This article is about the state of political tension in the 20th century. For the general term, see Cold war (term). For other uses, see Cold War (disambiguation).
At the end of World War II, English writer George Orwell used cold war, as a general term, in his essay "You and the Atomic Bomb", published 19 October 1945 in the British newspaper Tribune. Contemplating a world living in the shadow of the threat of nuclear warfare, Orwell looked at James Burnham's predictions of a polarized world, writing:
Looking at the world as a whole, the drift for many decades has been not towards anarchy but towards the reimposition of slavery... James Burnham's theory has been much discussed, but few people have yet considered its ideological implications—that is, the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of "cold war" with its neighbours.[4]
In The Observer of 10 March 1946, Orwell wrote, "...after the Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a 'cold war' on Britain and the British Empire."[5]
The first use of the term to describe the specific post-war geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States came in a speech by Bernard Baruch, an influential advisor to Democratic presidents,[6] on 16 April 1947. The speech, written by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope,[7] proclaimed, "Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war."[8] Newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann gave the term wide currency with his book The Cold War. When asked in 1947 about the source of the term, Lippmann traced it to a French term from the 1930s, la guerre froide.[9][B]
The roots of the Cold War can be traced back to diplomatic and military tensions preceding World War II. The 1917 Russian Revolution and the subsequent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, where Soviet Russia ceded vast territories to Germany, deepened distrust among the Western Allies. Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War further complicated relations, and although the Soviet Union later allied with Western powers to defeat Nazi Germany, this cooperation was strained by mutual suspicions.
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, disagreements about the future of Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, became central. The Soviet Union's establishment of communist regimes in the countries it had liberated from Nazi control—enforced by the presence of the Red Army—alarmed the US and UK. Western leaders saw this as a clear instance of Soviet expansionism, clashing with their vision of a democratic Europe. Economically, the divide was sharpened with the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1947, a US initiative to provide financial aid to rebuild Europe and prevent the spread of communism by stabilizing capitalist economies. The Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan, seeing it as an effort by the US to impose its influence on Europe. In response, the Soviet Union established Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) to foster economic cooperation among communist states.
The United States and its Western European allies sought to strengthen their bonds and used the policy of containment against Soviet influence; they accomplished this most notably through the formation of NATO, which was essentially a defensive agreement in 1949. The Soviet Union countered with the Warsaw Pact in 1955, which had similar results with the Eastern Bloc. As by that time the Soviet Union already had an armed presence and political domination all over its eastern satellite states, the pact has been long considered superfluous.[10] Although nominally a defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact's primary function was to safeguard Soviet hegemony over its Eastern European satellites, with the pact's only direct military actions having been the invasions of its own member states to keep them from breaking away;[11] in the 1960s, the pact evolved into a multilateral alliance, in which the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members gained significant scope to pursue their own interests. In 1961, Soviet-allied East Germany constructed the Berlin Wall to prevent the citizens of East Berlin from fleeing to West Berlin, at the time part of United States-allied West Germany.[12] Major crises of this phase included the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949, the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1945–1949, the Korean War of 1950–1953, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Suez Crisis of that same year, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Vietnam War of 1964–1975. Both superpowers competed for influence in Latin America and the Middle East, and the decolonising states of Africa, Asia, and Oceania.
Détente collapsed at the end of the decade with the beginning of the Soviet–Afghan War in 1979. Beginning in the 1980s, this phase was another period of elevated tension. The Reagan Doctrine led to increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, which at the time was undergoing the Era of Stagnation. This phase saw the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introducing the liberalizing reforms of glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("reorganization") and ending Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in 1989. Pressures for national sovereignty grew stronger in Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev refused to further support the Communist governments militarily.
Remains of the "Iron Curtain" in the Czech Republic, 2014
In February 1946, George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow to Washington helped to articulate the US government's increasingly hard line against the Soviets, which would become the basis for US strategy toward the Soviet Union for the duration of the Cold War. The telegram galvanized a policy debate that would eventually shape the Truman administration's Soviet policy.[14] Washington's opposition to the Soviets accumulated after broken promises by Stalin and Molotov concerning Europe and Iran.[15] Following the World War II Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the country was occupied by the Red Army in the far north and the British in the south.[16] Iran was used by the United States and British to supply the Soviet Union, and the Allies agreed to withdraw from Iran within six months after the cessation of hostilities.[16] However, when this deadline came, the Soviets remained in Iran under the guise of the Azerbaijan People's Government and KurdishRepublic of Mahabad.[17] Shortly thereafter, on 5 March, former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri.[18] The speech called for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviets, whom he accused of establishing an "iron curtain" dividing Europe from "Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic".[19][20]
A week later, on 13 March, Stalin responded vigorously to the speech, saying Churchill could be compared to Adolf Hitler insofar as he advocated the racial superiority of English-speaking nations so that they could satisfy their hunger for world domination, and that such a declaration was "a call for war on the USSR." The Soviet leader also dismissed the accusation that the USSR was exerting increasing control over the countries lying in its sphere. He argued that there was nothing surprising in "the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, [was] trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries."[21][22]
European military alliances
European economic blocs
Soviet territorial demands to Turkey regarding the Dardanelles in the Turkish Straits crisis and Black Sea border disputes were also a major factor in increasing tensions.[15][23] In September, the Soviet side produced the Novikov telegram, sent by the Soviet ambassador to the US but commissioned and "co-authored" by Vyacheslav Molotov; it portrayed the US as being in the grip of monopoly capitalists who were building up military capability "to prepare the conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war".[24] On 6 September 1946, James F. Byrnes delivered a speech in Germany repudiating the Morgenthau Plan (a proposal to partition and de-industrialize post-war Germany) and warning the Soviets that the US intended to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely.[25][26] As Byrnes stated a month later, "The nub of our program was to win the German people... it was a battle between us and Russia over minds..." In December, the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Iran after persistent US pressure, an early success of containment policy.
By 1947, US president Harry S. Truman was outraged by the perceived resistance of the Soviet Union to American demands in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, as well as Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan on nuclear weapons.[27] In February 1947, the British government announced that it could no longer afford to finance the Kingdom of Greece in its civil war against Communist-led insurgents.[28] In the same month, Stalin conducted the rigged 1947 Polish legislative election which constituted an open breach of the Yalta Agreement. The US government responded to this announcement by adopting a policy of containment,[29] with the goal of stopping the spread of communism. Truman delivered a speech calling for the allocation of $400million to intervene in the war and unveiled the Truman Doctrine, which framed the conflict as a contest between free peoples and totalitarian regimes.[29] American policymakers accused the Soviet Union of conspiring against the Greek royalists in an effort to expand Soviet influence even though Stalin had told the Communist Party to cooperate with the British-backed government.[30][31][32]
Enunciation of the Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of a US bipartisan defense and foreign policy consensus between Republicans and Democrats focused on containment and deterrence that weakened during and after the Vietnam War, but ultimately persisted thereafter.[33] Moderate and conservative parties in Europe, as well as social democrats, gave virtually unconditional support to the Western alliance,[34] while European and American Communists, financed by the KGB and involved in its intelligence operations,[35] adhered to Moscow's line, although dissent began to appear after 1956. Other critiques of the consensus policy came from anti-Vietnam War activists, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the anti-nuclear movement.[36]
Marshall Plan, Czechoslovak coup and formation of two German states
The labeling used on the Marshall Plan economic aid to Western Europe.Map of Cold War-era Europe and the Near East showing countries that received Marshall Plan aid. The red columns show the relative amount of total aid received per nation.Construction in West Berlin under Marshall Plan aid
In early 1947, France, Britain and the United States unsuccessfully attempted to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union for a plan envisioning an economically self-sufficient Germany, including a detailed accounting of the industrial plants, goods and infrastructure already taken by the Soviets.[37] In June 1947, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine, the United States enacted the Marshall Plan, a pledge of economic assistance for all European countries willing to participate, including the Soviet Union.[37] Under the plan, which President Harry S. Truman signed on 3 April 1948, the US government gave to Western European countries over $13billion (equivalent to $189billion in 2016) to rebuild the economy of Europe. Later, the program led to the creation of the OECD.
The plan's aim was to rebuild the democratic and economic systems of Europe and to counter perceived threats to the European balance of power, such as communist parties seizing control through revolutions or elections.[38] The plan also stated that European prosperity was contingent upon German economic recovery.[39] One month later, Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, creating a unified Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). These would become the main bureaucracies for US defense policy in the Cold War.[40]
Stalin believed economic integration with the West would allow Eastern Bloc countries to escape Soviet control, and that the US was trying to buy a pro-US re-alignment of Europe.[41] Stalin therefore prevented Eastern Bloc nations from receiving Marshall Plan aid.[41] The Soviet Union's alternative to the Marshall Plan, which was purported to involve Soviet subsidies and trade with central and eastern Europe, became known as the Molotov Plan (later institutionalized in January 1949 as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).[31] Stalin was also fearful of a reconstituted Germany; his vision of a post-war Germany did not include the ability to rearm or pose any kind of threat to the Soviet Union.[42]
In early 1948, following reports of strengthening "reactionary elements", Czech Communists executed a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia (resulting in the formation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (9 May 1948)), the only Eastern Bloc state that the Soviets had permitted to retain democratic structures.[43] The public brutality of the coup shocked Western powers more than any event up to that point, set in motion a brief scare that war would occur, and swept away the last vestiges of opposition to the Marshall Plan in the United States Congress.[44][45]
In an immediate aftermath of the crisis, the London Six-Power Conference was held, resulting in the Soviet boycott of the Allied Control Council and its incapacitation, an event marking the beginning of the full-blown Cold War and the end of its prelude, as well as ending any hopes at the time for a single German government and leading to formation in 1949 of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic.[46]
All major powers engaged in espionage, using a great variety of spies, double agents, moles, and new technologies such as the tapping of telephone cables.[48] The Soviet KGB ("Committee for State Security"), the bureau responsible for foreign espionage and internal surveillance, was famous for its effectiveness. The most famous Soviet operation involved its atomic spies that delivered crucial information from the United States' Manhattan Project, leading the USSR to detonate its first nuclear weapon in 1949, four years after the American detonation and much sooner than expected.[49][50] A massive network of informants throughout the Soviet Union was used to monitor dissent from official Soviet politics and morals.[48][51] Although to an extent disinformation had always existed, the term itself was invented, and the strategy formalized by a black propaganda department of the Soviet KGB.[52][C]
Based on the amount of top-secret Cold War archival information that has been released, historian Raymond L. Garthoff concludes there probably was parity in the quantity and quality of secret information obtained by each side. However, the Soviets probably had an advantage in terms of HUMINT (human intelligence or interpersonal espionage) and "sometimes in its reach into high policy circles." In terms of decisive impact, however, he concludes:[53]
We also can now have high confidence in the judgment that there were no successful "moles" at the political decision-making level on either side. Similarly, there is no evidence, on either side, of any major political or military decision that was prematurely discovered through espionage and thwarted by the other side. There also is no evidence of any major political or military decision that was crucially influenced (much less generated) by an agent of the other side.
