Collectivization in the Soviet Union

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"Strengthen working discipline in collective farms" - Soviet propaganda poster issued in Soviet Uzbekistan, 1933 "Strengthen working discipline in collective farms" - Uzbek, Tashkent, 1933 (Mardjani).jpg
"Strengthen working discipline in collective farms" – Soviet propaganda poster issued in Soviet Uzbekistan, 1933
Illustration to the Soviet categories of peasants: bednyaks, or poor peasants; serednyaks, or mid-income peasants; and kulaks, the higher-income farmers who had larger farms than most Russian peasants. Published Projector May 1926. Three broad categories of the peasants.jpg
Illustration to the Soviet categories of peasants: bednyaks, or poor peasants; serednyaks, or mid-income peasants; and kulaks, the higher-income farmers who had larger farms than most Russian peasants. Published Projector May 1926.

The Soviet Union implemented the collectivization (Russian : Коллективизация) of its agricultural sector between 1928 and 1940 during the ascension of Joseph Stalin. It began during and was part of the first five-year plan. The policy aimed to integrate individual landholdings and labour into collectively-controlled and state-controlled farms: Kolkhozy and Sovkhozy accordingly. The Soviet leadership confidently expected that the replacement of individual peasant farms by collective ones would immediately increase the food supply for the urban population, the supply of raw materials for the processing industry, and agricultural exports. Planners regarded collectivization as the solution to the crisis of agricultural distribution (mainly in grain deliveries) that had developed from 1927. [1] This problem became more acute as the Soviet Union pressed ahead with its ambitious industrialization program, meaning that more food needed to be produced to keep up with urban demand. [2]


In the early 1930s, over 91% of agricultural land became collectivized as rural households entered collective farms with their land, livestock, and other assets. The collectivization era saw several famines, many due to the shortage of modern technology in USSR at the time, but critics have also cited deliberate action on the government's part. [3] The death toll cited by experts has ranged from 7 million to 14 million. [4]


After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, peasants gained control of about half of the land they had previously cultivated and began to ask for the redistribution of all land. [5] The Stolypin agricultural reforms between 1905 and 1914 gave incentives for the creation of large farms, but these ended during World War I. The Russian Provisional Government accomplished little during the difficult World War I months, though Russian leaders continued to promise redistribution. Peasants began to turn against the Provisional Government and organized themselves into land committees, which together with the traditional peasant communes became a powerful force of opposition. When Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia on April 16, 1917, he promised the people "Peace, Land and Bread," the latter two appearing as a promise to the peasants for the redistribution of confiscated land and a fair share of food for every worker respectively.

During the period of war communism, however, the policy of Prodrazvyorstka meant that the peasantry was obligated to surrender the surpluses of agricultural produce for a fixed price. When the Russian Civil War ended, the economy changed with the New Economic Policy (NEP) and specifically, the policy of prodnalog or "food tax." This new policy was designed to re-build morale among embittered farmers and lead to increased production.

The pre-existing communes, which periodically redistributed land, did little to encourage improvement in technique and formed a source of power beyond the control of the Soviet government. Although the income gap between wealthy and poor farmers did grow under the NEP, it remained quite small, but the Bolsheviks began to take aim at the wealthy kulaks , who withheld surpluses of agricultural produce. Clearly identifying this group was difficult, though, since only about 1% of the peasantry employed labourers (the basic Marxist definition of a capitalist), and 82% of the country's population were peasants. [5]

The small shares of most of the peasants resulted in food shortages in the cities. Although grain had nearly returned to pre-war production levels, the large estates which had produced it for urban markets had been divided up. [5] Not interested in acquiring money to purchase overpriced manufactured goods, the peasants chose to consume their produce rather than sell it. As a result, city dwellers only saw half the grain that had been available before the war. [5] Before the revolution, peasants controlled only 2,100,000 km² divided into 16 million holdings, producing 50% of the food grown in Russia and consuming 60% of total food production. After the revolution, the peasants controlled 3,140,000 km² divided into 25 million holdings, producing 85% of the food, but consuming 80% of what they grew (meaning that they ate 68% of the total). [6]

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union had never been happy with private agriculture and saw collectivization as the best remedy for the problem. Lenin claimed, "Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions." [7] Apart from ideological goals, Joseph Stalin also wished to embark on a program of rapid heavy industrialization which required larger surpluses to be extracted from the agricultural sector in order to feed a growing industrial workforce and to pay for imports of machinery (by exporting grain). [8] Social and ideological goals would also be served through the mobilization of the peasants in a co-operative economic enterprise that would provide social services to the people and empower the state. Not only was collectivization meant to fund industrialization, but it was also a way for the Bolsheviks to systematically attack the Kulaks and peasants in general. Stalin was incredibly suspicious of the peasants, he viewed them as a major threat to socialism. Stalin's use of the collectivization process served to not only address the grain shortages, but his greater concern over the peasants' willingness to conform to the collective farm system and state mandated grain acquisitions. [9] He viewed this as an opportunity to eliminate Kulaks as a class by means of collectivization.

Crisis of 1928

This demand for more grain resulted in the reintroduction of requisitioning which was resisted in rural areas. In 1928 there was a 2-million-ton shortfall in grains purchased by the Soviet Union from neighbouring markets. Stalin claimed the grain had been produced but was being hoarded by "kulaks." Stalin tried to appear as being on the side of the peasants, but it did not help, and the peasants as a whole resented the grain seizures. The peasants did everything they could to protest what they considered unfair seizures. [9] Instead of raising the price, the Politburo adopted an emergency measure to requisition 2.5 million tons of grain.

