Tragedy of the commons

Fat-tailed sheep in Afghanistan. The "tragedy of the commons" is one way of accounting for overexploitation.

The tragedy of the commons describes a situation in economic science when individual users, who have open access to a resource unhampered by shared social structures or formal rules that govern access and use, act independently according to their own self-interest and, contrary to the common good of all users, cause depletion of the resource through their uncoordinated action. The concept originated in an essay written in 1833 by the British economist William Forster Lloyd, who used a hypothetical example of the effects of unregulated grazing on common land (also known as a "common") in Great Britain and Ireland. ^[1] The concept became widely known as the "tragedy of the commons" over a century later after an article written by Garrett Hardin in 1968. ^[2]

Although open-access resource systems may collapse due to overuse (such as in over-fishing), many examples have existed and still do exist where members of a community with regulated access to a common resource co-operate to exploit those resources prudently without collapse ^{[3] [4]} or even creating "perfect order". ^[5] Elinor Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic science for demonstrating exactly this concept in her book Governing the Commons, which included examples of how local communities were able to do this without top-down regulations or privatization. ^[6]

In a modern economic context, "commons" is taken to mean any open-access and unregulated resource such as the atmosphere, oceans, rivers, ocean fish stocks, or even an office refrigerator. In a legal context, it is a type of property that is neither private nor public, but rather held jointly by the members of a community, who govern access and use through social structures, traditions, or formal rules. ^[7]

The term is used also in environmental science. The "tragedy of the commons" is often cited in connection with sustainable development, meshing economic growth and environmental protection, as well as in the debate over global warming. It has also been used in analyzing behavior in the fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, game theory, politics, taxation, and sociology.

Expositions

Cows on Selsley Common, UK. Lloyd used shared grazing of common land as an illustration of where abuse of rights could occur.

Lloyd's pamphlet

In 1833, the English economist William Forster Lloyd published a pamphlet which included a hypothetical example of over-use of a common resource. This was the situation of cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they were each entitled to let their cows graze, as was the custom in English villages. He postulated that if a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result. For each additional animal, a herder could receive additional benefits, while the whole group shared the resulting damage to the commons. If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all. ^[1]

Garrett Hardin's article

The Tragedy of the Commons
Presented	13 December 1968
Location	Science
Author(s)	Garrett Hardin
Media type	Article

In 1968, ecologist Garrett Hardin explored this social dilemma in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons", published in the journal Science . ^[2] The essay derived its title from the pamphlet by Lloyd, which he cites, on the over-grazing of common land.

Hardin discussed problems that cannot be solved by technical means, as distinct from those with solutions that require "a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality". Hardin focused on human population growth, the use of the Earth's natural resources, and the welfare state. ^[8] Hardin argued that if individuals relied on themselves alone, and not on the relationship of society and man, then the number of children had by each family would not be of public concern. Parents breeding excessively would leave fewer descendants because they would be unable to provide for each child adequately. Such negative feedback is found in the animal kingdom. ^[8] Hardin said that if the children of improvident parents starved to death, if overbreeding was its own punishment, then there would be no public interest in controlling the breeding of families. ^[8] Hardin blamed the welfare state for allowing the tragedy of the commons; where the state provides for children and supports overbreeding as a fundamental human right, Malthusian catastrophe is inevitable. Consequently, in his article, Hardin lamented the following proposal from the United Nations:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. [Article 16] ^[9] It follows that any choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.

—  U Thant, Statement on Population by the Secretary-General of the United Nations ^[10]

In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be depleted. Overall, Hardin argued against relying on conscience as a means of policing commons, suggesting that this favors selfish individuals – often known as free riders  – over those who are more altruistic.

In the context of avoiding over-exploitation of common resources, Hardin concluded by restating Hegel's maxim (which was quoted by Engels), "freedom is the recognition of necessity". He suggested that "freedom" completes the tragedy of the commons. By recognizing resources as commons in the first place, and by recognizing that, as such, they require management, Hardin believed that humans "can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms".

The "Commons" as a modern resource concept

Hardin's article was the start of the modern use of "Commons" as a term connoting a shared resource. As Frank van Laerhoven and Elinor Ostrom have stated: "Prior to the publication of Hardin’s article on the tragedy of the commons (1968), titles containing the words 'the commons', 'common pool resources,' or 'common property' were very rare in the academic literature." They go on to say: "In 2002, Barrett and Mabry conducted a major survey of biologists to determine which publications in the twentieth century had become classic books or benchmark publications in biology. They report that Hardin’s 1968 article was the one having the greatest career impact on biologists and is the most frequently cited". ^[11]

Application

Metaphoric meaning

Like Lloyd and Thomas Malthus before him, Hardin was primarily interested in the problem of human population growth. But in his essay, he also focused on the use of larger (though finite) resources such as the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, as well as pointing out the "negative commons" of pollution (i.e., instead of dealing with the deliberate privatization of a positive resource, a "negative commons" deals with the deliberate commonization of a negative cost, pollution).

