Military alliance

Last updated
European military alliances prior to World War I .mw-parser-output .legend{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}.mw-parser-output .legend-color{display:inline-block;min-width:1.25em;height:1.25em;line-height:1.25;margin:1px 0;text-align:center;border:1px solid black;background-color:transparent;color:black}.mw-parser-output .legend-text{} Triple Entente Triple Alliance Map Europe alliances 1914-en.svg
European military alliances prior to World War I
Two military alliances (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact) in Europe during the Cold War Cold war europe military alliances map en.png
Two military alliances (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact) in Europe during the Cold War

A military alliance is a formal agreement between nations that specifies mutual obligations regarding national security. In the event a nation is attacked, members of the alliance are often obligated to come to their defense regardless if attacked directly. Military alliances can be classified into defense pacts, non-aggression pacts, and ententes. Alliances may be covert (as was common from 1870 to 1916) or public. [1]

Contents

According to a 2002 dataset of military alliances, there have been 538 alliance treaties from 1815 to 2003. [2] The vast majority of the alliances involve commitments to come to the military support of one ally involved in war. [2] The vast majority are defensive in nature. [2] Since the end of the Second World War, military alliances have usually behaved less aggressively and act more as a deterrent. [3]

Characteristics

Military alliances are related to collective security systems but can differ in nature. An early 1950s memorandum from the United States Department of State explained the difference by noting that historically, alliances "were designed to advance the respective nationalistic interests of the parties, and provided for joint military action if one of the parties in pursuit of such objectives became involved in war." A collective security arrangement "is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting 'balance of power' but to strengthen the 'balance of principle'." [4]

The obvious motivation in states engaging in military alliances is to protect themselves against threats from other countries. However, states have also entered into alliances to improve ties with a particular nation or to manage conflict with a particular nation. [5]

The nature of alliances, including their formation and cohesiveness (or lack thereof), is a subject of much academic study past and present. Influential works include those by Glenn Snyder, Stephen Walt, [6] and Kenneth Waltz. Kenneth Waltz outlined in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics a neorealist theory of international politics where he argued that balances of power tend to form in world politics. [7] Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to the study of military alliances in international relations; the two perspectives dominated international relations theory from the 1960s to the 1990s. [8] Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the understanding of military alliances in the classical realist tradition of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr. Neorealism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neorealism.

During peace-time, according to a 2019 study, almost all alliances from 1870 to 1916 may have been covert or implied. In other time periods, covert alliances have been rare. The study argues that from 1870 to 1916, the unusual amount of covert alliances was incentivized by other covert alliances. The creation of public alliances would signal to the covert ally that the public alliance was more valuable. [1] According to Ronald Krebs, pre-WWII alliances were generally "relatively simple, short-lived affairs." [9]

Common problems for alliances revolve around free-riding and burden-sharing. [10] [11] [12] Members of an alliance have incentives not to contribute to the alliance while simultaneously benefiting on the public goods provided by the alliance. According to Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser's classic study of alliances, small states frequently free-ride on the large state's contributions to an alliance. [13] Small allies that are militarily vulnerable are less likely to free-ride, whereas strategically important small allies are most likely to free-ride. [14] Alliances may also lead to moral hazard whereby allies behave more aggressively and recklessly if they believe that the alliance will aid them in any conflict. [15] [16] On the whole, alliances do deter aggression on net. [17]

Within alliances, actors may fear entrapment or abandonment. [18] [19] [20] Entrapment means that allies get dragged into a conflict over one ally's interests that the other allies do not share. [18] Scholars have disputed the prevalence of entrapment, [21] [22] with Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth writing "it is nearly impossible to find a clear case of entrapment actually occurring." [23] Abandonment means that allies do not come to the rescue of a fellow ally. [18] Strong commitments to an alliance can reduce the bargaining power of that ally vis-a-vis the other allies. [18] However, an ally whose commitment to the alliance is in doubt has greater bargaining leverage. [18] Weak alliance commitments can make it easier for the ally to realign the alliance if a fellow ally is considered unsatisfactory. [18] Strong alliance commitments may strengthen the adversary's alliance, as the adversary may face a greater threat. [18]

The failure of a strong ally to come to the rescue of a weaker ally (abandonment) may jeopardize the strong ally's other alliances. However, it may also strengthen the other alliances, as the other allies may sometimes prefer that the strong ally abandons a weak ally if it is likely to raise the risks of military escalation for the other allies. [24]