The seizures of grain discouraged the peasants and less grain was produced during 1928, and again the government resorted to requisitions, much of the grain being requisitioned from middle peasants as sufficient quantities were not in the hands of the "kulaks." The impact that this had on poorer peasants forced them to move to the cities. The peasants moved in search of jobs in the rapidly expanding industry. This, however, had a fairly negative impact upon their arrival as the peasants brought with them their habits from the farms. They struggled with punctuality and demonstrated a rather poor work ethic, which hindered their ability to perform in the workplace. [10] In 1929, especially after the introduction of the Ural-Siberian Method of grain procurement, resistance to grain seizures became widespread with some violent incidents of resistance. Also, massive hoarding (burial was the common method) and illegal transfers of grain took place. [ citation needed ] [11]

Faced with the refusal to hand grain over, a decision was made at a plenary session of the Central Committee in November 1929 to embark on a nationwide program of collectivization.

Several forms of collective farming were suggested by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem), distinguished according to the extent to which property was held in common: [12]

Also, various cooperatives for the processing of agricultural products were installed.

In November 1929, the Central Committee decided to implement accelerated collectivization in the form of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which had allowed peasants to sell their surpluses on the open market. Peasants that were willing to conform and join the kolkhozes were rewarded with higher quality land and tax breaks, whereas peasants unwilling to join the kolkhozes were punished with being given lower quality land and increased taxes. The taxes imposed on the peasants was primarily to fund the industrial blitz that Stalin had made a priority. [13] If these lesser forms of social coercion proved to be ineffective then the central government would resort to harsher forms of state coercion. [14] Stalin had many kulaks transported to collective farms in distant places to work in agricultural labour camps. In response to this, many peasants began to resist, often arming themselves against the activists sent from the towns. As a form of protest, many peasants preferred to slaughter their animals for food rather than give them over to collective farms, which produced a major reduction in livestock. [15]

Collectivization had been encouraged since the revolution, but in 1928, only about one per cent of farmland was collectivized, and despite efforts to encourage and coerce collectivization, the rather optimistic first five-year plan only forecast 15 per cent of farms to be run collectively. [5]

All-out drive, winter 1929–30

Yakov Yakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture appointed in 1929 Yakov Yakovlev. People's Commissar for Agriculture. USSR 1929.jpg
Yakov Yakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture appointed in 1929

The situation changed quickly in the fall of 1929 and the winter of 1930. Between September and December 1929, collectivization increased from 7.4% to 15%, but in the first two months of 1930, 11 million households joined collectivized farms, pushing the total to nearly 60% almost overnight.

To assist collectivization, the Party decided to send 25,000 "socially conscious" industry workers to the countryside. This was accomplished from 1929–1933, and these workers have become known as twenty-five-thousanders ("dvadtsat'pyat'tysyachniki"). Soviet officials had hoped that by sending the twenty-five thousanders to the countryside that they would be able to produce grain more rapidly. Their hopes were that key areas in the North Caucasus and Volga regions would be collectivized by 1931, and then the other regions by 1932. [16] Shock brigades were used to force reluctant peasants into joining the collective farms and remove those who were declared kulaks and their "agents".

Collectivization sought to modernize Soviet agriculture, consolidating the land into parcels that could be farmed by modern equipment using the latest scientific methods of agriculture. It was often claimed that an American Fordson tractor (called "Фордзон" in Russian) was the best propaganda in favour of collectivization. The Communist Party, which adopted the plan in 1929, predicted an increase of 330% in industrial production, and an increase of 50% in agricultural production.

The means of production (land, equipment, livestock) were to be totally "socialized", i.e. removed from the control of individual peasant households. Not even private household garden plots were allowed.[ citation needed ]

Agricultural work was envisioned on a mass scale. Huge glamorous columns of machines were to work the fields, in total contrast to peasant small-scale work.

The peasants traditionally mostly held their land in the form of large numbers of strips scattered throughout the fields of the village community. By an order of 7 January 1930, "all boundary lines separating the land allotments of the members of the artel are to be eliminated and all fields are to be combined in a single land mass." The basic rule governing the rearrangement of the fields was that the process would have to be completed before the spring planting. [17] The new kolkhozy were initially envisioned as giant organizations unrelated to the preceding village communities. Kolkhozy of tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of hectares, were envisioned in schemes which were later to become known as gigantomania. They were planned to be "divided into 'economies (ekonomii)' of 5,000–10,000 hectares which were in turn divided into fields and sections (uchastki) without regard to the existing villages – the aim was to achieve a 'fully depersonalized optimum land area'..."[ citation needed ] Parallel with this were plans to transfer the peasants to centralized 'agrotowns' offering modern amenities.

"Dizzy with Success"

The price of collectivization was so high that the March 2, 1930 issue of Pravda contained Stalin's article Dizzy with Success , in which he called for a temporary halt to the process:

It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 percent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had been collectivized. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had overfulfilled the five-year plan of collectivization by more than 100 per cent.... some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision.

After the publication of the article, the pressure for collectivization temporarily abated and peasants started leaving collective farms. According to Martin Kitchen, the number of members of collective farms dropped by 50% in 1930. But soon collectivization was intensified again, and by 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture was collectivized.

Peasant resistance

Theoretically, landless peasants were intended as the biggest beneficiaries of collectivization, because it promised them an opportunity to take an equal share in labour and its rewards.[ clarification needed ] In fact, however, rural areas did not have many landless peasants, given the wholesale redistribution of land following the Revolution. Alternatively, for those with property, collectivization meant forfeiting land up to the collective farms and selling most of the harvest to the state at minimal prices set by the state itself. This, in turn, engendered opposition to the idea. Furthermore, collectivization involved significant changes in the traditional village life of Russian peasants within a very short time frame, despite the long Russian rural tradition of collectivism in the village obshchina or mir . The changes were even more dramatic in other places, such as in Ukraine, with its tradition of individual farming, in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, and in the trans-Volga steppes, where for a family to have a herd of livestock was not only a matter of sustenance but of pride as well.