According to historian Robert L. Benson, "Washington's forte was 'signals' intelligence - the procurement and analysis of coded foreign messages." leading to the Venona project or Venona intercepts, which monitored the communications of Soviet intelligence agents.[54]Moynihan wrote that the Venona project contained "overwhelming proof of the activities of Soviet spy networks in America, complete with names, dates, places, and deeds."[55] The Venona project was kept highly secret even from policymakers until the Moynihan Commission in 1995.[55] Despite this, the decryption project had already been betrayed and dispatched to the USSR by Kim Philby and Bill Weisband in 1946,[55][56] as was discovered by the US by 1950.[57] Nonetheless, the Soviets had to keep their discovery of the program secret, too, and continued leaking their own information, some of which was still useful to the American program.[56] According to Moynihan, even President Truman may not have been fully informed of Venona, which may have left him unaware of the extent of Soviet espionage.[58][59]
Clandestine atomic spies from the Soviet Union, who infiltrated the Manhattan Project at various points during WWII, played a major role in increasing tensions that led to the Cold War.[54]
In addition to usual espionage, the Western agencies paid special attention to debriefing Eastern Bloc defectors.[60]Edward Jay Epstein describes that the CIA understood that the KGB used "provocations", or fake defections, as a trick to embarrass Western intelligence and establish Soviet double agents. As a result, from 1959 to 1973, the CIA required that East Bloc defectors went through a counterintelligence investigation before being recruited as a source of intelligence.[61]
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the KGB perfected its use of espionage to sway and distort diplomacy.[62]Active measures were "clandestine operations designed to further Soviet foreign policy goals," consisting of disinformation, forgeries, leaks to foreign media, and the channeling of aid to militant groups.[63] Retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, former head of Foreign Counter Intelligence for the KGB (1973–1979), described active measures as "the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence."[64]
During the Sino-Soviet split, "spy wars" also occurred between the USSR and PRC.[65]
In September 1947, the Soviets created Cominform to impose orthodoxy within the international communist movement and tighten political control over Soviet satellites through coordination of communist parties in the Eastern Bloc.[41] Cominform faced an embarrassing setback the following June, when the Tito–Stalin split obliged its members to expel Yugoslavia, which remained communist but adopted a non-aligned position and began accepting financial aid from the US.[66]
Besides Berlin, the status of the city of Trieste was at issue. Until the break between Tito and Stalin, the Western powers and the Eastern bloc faced each other uncompromisingly. In addition to capitalism and communism, Italians and Slovenes, monarchists and republicans as well as war winners and losers often faced each other irreconcilably. The neutral buffer state Free Territory of Trieste, founded in 1947 with the United Nations, was split up and dissolved in 1954 and 1975, also because of the détente between the West and Tito.[67][68]
The US and Britain merged their western German occupation zones into "Bizone" (1 January 1947, later "Trizone" with the addition of France's zone, April 1949).[69] As part of the economic rebuilding of Germany, in early 1948, representatives of a number of Western European governments and the United States announced an agreement for a merger of western German areas into a federal governmental system.[70] In addition, in accordance with the Marshall Plan, they began to re-industrialize and rebuild the West German economy, including the introduction of a new Deutsche Mark currency to replace the old Reichsmark currency that the Soviets had debased.[71] The US had secretly decided that a unified and neutral Germany was undesirable, with Walter Bedell Smith telling General Eisenhower "in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification on any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seem to meet most of our requirements."[72]
Shortly thereafter, Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade (June 1948 – May 1949), one of the first major crises of the Cold War, preventing Western food, materials and supplies from arriving in the West Germany's exclave of West Berlin.[73] The United States (primarily), Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and several other countries began the massive "Berlin airlift", supplying West Berlin with food and other provisions despite Soviet threats.[74]
The Soviets mounted a public relations campaign against the policy change. Once again, the East Berlin communists attempted to disrupt the Berlin municipal elections,[69] which were held on 5 December 1948 and produced a turnout of 86% and an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties.[75] The results effectively divided the city into East and West, the latter comprising US, British and French sectors. 300,000 Berliners demonstrated and urged the international airlift to continue,[76] and US Air Force pilot Gail Halvorsen created "Operation Vittles", which supplied candy to German children.[77] The Airlift was as much a logistical as a political and psychological success for the West; it firmly linked West Berlin to the United States.[78] In May 1949, Stalin backed down and lifted the blockade.[79][80]
In 1952, Stalin repeatedly proposed a plan to unify East and West Germany under a single government chosen in elections supervised by the United Nations, if the new Germany were to stay out of Western military alliances, but this proposal was turned down by the Western powers. Some sources dispute the sincerity of the proposal.[81]
Media in the Eastern Bloc was an organ of the state, completely reliant on and subservient to the communist party. Radio and television organizations were state-owned, while print media was usually owned by political organizations, mostly by the local communist party.[85] Soviet radio broadcasts used Marxist rhetoric to attack capitalism, emphasizing themes of labor exploitation, imperialism and war-mongering.[86]
Along with the broadcasts of the BBC and the Voice of America to Central and Eastern Europe,[87] a major propaganda effort began in 1949 was Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, dedicated to bringing about the peaceful demise of the communist system in the Eastern Bloc.[88] Radio Free Europe attempted to achieve these goals by serving as a surrogate home radio station, an alternative to the controlled and party-dominated domestic press in the Soviet Bloc.[88] Radio Free Europe was a product of some of the most prominent architects of America's early Cold War strategy, especially those who believed that the Cold War would eventually be fought by political rather than military means, such as George F. Kennan.[89] Soviet and Eastern Bloc authorities used various methods to suppress Western broadcasts, including radio jamming.[90][91]
American policymakers, including Kennan and John Foster Dulles, acknowledged that the Cold War was in its essence a war of ideas.[89] The United States, acting through the CIA, funded a long list of projects to counter the communist appeal among intellectuals in Europe and the developing world.[92] The CIA also covertly sponsored a domestic propaganda campaign called Crusade for Freedom.[93]
The rearmament of West Germany was achieved in the early 1950s. Its main promoter was Konrad Adenauer, the chancellor of West Germany, with France the main opponent. Washington had the decisive voice. It was strongly supported by the Pentagon (the US military leadership), and weakly opposed by President Truman; the State Department was ambivalent. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed the calculations and Washington now gave full support. That also involved naming Dwight D. Eisenhower in charge of NATO forces and sending more American troops to West Germany. There was a strong promise that West Germany would not develop nuclear weapons.[94]
Widespread fears of another rise of German militarism necessitated the new military to operate within an alliance framework under NATO command.[95] In 1955, Washington secured full German membership of NATO.[84] In May 1953, Lavrentiy Beria, by then in a government post, had made an unsuccessful proposal to allow the reunification of a neutral Germany to prevent West Germany's incorporation into NATO, but his attempts were cut short after he was executed several months later during a Soviet power struggle.[96] The events led to the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the West German military, in 1955.[97][98]
In 1949, CCP ChairmanMao Zedong's People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's United States-backed Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Government in China. The KMT-controlled territory was now restricted to the island of Taiwan, the nationalist government of which exists to this day. The Kremlin promptly created an alliance with the newly formed People's Republic of China.[99] According to Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad, the communists won the Civil War because they made fewer military mistakes than Chiang Kai-Shek made, and because in his search for a powerful centralized government, Chiang antagonized too many interest groups in China. Moreover, his party was weakened during the war against Japan. Meanwhile, the communists told different groups, such as the peasants, exactly what they wanted to hear, and they cloaked themselves under the cover of Chinese nationalism.[100]
Confronted with the communist revolution in China and the end of the American atomic monopoly in 1949, the Truman administration quickly moved to escalate and expand its containment doctrine.[31] In NSC 68, a secret 1950 document, the National Security Council proposed reinforcing pro-Western alliance systems and quadrupling spending on defense.[31] Truman, under the influence of advisor Paul Nitze, saw containment as implying complete rollback of Soviet influence in all its forms.[101]
United States officials moved to expand this version of containment into Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in order to counter revolutionary nationalist movements, often led by communist parties financed by the USSR.[102] In this way, this US would exercise "preponderant power," oppose neutrality, and establish globalhegemony.[101] In the early 1950s (a period sometimes known as the "Pactomania"), the US formalized a series of alliances with Japan (a former WWII enemy), South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines (notably ANZUS in 1951 and SEATO in 1954), thereby guaranteeing the United States a number of long-term military bases.[84]
One of the more significant examples of the implementation of containment was the United Nations US-led intervention in the Korean War. In June 1950, after years of mutual hostilities,[D][103][104]Kim Il Sung's North Korean People's ArmyinvadedSouth Korea at the 38th parallel. Stalin had been reluctant to support the invasion[E] but ultimately sent advisers.[105] To Stalin's surprise,[31] the United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 and 83 backed the defense of South Korea, although the Soviets were then boycotting meetings in protest of the fact that Taiwan (Republic of China), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat on the council.[106] A UN force of sixteen countries faced North Korea,[107] although 40 percent of troops were South Korean, and about 50 percent were from the United States.[108]
US Marines engaged in street fighting during the liberation of Seoul, September 1950
The US initially seemed to follow containment when it first entered the war. This directed the US's action to only push back North Korea across the 38th Parallel and restore South Korea's sovereignty while allowing North Korea's survival as a state. However, the success of the Inchon landing inspired the US/UN forces to pursue a rollback strategy instead and to overthrow communist North Korea, thereby allowing nationwide elections under U.N. auspices.[109] General Douglas MacArthur then advanced across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The Chinese, fearful of a possible US invasion, sent in a large army and defeated the U.N. forces, pushing them back below the 38th parallel. Truman publicly hinted that he might use his "ace in the hole" of the atomic bomb, but Mao was unmoved.[110] The episode was used to support the wisdom of the containment doctrine as opposed to rollback. The Communists were later pushed to roughly around the original border, with minimal changes. Among other effects, the Korean War galvanised NATO to develop a military structure.[111] Public opinion in countries involved, such as Great Britain, was divided for and against the war.[112]
After the Korean Armistice Agreement was approved in July 1953, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung created a highly centralized, totalitarian dictatorship that accorded his family unlimited power while generating a pervasive cult of personality.[113][114] In the South, the American-backed dictator Syngman Rhee ran an authoritarian regime that engaged in anti-communist mass killings.[115] While Rhee was overthrown in 1960, South Korea continued to be ruled by a military government of former Japanese collaborators until the re-establishment of a multi-party system in the late 1980s. Subsequently, South Korea experienced an economic boom and became one of the most advanced countries on the planet.[116]
NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strengths in Europe in 1959
In 1953, changes in political leadership on both sides shifted the dynamic of the Cold War.[40]Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated president that January. During the last 18months of the Truman administration, the American defense budget had quadrupled, and Eisenhower moved to reduce military spending by a third while continuing to fight the Cold War effectively.[31]
Joseph Stalin died in 1953. Without a mutually agreeable successor, the highest Communist Party officials initially opted to rule the Soviet Union jointly through a troika headed by Georgy Malenkov. This did not last, however, and Nikita Khrushchev eventually won the ensuing power struggle by the mid-1950s. In 1956, he denounced Joseph Stalin and proceeded to ease controls over the party and society. This was known as de-Stalinization.[40]