European historiography

In the European historical context, a military alliance can be viewed as a league between independent states, defined by treaty, for the purpose of combined action, defensive or offensive, or both. The oldest such alliance in the world today is the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, dating back to 1373 where the then Kingdoms of England and Portugal pledged to "perpetual friendship" between the two countries. This remains in action today between the current United Kingdom and Portugal, and the two have never fought against each other in any military campaign. Alliances have often been directed to specific objects carefully defined in the treaties. Thus the Triple Alliance of 1668 between Great Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands, and the Grand Alliance of 1689 between the Holy Roman Empire, Holland, England, Spain and Saxony, were both directed against the power of Louis XIV of France. The Quadruple or Grand Alliance of 1814, defined in the Treaty of Chaumont, between Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, had for its object the overthrow of Napoleon and his dynasty, and the confining of France within her traditional boundaries. The Triple Alliance of 1882 between Germany, Austria and Italy was ostensibly directed to the preservation of European peace against any possible aggressive action of France or Russia; and this led in turn, some ten years later, to the Dual Alliance between Russia and France, for mutual support in case of any hostile action of the other powers. [25]

Occasionally, however, attempts have been made to give alliances a more general character. Thus the Holy Alliance of 26 September 1815 was an attempt, inspired by the religious idealism of the Emperor Alexander I of Russia, to find in the "sacred precepts of the Gospel", [25] a common basis for a general league of the European governments, its object being, primarily, the preservation of peace. So, too, by Article VI of the Quadruple Treaty signed at Paris on 20 November 1815 – which renewed that of Chaumont and was again renewed, in 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle – the scope of the Grand Alliance was extended to objects of common interest not specifically stated in the treaties. The article runs: "In order to consolidate the intimate tie which unites the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own auspices or by their respective ministers, meetings consecrated to great common objects and to the examination of such measures as at each one of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations and the maintenance of the tranquility of Europe". [25]

It was this article of the treaty of the 20 November 1815, rather than the Holy Alliance, that formed the basis of the serious effort made by the great powers, between 1815 and 1822, to govern Europe in concert. In general it proved that an alliance, to be effective, must be clearly defined as to its objects, and that in the long run the treaty in which these objects are defined must – to quote Otto von Bismarck's somewhat cynical dictum – "be reinforced by the interests" of the parties concerned. [25] Yet the "moral alliance" of Europe, as Count Karl Nesselrode called it, [25] though it failed to secure the permanent harmony of the powers, was an effective instrument for peace during the years immediately following the downfall of Napoleon; and it set the precedent for those periodical meetings of the representatives of the powers, for the discussion and settlement of questions of international importance, which, though cumbrous and inefficient for constructive work, contributed much to the preservation of the general peace during much of the nineteenth century. [25]