YCLers seizing grain from "kulaks" which was hidden in the graveyard, Ukraine RIAN archive 79113 Seizing grain from kulaks.jpg
YCLers seizing grain from "kulaks" which was hidden in the graveyard, Ukraine

Some peasants viewed collectivization as the end of the world. [18] By no means was joining the collective farm (also known as the kolkhoz) voluntary. The drive to collectivize came without peasant support. [19] The intent was to increase state grain procurements without giving the peasants the opportunity to withhold grain from the market. Collectivization would increase the total crop and food supply but the locals knew that they were not likely to benefit from it. [20] Peasants tried to protest through peaceful means by speaking out at collectivization meetings and writing letters to the central authorities. The peasants argued with the collectors, they wrote letters to their children in the military and they even sowed less grain. The party officials tried to promise the peasants farming equipment (specifically tractors) and tax breaks if they would conform to the collective farm model (kolkhozes) but the party officials were unable to meet the promises they made due to the low industrial output. Essentially the tractors that they were promising could not be produced due to the massive issues in the Industrial sector of the Soviet Union. [21] When their strategies failed, villagers turned to violence: committing arson, and lynching and murdering local authorities, kolkhoz leaders, and activists. [22] [23] Others responded with acts of sabotage, including the burning of crops and the slaughter of draught animals. The amount of livestock dropped by half from 1928 to 1932 as a result of the slaughters. [24] The destruction of important farming equipment was common means of protest among peasants who resisted collectivization. [25] Fueled by fear and anxiety, rumours spread throughout the villages leading to these acts. [26] Rumors associated the Soviet government with the Antichrist (godless and evil), threatened an end to traditional ways of peasant life, and worked to unite the peasants to protest against collectivization.

Collectivization as a "second serfdom"

Rumors circulated in the villages warning the rural residents that collectivization would bring disorder, hunger, famine, and the destruction of crops and livestock. [27] Readings and reinterpretations of Soviet newspapers labelled collectivization as a second serfdom. [28] [29] Villagers were afraid the old landowners/serf owners were coming back and that the villagers joining the collective farm would face starvation and famine. [30] More reason for peasants to believe collectivization was a second serfdom was that entry into the kolkhoz had been forced. Farmers did not have the right to leave the collective without permission. The level of state procurements and prices on crops also enforced the serfdom analogy. The government would take a majority of the crops and pay extremely low prices. The serfs during the 1860s were paid nothing but collectivization still reminded the peasants of serfdom. [31] To them, this "second serfdom" became code for the Communist betrayal of the revolution. To the peasants, the revolution was about giving more freedom and land to the peasants, but instead, they had to give up their land and livestock to the collective farm which to some extent promoted communist policies.

Women's role in resistance

Women were the primary vehicle for rumours that touched upon issues of family and everyday life. [32] Fears that collectivization would result in the socialization of children, the export of women's hair, communal wife-sharing, and the notorious common blanket affected many women, causing them to revolt. For example, when it was announced that a collective farm in Crimea would become a commune and that the children would be socialized, women killed their soon-to-be socialized livestock, which spared the children. Stories that the Communists believed short hair gave women a more urban and industrial look insulted peasant women. [33] After local activists in a village in North Caucasus actually confiscated all blankets, more fear dispersed among villagers. The common blanket meant that all men and women would sleep on a seven-hundred meter long bed under a seven-hundred-meter long blanket. [34] Historians argue that women took advantage of these rumours without actually believing them so they could attack the collective farm "under the guise of irrational, nonpolitical protest." [35] Women were less vulnerable to retaliation than peasant men, and therefore able to get away with a lot more. [36]

Peasant women were rarely held accountable for their actions because of the officials' perceptions of their protests. They "physically blocked the entrances to huts of peasants scheduled to be exiled as kulaks, forcibly took back socialized seed and livestock and led assaults on officials." Officials ran away and hid to let the riots run their course. When women came to trial, they were given less harsh punishments as the men because women, to officials, were seen as illiterate and the most backward part of the peasantry. One particular case of this was a riot in a Russian village of Belovka where protestors were beating members of the local soviet and setting fire to their homes. The men were held exclusively responsible as the main culprits. Women were given sentences to serve as a warning, not as a punishment. Because of how they were perceived, women were able to play an essential role in the resistance to collectivization. [37]

Religious persecution

The removal of the bell from St Volodymyr's Cathedral Central Kiev USSR 1930 The removal of 5000 kg bell from St Volodymyr's Cathedral Kiev USSR 1930.jpg
The removal of the bell from St Volodymyr's Cathedral Central Kiev USSR 1930

Collectivization did not just entail the acquisition of land from farmers but also the closing of churches, burning of icons, and the arrests of priests. [30] Associating the church with the tsarist regime, [38] the Soviet state continued to undermine the church through expropriations and repression. [39] They cut off state financial support to the church and secularized church schools. [38] Peasants began to associate Communists with atheists because the attack on the church was so devastating. [39] The Communist assault on religion and the church angered many peasants, giving them more reason to revolt. Riots exploded after the closing of churches as early as 1929. [40]

Identification of Soviet power with the Antichrist also decreased peasant support for the Soviet regime. Rumors about religious persecution spread mostly by word of mouth, but also through leaflets and proclamations. [41] Priests preached that the Antichrist had come to place "the Devil's mark" on the peasants. [42] and that the Soviet state was promising the peasants a better life but was actually signing them up for Hell. Peasants feared that if they joined the collective farm they would be marked with the stamp of the Antichrist. [43] They faced a choice between God and the Soviet collective farm. Choosing between salvation and damnation, peasants had no choice but to resist the policies of the state. [44] These rumours of the Soviet state as the Antichrist functioned to keep peasants from succumbing to the government. The attacks on religion and the Church affected women the most because they were upholders of religion within the villages. [45]

Dovzhenko's film Earth gives example of peasants' scepticism with collectivization on the basis that it was an attack on the church. [46]


Resistance to collectivization and consequences

Soviet famine of 1932-33. Areas of most disastrous famine marked with black. Famine en URSS 1933.jpg
Soviet famine of 1932–33. Areas of most disastrous famine marked with black.
American press with information about famine Chicago American 25.02.1935.jpg
American press with information about famine
Pavlik Morozov (second row, in the middle): this is the only surviving photograph known of him. PavlikMor.jpg
Pavlik Morozov (second row, in the middle): this is the only surviving photograph known of him.