On 18 November 1956, while addressing Western dignitaries at a reception in Moscow's Polish embassy, Khrushchev infamously declared, "Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you", shocking everyone present.[117] He would later claim he had not been referring to nuclear war, but the "historically fated victory of communism over capitalism."[118] In 1961, Khrushchev boasted that, even if the Soviet Union was currently behind the West, its housing shortage would disappear within ten years, consumer goods would be made abundant, and the "construction of a communist society" would be completed "in the main" within no more than two decades.[119]
Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, initiated a "New Look" for the containment strategy, calling for a greater reliance on nuclear weapons against US enemies in wartime.[40] Dulles also enunciated the doctrine of "massive retaliation", threatening a severe US response to any Soviet aggression. Possessing nuclear superiority, for example, allowed Eisenhower to face down Soviet threats to intervene in the Middle East during the 1956 Suez Crisis.[31] The declassified US plans for retaliatory nuclear strikes in the late 1950s included the "systematic destruction" of 1,200 major urban centers in the Soviet Bloc and China, including Moscow, East Berlin and Beijing.[120][121]
In spite of these events, there were substantial hopes for détente when an upswing in diplomacy took place in 1959, including a two-week visit by Khrushchev to the US, and plans for a two-power summit for May 1960. The latter was disturbed by the U-2 spy plane scandal, however, in which Eisenhower was caught lying about the intrusion of American surveillance aircraft into Soviet territory.[122][123]
While Stalin's death in 1953 slightly relaxed tensions, the situation in Europe remained an uneasy armed truce.[124] The Soviets, who had already created a network of mutual assistance treaties in the Eastern Bloc by 1949, established a formal alliance therein, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955. It stood opposed to NATO.[84]
Hungarian flag (1949–1956) with the communist coat of arms cut out was an anti-Soviet revolutionary symbol
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 occurred shortly after Khrushchev arranged the removal of Hungary's Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi.[125] In response to a popular anti-communist uprising,[F] the new regime formally disbanded the secret police, declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and pledged to re-establish free elections. The Soviet Army invaded.[126] Thousands of Hungarians were killed and arrested, imprisoned and deported to the Soviet Union,[127] and approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary in the chaos.[128] Hungarian leader Imre Nagy and others were executed following secret trials.[129]
From 1957 through 1961, Khrushchev openly and repeatedly threatened the West with nuclear annihilation. He claimed that Soviet missile capabilities were far superior to those of the United States, capable of wiping out any American or European city. According to John Lewis Gaddis, Khrushchev rejected Stalin's "belief in the inevitability of war," however. The new leader declared his ultimate goal was "peaceful coexistence".[130] In Khrushchev's formulation, peace would allow capitalism to collapse on its own,[131] as well as giving the Soviets time to boost their military capabilities,[132] which remained for decades until Gorbachev's later "new thinking" envisioning peaceful coexistence as an end in itself rather than a form of class struggle.[133]
The events in Hungary produced ideological fractures within the communist parties of the world, particularly in Western Europe, with great decline in membership, as many in both western and socialist countries felt disillusioned by the brutal Soviet response.[134] The communist parties in the West would never recover from the effect the Hungarian Revolution had on their membership, a fact that was immediately recognized by some, such as the Yugoslavian politician Milovan Đilas who shortly after the revolution was crushed said that "The wound which the Hungarian Revolution inflicted on communism can never be completely healed".[134]
In 1957, Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki proposed the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear free zone in central Europe. Public opinion tended to be favourable in the West, but it was rejected by leaders of West Germany, Britain, France and the United States. They feared it would leave the powerful conventional armies of the Warsaw Pact dominant over the weaker NATO armies.[135]
During November 1958, Khrushchev made an unsuccessful attempt to turn all of Berlin into an independent, demilitarized "free city". He gave the United States, Great Britain and France a six-month ultimatum to withdraw their troops from the sectors of West Berlin, or he would transfer control of Western access rights to the East Germans. Khrushchev earlier explained to Mao Zedong that "Berlin is the testicles of the West. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin."[136] NATO formally rejected the ultimatum in mid-December and Khrushchev withdrew it in return for a Geneva conference on the German question.[137]
John F. Kennedy's foreign policy was dominated by American confrontations with the Soviet Union, manifested by proxy contests. Like Truman and Eisenhower, Kennedy supported containment to stop the spread of Communism. President Eisenhower's New Look policy had emphasized the use of less expensive nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression by threatening massive nuclear attacks on all of the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were much cheaper than maintaining a large standing army, so Eisenhower cut conventional forces to save money. Kennedy implemented a new strategy known as flexible response. This strategy relied on conventional arms to achieve limited goals. As part of this policy, Kennedy expanded the United States special operations forces, elite military units that could fight unconventionally in various conflicts. Kennedy hoped that the flexible response strategy would allow the US to counter Soviet influence without resorting to nuclear war.[138]
To support his new strategy, Kennedy ordered a massive increase in defense spending. He sought, and Congress provided, a rapid build-up of the nuclear arsenal to restore the lost superiority over the Soviet Union—he claimed in 1960 that Eisenhower had lost it because of excessive concern with budget deficits. In his inaugural address, Kennedy promised "to bear any burden" in the defense of liberty, and he repeatedly asked for increases in military spending and authorization of new weapons systems. From 1961 to 1964, the number of nuclear weapons increased by 50 percent, as did the number of B-52 bombers to deliver them. The new ICBM force grew from 63 intercontinental ballistic missiles to 424. He authorized 23 new Polaris submarines, each of which carried 16 nuclear missiles. Kennedy also called on cities to construct fallout shelters.[139][140]
European colonial empires in Asia and Africa all collapsed in the years after 1945.
Nationalist movements in some countries and regions, notably Guatemala, Indonesia and Indochina, were often allied with communist groups or otherwise perceived to be unfriendly to Western interests.[40] In this context, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly competed for influence by proxy in the Third World as decolonization gained momentum in the 1950s and early 1960s.[141] Both sides were selling armaments to gain influence.[142] The Kremlin saw continuing territorial losses by imperial powers as presaging the eventual victory of their ideology.[143]
The United States used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undermine neutral or hostile Third World governments and to support allied ones.[144] In 1953, President Eisenhower implemented Operation Ajax, a covert coup operation to overthrow the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The popularly elected Mosaddegh had been a Middle Eastern nemesis of Britain since nationalizing the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Winston Churchill told the United States that Mosaddegh was "increasingly turning towards Communist influence."[145][146] The pro-Western shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, assumed control as an autocratic monarch.[147] The shah's policies included banning the communist Tudeh Party of Iran, and general suppression of political dissent by SAVAK, the shah's domestic security and intelligence agency.
The non-aligned Indonesian government of Sukarno was faced with a major threat to its legitimacy beginning in 1956 when several regional commanders began to demand autonomy from Jakarta. After mediation failed, Sukarno took action to remove the dissident commanders. In February 1958, dissident military commanders in Central Sumatra (Colonel Ahmad Husein) and North Sulawesi (Colonel Ventje Sumual) declared the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Permesta Movement aimed at overthrowing the Sukarno regime. They were joined by many civilian politicians from the Masyumi Party, such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were opposed to the growing influence of the communist Partai Komunis Indonesia. Due to their anti-communist rhetoric, the rebels received arms, funding, and other covert aid from the CIA until Allen Lawrence Pope, an American pilot, was shot down after a bombing raid on government-held Ambon in April 1958. The central government responded by launching airborne and seaborne military invasions of rebel strongholds at Padang and Manado. By the end of 1958, the rebels were militarily defeated, and the last remaining rebel guerilla bands surrendered by August 1961.[150]
In the Republic of the Congo, also known as Congo-Léopoldville, newly independent from Belgium since June 1960, the Congo Crisis erupted on 5 July leading to the secession of the regions Katanga and South Kasai. CIA-backed President Joseph Kasa-Vubu ordered the dismissal of the democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the Lumumba cabinet in September over massacres by the armed forces during the invasion of South Kasai and for involving Soviets in the country.[151][152] Later the CIA-backed Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko quickly mobilized his forces to seize power through a military coup d'état, [152] and worked with Western intelligence agencies to imprison Lumumba and hand him over to Katangan authorities who executed him by firing squad.[153][154]
In British Guiana, the leftist People's Progressive Party (PPP) candidate Cheddi Jagan won the position of chief minister in a colonially administered election in 1953 but was quickly forced to resign from power after Britain's suspension of the still-dependent nation's constitution.[155] Embarrassed by the landslide electoral victory of Jagan's allegedly Marxist party, the British imprisoned the PPP's leadership and maneuvered the organization into a divisive rupture in 1955, engineering a split between Jagan and his PPP colleagues.[156] Jagan again won the colonial elections in 1957 and 1961, despite Britain's shift to a reconsideration of its view of the left-wing Jagan as a Soviet-style communist at this time. The United States pressured the British to withhold Guyana's independence until an alternative to Jagan could be identified, supported, and brought into office.[157]
Worn down by the communist guerrilla war for Vietnamese independence and handed a watershed defeat by communist Viet Minh rebels at the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the French accepted a negotiated abandonment of their colonial stake in Vietnam. In the Geneva Conference, peace accords were signed, leaving Vietnam divided between a pro-Soviet administration in North Vietnam and a pro-Western administration in South Vietnam at the 17th parallel north. Between 1954 and 1961, Eisenhower's United States sent economic aid and military advisers to strengthen South Vietnam's pro-Western government against communist efforts to destabilize it.[31]
Many emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America rejected the pressure to choose sides in the East–West competition. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, dozens of Third World governments resolved to stay out of the Cold War.[158] The consensus reached at Bandung culminated with the creation of the Belgrade-headquartered Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.[40] Meanwhile, Khrushchev broadened Moscow's policy to establish ties with India and other key neutral states. Independence movements in the Third World transformed the post-war order into a more pluralistic world of decolonized African and Middle Eastern nations and of rising nationalism in Asia and Latin America.[31]
Map showing greatest territorial extent of the Soviet Union and the states that it dominated politically, economically and militarily in 1960, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 but before the official Sino-Soviet split of 1961 (total area: c. 35,000,000 km )A map showing the relations of Marxist–Leninist states after the Sino-Soviet split, as of 1980:
After 1956, the Sino-Soviet alliance began to break down. Mao had defended Stalin when Khrushchev criticized him in 1956 and treated the new Soviet leader as a superficial upstart, accusing him of having lost his revolutionary edge.[159] For his part, Khrushchev, disturbed by Mao's glib attitude toward nuclear war, referred to the Chinese leader as a "lunatic on a throne".[160]
After this, Khrushchev made many desperate attempts to reconstitute the Sino-Soviet alliance, but Mao considered it useless and denied any proposal.[159] The Chinese-Soviet animosity spilled out in an intra-communist propaganda war.[161] Further on, the Soviets focused on a bitter rivalry with Mao's China for leadership of the global communist movement.[162] Historian Lorenz M. Lüthi argues:
The Sino-Soviet split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second[clarification needed] Vietnam War, and Sino-American rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework for the Cold War period 1979–1985 in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War in particular.[163]
Clockwise from top left: Sputnik 1, Apollo 11 Moon landing, Space station Mir
On the nuclear weapons front, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued nuclear rearmament and developed long-range weapons with which they could strike the territory of the other.[84] In August 1957, the Soviets successfully launched the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),[164] and in October they launched the first Earth satellite, Sputnik 1.[165] This led to what became known as the Sputnik crisis. The Central Intelligence Agency described the orbit of Sputnik 1 as a "stupendous scientific achievement" and concluded that the USSR had likely perfected an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching 'any desired target with accuracy'.[166]