As a metaphor, the tragedy of the commons should not be taken too literally. The "tragedy" is not in the word's conventional or theatric sense, nor a condemnation of the processes that lead to it. Similarly, Hardin's use of "commons" has frequently been misunderstood, leading him to later remark that he should have titled his work "The Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons". ^{[12] [13]}

The metaphor illustrates the argument that free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation, temporarily or permanently. This occurs because the benefits of exploitation accrue to individuals or groups, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource to the point in which they become reliant on it, while the costs of the exploitation are borne by all those to whom the resource is available (which may be a wider class of individuals than those who are exploiting it). This, in turn, causes demand for the resource to increase, which causes the problem to snowball until the resource collapses (even if it retains a capacity to recover). The rate at which depletion of the resource is realized depends primarily on three factors: the number of users wanting to consume the common in question, the consumptive nature of their uses, and the relative robustness of the common. ^[14]

The same concept is sometimes called the "tragedy of the fishers", because fishing too many fish before or during breeding could cause stocks to plummet. ^[15]

Modern commons

The tragedy of the commons can be considered in relation to environmental issues such as sustainability. The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water, forests, ^[16] fish, and non-renewable energy sources such as oil and coal.

Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and destruction of the Grand Banks, the destruction of salmon runs on rivers that have been dammed – most prominently in modern times on the Columbia River in the Northwest United States, and historically in North Atlantic rivers – the devastation of the sturgeon fishery – in modern Russia, but historically in the United States as well – and, in terms of water supply, the limited water available in arid regions (e.g., the area of the Aral Sea) and the Los Angeles water system supply, especially at Mono Lake and Owens Lake.

In economics, an externality is a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit. Negative externalities are a well-known feature of the "tragedy of the commons". For example, driving cars has many negative externalities; these include pollution, carbon emissions, and traffic accidents. Every time 'Person A' gets in a car, it becomes more likely that 'Person Z' – and millions of others – will suffer in each of those areas. ^[17] Economists often urge the government to adopt policies that "internalize" an externality. ^[18]

The tragedy of commons can also be referred to the idea of open data. Anonymised data are crucial for useful social research and represent therefore a public resource – better said a common good – which is liable to exhaustion. Some feel that the law should provide a safe haven for the dissemination of research data, since it can be argued that current data protection policies overburden valuable research without mitigating realistic risks. ^[19]

Tragedy of the Digital Commons  

In the past two decades, scholars have been attempting to apply the concept of the Tragedy of the Commons to the digital environment. However, between scholars there are differences on some very basic notions inherent to the tragedy of the commons – the idea of finite resources and the extent of pollution. On the other hand there seems to be some agreement on the role of the Digital Divide and how to solve a potential Tragedy of the Digital Commons.  

Resources and Pollution

In terms of resources, there is no coherent conception of whether digital resources are finite. Some scholars argue that digital resources are infinite because downloading a file does not constitute the destruction of the file in the digital environment. Digital resources, as such, are merely replicated and disseminated throughout the digital environment and as such can be understood as infinite. ^[20] While others argue that data, for example, is a finite resource because privacy laws and regulations put a significant strain on the access to data. ^[21]  

This begs the question whether one can view access itself as a finite resource in the context of a digital environment. Some scholars argue this point, often pointing to a proxy for access that is more concrete and measurable. One such proxy is bandwidth, which can become congested when too many people try to access the digital environment. ^{[20] [22]} Alternatively, one can think of the network itself as a common resource which can be exhausted through overuse. ^[23] Therefore when talking about resources running out in a digital environment, it could be more useful to think in terms of the access to the digital environment being restricted in some way – this is called information entropy.

In terms of pollution, there are some scholars that look only at the pollution that occurs in the digital environment itself. They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources can cause an overproduction of redundant data which causes noise and corrupts communication channels within the digital environment. ^[20] Others argue that the pollution caused by the overuse of digital resources also causes pollution in the physical environment. They argue that unrestricted use of digital resources causes misinformation, fake news, crime, and terrorism, as well as problems of a different nature such as confusion, manipulation, insecurity, and loss of confidence. ^[24]

Digital Divide and Solutions

Scholars disagree on the particularities underlying the Tragedy of the Digital Commons, however, there does seem to be some agreement on the cause and the solution. The cause of the Tragedy of the Commons occurring in the digital environment is attributed by some scholars to the Digital Divide. They argue that there is too large a focus on bridging this divide and provide unrestricted access to everyone. Such a focus on increasing access without the necessary restrictions causes the exploitation of digital resources for individual self interest that is underlying any Tragedy of the Commons. ^{[20] [22]}