Due to the high government production quotas, peasants received, as a rule, less for their labour than they did before collectivization, and some refused to work. Merle Fainsod estimated that, in 1952, collective farm earnings were only one-fourth of the cash income from private plots on Soviet collective farms. [47] In many cases, the immediate effect of collectivization was to reduce output and cut the number of livestock in half. The subsequent recovery of the agricultural production was also impeded by the losses suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II and the severe drought of 1946. However, the largest loss of livestock was caused by collectivization for all animals except pigs. [48] The numbers of cows in the USSR fell from 33.2 million in 1928 to 27.8 million in 1941 and to 24.6 million in 1950. The number of pigs fell from 27.7 million in 1928 to 27.5 million in 1941 and then to 22.2 million in 1950. The number of sheep fell from 114.6 million in 1928 to 91.6 million in 1941 and to 93.6 million in 1950. The number of horses fell from 36.1 million in 1928 to 21.0 million in 1941 and to 12.7 million in 1950. Only by the late 1950s did Soviet farm animal stocks begin to approach 1928 levels. [48]

Despite the initial plans, collectivization, accompanied by the bad harvest of 1932–1933, did not live up to expectations. Between 1929 and 1932 there was a massive fall in agricultural production resulting in famine in the countryside. Stalin and the CPSU blamed the prosperous peasants, referred to as 'kulaks' (Russian: fist), who were organizing resistance to collectivization. Allegedly, many kulaks had been hoarding grain in order to speculate on higher prices, thereby sabotaging grain collection. Stalin resolved to eliminate them as a class. The methods Stalin used to eliminate the kulaks were dispossession, deportation, and execution. The term "Ural-Siberian Method" was coined by Stalin, the rest of the population referred to it as the "new method". Article 107 of the criminal code was the legal means by which the state acquired grain. [21]

The Soviet government responded to these acts by cutting off food rations to peasants and areas where there was opposition to collectivization, especially in Ukraine. For peasants that were unable to meet the grain quota, they were fined five-times the quota. If the peasant continued to be defiant the peasants' property and equipment would be confiscated by the state. If none of the previous measures were effective the defiant peasant would be deported or exiled. The practice was made legal in 1929 under Article 61 of the criminal code. [21] Many peasant families were forcibly resettled in Siberia and Kazakhstan into exile settlements, and most of them died on the way. Estimates suggest that about a million so-called 'kulak' families, or perhaps some 5 million people, were sent to forced labour camps. [49] [50]

On August 7, 1932, the Decree about the Protection of Socialist Property proclaimed that the punishment for theft of kolkhoz or cooperative property was the death sentence, which "under extenuating circumstances" could be replaced by at least ten years of incarceration. With what some called the Law of Spikelets ("Закон о колосках"), peasants (including children) who hand-collected or gleaned grain in the collective fields after the harvest were arrested for damaging the state grain production. Martin Amis writes in Koba the Dread that 125,000 sentences were passed for this particular offence in the bad harvest period from August 1932 to December 1933.

During the Famine of 1932–33 it's estimated that 7.8–11 million people died from starvation. [51] The implication is that the total death toll (both direct and indirect) for Stalin's collectivization program was on the order of 12 million people. [50] It is said that in 1945, Joseph Stalin confided to Winston Churchill at Yalta that 10 million people died in the course of collectivization. [52]


Since the second half of the 19th century, Siberia had been a major agricultural region within Russia, espеcially its southern territories (nowadays Altai Krai, Omsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Khakassia, Irkutsk Oblast). Stolypin's program of resettlement granted a lot of land for immigrants from elsewhere in the empire, creating a large portion of well-off peasants and stimulating rapid agricultural development in the 1910s. Local merchants exported large quantities of labelled grain, flour, and butter into central Russia and Western Europe. [53] In May 1931, a special resolution of the Western-Siberian Regional Executive Committee (classified "top secret") ordered the expropriation of property and the deportation of 40,000 kulaks to "sparsely populated and unpopulated" areas in Tomsk Oblast in the northern part of the Western-Siberian region. [54] The expropriated property was to be transferred to kolkhozes as indivisible collective property and the kolkhoz shares representing this forced contribution of the deportees to kolkhoz equity were to be held in the "collectivization fund of poor and landless peasants" (фонд коллективизации бедноты и батрачества).

It has since been perceived by historians such as Lynne Viola as a Civil War of the peasants against the Bolshevik Government and the attempted colonization of the countryside. [55]

Central Asia and Kazakhstan

In areas where the major agricultural activity was nomadic herding, collectivization met with massive resistance and major losses and confiscation of livestock. Livestock in Kazakhstan fell from 7 million cattle to 1.6 million and from 22 million sheep to 1.7 million. Restrictions on migration proved ineffective and half a million migrated to other regions of Central Asia and 1.5 million to China. [56] Of those who remained, as many as a million died in the resulting famine. [57] In Mongolia, a so-called 'Soviet dependency', attempted collectivization was abandoned in 1932 after the loss of 8 million head of livestock. [58]


Most historians agree that the disruption caused by collectivization and the resistance of the peasants significantly contributed to the Great Famine of 1932–1933, especially in Ukraine, a region famous for its rich soil (chernozem). This particular period is called "Holodomor" in Ukrainian. During the similar famines of 1921–1923, numerous campaigns – inside the country, as well as internationally – were held to raise money and food in support of the population of the affected regions. Nothing similar was done during the drought of 1932–1933, mainly because the information about the disaster was suppressed by Stalin. [59] [60] Stalin also undertook a purge of the Ukrainian communists and intelligentsia, with devastating long-term effects on the area. [61] Many Ukrainian villages were blacklisted and penalized by government decree for perceived sabotage of food supplies. [62] Moreover, migration of population from the affected areas was restricted. [63] [64] According to Stalin in his conversation with the prize-winning writer Mikhail Sholokhov, the famine was caused by the excesses of local party workers and sabotage,