See also

Notes

  1. 1 2 Kuo, Raymond (2019). "Secrecy among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 64: 63–89. doi:10.1177/0022002719849676. ISSN   0022-0027. S2CID   182507234.
  2. 1 2 3 Frieden, Jeffry A. (2018). World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions (4 ed.). W W NORTON. p. 190. ISBN   978-0-393-67510-8. OCLC   1197968459.
  3. ↑ Leeds, Brett Ashley (2003). "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes". American Journal of Political Science. 47 (3): 427–439. doi:10.2307/3186107. ISSN   0092-5853. JSTOR   3186107. Archived from the original on 2022-09-23. Retrieved 2021-06-22.
  4. ↑ Tucker, Robert; Hendrickson, David C. (1992). The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose . Council on Foreign Relations. pp.  64–65.
  5. ↑ Weitsman, Patricia A. (2004). Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford University Press. pp. 18–19. ISBN   978-0-8047-4866-7. Archived from the original on 2023-11-07. Retrieved 2023-10-30.
  6. ↑ Byman, Daniel (October 2006). "Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism" (PDF). The Journal of Strategic Studies. 29 (5): 767–811. doi:10.1080/01402390600900887. S2CID   14316259. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2015-04-05.
  7. ↑ According to Sagan 2004 , p. 91 n.4, Waltz's book remains "the seminal text of neorealism".
  8. ↑ Powell, Robert (1994). "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate". International Organization. 48 (2): 313. doi:10.1017/s0020818300028204. S2CID   45773252. Archived from the original on 24 December 2022.
  9. ↑ Krebs, Ronald R. (1999). "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict". International Organization. 53 (2): 343–377. doi:10.1162/002081899550904. ISSN   0020-8183. JSTOR   2601392. S2CID   37524225. Archived from the original on 2022-09-23. Retrieved 2021-12-05.
  10. ↑ Blankenship, Brian D. (2023). The Burden-Sharing Dilemma: Coercive Diplomacy in US Alliance Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-1-5017-7247-4. JSTOR   10.7591/jj.130890.
  11. ↑ Blankenship, Brian (2024). "Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance Burden Sharing". The Washington Quarterly. 47 (1): 41–61. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2024.2323898. ISSN   0163-660X.
  12. ↑ Zyla, Benjamin (2023), "Burden-sharing", Research Handbook on NATO, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 369–384, ISBN   978-1-83910-339-1
  13. ↑ Olson, Mancur; Zeckhauser, Richard (1966). "An Economic Theory of Alliances". The Review of Economics and Statistics. 48 (3): 266–279. doi:10.2307/1927082. ISSN   0034-6535. JSTOR   1927082. Archived from the original on 2023-03-15. Retrieved 2021-08-02.
  14. ↑ Blankenship, Brian (2022). "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure". Security Studies. 30 (5): 691–724. doi:10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624. ISSN   0963-6412. S2CID   245600314. Archived from the original on 2023-11-07. Retrieved 2021-12-31.
  15. ↑ Benson, Brett V.; Meirowitz, Adam; Ramsay, Kristopher W. (2014). "Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 58 (2): 307–335. doi:10.1177/0022002712467936. ISSN   0022-0027. S2CID   54823122. Archived from the original on 2023-11-07. Retrieved 2021-12-12.
  16. ↑ Benson, Brett V. (2012). Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139225694. ISBN   978-1-107-02724-4. Archived from the original on 2023-03-29. Retrieved 2021-12-12.
  17. ↑ Benson, Brett V. (2011). "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816–2000". The Journal of Politics. 73 (4): 1111–1127. doi:10.1017/s0022381611000867. ISSN   0022-3816.
  18. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Snyder, Glenn H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics". World Politics. 36 (4): 461–495. doi:10.2307/2010183. ISSN   0043-8871. JSTOR   2010183. S2CID   154759602. Archived from the original on 2023-03-26. Retrieved 2022-02-01.
  19. ↑ Henry, Iain D. (2020). "What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence". International Security. 44 (4): 45–83. doi: 10.1162/isec_a_00375 . hdl: 1885/206720 . ISSN   0162-2889. S2CID   215747296.
  20. ↑ Lanoszka, Alexander (2018). "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War". Contemporary Security Policy. 39 (2): 234–257. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102. ISSN   1352-3260. S2CID   158217866. Archived from the original on 2023-11-07. Retrieved 2022-02-01.
  21. ↑ Beckley, Michael (2015). "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts". International Security. 39 (4): 7–48. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00197. ISSN   0162-2889.
  22. ↑ Kim, Tongfi (2011). "Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States". Security Studies. 20 (3): 350–377. doi:10.1080/09636412.2011.599201. hdl: 10072/41644 . ISSN   0963-6412. S2CID   144808663. Archived from the original on 2023-07-19. Retrieved 2023-07-19.
  23. ↑ Brooks, Stephen G.; Ikenberry, G. John; Wohlforth, William C. (2012). "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment". International Security. 37 (3): 7–51. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00107. ISSN   0162-2889. JSTOR   41804173. S2CID   57564135. Archived from the original on 2023-07-19. Retrieved 2023-07-19.
  24. ↑ Henry, Iain D. (2022). Reliability and Alliance Interdependence: The United States and Its Allies in Asia, 1949–1969. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-1-5017-6305-2. Archived from the original on 2023-03-26. Retrieved 2022-04-29.
  25. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Phillips 1911, p. 695.

Related Research Articles

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that emphasizes the role of power politics in international relations, sees competition and conflict as enduring features and sees limited potential for cooperation. The anarchic state of the international system means that states cannot be certain of other states' intentions and their security, thus prompting them to engage in power politics.

Regime change is the partly forcible or coercive replacement of one government regime with another. Regime change may replace all or part of the state's most critical leadership system, administrative apparatus, or bureaucracy. Regime change may occur through domestic processes, such as revolution, coup, or reconstruction of government following state failure or civil war. It can also be imposed on a country by foreign actors through invasion, overt or covert interventions, or coercive diplomacy. Regime change may entail the construction of new institutions, the restoration of old institutions, and the promotion of new ideologies.

In international relations, power is defined in several different ways. Material definitions of state power emphasize economic and military power. Other definitions of power emphasize the ability to structure and constitute the nature of social relations between actors. Power is an attribute of particular actors in their interactions, as well as a social process that constitutes the social identities and capacities of actors.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Peace treaty</span> Agreement to formally end hostilities between two or more warring parties

A peace treaty is an agreement between two or more hostile parties, usually countries or governments, which formally ends a state of war between the parties. It is different from an armistice, which is an agreement to stop hostilities; a surrender, in which an army agrees to give up arms; or a ceasefire or truce, in which the parties may agree to temporarily or permanently stop fighting.