In terms of the solution, scholars agree that cooperation rather than regulation is the best way to mitigate a Tragedy of the Digital Commons. The digital world is not a closed system in which a central authority can regulate the users, as such some scholars argue that voluntary cooperation must be fostered. ^[22] This could perhaps be done through digital governance structure that motivates multiple stakeholders to engage and collaborate in the decision-making process. ^[24] Other scholars argue more in favor of formal or informal sets of rules, like a code of conduct, to promote ethical behavior in the digital environment and foster trust. ^{[20] [25]} Alternative to managing relations between people, some scholars argue that it is access itself that needs to be properly managed, which includes expansion of network capacity. ^[23]

Examples

More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual tragedies include:

Clearing rainforest for agriculture in southern Mexico.

• Planet Earth ecology
  • Uncontrolled human population growth leading to overpopulation. ^[2]
  • Atmosphere, through the release of pollution that leads to ozone depletion, global warming, ocean acidification (by way of increased atmospheric CO2 being absorbed by the sea), and particulate pollution
  • Light pollution  – with the loss of the night sky for research and cultural significance, affected human, flora and fauna health, nuisance, trespass and the loss of enjoyment or function of private property. ^[26]
  • Water  – Water pollution, water crisis of over-extraction of groundwater and wasting water due to overirrigation ^[27]
  • Forests  – Frontier logging of old growth forest and slash and burn ^[28]
  • Energy resources and climate  – Environmental residue of mining and drilling, Burning of fossil fuels and consequential global warming
  • Animals  – Habitat destruction and poaching leading to the Holocene mass extinction ^[29]
  • Oceans  – Overfishing ^{[30] [31]}
  • Human and wildlife conflict.^{[ citation needed ]}

• Human health
  • A preference for sons made people abort foetal girls. This results in an imbalanced sex ratio. ^[32]
  • indoor air ^{[ citation needed ]}
  • Antibiotics  – Antibiotic Resistance Mis-use of antibiotics anywhere in the world will eventually result in antibiotic resistance developing at an accelerated rate. The resulting antibiotic resistance has spread (and will likely continue to do so in the future) to other bacteria and other regions, hurting or destroying the Antibiotic Commons that is shared on a worldwide basis ^[33]
  • Vaccines  – Herd immunity Avoiding a vaccine shot and relying on the established herd immunity instead will avoid potential vaccine risks, but if everyone does this, it will diminish herd immunity and bring risk to individuals that cannot receive vaccines for medical reasons. ^[34]

• Publicly shared resources
  • Spam email degrades the usefulness of the email system and increases the cost for all users of the Internet while providing a benefit to only a tiny number of individuals.
  • Wi-Fi and its overcrowded 2.4 GHz channels.
  • Vandalism and littering in public spaces such as parks, recreation areas, and public restrooms.
  • Hoarding of items such as toilet paper during a perceived threat such as weather events or disease epidemics results in a few people having excess and many people not having enough.
  • Knowledge commons encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods in the information age, including, for example:
    • source code and software documentation in software projects that can get "polluted" with messy code or inaccurate information. ^[35]
    • Skills acquisition and training, when all parties involved pass the buck on implementing it. ^[36]
  • Electric vehicle (EV) charging station blocked by parked vehicles, ICE vehicles whose drivers resent EVs, EVs that overstay time limits, and EVs whose owners have no intention of charging but feel they are entitled to park.
  • Space debris in Earth's surrounding space leading to limited locations for new satellites and the obstruction of universal observations. ^[37]

Application to evolutionary biology

A parallel was drawn recently between the tragedy of the commons and the competing behaviour of parasites that through acting selfishly eventually diminish or destroy their common host. ^[38] The idea has also been applied to areas such as the evolution of virulence or sexual conflict, where males may fatally harm females when competing for matings. ^[39]

The idea of evolutionary suicide, where adaptation at the level of the individual causes the whole species or population to be driven extinct, can be seen as an extreme form of an evolutionary tragedy of the commons. ^{[40] [41]} From an evolutionary point of view, the creation of the tragedy of the commons in pathogenic microbes may provide us with advanced therapeutic methods. ^{[42] [ better source needed ]}

Commons dilemma

The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the common good. ^[43] In academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common pool resource .

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or over-harvest common resources in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to management of commons.

In game theory, which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs – Privatize Profits Game (CC–PP game).

Psychological factors

Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames. They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment). Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task. ^[44]

Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables. ^{[45] [ full citation needed ]} Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework. ^[46] An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness, ^{[47] [48] [ full citation needed ]} suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"

Strategic factors

Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence – first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first – the leaders – are higher than the harvest of those coming later – the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule. Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations. Research ^{[ by whom? ]} found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.

Structural factors

Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." ^[49] One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common. Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task. Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. A general aversion to autocratic leadership exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.