I've thanked you for the letters, as they expose a sore in our Party-Soviet work and show how our workers, wishing to curb the enemy, sometimes unwittingly hit friends and descend to sadism. ... the esteemed grain-growers of your district (and not only of your district alone) carried on an 'Italian strike' (sabotage!) and were not loath to leave the workers and the Red Army without bread. That the sabotage was quiet and outwardly harmless (without blood) does not change the fact that the esteemed grain-growers waged what was in fact a 'quiet' war against Soviet power. A war of starvation, dear com[rade] Sholokhov. This, of course, can in no way justify the outrages, which, as you assure me, have been committed by our workers. ... And those guilty of those outrages must be duly punished. [65] [66]

Starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933 GolodomorKharkiv.jpg
Starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933

About 40 million people were affected by the food shortages including areas near Moscow where mortality rates increased by 50%. [67] The center of the famine, however, was Ukraine and surrounding regions, including the Don, the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan where the toll was one million dead. The countryside was affected more than cities, but 120,000 died in Kharkiv, 40,000 in Krasnodar and 20,000 in Stavropol. [67]

The declassified Soviet archives show that there were 1.54 million officially registered deaths in Ukraine from famine. [68] Alec Nove claims that registration of deaths largely ceased in many areas during the famine. [69] However, it's been pointed out that the registered deaths in the archives were substantially revised by the demographics officials. The older version of the data showed 600,000 fewer deaths in Ukraine than the current, revised statistics. [68] In The Black Book of Communism , the authors claim that the number of deaths was at least 4 million, and they also characterize the Great Famine as "a genocide of the Ukrainian people". [70] [71]


After the Soviet Occupation of Latvia in June 1940, the country's new rulers were faced with a problem: the agricultural reforms of the inter-war period had expanded individual holdings. The property of "enemies of the people" and refugees, as well as those above 30 hectares, was nationalized in 1940–44, but those who were still landless were then given plots of 15 hectares each. Thus, Latvian agriculture remained essentially dependent on personal smallholdings, making central planning difficult. In 1940–41 the Communist Party repeatedly said that collectivization would not occur forcibly, but rather voluntarily and by example. To encourage collectivization high taxes were enforced and new farms were given no government support. But after 1945 the Party dropped its restrained approach as the voluntary approach was not yielding results. Latvians were accustomed to individual holdings (viensētas), which had existed even during serfdom, and for many farmers, the plots awarded to them by the interwar reforms were the first their families had ever owned. Furthermore, the countryside was filled with rumours regarding the harshness of collective farm life.

Pressure from Moscow to collectivize continued and the authorities in Latvia sought to reduce the number of individual farmers (increasingly labelled kulaki or budži) through higher taxes and requisitioning of agricultural products for state use. The first kolkhoz was established only in November 1946 and by 1948, just 617 kolkhozes had been established, integrating 13,814 individual farmsteads (12.6% of the total). The process was still judged too slow, and in March 1949 just under 13,000 kulak families, as well as a large number of individuals, were identified. Between March 24 and March 30, 1949, about 40,000 people were deported and resettled at various points throughout the USSR.

After these deportations, the pace of collectivization increased as a flood of farmers rushed into kolkhozes. Within two weeks 1740 new kolkhozes were established and by the end of 1950, just 4.5% of Latvian farmsteads remained outside the collectivized units; about 226,900 farmsteads belonged to collectives, of which there were now around 14,700. Rural life changed as farmers' daily movements were dictated to by plans, decisions, and quotas formulated elsewhere and delivered through an intermediate non-farming hierarchy. The new kolkhozes, especially smaller ones, were ill-equipped and poor – at first farmers were paid once a year in kind and then in cash, but salaries were very small and at times farmers went unpaid or even ended up owing money to the kholhoz. Farmers still had small pieces of land (not larger than 0.5 ha) around their houses where they grew food for themselves. Along with collectivization, the government tried to uproot the custom of living in individual farmsteads by resettling people in villages. However this process failed due to lack of money since the Soviets planned to move houses as well. [72] [73]

Progress of collectivization in the USSR 1927–1940

YearNumber of
collective farms
Percent of farmsteads
in collective farms
Percent of sown area
in collective use

Sources: Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR, Gosplanizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939 (pp. 42, 43); supplementary numbers for 1927–1935 from Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1935, Narkomzem SSSR, Moscow, 1936 (pp. 630, 634, 1347, 1369); 1937 from Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 22, Moscow, 1953 (p. 81); 1939 from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1917–1987, Moscow, 1987 (pp. 35); 1940 from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922–1972, Moscow, 1972 (pp. 215, 240).

The official numbers for the collectivized areas (the column with per cent of sown area in collective use in the table above) are biased upward by two technical factors. First, these official numbers are calculated as a per cent of sown area in peasant farmsteads, excluding the area cultivated by sovkhozes and other agricultural users. Estimates based on the total sown area (including state farms) reduce the share of collective farms between 1935–1940 to about 80%. Second, the household plots of kolkhoz members (i.e., collectivized farmsteads) are included in the land base of collective farms. Without the household plots, arable land in collective cultivation in 1940 was 96.4% of land in collective farms, and not 99.8% as shown by official statistics. Although there is no arguing with the fact that collectivization was sweeping and total between 1928 and 1940, the table below provides different (more realistic) numbers on the extent of collectivization of sown areas.