The launch of Sputnik inaugurated the Space Race. This led to a series of historic space exploration milestones, and most notably the ApolloMoon landings from 1969 by the United States, which astronaut Frank Borman later described as "just a battle in the Cold War."[167] The public's reaction in the Soviet Union was mixed. The Soviet government limited the release of information about the lunar landing, which affected the reaction. A portion of the populace did not give it any attention, and another portion was angered by it.[168] A major Cold War element of the Space Race was satellite reconnaissance, as well as signals intelligence to gauge which aspects of the space programs had military capabilities.[169] The Soviet Salyut programme, conducted in the 1970s and 80s, put a manned space station in long term orbit; two of the successful installations to the station were covers for secret military Almaz reconnaissance stations: Salyut 3, and Salyut 5.[170][171][172][173]
During the whole duration of the cold war, the US and the USSR represented the largest and dominant space powers of the world.[174] Despite their fierce competition, both nations signed international space treaties in the 1960s which would limit the militarization of space.[175]
In Cuba, the 26th of July Movement, led by young revolutionaries Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, seized power in the Cuban Revolution on 1 January 1959, toppling President Fulgencio Batista, whose unpopular regime had been denied arms by the Eisenhower administration.[178] Although Fidel Castro's first refused to categorize his new government as socialist and repeatedly denying being a communist, Castro appointed Marxists to senior government and military positions. Most significantly, Che Guevara became Governor of the Central Bank and then Minister of Industries.[179][180][181]
Diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States continued for some time after Batista's fall, but President Eisenhower deliberately left the capital to avoid meeting Castro during the latter's trip to Washington, D.C. in April, leaving Vice President Richard Nixon to conduct the meeting in his place.[182] Cuba began negotiating for arms purchases from the Eastern Bloc in March 1960.[183] The same month, Eisenhower gave approval to CIA plans and funding to overthrow Castro.[184]
In January 1961, just prior to leaving office, Eisenhower formally severed relations with the Cuban government. That April, the administration of newly elected American President John F. Kennedy mounted the unsuccessful CIA-organized ship-borne invasion of the island by Cuban exiles at Playa Girón and Playa Larga in Santa Clara Province—a failure that publicly humiliated the United States.[185] Castro responded by publicly embracing Marxism–Leninism, and the Soviet Union pledged to provide further support.[185] In December, the US government began a violent campaign of terrorist attacks against civilians in Cuba, and covert operations and sabotage against the administration, in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government.[190]
The emigration resulted in a massive "brain drain" from East Germany to West Germany of younger educated professionals, such that nearly 20% of East Germany's population had migrated to West Germany by 1961.[194] That June, the Soviet Union issued a new ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Berlin.[195] The request was rebuffed, but the United States now limited its security guarantees to West Berlin.[196] On 13 August, East Germany erected a barbed-wire barrier that would eventually be expanded through construction into the Berlin Wall, effectively closing the loophole and preventing its citizens from fleeing to the West.[197]
Aerial photograph of a Soviet missile site in Cuba, taken by a US spy aircraft, 1 November 1962
The Kennedy administration continued seeking ways to oust Castro following the Bay of Pigs invasion, experimenting with various ways of covertly facilitating the overthrow of the Cuban government. Significant hopes were pinned on the program of terrorist attacks and other destabilization operations known as Operation Mongoose, that was devised under the Kennedy administration in 1961. Khrushchev learned of the project in February 1962,[198] and preparations to install Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were undertaken in response.[198]
Alarmed, Kennedy considered various reactions. He ultimately responded to the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba with a naval blockade, and he presented an ultimatum to the Soviets. Khrushchev backed down from a confrontation, and the Soviet Union removed the missiles in return for a public American pledge not to invade Cuba again as well as a covert deal to remove US missiles from Turkey.[199] Castro later admitted that "I would have agreed to the use of nuclear weapons. ... we took it for granted that it would become a nuclear war anyway, and that we were going to disappear."[200]
The Cuban Missile Crisis (October–November 1962) brought the world closer to nuclear war than ever before.[201] The aftermath led to efforts in the nuclear arms race at nuclear disarmament and improving relations, although the Cold War's first arms control agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, had come into force in 1961.[J]
The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started. In 1964, Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues managed to oust him, but allowed him a peaceful retirement.[202] He was accused of rudeness and incompetence, and John Lewis Gaddis argues that he was also blamed with ruining Soviet agriculture, bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war, and becoming an "international embarrassment" when he authorized construction of the Berlin Wall.[203] According to Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation".[204][205]
In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Cold War participants struggled to adjust to a new, more complicated pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer divided into two clearly opposed blocs.[40] From the beginning of the post-war period, with American help Western Europe and Japan rapidly recovered from the destruction of World War II and sustained strong economic growth through the 1950s and 1960s, with per capita GDPs approaching those of the United States, while Eastern Bloc economies stagnated.[40][206]
The Vietnam War descended into a quagmire for the United States, leading to a decline in international prestige and economic stability, derailing arms agreements, and provoking domestic unrest. America's withdrawal from the war led it to embrace a policy of détente with both China and the Soviet Union.[207]
In the 1973 oil crisis, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut their petroleum output. This raised oil prices and hurt Western economies, but helped the Soviet Union by generating a huge flow of money from its oil sales.[208]
As a result of the oil crisis, combined with the growing influence of Third World alignments such as OPEC and the Non-Aligned Movement, less powerful countries had more room to assert their independence and often showed themselves resistant to pressure from either superpower.[102] Meanwhile, Moscow was forced to turn its attention inward to deal with the Soviet Union's deep-seated domestic economic problems.[40] During this period, Soviet leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin embraced the notion of détente.[40]
Under President John F. Kennedy, US troop levels in Vietnam grew under the Military Assistance Advisory Group program from just under a thousand in 1959 to 16,000 in 1963.[209][210] South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's heavy-handed crackdown on Buddhist monks in 1963 led the US to endorse a deadly military coup against Diem.[211] The war escalated further in 1964 following the controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which a US destroyer was alleged to have clashed with North Vietnamese fast attack craft. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Lyndon B. Johnson broad authorization to increase US military presence, deploying ground combat units for the first time and increasing troop levels to 184,000.[212] Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev responded by reversing Khrushchev's policy of disengagement and increasing aid to the North Vietnamese, hoping to entice the North from its pro-Chinese position. The USSR discouraged further escalation of the war, however, providing just enough military assistance to tie up American forces.[213] From this point, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), also known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), engaged in more conventional warfare with US and South Vietnamese forces.[214]
The Tet Offensive of 1968 proved to be the turning point of the war. Despite years of American tutelage and aid, the South Vietnamese forces were unable to withstand the communist offensive and the task fell to US forces instead. Tet showed that the end of US involvement was not in sight, increasing domestic skepticism of the war and giving rise to what was referred to as the Vietnam syndrome, a public aversion to American overseas military involvements. Nonetheless, operations continued to cross international boundaries: bordering areas of Laos and Cambodia were used by North Vietnam as supply routes, and were heavily bombed by US forces.[215]
At the same time, in 1963–1965, American domestic politics saw the triumph of liberalism. According to historian Joseph Crespino:
It has become a staple of twentieth-century historiography that Cold War concerns were at the root of a number of progressive political accomplishments in the postwar period: a high progressive marginal tax rate that helped fund the arms race and contributed to broad income equality; bipartisan support for far-reaching civil rights legislation that transformed politics and society in the American South, which had long given the lie to America's egalitarian ethos; bipartisan support for overturning an explicitly racist immigration system that had been in place since the 1920s; and free health care for the elderly and the poor, a partial fulfillment of one of the unaccomplished goals of the New Deal era. The list could go on.[216]
Nuclear testing and Use of Outer-Space treaties
The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed on August 5, 1963, by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and over 100 other nations. This treaty banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, restricting such tests to underground environments.[217][218][219][220] The treaty followed heightened concerns over the militarization of space, amplified by the United States' Starfish Prime test in 1962, which involved the detonation of a nuclear device in the upper atmosphere. This event generated significant electromagnetic effects and illuminated the potential for space-based weaponry, prompting international calls for regulation.[221][222]
To further delineate the peaceful use of outer space, the United Nations facilitated the drafting of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. Signed on January 27, 1967, by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, it entered into force on October 10, 1967. The treaty established space as a domain to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies.[223][224][225]
In answer to the Prague Spring, on 20 August 1968, the Soviet Army, together with most of their Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia.[229] The invasion was followed by a wave of emigration, including an estimated 70,000 Czechs and Slovaks initially fleeing, with the total eventually reaching 300,000.[230][231] The invasion sparked intense protests from Yugoslavia, Romania, China, and from Western European countries.[232]
Although indirect conflict between Cold War powers continued through the late 1960s and early 1970s, tensions were beginning to ease.[235] Following the ousting of Khrushchev, another period of collective leadership ensued, consisting of Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary, Alexei Kosygin as Premier and Nikolai Podgorny as Chairman of the Presidium, lasting until Brezhnev established himself in the early 1970s as the preeminent Soviet leader.
Following his visit to China, Nixon met with Soviet leaders in Moscow.[236] These Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resulted in landmark arms control treaties. These aimed to limit the development of costly anti-ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles.[40]
Nixon and Brezhnev proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence" and established the groundbreaking new policy of détente (or cooperation) between the superpowers. Meanwhile, Brezhnev attempted to revive the Soviet economy, which was declining in part because of heavy military expenditures. The Soviet Union's military budget in the 1970s was massive, 40–60% of the federal budget and 15% of GDP.[237] Between 1972 and 1974, the two sides also agreed to strengthen their economic ties,[31] including agreements for increased trade. As a result of their meetings, détente would replace the hostility of the Cold War and the two countries would live mutually.[238] These developments coincided with Bonn's "Ostpolitik" policy formulated by the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,[232] an effort to normalize relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe. Other agreements were concluded to stabilize the situation in Europe, culminating in the Helsinki Accords signed at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975.[239]
The Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviets promised to grant free elections in Europe, has been called a major concession to ensure peace by the Soviets. In practice, the Soviet government significantly curbed the rule of law, civil liberties, protection of law and guarantees of property,[240][241] which were considered examples of "bourgeois morality" by Soviet legal theorists such as Andrey Vyshinsky.[242] The Soviet Union signed legally-binding human rights documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1973 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975, but they were neither widely known or accessible to people living under Communist rule, nor were they taken seriously by the Communist authorities.[243] Human rights activists in the Soviet Union were regularly subjected to harassment, repressions and arrests.