The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources. Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation – for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses. Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool. ^[50] The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood. ^[51]

Solutions

See also: Externality § Possible solutions

Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of political philosophy. In many situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well. When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.

Non-governmental solution

Robert Axelrod contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests. ^[52] Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticized those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge." ^[53]

Political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded 2009's Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999. ^[54] They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves. ^[55] For example, it was found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland. In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency. ^{[56] [57]}

Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many nomadic pastoralist societies of Africa and the Middle East in fact "balanced local stocking ratios against seasonal rangeland conditions in ways that were ecologically sound", reflecting a desire for lower risk rather than higher profit; in spite of this, it was often the case that "the nomad was blamed for problems that were not of his own making and were a product of alien forces." ^[58] Independently finding precedent in the opinions of previous scholars such as Ibn Khaldun as well as common currency in antagonistic cultural attitudes towards non-sedentary peoples, ^[58] governments and international organizations have made use of Hardin's work to help justify restrictions on land access and the eventual sedentarization of pastoral nomads despite its weak empirical basis. Examining relations between historically nomadic Bedouin Arabs and the Syrian state in the 20th century, Dawn Chatty notes that "Hardin's argument […] was curiously accepted as the fundamental explanation for the degradation of the steppe land" in development schemes for the arid interior of the country, downplaying the larger role of agricultural overexploitation in desertification as it melded with prevailing nationalist ideology which viewed nomads as socially backward and economically harmful. ^[59]

Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management. One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g. land) can be preserved much more easily. A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion, and it must be difficult to find substitutes. The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better. ^[56] A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse. When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used. ^[55]

One schema^{[ citation needed ]} that solves the Tragedy is if the total amount of common goods is measurable and if there is a majority who sets up the following rules: people have to pay proportionally for their consumption if they report it, but those who refuse to tell, have to pay an equal portion of the amount that is left of the total consumption after subtracting those of all reporting individuals. Since people will consume mostly diverse amounts, those who can, consume less, and are thus interested in joining the club of those who report and pay proportionally. This goes on until only the biggest consumer won't be reporting, but they don't have to, as their share can already be calculated by subtracting all the reported values from the total consumption.^{[ citation needed ]}

Governmental solutions

Governmental solutions may be necessary when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being too big or too unstable to provide a thick social network). Examples of government regulation include privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.

Privatization

One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property, giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability. Libertarians and classical liberals cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when Lockean property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government. ^[60] They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it. ^[61]

In England, this solution was attempted in the Inclosure Acts.

Regulation

In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual. Permit systems for extractive economic activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising, and timber extraction are examples of this approach. Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons. This idea is used by the United Nations Moon Treaty, Outer Space Treaty and Law of the Sea Treaty as well as the UNESCO World Heritage Convention (treaty) which involves the international law principle that designates some areas or resources the Common Heritage of Mankind. ^[62]

In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, Managing the Commons, co-written with John A. Baden. ^[63] He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the "reproductive right", to safeguard all other rights. Several countries have a variety of population control laws in place.

German historian Joachim Radkau thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies. ^[64] An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict private property and espouse expansion of public property. ^{[65] [66]}

Internalizing externalities

Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation. As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons. Internalizing the externalities, in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation. One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution. This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.

The Mid-Way Solution

One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community. By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only. Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability, and legal aspects, etc.^{[ citation needed ]}

Criticism

Hardin's work is criticised as historically inaccurate in failing to account for the demographic transition, ^[67] and for failing to distinguish between common property and open access resources. ^{[68] [69]} In a similar vein, Carl Dahlman argues that commons were effectively managed to prevent overgrazing. ^[70] Likewise, Susan Jane Buck Cox argues that the common land example used to argue this economic concept is on very weak historical ground, and misrepresents what she terms was actually the "triumph of the commons": the successful common usage of land for many centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not the behaviour of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons. ^[4]

Radical environmentalist Derrick Jensen claims the tragedy of the commons is used as propaganda for private ownership. ^{[71] [ page needed ]} He says it has been used by the political right wing to hasten the final enclosure of the "common resources" of third world and indigenous people worldwide, as a part of the Washington Consensus. He argues that in true situations, those who abuse the commons would have been warned to desist and if they failed would have punitive sanctions against them. He says that rather than being called "The Tragedy of the Commons", it should be called "the Tragedy of the Failure of the Commons".^{[ citation needed ]}

Marxist geographer David Harvey has a similar criticism, noting that "The dispossession of indigenous populations in North America by 'productive' colonists, for instance, was justified because indigenous populations did not produce value", and asks generally: "Why, for instance, do we not focus in Hardin's metaphor on the individual ownership of the cattle rather than on the pasture as a common?" ^[72]

Some authors, like Yochai Benkler, say that with the rise of the Internet and digitalisation, an economics system based on commons becomes possible again. He wrote in his book The Wealth of Networks in 2006 that cheap computing power plus networks enable people to produce valuable products through non-commercial processes of interaction: "as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system". He uses the term networked information economy to refer to a "system of production, distribution, and consumption of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on market strategies." ^[73] He also coined the term commons-based peer production for collaborative efforts based on sharing information. ^[74] Examples of commons-based peer production are Wikipedia, free and open source software and open-source hardware.