Distribution of sown area by land users, 1928 and 1940

Land users19281940
All farms, '000 hectares113,000150,600
State farms (sovkhozy)1.5%8.8%
Collective farms (kolkhozy)1.2%78.2%
Household plots
(in collective and state farms)
Peasant farms and other users96.2%9.5%

Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922–1972, Moscow, 1972 (p. 240).

Decollectivization under German occupation

During World War II, Alfred Rosenberg, in his capacity as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, issued a series of posters announcing the end of the Soviet collective farms in areas of the USSR under German occupation. He also issued an Agrarian Law in February 1942, annulling all Soviet legislation on farming, restoring family farms for those willing to collaborate with the occupiers. But decollectivization conflicted with the wider demands of wartime food production, and Hermann Göring demanded that the kolkhoz be retained, save for a change of name. Hitler himself denounced the redistribution of land as 'stupid.' [74] [75] In the end, the German occupation authorities retained most of the kolkhozes and simply renamed them "community farms" (Russian : Общинные хозяйства, a throwback to the traditional Russian commune). German propaganda described this as a preparatory step toward the ultimate dissolution of the kolkhozes into private farms, which would be granted to peasants who had loyally delivered compulsory quotas of farm produce to the Germans. By 1943, the German occupation authorities had converted 30% of the kolkhozes into German-sponsored "agricultural cooperatives", but as yet had made no conversions to private farms. [76] [77]

See also


  1. McCauley, Martin, Stalin and Stalinism, p. 25, Longman Group, England, ISBN   0-582-27658-6
  2. Davies, R.W., The Soviet Collective Farms, 1929–1930, Macmillan, London (1980), p. 1.
  3. Jacques, Vallin (November 2002). "A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s". Population Studies. 56 (3): 249–64. doi:10.1080/00324720215934. PMID   12553326. S2CID   21128795.
  4. Himka, John-Paul (Spring 2013). "Encumbered Memory: The Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 14 (2): 411–36. doi:10.1353/kri.2013.0025. S2CID   159967790.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to End. Kenez, Peter. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
  6. p. 87, Harvest of Sorrow ISBN   0-19-504054-6, Conquest cites Lewin pp. 36–37, 176
  7. Fainsod, Merle (1970). How Russia is Ruled (revised ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. p.  526.
  8. Fainsod (1970), p. 529.
  9. 1 2 Iordachi, Constantin; Bauerkämper, Arnd (2014). Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press. ISBN   978-6155225635. JSTOR   10.7829/j.ctt6wpkqw. ProQuest   1651917124.
  10. McCauley 2008 [ page needed ]
  11. Grigor., Suny, Ronald (1998). The Soviet experiment Russia, the USSR, and the successor states . Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0195081046. OCLC   434419149.
  12. James W. Heinzen, "Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917–1929", University of Pittsburgh Press (2004) ISBN   0-8229-4215-1, Chapter 1, "A False Start: The Birth and Early Activities of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, 1917–1920"
  13. McCauley 2008 [ page needed ]
  14. Livi-Bassi, Massimo (1993). "On the Human Cost of Collectivization in the Soviet Union". Population and Development Review. Population and Development Review (19): 743–766. doi:10.2307/2938412. JSTOR   2938412.
  15. "Collectivization". Seventeen Moments in Soviet History. June 17, 2015. Retrieved February 3, 2019.
  16. McCauley 2008 [ page needed ]
  17. James R Millar, ed., The Soviet Rural Community (University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 27–28.
  18. Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (Oxford University Press, 1996), 3–12.
  19. Fitzpatrick, Sheila (1994). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization . Oxford University Press. pp.  3–18.
  20. Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 4.
  21. 1 2 3 Hughes, James (Spring 1994). "Capturing the Russian Peasantry: Stalinist Grain Procurement Policy and the Ural-Siberian Method". Slavic Review. 53 (1): 76–103. doi:10.2307/2500326. JSTOR   2500326.
  22. Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin
  23. Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 234.
  24. McCauley 2008 p. 41
  25. McCauley 2008 [ page needed ]
  26. Lynne Viola. "The Peasant Nightmare: Visions of Apocalypse in the Soviet Countryside." The Journal of Modern History 62, no. 4 (1990): 751.
  27. Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 60.
  28. Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 67.
  29. Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 3.
  30. 1 2 Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 6.
  31. Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 129.
  32. Viola, "The Peasant Nightmare," 760.
  33. Lynne Viola, "Bab'i bunti and peasant women's protest during collectivization," in The Stalinist Dictatorship, ed. Chris Ward. (London; New York: Arnold, 1998), 218–19.
  34. Viola, "The Peasant Nightmare," 765.
  35. Viola, "Bab'i bunti," 218–19.
  36. Viola, "Bab'i bunti," 224–25.
  37. Viola, "Bab'i bunti," 220–22.
  38. 1 2 Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 33.
  39. 1 2 Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 49.
  40. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin, 157.
  41. Viola, "The Peasant nightmare," 762.
  42. Fitzpatrick (1994), p. 45.
  43. Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 63.
  44. Viola, "The Peasant nightmare," 767.
  45. Viola, "Bab'i bunti", 217–18.
  46. Dovzhenko, Aleksandr (October 17, 1930), Earth, Stepan Shkurat, Semyon Svashenko, Yuliya Solntseva, retrieved March 25, 2018
  47. Fainsod (1970), p. 542.
  48. 1 2 Fainsod (1970), p. 541.
  49. Fainsod (1970), p. 526.
  50. 1 2 Hubbard, Leonard E. (1939). The Economics of Soviet Agriculture. Macmillan and Co. pp.  117–18.
  51. McCauley, Martin (2013). Stalin and Stalinism. Routledge. p. 43.
  52. Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Companion by Helen Rappaport, p. 53
  53. Commerce in the Siberian town of Berdsk, early 20th century. Archived 2004-12-24 at the Wayback Machine
  54. Western-Siberian resolution of deportation of 40,000 kulaks to northern Siberia, May 5, 1931.
  55. Viola, Lynne, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1996), p. 3.
  56. Courtois, Stéphane, ed. (1999). The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press. p.  168. ISBN   978-0-674-07608-2.
  57. Pannier, Bruce (December 28, 2007). "Kazakhstan: The Forgotten Famine". Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.
  58. Conquest, Robert (October 9, 1986). "Central Asia and the Kazakh Tragedy" . Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. Oxford University Press. pp.  189–198. ISBN   978-0-19-504054-8.
  59. Courtois, S. (1997). The Black Book of Communism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 159.
  60. Courtois (1997), p. 159.
  61. "Ukrainian Famine". Excerpts from the Original Electronic Text at the web site of Revelations from the Russian Archives (Library of Congress). Hanover College.
  62. "Grain Problem". Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93. Library of Congress. December 6, 1932.
  63. Courtois (1997), p. 164.
  64. "Revelations from the Russian Archives: Ukrainian Famine". Library of Congress.
  65. "Correspondence between Joseph Stalin and Mikhail Sholokhov published in Вопросы истории, 1994, № 3, с. 9–24". Archived from the original on August 16, 2018. Retrieved November 26, 2016.
  66. Courtois, Stéphane, Werth Nicolas , Panné Jean-Louis , Paczkowski Andrzej , Bartošek Karel , Margolin Jean-Louis Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania. Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 1999. 164–165
  67. 1 2 Courtois (1997), p. 167.
  68. 1 2 Wheatcroft, Stephen; Davies, RW (2004). The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933. Palgrave MacMillan.
  69. Nove, Alec (1993). "Victims of Stalinism: How Many?". In Getty, J. Arch; Manning, Roberta T. (eds.). Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives . Cambridge University Press. pp.  266. ISBN   978-0-521-44670-9.
  70. Courtois (1997), p. 168.
  71. Merl, S. (1995). "Golod 1932–1933: Genotsid Ukraintsev dlya osushchestvleniya politiki russifikatsii? (The famine of 1932–1933: Genocide of the Ukrainians for the realization of the policy of Russification?)". Otechestvennaya istoriya. 1. pp. 49–61.
  72. Plakans, Andrejs (1995). The Latvians: A Short History . Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. pp.  155–56.
  73. Freibergs, J. (2001) [1998]. Jaunako laiku vesture 20. gadsimts. Zvaigzne ABC. ISBN   978-9984-17-049-7.
  74. Leonid Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1945: A Critical Historiographical Analysis, Routledge, New York (1999), pp. 169–71.
  75. Memorandum by Brautigam concerning conditions in occupied areas of the USSR, 25 October 1942. Archived 24 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine
  76. Joseph L. Wieczynski, ed., The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, Academic International Press, Gulf Breeze, FL, 1978, vol. 7, pp. 161–62.
  77. Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Politics (London, Macmillan, 1957), pp. 346–51; Karl Brandt, Otto Schiller, and Frantz Anlgrimm, Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), pp. 92ff. [pp. 96–99, gives an interesting case study of the dissolution process]