The pro-Soviet American business magnate Armand Hammer of Occidental Petroleum often mediated trade relations. Author Daniel Yergin, in his book The Prize, writes that Hammer "ended up as a go-between for five Soviet General Secretaries and seven U.S. Presidents."[244] Hammer had extensive business relationship in the Soviet Union stretching back to the 1920s with Lenin's approval.[245][246] According to Christian Science Monitor in 1980, "although his business dealings with the Soviet Union were cut short when Stalin came to power, he had more or less single-handedly laid the groundwork for the [1980] state of Western trade with the Soviet Union."[245] In 1974, Brezhnev "publicly recognized Hammer's role in facilitating East-West trade." By 1981, according to the New York Times in that year, Hammer was on a "first-name basis with Leonid Brezhnev."[246]
Kissinger and Nixon were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities.[247] Instead of a Cold War they wanted peace, trade and cultural exchanges. They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead, Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive, and neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.[248]
In the 1970s, the KGB, led by Yuri Andropov, continued to persecute distinguished Soviet dissidents, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who were criticising the Soviet leadership in harsh terms.[249] Indirect conflict between the superpowers continued through this period of détente in the Third World, particularly during political crises in the Middle East, Chile, Ethiopia, and Angola.[250]
In 1973, Nixon announced his administration was committed to seeking most favored nation trade status with the USSR,[251] which was challenged by Congress in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.[252] The United States had long linked trade with the Soviet Union to its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and, especially since the early 1980s, to Soviet human rights policies. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which was attached to the 1974 Trade Act, linked the granting of most-favored-nation to the USSR to the right of persecuted Soviet Jews to emigrate. Because the Soviet Union refused the right of emigration to Jewish refuseniks, the ability of the President to apply most-favored nation trade status to the Soviet Union was restricted.[253]
Protest in Amsterdam against the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, 1981
The period in the late 1970s and early 1980s showed an intensive reawakening of Cold War tensions and conflicts. Tensions greatly increased between the major powers with both sides becoming more militant.[255]Diggins says, "Reagan went all out to fight the second cold war, by supporting counterinsurgencies in the third world."[256]Cox says, "The intensity of this 'second' Cold War was as great as its duration was short."[257]
In April 1978, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in the Saur Revolution. Within months, opponents of the communist regime launched an uprising in eastern Afghanistan that quickly expanded into a civil war waged by guerrilla mujahideen against government forces countrywide.[258] The Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen insurgents received military training and weapons in neighboring Pakistan and China,[259][260] while the Soviet Union sent thousands of military advisers to support the PDPA government.[258] Meanwhile, increasing friction between the competing factions of the PDPA—the dominant Khalq and the more moderate Parcham—resulted in the dismissal of Parchami cabinet members and the arrest of Parchami military officers under the pretext of a Parchami coup. By mid-1979, the United States had started a covert program to assist the mujahideen.[261][262]
In September 1979, Khalqist President Nur Muhammad Taraki was assassinated in a coup within the PDPA orchestrated by fellow Khalq member Hafizullah Amin, who assumed the presidency. Distrusted by the Soviets, Amin was assassinated by Soviet special forces during Operation Storm-333 in December 1979. Afghan forces suffered losses during the Soviet operation; 30 Afghan palace guards and over 300 army guards were killed while another 150 were captured.[263] Two of Amin's sons, an 11-year-old and a 9-year-old, died from shrapnel wounds sustained during the clashes.[264] In the aftermath of the operation, a total of 1,700 Afghan soldiers who surrendered to Soviet forces were taken as prisoners,[265] and the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, the leader of the PDPA's Parcham faction, as Amin's successor. Veterans of the Soviet Union's Alpha Group have stated that Operation Storm-333 was one of the most successful in the unit's history. Documents released following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s revealed that the Soviet leadership believed Amin had secret contacts within the American embassy in Kabul and "was capable of reaching an agreement with the United States";[266] however, allegations of Amin colluding with the Americans have been widely discredited.[267][K][L] The PDBA was tasked to fill the vacuum and carried out a purge of Amin supporters. Soviet troops were deployed to put Afghanistan under Soviet control with Karmal in more substantial numbers, although the Soviet government did not expect to do most of the fighting in Afghanistan. As a result, however, the Soviets were now directly involved in what had been a domestic war in Afghanistan.[268]
President Reagan publicizes his support by meeting with Afghan mujahideen leaders in the White House, 1983.
Carter responded to the Soviet invasion by withdrawing the SALT II treaty from ratification, imposing embargoes on grain and technology shipments to the USSR, and demanding a significant increase in military spending, and further announced the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, which was joined by 65 other nations.[269][270][271] He described the Soviet incursion as "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War".[272]
President Reagan with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during a working luncheon at Camp David, December 1984The world map of military alliances in 1980
In January 1977, four years prior to becoming president, Ronald Reagan bluntly stated, in a conversation with Richard V. Allen, his basic expectation in relation to the Cold War. "My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic," he said. "It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?"[273] In 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election, vowing to increase military spending and confront the Soviets everywhere.[274] Both Reagan and new British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher denounced the Soviet Union and its ideology. Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and predicted that Communism would be left on the "ash heap of history," while Thatcher inculpated the Soviets as "bent on world dominance."[275] In 1982, Reagan tried to cut off Moscow's access to hard currency by impeding its proposed gas line to Western Europe. It hurt the Soviet economy, but it also caused ill will among American allies in Europe who counted on that revenue. Reagan retreated on this issue.[276][277]
By early 1985, Reagan's anti-communist position had developed into a stance known as the new Reagan Doctrine—which, in addition to containment, formulated an additional right to subvert existing communist governments.[278] Besides continuing Carter's policy of supporting the Islamic opponents of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-backed PDPA government in Afghanistan, the CIA also sought to weaken the Soviet Union itself by promoting Islamism in the majority-Muslim Central Asian Soviet Union.[279] Additionally, the CIA encouraged anti-communist Pakistan's ISI to train Muslims from around the world to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union.[279]
Pope John Paul II provided a moral focus for anti-communism; a visit to his native Poland in 1979 stimulated a religious and nationalist resurgence centered on the Solidarity movement trade union that galvanized opposition, and may have led to his attempted assassination two years later.[280][281][282] In December 1981, Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski reacted to the crisis by imposing a period of martial law. Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Poland in response.[283]Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's top ideologist, advised Soviet leaders not to intervene if Poland fell under the control of Solidarity, for fear it might lead to heavy economic sanctions, resulting in a catastrophe for the Soviet economy.[283]
US and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, 1945–2006
The Soviet Union had built up a military that consumed as much as 25percent of its gross national product at the expense of consumer goods and investment in civilian sectors.[284] Soviet spending on the arms race and other Cold War commitments both caused and exacerbated deep-seated structural problems in the Soviet system,[285] which experienced at least a decade of economic stagnation during the late Brezhnev years.
Soviet investment in the defense sector was not driven by military necessity but in large part by the interests of the nomenklatura, which was dependent on the sector for their own power and privileges.[286] The Soviet Armed Forces became the largest in the world in terms of the numbers and types of weapons they possessed, in the number of troops in their ranks, and in the sheer size of their military–industrial base.[287] However, the quantitative advantages held by the Soviet military often concealed areas where the Eastern Bloc dramatically lagged behind the West.[288] For example, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated how the armor, fire control systems, and firing range of the Soviet Union's most common main battle tank, the T-72, were drastically inferior to the American M1 Abrams, yet the USSR fielded almost three times as many T-72s as the US deployed M1s.[289]
By the early 1980s, the USSR had built up a military arsenal and army surpassing that of the United States. Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter began massively building up the United States military. This buildup was accelerated by the Reagan administration, which increased the military spending from 5.3 percent of GNP in 1981 to 6.5 percent in 1986,[290] the largest peacetime defense buildup in United States history.[291] The American-Soviet tensions present during 1983 was defined by some as the start of "Cold War II". While in retrospective this phase of the Cold War was generally defined as a "war of words",[292] the Soviet's "peace offensive" was largely rejected by the West.[293]
Tensions continued to intensify as Reagan revived the B-1 Lancer program, which had been canceled by the Carter administration,[294] produced LGM-118 Peacekeeper missiles,[295] installed US cruise missiles in Europe, and announced the experimental Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, a defense program to shoot down missiles in mid-flight.[296] The Soviets deployed RSD-10 Pioneerballistic missiles targeting Western Europe, and NATO decided, under the impetus of the Carter presidency, to deploy MGM-31 Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, primarily West Germany.[297] This deployment placed missiles just 10minutes' striking distance from Moscow.[298]
After Reagan's military buildup, the Soviet Union did not respond by further building its military,[299] because the enormous military expenses, along with inefficient planned manufacturing and collectivized agriculture, were already a heavy burden for the Soviet economy.[300] At the same time, Saudi Arabia increased oil production,[301] even as other non-OPEC nations were increasing production.[M] These developments contributed to the 1980s oil glut, which affected the Soviet Union as oil was the main source of Soviet export revenues.[284] Issues with command economics,[302] oil price decreases and large military expenditures gradually brought the Soviet economy to stagnation.[301]
After ten-year-old American Samantha Smith wrote a letter to Yuri Andropov expressing her fear of nuclear war, Andropov invited Smith to the Soviet Union.
On 1 September 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747 with 269 people aboard, including sitting Congressman Larry McDonald, an action which Reagan characterized as a massacre. The airliner was en route from Anchorage to Seoul but owing to a navigational mistake made by the crew, it drifted from its original planned route and flew through Russian prohibited airspace past the west coast of Sakhalin Island near Moneron Island. The Soviet Air Force treated the unidentified aircraft as an intruding U.S. spy plane and destroyed it with air-to-air missiles. The Soviet Union found the wreckage under the sea two weeks later on 15 September and found the flight recorders in October, but this information was kept secret by the Soviet authorities until after the country's collapse.[303] The incident increased support for military deployment, overseen by Reagan, which stood in place until the later accords between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.[304] During the early hours of 26 September 1983, the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident occurred; systems in Serpukhov-15 underwent a glitch that claimed several intercontinental ballistic missiles were heading towards Russia, but officer Stanislav Petrov correctly suspected it was a false alarm, ensuring the Soviets did not respond to the non-existent attack.[305] As such, he has been credited as "the man who saved the world".[306] The Able Archer 83 exercise in November 1983, a realistic simulation of a coordinated NATO nuclear release, was perhaps the most dangerous moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the Soviet leadership feared that a nuclear attack might be imminent.[307]
American domestic public concerns about intervening in foreign conflicts persisted from the end of the Vietnam War.[308] The Reagan administration emphasized the use of quick, low-cost counterinsurgency tactics to intervene in foreign conflicts.[308] In 1983, the Reagan administration intervened in the multisided Lebanese Civil War, invaded Grenada, bombed Libya and backed the Central American Contras, anti-communist paramilitaries seeking to overthrow the Soviet-aligned Sandinista government in Nicaragua.[102] While Reagan's interventions against Grenada and Libya were popular in the United States, his backing of the Contra rebels was mired in controversy.[309] The Reagan administration's backing of the military government of Guatemala during the Guatemalan Civil War, in particular the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt, was also controversial.[310]
Meanwhile, the Soviets incurred high costs for their own foreign interventions. Although Brezhnev was convinced in 1979 that the Soviet war in Afghanistan would be brief, Muslim guerrillas, aided by the US, China, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,[260] waged a fierce resistance against the invasion.[311] The Kremlin sent nearly 100,000 troops to support its puppet regime in Afghanistan, leading many outside observers to dub the war "the Soviets' Vietnam".[311] However, Moscow's quagmire in Afghanistan was far more disastrous for the Soviets than Vietnam had been for the Americans because the conflict coincided with a period of internal decay and domestic crisis in the Soviet system.
A senior US State Department official predicted such an outcome as early as 1980, positing that the invasion resulted in part from a:
...domestic crisis within the Soviet system. ... It may be that the thermodynamic law of entropyhas ... caught up with the Soviet system, which now seems to expend more energy on simply maintaining its equilibrium than on improving itself. We could be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay.[312]
By the time the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985,[275] the Soviet economy was stagnant and faced a sharp fall in foreign currency earnings as a result of the downward slide in oil prices in the 1980s.[313] These issues prompted Gorbachev to investigate measures to revive the ailing state.[313]
An ineffectual start led to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary, and in June 1987 Gorbachev announced an agenda of economic reform called perestroika, or restructuring.[314] Perestroika relaxed the production quota system, allowed cooperative ownership of small businesses and paved the way for foreign investment. These measures were intended to redirect the country's resources from costly Cold War military commitments to more productive areas in the civilian sector.[314]
Despite initial skepticism in the West, the new Soviet leader proved to be committed to reversing the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic condition instead of continuing the arms race with the West.[315] Partly as a way to fight off internal opposition from party cliques to his reforms, Gorbachev simultaneously introduced glasnost, or openness, which increased freedom of the press and the transparency of state institutions.[316]Glasnost was intended to reduce the corruption at the top of the Communist Party and moderate the abuse of power in the Central Committee.[317] Glasnost also enabled increased contact between Soviet citizens and the Western world, particularly with the United States, contributing to the accelerating détente between the two nations.[318]
The beginning of the 1990s brought a thaw in relations between the superpowers.