Comedy of the commons

In certain cases, exploiting a resource more may be a good thing. Carol M. Rose, in a 1986 article, discussed the concept of the "comedy of the commons", where the public property in question exhibits "increasing returns to scale" in usage (hence the phrase, "the more the merrier"), in that the more people use the resource, the higher the benefit to each one. Rose cites as examples commerce and group recreational activities. According to Rose, public resources with the "comedic" characteristic may suffer from under-investment rather than over usage. ^[75]

A modern example presented by Garrett Richards in environmental studies is that the issue of excessive carbon emissions can be tackled effectively only when the efforts are directly addressing the issues along with the collective efforts from the world economies. Collective funding and shared solutions across nations could help identify technologies that can solve carbon emission issues. Additionally, the more that nations are willing to collaborate and contribute resources, the higher the chances are for successful technological developments. ^[76]

See also

• Bounded rationality
• Dutch disease
• Externality
• Credentialism and educational inflation
• International Association for the Study of the Commons
• Nash equilibrium
• Race to the bottom
• Panic buying
• Parasitism (social offense)
• Prisoner's dilemma, wherein two parties may each act in an individually beneficial fashion to the detriment of both.
• Social reputation in fiction
• Social trap
• Somebody else's problem
• Stone Soup, the inverse of the tragedy.
• Tragedy of the anticommons
• Tyranny of small decisions
• Unscrupulous diner's dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Unintended consequences
• Volunteer's dilemma
• Overfishing
  • Shark finning
  • Pacific bluefin tuna