Further reading

Related Research Articles

History of the Soviet Union (1927–1953) aspect of history

The history of the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1953 covers the period in Soviet history from the establishment of Stalinism through victory in the Second World War and down to the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. He sought to destroy his enemies while transforming Soviet society with aggressive economic planning, in particular a sweeping collectivization of agriculture and rapid development of heavy industry. Stalin consolidated his power within the party and the state and fostered an extensive cult of personality. Soviet secret-police and the mass-mobilization Communist Party served as Stalin's major tools in molding Soviet society. Stalin's methods in achieving his goals, which included party purges, political repression of the general population, and forced collectivization, led to millions of deaths: in Gulag labor camps and during famine.

A Sovkhoz or Soviet farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name.

Agriculture in the Soviet Union was mostly collectivized, with some limited cultivation of private plots. It is often viewed as one of the more inefficient sectors of the economy of the Soviet Union. A number of food taxes were introduced in the early Soviet period despite the Decree on Land that immediately followed the October Revolution. The forced collectivization and class war against "kulaks" under Stalinism greatly disrupted farm output in the 1920s and 1930s, contributing to the Soviet famine of 1932–33. A system of state and collective farms, known as sovkhozes and kolkhozes, respectively, placed the rural population in a system intended to be unprecedentedly productive and fair but which turned out to be chronically inefficient and lacking in fairness. Under the administrations of Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev, many reforms were enacted as attempts to defray the inefficiencies of the Stalinist agricultural system. However, Marxist–Leninist ideology did not allow for any substantial amount of market mechanism to coexist alongside central planning, so the private plot fraction of Soviet agriculture, which was its most productive, remained confined to a limited role. Throughout its later decades the Soviet Union never stopped using substantial portions of the precious metals mined each year in Siberia to pay for grain imports, which has been taken by various authors as an economic indicator showing that the country's agriculture was never as successful as it ought to have been. The real numbers, however, were treated as state secrets at the time, so accurate analysis of the sector's performance was limited outside the USSR and nearly impossible to assemble within its borders. However, Soviet citizens as consumers were familiar with the fact that foods, especially meats, were often noticeably scarce, to the point that not lack of money so much as lack of things to buy with it was the limiting factor in their standard of living.

The Law of Spikelets or Law of Three Spikelets was a decree in the Soviet Union to protect state property of kolkhozes —especially the grain they produced—from theft to stop mass destruction of foodstuff during the Soviet famine of 1932–33. The decree was also known as the "Seven Eighths Law", because the date in Russian is filled into forms as 7/8/1932.

Droughts and famines in Russia and the Soviet Union

Throughout Russian history famines and droughts have been a common feature, often resulting in humanitarian crises traceable to political or economic instability, poor policy, environmental issues and war. Droughts and famines in the Russian Empire tended to occur fairly regularly, with famine occurring every 10–13 years and droughts every five to seven years. Golubev and Dronin distinguish three types of drought according to productive areas vulnerable to droughts: Central, Southern, and Eastern.