In response to the Kremlin's military and political concessions, Reagan agreed to renew talks on economic issues and the scaling-back of the arms race.[319] The first summit was held in November 1985 in Geneva, Switzerland.[319] A second summit was held in October 1986 in Reykjavík, Iceland. Talks went well until the focus shifted to Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which Gorbachev wanted to be eliminated. Reagan refused.[320] The negotiations failed, but the third summit (Washington Summit (1987), 8–10 December 1987) led to a breakthrough with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The INF treaty eliminated all nuclear-armed, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,420mi) and their infrastructure.[321]
During 1988, it became apparent to the Soviets that oil and gas subsidies, along with the cost of maintaining massive troops levels, represented a substantial economic drain.[322] In addition, the security advantage of a buffer zone was recognised as irrelevant and the Soviets officially declared that they would no longer intervene in the affairs of satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe.[323]George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev met at the Moscow Summit in May 1988 and the Governors Island Summit in December 1988.
Two developments dominated the decade that followed: the increasingly apparent crumbling of the Soviet Union's economic and political structures, and the patchwork attempts at reforms to reverse that process. Kenneth S. Deffeyes argued in Beyond Oil that the Reagan administration encouraged Saudi Arabia to lower the price of oil to the point where the Soviets could not make a profit selling their oil, and resulted in the depletion of the country's hard currency reserves.[329]
Brezhnev's next two successors, transitional figures with deep roots in his tradition, did not last long. Yuri Andropov was 68 years old and Konstantin Chernenko 72 when they assumed power; both died in less than two years. In an attempt to avoid a third short-lived leader, in 1985, the Soviets turned to the next generation and selected Mikhail Gorbachev. He made significant changes in the economy and party leadership, called perestroika. His policy of glasnost freed public access to information after decades of heavy government censorship. Gorbachev also moved to end the Cold War. In 1988, the USSR abandoned its war in Afghanistan and began to withdraw its forces. In the following year, Gorbachev refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet satellite states, which paved the way for the Revolutions of 1989. In particular, the standstill of the Soviet Union at the Pan-European Picnic in August 1989 then set a peaceful chain reaction in motion, at the end of which the Eastern Bloc collapsed. With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and with East and West Germany pursuing re-unification, the Iron Curtain between the West and Soviet-occupied regions came down.[330][331][332]
By 1989, the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse, and, deprived of Soviet military support, the communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power.[324] Grassroots organizations, such as Poland's Solidarity movement, rapidly gained ground with strong popular bases.
The Pan-European Picnic took place in August 1989 on the Hungarian-Austrian border.
The Pan-European Picnic in August 1989 in Hungary finally started a peaceful movement that the rulers in the Eastern Bloc could not stop. It was the largest movement of refugees from East Germany since the Berlin Wall was built in 1961 and ultimately brought about the fall of the Iron Curtain. The patrons of the picnic, Otto von Habsburg and the Hungarian Minister of State Imre Pozsgay, saw the planned event as an opportunity to test Mikhail Gorbachev's reaction. The Austrian branch of the Paneuropean Union, which was then headed by Karl von Habsburg, distributed thousands of brochures inviting the GDR holidaymakers in Hungary to a picnic near the border at Sopron. But with the mass exodus at the Pan-European Picnic the subsequent hesitant behavior of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany and the non-interference of the Soviet Union broke the dams. Now tens of thousands of media-informed East Germans made their way to Hungary, which was no longer willing to keep its borders completely closed or to oblige its border troops to use armed force. On the one hand, this caused disagreement among the Eastern European states and, on the other hand, it was clear to the Eastern European population that the governments no longer had absolute power.[330][331][332][333]
East German leader Erich Honecker lost control in August 1989.
In 1989, the communist governments in Poland and Hungary became the first to negotiate the organization of competitive elections. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, mass protests unseated entrenched communist leaders. The communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania also crumbled, in the latter case as the result of a violent uprising. Attitudes had changed enough that US Secretary of State James Baker suggested that the American government would not be opposed to Soviet intervention in Romania, on behalf of the opposition, to prevent bloodshed.[334]
The tidal wave of change culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which symbolized the collapse of European communist governments and graphically ended the Iron Curtain divide of Europe. The 1989 revolutionary wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe and peacefully overthrew all of the Soviet-style Marxist–Leninist states: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria;[335] Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently and execute its head of state.[336]
At the same time, the Soviet republics started legal moves towards potentially declaring sovereignty over their territories, citing the freedom to secede in Article 72 of the USSR constitution.[337] On 7 April 1990, a law was passed allowing a republic to secede if more than two-thirds of its residents voted for it in a referendum.[338] Many held their first free elections in the Soviet era for their own national legislatures in 1990. Many of these legislatures proceeded to produce legislation contradicting the Union laws in what was known as the 'War of Laws'. In 1989, the Russian SFSR convened a newly elected Congress of People's Deputies. Boris Yeltsin was elected its chairman. On 12 June 1990, the Congress declared Russia's sovereignty over its territory and proceeded to pass laws that attempted to supersede some of the Soviet laws. After a landslide victory of Sąjūdis in Lithuania, that country declared its independence restored on 11 March 1990, citing the illegality of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. Soviet forces attempted to halt the secession by crushing popular demonstrations in Lithuania (Bloody Sunday) and Latvia (The Barricades), as a result, numerous civilians were killed or wounded. However, these actions only bolstered international support for the secessionists.[339]
A referendum for the preservation of the USSR was held on 17 March 1991 in nine republics (the remainder having boycotted the vote), with the majority of the population in those republics voting for preservation of the Union in the form of a new federation. The referendum gave Gorbachev a minor boost. In the summer of 1991, the New Union Treaty, which would have turned the country into a much looser Union, was agreed upon by eight republics. The signing of the treaty, however, was interrupted by the August Coup—an attempted coup d'état by hardline members of the government and the KGB who sought to reverse Gorbachev's reforms and reassert the central government's control over the republics. After the coup collapsed, Russian president Yeltsin was seen as a hero for his decisive actions, while Gorbachev's power was effectively ended. The balance of power tipped significantly towards the republics. In August 1991, Latvia and Estonia immediately declared the restoration of their full independence (following Lithuania's 1990 example). Gorbachev resigned as general secretary in late August, and soon afterwards, the party's activities were indefinitely suspended—effectively ending its rule. By the fall, Gorbachev could no longer influence events outside Moscow, and he was being challenged even there by Yeltsin, who had been elected President of Russia in July 1991.
Later in August, Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the Communist party, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered the seizure of Soviet property. Gorbachev clung to power as the President of the Soviet Union until 25 December 1991, when the USSR dissolved.[340]Fifteen states emerged from the Soviet Union, with by far the largest and most populous one (which also was the founder of the Soviet state with the October Revolution in Petrograd), the Russian Federation, taking full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations, including the financial obligations. As such, Russia assumed the Soviet Union's UN membership and permanent membership on the Security Council, nuclear stockpile and the control over the armed forces; Soviet embassies abroad became Russian embassies.[13]
In his 1992 State of the Union Address, US President George H. W. Bush expressed his emotions: "The biggest thing that has happened in the world in my life, in our lives, is this: By the grace of God, America won the Cold War."[341] Bush and Yeltsin met in February 1992, declaring a new era of "friendship and partnership".[342] In January 1993, Bush and Yeltsin agreed to START II, which provided for further nuclear arms reductions on top of the original START treaty.[343]
Changes in national boundaries after the end of the Cold War
In summing up the international ramifications of these events, Vladislav Zubok stated: 'The collapse of the Soviet empire was an event of epochal geopolitical, military, ideological, and economic significance.'[344]
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia drastically cut military spending, and restructuring the economy left millions unemployed.[345] According to Western analysis, the neoliberal reforms in Russia culminated in a recession in the early 1990s more severe than the Great Depression as experienced by the United States and Germany.[346] Western analysts suggest that in the 25 years following the end of the Cold War, only five or six of the post-communist states are on a path to joining the rich and capitalist world while most are falling behind, some to such an extent that it will take several decades to catch up to where they were before the collapse of communism.[347][348]
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania consider themselves as revivals of the three independent countries that existed prior to their occupation and annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. They maintain that the process by which they were incorporated into the Soviet Union violated both international law and their own law, and that in 1990–1991 they were reasserting an independence that still legally existed.
Communist parties outside the Baltic states were not outlawed and their members were not prosecuted. Just a few places attempted to exclude members of communist secret services from decision-making. In some countries, the communist party changed its name and continued to function.[349]
Decommunization
Stephen Holmes of the University of Chicago argued in 1996 that decommunization, after a brief active period, quickly ended in near-universal failure. After the introduction of lustration, demand for scapegoats has become relatively low, and former communists have been elected for high governmental and other administrative positions. Holmes notes that the only real exception was former East Germany, where thousands of former Stasi informers have been fired from public positions.[350]
Holmes suggests the following reasons for the failure of decommunization:[350]
After 45–70 years of communist rule, nearly every family has members associated with the state. After the initial desire "to root out the reds" came a realization that massive punishment is wrong and finding only some guilty is hardly justice.
The urgency of the current economic problems of postcommunism makes the crimes of the communist past "old news" for many citizens.
Decommunization is believed to be a power game of elites.
The difficulty of dislodging the social elite makes it require a totalitarian state to disenfranchise the "enemies of the people" quickly and efficiently and a desire for normalcy overcomes the desire for punitive justice.
Very few people have a perfectly clean slate and so are available to fill the positions that require significant expertise.
Compared with the decommunization efforts of the other former constituents of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, decommunization in Russia has been restricted to half-measures, if conducted at all.[351] Notable anti-communist measures in the Russian Federation include the banning of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and the creation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) as well as changing the names of some Russian cities back to what they were before the 1917 October Revolution (Leningrad to Saint Petersburg, Sverdlovsk to Yekaterinburg and Gorky to Nizhny Novgorod),[352] though others were maintained, with Ulyanovsk (former Simbirsk), Tolyatti (former Stavropol) and Kirov (former Vyatka) being examples. Even though Leningrad and Sverdlovsk were renamed, regions that were named after them are still officially called Leningrad and Sverdlovsk oblasts.[353]
The Spasskaya Tower had kept its red star and did not restore the two-headed eagle present before communist takeover.
The Cold War had provided external stabilizing pressures. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had a vested interest in Yugoslavia’s stability, ensuring it remained a buffer state in the East-West divide. This resulted in financial and political support for its regime. When the Cold War ended, this external support evaporated, leaving Yugoslavia more vulnerable to internal divisions.[370][371]
As Yugoslavia fragmented, the wars began after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991. Serbia, under Slobodan Milošević, opposed these moves.[372]The Bosnian War (1992–1995) was the most brutal of the Yugoslav Wars, characterized by ethnic cleansing and genocide. International organizations, including the United Nations, struggled to manage the violence. NATO eventually intervened with airstrikes in Bosnia (1995) as part of Operation Deliberate Force and later in Kosovo (1999) as part of Operation allied force. These interventions marked the transition of NATO as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, to also functioning at the time as an active peacekeeping and conflict-resolution force.[373]
Influence
The Cold War continues to influence world affairs. The post-Cold War world is considered to be unipolar, with the United States the sole remaining superpower.[374][375] The Cold War defined the political role of the United States after World WarII—by 1989 the United States had military alliances with 50 countries, with 526,000 troops stationed abroad,[376] with 326,000 in Europe (two-thirds of which were in West Germany)[377] and 130,000 in Asia (mainly Japan and South Korea).[376] The Cold War also marked the zenith of peacetime military–industrial complexes, especially in the Soviet Union and the United States, and large-scale military funding of science.[378] These complexes, though their origins may be found as early as the 19th century, snowballed considerably during the Cold War.[379]
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has expanded eastwards into the former Warsaw Pact and parts of the former Soviet Union.