References

Notes

1. Lloyd, William Forster (1833). Two Lectures on the Checks to Population  . England: Oxford University. JSTOR   1972412. OL   23458465M – via Wikisource.
2. Hardin 1968
3. Wade, R. (1986). "Common Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages" (PDF). Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 21-26, 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. pp. 231ff. ISBN   9780309042581. OCLC   16727857.
4. Cox, Susan Jane Buck (1985). "No Tragedy on the Commons" (PDF). Environmental Ethics. 7 (1): 49–61. doi:10.5840/enviroethics1985716. hdl: 10535/3113 .
5. Lansing, Stephen, J. (2006). Perfet Order: Recognizing Complexity in Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6. "Elinor Ostrom - Facts". www.nobelprize.org. Retrieved 2018-08-15.
7. Rowe, Jonathan (2008). "The parallel Economy of the Commons". State of the World 2008: Innovation for a Sustainable Development. London, UK: Earthscan: 140.
8. Hardin 1968 , p. 1248: "it is the role of education to reveal to all the necessity of abandoning the freedom to breed. Only so, can we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons."
9. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 10 December 1948. Retrieved 4 September 2011.
10. United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2004). Levels and trends of contraceptive use as assessed in 2002. United Nations Publications. p. 126. ISBN   978-92-1-151399-8. some have argued that it may be inferred from the rights to privacy, conscience, health and well-being set forth in various United Nation's conventions […] Parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children (United Nations, 1968)
11. van Laerhoven, Frank; Ostrom, Elinor (2007). "Traditions and Trends in the Study of the Commons" (PDF). International Journal of the Commons. 1 (1): 3–28. doi:10.18352/ijc.76.
12. Hesse, Stephen (2006-07-26). "Will commons sense dawn again in time?". The Japan Times Online. Search.japantimes.co.jp. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
13. Hardin 1998.
14. Daniels, Brigham (2007). "Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions". Environmental Law. 37 (3): 515–571. JSTOR   43267404. SSRN   1227745 . Page 536.
15. Bowles, Samuel (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton University Press. pp. 27–29. ISBN   978-1400829316.
16. Andersson, K. (1996). "The Tragedy of the Common Forest: Why the Pacific Northwest Forest Conflict is a 'No Technical Solution' Problem". Oregon Daily Emerald.
17. Dubner, Stephen J.; Levitt, Steven D. (2008-04-20). "Not-So-Free Ride". The New York Times. Retrieved 2020-02-25.
18. Jaeger, William. Environmental Economics for Tree Huggers and Other Skeptics , p. 80 (Island Press 2012): "Economists often say that externalities need to be 'internalized,' meaning that some action needs to be taken to correct this kind of market failure."
19. Yakowitz Bambauer, Jane (2011). "Tragedy of the Data Commons". Harvard Journal of Law and Technology. 25 (1). SSRN   1789749 .
20. Greco, Gian Maria; Floridi, Luciano (2004). "The tragedy of the digital commons". Ethics and Information Technology. 6 (2): 73–81. doi:10.1007/s10676-004-2895-2. ISSN   1388-1957. S2CID   5990776.
21. Yakowitz Bambauer, Jane (2011). "Tragedy of the Data Commons". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1789749. ISSN   1556-5068.
22. C. D., Springer (2009). "Avoiding a Tragedy: Information Literacy and the Tragedy of the Digital Commons". Library Philosophy and Practice. 5.
23. Gupta, A.; Jukic, B.; Parameswaran, M.; Stahl, D.O.; Whinston, A.B. (November–December 1997). "Streamlining the digital economy: how to avert a tragedy of the commons". IEEE Internet Computing. 1 (6): 38–46. doi:10.1109/4236.643935.
24. Almeida, Virgilio; Filgueiras, Fernando; Gaetani, Francisco; Almeida, Virgilio (2020-07-01). "Digital Governance and the Tragedy of the Commons". IEEE Internet Computing. 24 (4): 41–46. doi:10.1109/MIC.2020.2979639. ISSN   1089-7801. S2CID   221845343.
25. Curien, Nicolas; Fauchart, Emmanuelle; Laffond, Gilbert; Moreau, François (2007), Brousseau, Eric; Curien, Nicolas (eds.), "Online consumer communities: escaping the tragedy of the digital commons", Internet and Digital Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 201–219, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511493201.006, ISBN   978-0-511-49320-1 , retrieved 2020-12-23
26. Madren, Carrie (August 31, 2010). "Dark nights: the global effort to tackle light pollution". The Ecologist. Retrieved 2020-02-24.
27. Shiklomanov, Igor A. (2000). "Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources". Water International. 25 (1): 11–32. doi:10.1080/02508060008686794. S2CID   4936257.
28. Wilson, E.O., 2002, The Future of Life, Vintage ISBN   0-679-76811-4
29. Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996, The Sixth Extinction : Patterns of Life and the Future of Humankind, Anchor, ISBN   0-385-46809-1
30. Hogan, C. Michael (2014). Overfishing. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. eds. Sidney Draggan and C. Cleveland. Washington DC.
31. ch 11–12. Mark Kurlansky, 1997. Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World, New York: Walker, ISBN   0-8027-1326-2.
32. Hesketh, Therese; Lu, Li; Xing, Zhu Wei (6 September 2011). "The consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries". Canadian Medical Association Journal. 183 (183(12): 1374–1377): 1374–1377. doi: 10.1503/cmaj.101368 . PMC   3168620 . PMID   21402684.
33. Flockers, Small (15 January 2016). "Small Flock Poultry Farmers of Canada: MCR-1: Tragedy of the Commons for Antibiotics".
34. Hendrix, K. S.; Sturm, L. A.; Zimet, G. D.; Meslin, E. M. (2016). "Ethics and Childhood Vaccination Policy in the United States". American Journal of Public Health. 106 (2): 273–278. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302952. PMC   4815604 . PMID   26691123. Section 3: The tragedy of the (herd immunity) commons.
35. Prause, Christian R. (2011). "Reputation-based self-management of software process artifact quality in consortium research projects" (PDF). Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT symposium and the 13th European conference on Foundations of software engineering - SIGSOFT/FSE '11. pp. 380–383. doi:10.1145/2025113.2025166. ISBN   9781450304436. S2CID   3101839.