First five-year plan major centralised economic plan in the USSR

The first five-year plan of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a list of economic goals, created by Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, based on his policy of Socialism in One Country. The plan was implemented in 1928 and took effect until 1932.

Soviet famine of 1932–33 Man-made famine that affected the major grain-producing areas of the Soviet Union

The Soviet famine of 1932–33 was a major famine that killed millions of people in the major grain-producing areas of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Volga Region and Kazakhstan, the South Urals, and West Siberia. It has been estimated that between 3.3 and 3.9 million died in Ukraine and 2 million died in Kazakhstan.

Dekulakization Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the affluent kulaks (peasants) and their families between 1929–1932

Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of kulaks and their families in the 1929–1932 period of the first five-year plan. To facilitate the expropriations of farmland, the Soviet government portrayed kulaks as class enemies of the USSR.

Forced labor was used extensively in the Soviet Union as a means of controlling Soviet citizens and foreigners. Forced labor also provided manpower for government projects and for reconstruction after the war. It began before the Gulag and Kolkhoz systems were established, although through these institutions, its scope and severity were increased. The conditions that accompanied forced labor were often harsh and could be deadly.

Holodomor genocide question

The Holodomor genocide question refers to attempts to determine whether the Holodomor was an ethnic genocide against Ukrainians. The famine killed 3.3-3.9 million people in Ukraine, while the broader Soviet famine of 1932–33 killed 5.5-6.5 million people in the USSR.

Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Collectivization in Ukraine, officially the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom.

Household plot is a legally defined farm type in all former socialist countries in CIS and CEE. This is a small plot of land attached to a rural residence. The household plot is primarily cultivated for subsistence and its traditional purpose since the Soviet times has been to provide the family with food. Surplus products from the household plot are sold to neighbors, relatives, and often also in farmer markets in nearby towns. The household plot was the only form of private or family farming allowed during the Soviet era, when household plots of rural people coexisted in a symbiotic relationship with large collective and state farms. Since 1990, the household plots are classified as one of the two components of the individual farm sector, the other being peasant farms – independent family farms established for commercial production on much larger areas of agricultural land. In terms of legal organization, household plots are natural (physical) persons, whereas peasant farms generally are legal (juridical) persons.

Causes of the Holodomor

The causes of the Holodomor, the name of the famine that ravaged Soviet Ukraine in 1932–1933 whose estimates for the total number of casualties within Soviet Ukraine range between 2.2 million and 10 million, are a subject of scholarly and political debate. Some historians theorize that the famine was an unintended consequence of the economic problems associated with radical economic changes implemented during the period of Soviet industrialization. Others claim that the Soviet policies that caused the famine were an engineered attack on Ukrainian nationalism, or more broadly, on all peasants, in order to prevent uprisings. Some suggest that the famine may fall under the legal definition of genocide.

The last major famine to hit the USSR began in July 1946, reached its peak in February–August 1947 and then quickly diminished in intensity, although there were still some famine deaths in 1948. The situation spanned most of the grain-producing regions of the country: Ukraine, Moldova and parts of central Russia. The conditions were caused by drought, the effects of which were exacerbated by the devastation caused by World War II. The grain harvest in 1946 totaled 39.6 million tons – barely 40% of the yield in 1940. With the war, there was a significant decrease in the number of able-bodied men in the rural population, retreating to 1931 levels. There was a shortage of agricultural machinery and horses. The Soviet government with its grain reserves provided relief to rural areas and appealed to the United Nations for relief. Assistance also came from the Ukrainian diaspora and Russians from eastern Ukraine and from North America, which minimized mortality.

Collective farming Type of agricultural organization

Collective farming and communal farming are various types of "agricultural production in which multiple farmers run their holdings as a joint enterprise". There are two broad types of communal farms: Agricultural cooperatives, in which member-owners jointly engage in farming activities as a collective, and state farms, which are owned and directly run by a centralized government. The process by which farmland is aggregated is called collectivization. In some countries, there have been both state-run and cooperative-run variants. For example, the Soviet Union had both kolkhozy and sovkhozy.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was an economic policy of the Soviet Union proposed by Vladimir Lenin in 1921 as a temporary expedient. Lenin characterized the NEP in 1922 as an economic system that would include "a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control," while socialized state enterprises would operate on "a profit basis."

Kulak wealthy independent farmer in the Russian Empire, designated as class enemy in the Soviet Union

Kulak, or golchomag was the term used towards the end of the Russian Empire to describe peasants with over 8 acres of land. In the early Soviet Union, particularly Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, kulak became a vague reference to property ownership among peasants who were considered "hesitant" allies of the revolution.

A kolkhoz was a form of collective farm in the Soviet Union. Kolkhozes existed along with state farms or sovkhoz. These were the two components of the socialized farm sector that began to emerge in Soviet agriculture after the October Revolution of 1917, as an antithesis both to the feudal structure of impoverished serfdom and aristocratic landlords and to individual or family farming.

The Soviet grain procurement crisis of 1928, sometimes referred to as "the crisis of NEP," was a pivotal economic event which took place in the Soviet Union beginning in January 1928 during which the quantities of wheat, rye, and other cereal crops made available for purchase by the state fell to levels regarded by planners as inadequate to support the needs of the country's urban population. Failure of the state to make successful use of the price system to generate sufficient grain sales was met with a regimen of increasingly harsh administrative sanctions against the Soviet peasantry. The state of national emergency which followed led to the termination of the New Economic Policy and spurred a move towards the collectivization of agriculture in 1929.

Operation Osen was a mass deportation carried out by the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR in the autumn of 1951. During the operation, more than 5,000 families were transported to remote regions of the Soviet Union. It was the last large deportation in the series of Soviet deportations from Lithuania. The operation was a dekulakization campaign specifically targeting peasants who resisted collectivisation and refused to join the kolkhozes.