Cumulative US military expenditures throughout the entire Cold War amounted to an estimated $8trillion. Further nearly 100,000 Americans died in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.[380] Although Soviet casualties are difficult to estimate, as a share of gross national product the financial cost for the Soviet Union was much higher than that incurred by the United States.[381]
In addition to the loss of life by uniformed soldiers, millions died in the superpowers' proxy wars around the globe, most notably in eastern Asia.[382][N] Most of the proxy wars and subsidies for local conflicts ended along with the Cold War; interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, as well as refugee and displaced persons crises have declined sharply in the post-Cold War years.[383]
However, the aftermath of the Cold War is not considered to be concluded. Many of the economic and social tensions that were exploited to fuel Cold War competition in parts of the Third World remain acute. The breakdown of state control in a number of areas formerly ruled by communist governments produced new civil and ethnic conflicts, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. In Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of economic growth and an increase in the number of liberal democracies, while in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, independence was accompanied by state failure.[255]
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in propaganda designed to influence people around the world, especially using motion pictures.[384][pageneeded] The Cold War endures as a popular topic reflected in entertainment media, and continuing to the present with post-1991 Cold War-themed feature films, novels, television and web series, and other media. In 2013, a KGB-sleeper-agents-living-next-door action drama series, The Americans, set in the early 1980s, was ranked No. 6 on the Metacritic annual Best New TV Shows list; its six-season run concluded in May 2018.[385][386]
As soon as the term "Cold War" was popularized to refer to post-war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, interpreting the course and origins of the conflict has been a source of heated controversy among historians, political scientists, and journalists.[387] In particular, historians have sharply disagreed as to who was responsible for the breakdown of Soviet–US relations after the Second World War; and whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable or could have been avoided.[388] Historians have also disagreed on what exactly the Cold War was, what the sources of the conflict were, and how to disentangle patterns of action and reaction between the two sides.[255]
Although explanations of the origins of the conflict in academic discussions are complex and diverse, several general schools of thought on the subject can be identified. Historians commonly speak of three different approaches to the study of the Cold War: "orthodox" accounts, "revisionism", and "post-revisionism".[378]
"Orthodox" accounts place responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansion further into Europe.[378] "Revisionist" writers place more responsibility for the breakdown of post-war peace on the United States, citing a range of US efforts to isolate and confront the Soviet Union well before the end of World War II.[378] "Post-revisionists" see the events of the Cold War as more nuanced and attempt to be more balanced in determining what occurred during the Cold War.[378] Much of the historiography on the Cold War weaves together two or even all three of these broad categories.[84]
↑ Jowett & O'Donnell 2005, pp.21–23: "In fact, the word disinformation is a cognate for the Russian dezinformatsia, taken from the name of a division of the KGB devoted to black propaganda."
↑ Matray 2002: "South Korea's President Rhee was obsessed with accomplishing early reunification through military means. The Truman administration's fear that Rhee would launch an invasion prompted it to limit South Korea's military capabilities, refusing to provide tanks, heavy artillery, and combat planes. This did not stop the South Koreans from initiating most of the border clashes with North Korean forces at the thirty-eighth parallel beginning in the summer of 1948 and reaching a high level of intensity and violence a year later. Historians now acknowledge that the two Koreas already were waging a civil conflict when North Korea's attack opened the conventional phase of the war."
↑ Matray 2002: "Contradicting traditional assumptions, however, available declassified Soviet documents demonstrate that throughout 1949 Stalin consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung's persistent requests to approve an invasion of South Korea. The Soviet leader believed that North Korea had not achieved either military superiority north of the parallel or political strength south of that line. His main concern was the threat South Korea posed to North Korea's survival, for example fearing an invasion northward following U.S. military withdrawal in June 1949."
↑ "Revolt in Hungary". Archived from the original on 17 November 2007. Narrator: Walter Cronkite, producer: CBS (1956) – Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40
↑ Prados & Jimenez-Bacardi 2019: "The memorandum showed no concern for international law or the unspoken nature of these operations as terrorist attacks."
↑ International Policy Report (Report). Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy. 1977. pp.10–12. To coordinate and carry out its war of terror and destruction during the early 1960s, the CIA established a base of operations, known as JMWAVE.
↑ National Research Council Committee on Antarctic Policy and Science, p. 33
↑ Coll 2004, pp.47–49: "Frustrated and hoping to discredit him, the KGB initially planted false stories that Amin was a CIA agent. In the autumn these rumors rebounded on the KGB in a strange case of "blowback," the term used by spies to describe planted propaganda that filters back to confuse the country that first set the story loose."
↑ Jones, S. 2010, pp.16–17: "'It was total nonsense,' said the CIA's Graham Fuller. 'I would have been thrilled to have those kinds of contacts with Amin, but they didn't exist.'"
↑ Kim 2014, p.45: "With three of the four major Cold War fault lines—divided Germany, divided Korea, divided China, and divided Vietnam—East Asia acquired the dubious distinction of having engendered the largest number of armed conflicts resulting in higher fatalities between 1945 and 1994 than any other region or sub-region. Even in Asia, while Central and South Asia produced a regional total of 2.8 million in human fatalities, East Asia's regional total is 10.4 million including the Chinese Civil War (1 million), the Korean War (3 million), the Vietnam War (2 million), and the Pol Pot genocide in Cambodia (1 to 2 million)."
Related Research Articles
The Cold War (1948–1953) is the period within the Cold War from the incapacitation of the Allied Control Council in 1948 to the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953.
The history of the Soviet Union from 1982 through 1991 spans the period from the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's death until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Due to the years of Soviet military buildup at the expense of domestic development, and complex systemic problems in the command economy, Soviet output stagnated. Failed attempts at reform, a standstill economy, and the success of the proxies of the United States against the Soviet Union's forces in the war in Afghanistan led to a general feeling of discontent, especially in the Soviet-occupied Baltic countries and Eastern Europe.
The Warsaw Pact (WP), formally the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA), was a collective defense treaty signed in Warsaw, Poland, between the Soviet Union and seven other Eastern Bloc socialist republics of Central and Eastern Europe in May 1955, during the Cold War. The term "Warsaw Pact" commonly refers to both the treaty itself and its resultant military alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The Warsaw Pact was the military complement to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the economic organization for the Eastern Bloc states.
Brinkmanship or brinksmanship is the practice of trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the brink of active conflict. The maneuver of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions rather than risk engaging in a conflict that would no longer be beneficial to either side. That might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers, by creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. The tactic occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labor relations, contemporary military strategy, terrorism, and high-stakes litigation.
George Frost Kennan was an American diplomat and historian. He was best known as an advocate of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War. He lectured widely and wrote scholarly histories of the relations between the USSR and the United States. He was also one of the group of foreign policy elders known as "The Wise Men".
Détente is the relaxation of strained relations, especially political ones, through verbal communication. The diplomacy term originates from around 1912, when France and Germany tried unsuccessfully to reduce tensions.
The Cold War emerged from the breakdown of relations between two of the primary victors of World War II: the United States and Soviet Union, along with their respective allies in the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc. This ideological and political rivalry, which solidified between 1945-49, would shape the global order for the next four decades.
Containment was a geopolitical strategic foreign policy pursued by the United States during the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism after the end of World War II. The name was loosely related to the term cordon sanitaire, which was containment of the Soviet Union in the interwar period.
During the Cold War, Canada was one of the western powers playing a central role in the major alliances. It was an ally of the United States, but there were several foreign policy differences between the two countries over the course of the Cold War. Canada's peacekeeping role during the Cold War has played a major role in its positive global image. The country served in every UN peacekeeping effort from its inception in 1948 until 1989. This resulted in Canada provided the greatest amount of UN peacekeepers during the Cold War.
The Reykjavík Summit was a summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, held in Reykjavík, Iceland, on 11–12 October 1986. The talks collapsed at the last minute, but the progress that had been achieved eventually resulted in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Cold War from 1979 to 1985, was a late phase of the Cold War marked by a sharp increase in hostility between the Soviet Union and the West. It arose from a strong denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. With the election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and American President Ronald Reagan in 1980, a corresponding change in Western foreign policy approach toward the Soviet Union was marked by the rejection of détente in favor of the Reagan Doctrine policy of rollback, with the stated goal of dissolving Soviet influence in Soviet Bloc countries. During this time, the threat of nuclear war had reached new heights not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
The time period of around 1985–1991 marked the final period of the Cold War. It was characterized by systemic reform within the Soviet Union, the easing of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet-led bloc and the United States-led bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The Cold War (1962–1979) refers to the phase within the Cold War that spanned the period between the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis in late October 1962, through the détente period beginning in 1969, to the end of détente in the late 1970s.
This is an English language bibliography of scholarly books and articles on the Cold War. Because of the extent of the Cold War, the conflict is well documented.
The aftermath of World War II saw the rise of two global superpowers, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). The aftermath of World War II was also defined by the rising threat of nuclear warfare, the creation and implementation of the United Nations as an intergovernmental organization, and the decolonization of Asia, Oceania, South America and Africa by European and East Asian powers, most notably by the United Kingdom, France, and Japan.
Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were fully established in 1933 as the succeeding bilateral ties to those between the Russian Empire and the United States, which lasted from 1776 until 1917; they were also the predecessor to the current bilateral ties between the Russian Federation and the United States that began in 1992 after the end of the Cold War.
As soon as the term "Cold War" was popularized to refer to postwar tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, interpreting the course and origins of the conflict became a source of heated controversy among historians, political scientists and journalists. In particular, historians have sharply disagreed as to who was responsible for the breakdown of Soviet Union–United States relations after the World War II and whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable, or could have been avoided. Historians have also disagreed on what exactly the Cold War was, what the sources of the conflict were and how to disentangle patterns of action and reaction between the two sides. While the explanations of the origins of the conflict in academic discussions are complex and diverse, several general schools of thought on the subject can be identified. Historians commonly speak of three differing approaches to the study of the Cold War: "orthodox" accounts, "revisionism" and "post-revisionism". However, much of the historiography on the Cold War weaves together two or even all three of these broad categories and more recent scholars have tended to address issues that transcend the concerns of all three schools.
The post–Cold War era is a period of history that follows the end of the Cold War, which represents history after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This period saw many former Soviet republics become sovereign nations, as well as the introduction of market economies in eastern Europe. This period also marked the United States becoming the world's sole superpower.
New generation warfare or NGW is a Russian theory of unconventional warfare which prioritizes the psychological and people-centered aspects over traditional military concerns, and emphasizes a phased approach of non-military influence such that armed conflict, if it arises, is much less costly in human or economic terms for the aggressor than it otherwise would be. It was first enunciated in 2013 by Valery Gerasimov as part of his Gerasimov Doctrine.
The Cold War from 1947 to 1948 is the period within the Cold War from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the incapacitation of the Allied Control Council in 1948. The Cold War emerged in Europe a few years after the successful US–USSR–UK coalition won World War II in Europe, and extended to 1989–1991. It took place worldwide, but it had a partially different timing outside Europe. Some conflicts between the West and the USSR appeared earlier. In 1945–1946 the US and UK strongly protested Soviet political takeover efforts in Eastern Europe and Iran, while the hunt for Soviet spies made the tensions more visible. However, historians emphasize the decisive break between the US–UK and the USSR came in 1947–1948 over such issues as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the breakdown of cooperation in governing occupied Germany by the Allied Control Council. In 1947, Bernard Baruch, the multimillionaire financier and adviser to presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Harry S. Truman, coined the term "Cold War" to describe the increasingly chilly relations between three World War II Allies: the United States and British Empire together with the Soviet Union.
↑ Kalabekov, I.G. "Расходы на оборону и численность вооруженных сил СССР"[Defense spending and size of the Armed Forces of the USSR]. СССР и страны мира в цифрах, 2008 – 2023[USSR and countries of the world in figures, 2008 – 2023] (in Russian).