Bilateralism is the conduct of political, economic, or cultural relations between two sovereign states. It is in contrast to unilateralism or multilateralism, which is activity by a single state or jointly by multiple states, respectively. When states recognize one another as sovereign states and agree to diplomatic relations, they create a bilateral relationship. States with bilateral ties will exchange diplomatic agents such as ambassadors to facilitate dialogues and cooperations.

Grand strategy or high strategy is a state's strategy of how means can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Issues of grand strategy typically include the choice of military doctrine, force structure and alliances, as well as economic relations, diplomatic behavior, and methods to extract or mobilize resources.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deterrence theory</span> Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons

Deterrence theory refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some other course of action. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction, according to which a full-scale nuclear attack on a power with second-strike capability would devastate both parties. The central problem of deterrence revolves around how to credibly threaten military action or nuclear punishment on the adversary despite its costs to the deterrer. Deterrence in an international relations context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict.

Economic interdependence is the mutual dependence of the participants in an economic system who trade in order to obtain the products they cannot produce efficiently for themselves. Such trading relationships require that the behavior of a participant affects its trading partners and it would be costly to rupture their relationship. The subject was addressed by A. A. Cournot who wrote: "...but in reality the economic system is a whole in which all of the parts are connected and react on one another. An increase in the income of the producers of commodity A will affect the demands for commodities B, C, etc. and the incomes of their producers, and by its reaction will affect the demand for commodity A." Economic Interdependence is evidently a consequence of the division of labour.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Interventionism (politics)</span> Interference by one country in the affairs of another

Interventionism, in international politics, is the interference of a state or group of states into the domestic affairs of another state for the purposes of coercing that state to do something or refrain from doing something. The intervention can be conducted through military force or economic coercion. A different term, economic interventionism, refers to government interventions into markets at home.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Realism (international relations)</span> School of thought

Realism, a school of thought in international relations theory, is a theoretical framework that views world politics as an enduring competition among self-interested states vying for power and positioning within an anarchic global system devoid of a centralized authority. It centers on states as rational primary actors navigating a system shaped by power politics, national interest, and a pursuit of security and self-preservation.

Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes three types of systems: unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity for three or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and influence of states in a region or globally.

In international relations theory, the concept of anarchy is the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority or sovereignty. In an anarchic state, there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, or order the system of international politics. In international relations, anarchy is widely accepted as the starting point for international relations theory.

The San Francisco System is a network of alliances pursued by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, after the end of World War II – the United States as a "hub", and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand as "spokes". The system is made of bilateral political-military and economic commitments between the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies. This system stands in contrast to a multilateral alliance, such as NATO.

Liberal institutionalism is a theory of international relations that holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, or commercial peace, posits that market openness contributes to more peaceful behavior among states, and that developed market-oriented economies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another. Along with the democratic peace theory and institutionalist arguments for peace, the commercial peace forms part of the Kantian tripod for peace. Prominent mechanisms for the commercial peace revolve around how capitalism, trade interdependence, and capital interdependence raise the costs of warfare, incentivize groups to lobby against war, make it harder for leaders to go to war, and reduce the economic benefits of conquest.

Glenn Herald Snyder was professor emeritus of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His expertise was in the fields of international relations theory and security studies. He made influential contribution to the study of alliances and deterrence theory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Patricia A. Weitsman</span> American political scientist and international relations scholar

Patricia Ann Weitsman was an American political scientist and international relations professor at Ohio University where she was also Director of War and Peace Studies. She specialized in security studies and international relations theory, especially on topics related to military alliances.

Wedge strategies in diplomacy are used to prevent, divide, and weaken an adversary coalition. Wedge strategies can take the shape of reward-based or coercive-based. Alignment abnormalities can arise because of wedge strategies.

In international relations, credibility is the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made. Credibility is a key component of coercion, as well as the functioning of military alliances. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation and resolve. Reputation for resolve may be a key component of credibility, but credibility is also highly context-dependent.

In international relations, coercion refers to the imposition of costs by a state on other states and non-state actors to prevent them from taking an action (deterrence) or to compel them to take an action (compellence). Coercion frequently takes the form of threats or the use of limited military force. It is commonly seen as analytically distinct from persuasion, brute force, or full-on war.

References

Further reading

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.