Where an autonomous district, Si, or Gun that falls short of the 2:1 range (population range) of population deviation and is unable to construct a constituency that meets the population range by combining all of the jurisdictions of one or more adjacent autonomous districts, Si, or Guns, a constituency may be formed by dividing a part of the adjacent autonomous district, Si, or Gun (provided in Article 25 (1) 2 of the Public Official Election Act). This exception is permitted to ensure the minimal regional representation of underpopulated areas.[53]
Reflecting the representation of the rural, mountain and fishing villages: The Public Official Election Act stipulates that efforts shall be made to reflect the regional representation of farming, mountain and fishing villages within the limits of the upper and lower limits of the 2:1 population deviation in the demarcation of the National Assembly members' constituencies (Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the Public Official Election Act).[54] The Public Official Election Act directs that, within the established 2:1 population deviation range, the legislature and the NEDDC must make efforts to reflect the representational needs of agricultural and fishing regions.[55]
All 17 metropolitan mayors and governors All 226 municipal mayors All 824 seats for provincial and metropolitan councillors All 2926 seats for municipal councillors
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