36. Stephane Kasriel (2017-07-31). "Skill, re-skill and re-skill again. How to keep up with the future of work". World Economic Forum.
37. "Satellite constellations: Astronomers warn of threat to view of Universe". BBC. December 27, 2019. Retrieved February 3, 2020.
38. Dionisio, Francisco; Gordo, Isabel (2006). "The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology" (PDF). Evolutionary Ecology Research. 8: 321–332. hdl:10400.7/88. ISSN   1522-0613. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-27.
39. Rankin, Daniel J.; Kokko, Hanna (2006). "Sex, death and tragedy" (PDF). Trends in Ecology & Evolution. 21 (5): 225–226. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2006.02.013. PMID   16697906.
40. Rankin, Daniel J. (2005). "Can adaptation lead to extinction?" (PDF). Oikos. 111 (3): 616–619. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.692.9713 . doi:10.1111/j.1600-0706.2005.14541.x. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-05-03.
41. Rankin, Daniel J.; Bargum, Katja; Kokko, Hanna (2007). "The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology" (PDF). Trends in Ecology & Evolution. 22 (12): 643–651. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009. hdl:1975/7498. PMID   17981363.
42. Ibrahim, Ahmed (2015). "The tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma may improve our realization of the theory of life and provide us with advanced therapeutic ways". Figshare.
43. Druzin, Bryan (2016). "A Plan to strengthen the Paris Agreement". Fordham Law Review. 84: 19–20.
44. Kopelman, Weber & Messick 2002.
45. Gelfand & Dyer, 2000
46. Weber, Kopelman & Messick 2004.
47. Kopelman 2009.
48. Myers & Kopelman, 2012.
49. Hardin 1968, p. 1244.
50. Van Vugt, M.; Van Lange, P. A. M.; Meertens, R. M.; Joireman, J. A. (1996). "How a Structural Solution to a Real-World Social Dilemma Failed: A Field Experiment on the First Carpool Lane in Europe" (PDF). Social Psychology Quarterly. 59 (4): 364–374. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.318.656 . doi:10.2307/2787077. JSTOR   2787077. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09.
51. "Put on a happy face, lower your electric bill". Toronto Sun. 2009-06-17. Archived from the original on 2009-06-17. Retrieved 2020-02-25.
52. Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation . New York: Basic Books. ISBN   978-0-465-02121-5.
53. Appell, George N. (1993). "Hardin's Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions. With Appendix: Diagrams of Forms of Co-ownership" (PDF) (Working Paper). Phillips, ME: Social Transformation and Adaptation Research Institute. hdl: 10535/4532 .
54. Ostrom, Elinor; Burger, Joanna; Field, Christopher B.; Norgaard, Richard B.; Policansky, David (1999). "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges" (PDF). Science. 284 (5412): 278–282. Bibcode:1999Sci...284..278.. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.510.4369 . doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278. PMID   10195886. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09. Retrieved 2018-07-23.
55. "Ostrom 'revisits the commons' in 'Science'". Archived from the original on 2012-03-05.
56. Elinor Ostrom: Beyond the tragedy of commons. Stockholm whiteboard seminars. (Video, 8:26 min.)
57. Smith, Vernon L. (October 12, 2009). "Governing The Commons". Forbes. Retrieved 2020-02-25.
58. Johnson, Douglas L. (1993). "Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East". GeoJournal. 31 (1): 51–66. doi:10.1007/bf00815903. S2CID   153445920.
59. Chatty, Dawn (2010). "The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control". Middle East Journal. 64 (1): 29–69. doi:10.3751/64.1.12. S2CID   143487962.
60. Smith, Robert J. (Fall 1981), Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife (PDF), Cato Journal, 1, Cato Institute, pp. 439–468
61. John Locke, "Sect. 27" and following sections in Second Treatise of Government (1690). Also available here.
62. Frakes, Jennifer (2003). "The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise". Wisconsin International Law Journal. 21 (2): 409–434. HOL wisint21_18.
63. "Managing the Commons by Garrett Hardin and John Baden". Ecobooks.com. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
64. Radkau, Joachim (2008). Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment. Cambridge University Press. ISBN   9780521851299.
65. Mirovitskaya, N.; Soroos, M. S. (January 1995). "Socialism and the Tragedy of the Commons: Reflections on Environmental Practice in the Soviet Union and Russia". The Journal of Environment & Development. 4 (1): 77–110. doi:10.1177/107049659500400105. S2CID   155028630.
66. Perry, Mark (June 1995). "Why Socialism Failed". The Freeman . 45 (6). Archived from the original on 2009-06-29. Retrieved 2011-06-08.
67. Dasgupta, Partha (2001). Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment. Oxford University Press. ISBN   9780199247882.
68. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.; Bishop, Richard (1975). "Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy". Natural Resources Journal. 15 (4): 713–727. ISSN   0028-0739.
69. Rowe, Jonathan (2008). "The parallel Economy of the Commons". State of the World 2008: Innovation for a Sustainable Development. London, UK: Earthscan: 142.
70. Dahlman, Carl J. (1991). "The tragedy of the commons that wasn't: On technical solutions to the institutions game". Population and Environment. 12 (3): 285–296. doi:10.1007/BF01357919. S2CID   154166211.
71. Jensen, Derrick (2007), "Endgame Vol 1: The Problem of Civilization" and "Endgame Vol II: Resistance" (Seven Stories Press)
72. Harvey, David (2011). "The future of the commons" (PDF). Radical History Review. 2011 (109): 101–107. doi:10.1215/01636545-2010-017.
73. Benkler, Yochai (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom . New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. p.  3. ISBN   978-0-300-11056-2.
74. Steven Johnson (September 21, 2012). "The Internet? We Built That". New York Times . Retrieved 2012-09-24. The Harvard legal scholar Yochai Benkler has called this phenomenon 'commons-based peer production'.
75. Rose, Carol M. (1986). "The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property". Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale Law School. Paper 1828.
76. Richards, Garrett (2015-12-01). "Comedy of the Commons: Cheerful Options for Shared Resources in an Era of Climate Change". Alternatives . 41: 50.