↑ Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak.
1 2 Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland – Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (2009).
1 2 Thomas Roser: DDR-Massenflucht: Ein Picknick hebt die Welt aus den Angeln (German – Mass exodus of the GDR: A picnic clears the world) in: Die Presse 16 August 2018.
1 2 Otmar Lahodynsky: Paneuropäisches Picknick: Die Generalprobe für den Mauerfall (Pan-European picnic: the dress rehearsal for the fall of the Berlin Wall – German), in: Profil 9 August 2014.
↑ Hilde Szabo: Die Berliner Mauer begann im Burgenland zu bröckeln (The Berlin Wall began to crumble in Burgenland – German), in Wiener Zeitung 16 August 1999.
Blumberg, Arnold (1995). Great Leaders, Great Tyrants?: Contemporary Views of World Rulers Who Made History. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN978-0-313-28751-0.
Byrd, Peter (2003). "Cold War (entire chapter)". In McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair (eds.). The concise Oxford dictionary of politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-280276-7. Archived from the original on 29 July 2020. Retrieved 16 June 2008.
Craig, Campbell; Logevall, Fredrik (2012). America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Harvard University Press. ISBN978-0-674-05367-0.
Crocker, Chester A.; Hampson, Fen Osler; Aall, Pamela R. (2007). Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN978-1-929223-97-8.
Crump, Laurien (2015). The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969. Routledge.
Cumings, Bruce (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947. Princeton University Press.
Cummings, Richard H. (2010). Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for freedom": Rallying Americans behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. ISBN978-0-7864-4410-6.
Ello, Paul, ed. (1968). "Action Plan of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1968)". Dubcek's Blueprint for Freedom: His original documents leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Control Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. William Kimber & Co.
Ganser, Daniele (2005). NATO's secret armies: operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass. ISBN9780714656076.
Garthoff, Raymond (1994). Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN978-0-8157-3041-5.
Harrison, Hope Millard (2003). Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961. Princeton University Press. ISBN0-691-09678-3.
Hart-Landsberg, Martin (1998). Korea: Division, Reunification, & U.S. Foreign Policy. Monthly Review Press. ISBN9780853459279.
Heuveline, Patrick (2001). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979". Forced Migration and Mortality. National Academies Press. ISBN978-0-309-07334-9.
Hoppe, Bert (2011). In Stalins Gefolgschaft: Moskau und die KPD 1928–1933 (in German). Oldenbourg Verlag. ISBN9783486711738.
Hughes, Geraint (2014). My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. ISBN978-1-84519-627-1.
Hussain, Rizwan (2005). Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan. Aldershot, England Burlington, VT: Ashgate. ISBN978-0-7546-4434-7.
Jennings, Christian (2017). Flashpoint Trieste: The First Battle of the Cold War. Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge. ISBN9781512601725.
Jowett, Garth; O'Donnell, Victoria (2005). "What Is Propaganda, and How Does It Differ From Persuasion?". Propaganda and Persuasion. Sage Publications. ISBN978-1-4129-0898-6.
LaFeber, Walter (1993a). "Thomas C. Mann and the Devolution of Latin American Policy: From the Good Neighbor to Military Intervention". In Thomas J. McCormick & Walter LaFeber (eds.). Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898–1968. University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN0-299-13740-6.
Lendvai, Paul (2008). One Day that Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy. Princeton University Press. ISBN978-0-691-13282-2.
Litwak, Robert (1986). Détente and the Nixon doctrine: American foreign policy and the pursuit of stability, 1969–1976. Cambridge Cambridgeshire New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-25094-8.
Malkasian, Carter (2001). The Korean War: Essential Histories. Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-84176-282-1.
Mälksoo, Lauri (28 June 2022). "The Baltic States Between 1940 and 1991: Illegality and/Or Prescription". Illegal Annexation and State Continuity. BRILL. pp.70–139. doi:10.1163/9789004464896_005. ISBN9789004464896.
Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. (1996). Post-Communism: Four Perspectives. Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN0-87609-186-9.
Menon, Anand (2000). France, NATO, and the limits of independence, 1981–97: the politics of ambivalence. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-312-22931-3.
Meher, Jagmohan (2004). America's Afghanistan war: the success that failed. Delhi: Kalpaz. ISBN978-81-7835-262-6.
Miglietta, John P. (2002). American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945–1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Lexington Books.
Miller, Nicola (2002). "The Real Gap in the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Post-Cold-War Historiography and Continued Omission of Cuba". In Carter, Dale; Clifton, Robin (eds.). War and Cold War in American foreign policy, 1942–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-1-4039-1385-2.
No, Kum-Sok; Osterholm, J. Roger (1996). A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir of the Wartime North Korean Defector who First Delivered the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953. McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-0210-6.
Papathanasiou, Ioanna (5 July 2017). "The Cominform and the Greek Civil War, 1947–49". In Carabott, Philip; Sfikas, Thanasis D. (eds.). The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences. Taylor & Francis. pp.57–72. ISBN978-1-351-88865-3. Archived from the original on 29 July 2020. Retrieved 25 October 2019.
Plettenberg, Ingeborg (2010). "The Soviet Union and the League of Nations". The League of Nations in retrospect – Proceedings of the Symposium / La Societe des Nations: retrospective – Actes du Colloque. Walter de Gruyter. pp.144–181. ISBN978-3-11-090585-4.
Rislakki, Jukka (1982). Erittäin salainen. Vakoilu Suomessa (in Finnish). LOVE KIRJAT. ISBN951-835-057-4.
Roadnight, Andrew (2002). United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-333-79315-2.
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (1995). Impunity and human rights in international law and practice. Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-508136-6.
Rose, Euclid A. (2002). Dependency and Socialism in the Modern Caribbean: Superpower Intervention in Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada, 1970–1985. Lexington Books. ISBN978-0-7391-0448-4.
Rothschild, Donald (1997). Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington: The Brookings Institution. ISBN978-0-8157-7593-5.
Ryavec, Karl W. (2003). Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN0-8476-9503-4.
Shaw, Tony; Youngblood, Denise Jeanne (2010). Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds. University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-1743-2.
Tucker, Spencer C (2010). The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, Volume 1. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-1-8510-9947-4.
Marshall, Monty G.; Gurr, Ted (2006). Peace and Conflict 2005(PDF) (Report). Center for Systemic Peace. Archived from the original(PDF) on 24 June 2008. Retrieved 14 June 2008.
Allen, Robert C. (November 2001). "The rise and decline of the Soviet economy". Canadian Journal of Economics. 34 (4): 859–881. doi:10.1111/0008-4085.00103. ISSN0008-4085.
Bailes, Kendall E. (1981). "The American Connection: Ideology and the Transfer of American Technology to the Soviet Union, 1917–1941". Comparative Studies in Society and History. 23 (3): 421–448. doi:10.1017/S0010417500013438.
Bungert, Heike (July 1994). "A New Perspective on French-American Relations during the Occupation of Germany, 1945? 1948: Behind-the-Scenes Diplomatic Bargaining and the Zonal Merger". Diplomatic History. 18 (3): 333–352. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1994.tb00217.x.
Crespino, Joseph (March 2020). "A Nation Ruled by Its Fears". Reviews in American History. 48 (1): 119–123. doi:10.1353/rah.2020.0016.
Cseresnyés, Ferenc (Summer 1999). "The '56 Exodus to Austria". The Hungarian Quarterly. XL (154): 86–101. Archived from the original on 27 November 2004. Retrieved 9 October 2006.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
Dalrymple, Dana G. (1964). "The American tractor comes to Soviet agriculture: The transfer of a technology". Technology and Culture. 5 (2): 191–214. doi:10.2307/3101161. JSTOR3101161.
Eaton, Joseph (November 2016). "Reconsidering the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott: American Sports Diplomacy in East Asian Perspective". Diplomatic History. 40 (5): 845–864. doi:10.1093/dh/dhw026. JSTOR26376807.
Edmondson, Charles M. (1981). "An Inquiry into the Termination of Soviet Famine Relief Programmes and the Renewal of Grain Export, 1922–23". Soviet Studies. 33 (3): 370–385. doi:10.1080/09668138108411366. JSTOR151078. PMID11633260.
Ekholm, Kai (2001). "Political Censorship in Finnish Libraries in 1944–1946". Libraries & Culture. 36 (1): 51–57. doi:10.1353/lac.2001.0008. S2CID152952804.
Esno, Tyler (April 2018). "Reagan's Economic War on the Soviet Union". Diplomatic History. 42 (2): 281–304. doi:10.1093/dh/dhx061. ISSN0145-2096.
Garthoff, Raymond L. (2004). "Foreign intelligence and the historiography of the Cold War". Journal of Cold War Studies. 6 (2): 21–56. doi:10.1162/152039704773254759. S2CID57563600.
Hershberg, James G. (1992). "Explosion in the Offing: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953–1955". Diplomatic History. 16 (4): 511–550. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1992.tb00630.x.
Hopkins, Michael F. (2007). "Continuing debate and new approaches in Cold War history". Historical Journal. 50 (4): 913–934. doi:10.1017/S0018246X07006437.
Iatrides, John O. (1 October 1996). "The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War: The Imperialism of 'Non-Intervention' (review)". Journal of Modern Greek Studies. 14 (2): 373–376. doi:10.1353/mgs.1996.0020. ISSN1086-3265. S2CID142792238.
Little, Douglas (1983). "Anti-Bolshevism and American Foreign Policy, 1919–1939". American Quarterly. 35 (4): 376–390. doi:10.2307/2712876. JSTOR2712876.
Locard, Henri (1 March 2005). "State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)". European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire. 12 (1): 121–143. doi:10.1080/13507480500047811. ISSN1350-7486. S2CID144712717.
Matray, James I (September 1979). "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea". Journal of American History. 66 (2). JStor: 314–333. doi:10.2307/1900879. JSTOR1900879.
Painter, D. S. (2014). "Oil and geopolitics: the oil crises of the 1970s and the Cold War". Historical Social Research. 39 (4): 186–208. doi:10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.186-208.
Ruzicic-Kessler, Karlo (2014). "Togliatti, Tito and the Shadow of Moscow 1944/45–1948: Post-War Territorial Disputes and the Communist World". Journal of European Integration History. 2: [, pages needed], .
Schwartz, Thomas A. (2011). "Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 22 (1): 121–141. doi:10.1080/09592296.2011.549746.
Shifrinson, J. R. I. (2016). "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion". International Security. 40 (4): 7–44. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00236.
Slocomb, Margaret (2001). "The K5 Gamble: National Defence and Nation Building under the People's Republic of Kampuchea". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 32 (2): 195–210. doi:10.1017/S0022463401000091. ISSN1474-0680. S2CID162956030.
Singh, Bilveer (2005), "Chapter 11: Jemaah Islamiyah", in Swati, Parashar; Wilson, John (eds.), Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Implications for South Asia, Delhi, India: Pearson Education India, ISBN978-81-297-0998-1
Snyder, David R. (April 2002). "Arming the "Bundesmarine": The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950–1960". The Journal of Military History. 66 (2): 477–500. doi:10.2307/3093068. JSTOR3093068.
Stefancic, David (Winter 1987). "The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy". East European Quarterly. 21 (4): 401–412. ProQuest1297275220
Talbott, Strobe; Hannifin, Jerry; Magnuson, Ed; Doerner, William R.; Kane, Joseph J. (12 September 1983). "Atrocity in the skies". Time. Archived from the original on 12 June 2008. Retrieved 8 June 2008.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