Bibliography

• Angus, I. (2008). "The myth of the tragedy of the commons", Socialist Voice (August 24).
• Chatty, Dawn (2010). "The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control". Middle East Journal. 64 (1): 29–69. doi:10.3751/64.1.12. S2CID   143487962.
• Cox, Susan Jane Buck (1985). "No Tragedy on the Commons" (PDF). Environmental Ethics. 7 (1): 49–61. doi:10.5840/enviroethics1985716. hdl: 10535/3113 .
• Dixit, Avinash K.; Nalebuff, Barry J. (1993). Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN   9780393069792.
• Gonner, E. C. K (1912). Common Land and Inclosure. London: Macmillan & Co.
• Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., and Hogg, M. (1999). Resolving social dilemmas. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
• Frischmann, Brett M.; Marciano, Alain; Ramello, Giovanni Battista (2019). "Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (4): 211–228. doi: 10.1257/jep.33.4.211 .
• Hardin, Garrett (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons" (PDF). Science. 162 (3859): 1243–1248. Bibcode:1968Sci...162.1243H. doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243. PMID   5699198.
• Hardin, G. (1994). "The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons". Trends in Ecology & Evolution . 9 (5): 199. doi:10.1016/0169-5347(94)90097-3. ISBN   9780202365978. PMID   21236819.
• Hardin, Garrett (May 1, 1998). "Extensions of "The Tragedy of the Commons"". Science. 280 (5364): 682–683. doi:10.1126/science.280.5364.682. S2CID   153844385.
• Hardin, Garrett (2008). "Tragedy of the Commons". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty. ISBN   978-0865976658. OCLC   237794267 . Retrieved 2016-03-13.
• Johnson, Douglas L. (1993). "Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East". GeoJournal. 31 (1): 51–66. doi:10.1007/bf00815903. S2CID   153445920.
• Jones, Bryan; Rachlin, Howard (2006). "Social Discounting" (PDF). Psychological Science. 17 (4): 283–286. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01699.x. PMID   16623683. S2CID   6641888.
• Kopelman, S.; Weber, M; Messick, D. (2002). "Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research". In Ostrom, E.; et al. (eds.). The Drama of the Commons. Washington DC: National Academy Press. Ch. 4., 113–156. doi:10.17226/10287. ISBN   978-0-309-08250-1.
• Kopelman, S (2009). "The effect of culture and power on cooperation in commons dilemmas: Implications for global resource management" (PDF). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 108 (1): 153–163. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.06.004. hdl:2027.42/50454.
• Locher, Fabien (2013). "Cold War Pastures: Garrett Hardin and the 'Tragedy of the Commons'" (PDF). Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine. 60 (1): 7–36. doi:10.3917/rhmc.601.0007.
• Messick, D. M.; Wilke, H. A. M.; Brewer, M. B.; Kramer, R. M.; Zemke, P. E.; Lui, L. (1983). "Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 44 (294): 309. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.2.294.
• Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Rachlin, H.; Green, L. (1972). "Commitment, choice, and self-control". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 17 (1): 15–22. doi:10.1901/jeab.1972.17-15. PMC   1333886 . PMID   16811561.
• Rachlin, Howard (1974). "Self-Control". Behaviorism. 2 (1): 94–107. JSTOR   27758811.
• Van Vugt, M.; Van Lange, P. A. M.; Meertens, R. M.; Joireman, J. A. (1996). "How a Structural Solution to a Real-World Social Dilemma Failed: A Field Experiment on the First Carpool Lane in Europe" (PDF). Social Psychology Quarterly. 59 (4): 364–374. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.318.656 . doi:10.2307/2787077. JSTOR   2787077. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09.
• Van Vugt, Mark (2001). "Community Identification Moderating the Impact of Financial Incentives in a Natural Social Dilemma: Water Conservation" (PDF). Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 27 (11): 1440–1449. doi:10.1177/01461672012711005.
• Van Vugt, Mark (2009). "Triumph of the commons" (PDF). New Scientist. 203 (2722): 40–43. doi:10.1016/S0262-4079(09)62221-1.
• Weber, M.; Kopelman, S.; Messick, D. (2004). "A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: applying the logic of appropriateness". Personality and Social Psychology Review. 8 (3): 281–307. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_4. PMID   15454350. S2CID   1525372.

External links

Look up tragedy of the commons in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Wikiquote has quotations related to: Tragedy of the Commons

• The Digital Library of the Commons
• The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons by Ian Angus
• "Global Tragedy of the Commons" by John Hickman and Sarah Bartlett
• "Tragedy of the Commons Explained with Smurfs" by Ryan Somma
• Public vs. Private Goods & Tragedy of the Commons
• On averting the Tragedy of the Commons